Block grants: A perennial, but unstable, tool of government

Publius: The Journal of Federalism

Volumn 26, Issue 3, 1996, Pages 87-108

  Posner, Paul L ^a   Wrightson, Margaret T ^a  

^a NONE

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 0030167216     PISSN: 00485950     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/oxfordjournals.pubjof.a029872     Document Type: Article

References (55)

1. 1 See Cheryl D. Haves and Anna E. Dannegger. Rethinking Block Grants (Washington, D.C. The Finance Project 1995).
2. 2 For example, see David Mayhew. Congress: The Electoral Connection (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1974).
3. 3 For example, see U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations. The Federal Role in The Federal System: The Dynamics of Growth: A Crisis of Confidence and Competence. vol. 1. (Washington. D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1981). A summary of recent GAO work on program consolidation is found in Program Consolidation: Opportunities for Improved Delivery (Washington, D.C.: GAO, 1995). T-AIMD-95-145.
4. 4 See Office of Management and Budget. The Budget of the United States Government. Fiscal Year 1996 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1995). pp. 152-154.
5. 5 Paul E. Peterson. The Price of Federalism (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1995).
6. 6 Office of Management and Budget. Historical Tables: Budget of the United States Government. Fiscal Year 1996 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1995). p. 175.
7. 7 U.S. General Accounting Office. The Defecit and the Economy: An Update of Long-Term Simulations (Washington, D.C.: GAO, 1995). AIMD-OCE-95-119.
8. 8 Helen Ingram, "Policy Implementation Through Bargaining: The Case of Grants-in-Aid." Public Policy (Fall 1977); Richard P. Nathan, "State and Local Governments Under Federal Grants: Toward A Predictive Theory." Political Science Quarterly 98 (Spring 1983); 47-58.
9. 8 Helen Ingram, "Policy Implementation Through Bargaining: The Case of Grants-in-Aid." Public Policy (Fall 1977); Richard P. Nathan, "State and Local Governments Under Federal Grants: Toward A Predictive Theory." Political Science Quarterly 98 (Spring 1983); 47-58.
10. 9 Richard P. Nathan, "State and Local Governments Under Federal Aid: Toward a Predictive Theory." Political Science Quarterly 98 (Spring 1983); 47-58.
11. 10 Ibid.
12. 11 U.S. General Accounting Office. Block Grants: Federal-State Cooperation in Developing National Data Collection Strategies (Washington, D.C.: GAO, 1988). GAO/HRD-89-2.
13. 12 Alan Ehrenhalt, "The Locust in the Garden of Government." Governing 9 (March 1995); 7-8.
14. 13 Ed Kilgore and Kathleen Sylvester. Blocking Devolution: Why Block Grants are the Wrong Approach to Devolution - and Three Progressive Alternatives (Washington, D.C.: The Progressive Policy Institute, 1995).
15. 14 Alan Ehrenhalt, "The Locust in the Garden of Government." 7-8.
16. 15 Richard P. Nathan and Fred C. Doolittle. Reagan and the States (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987).
17. 16 U.S. General Accounting Office. Block Grants. Characteristics, Experience, and Lessons Learned (Washington, D.C.: GAO, 1995). HEHS-95-74; Haves and Danegger, Rethinking Block Grants.
18. 16 U.S. General Accounting Office. Block Grants. Characteristics, Experience, and Lessons Learned (Washington, D.C.: GAO, 1995). HEHS-95-74; Hayes and Danegger, Rethinking Block Grants.
19. 17 Edward Gramlich, "Intergovernmental Grants: A Review of the Empirical Literature." The Political Economy of Fiscal Federalism, ed. Wallace Oates (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1977).
20. 18 Paul E. Peterson et al., When Federalism Works (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1987).
21. 19 Robert Stoker, "A Regime Framework for Implementation Analysis: Cooperation and Reconciliation of Federalist Imperatives." Policy Studies Review 9 (Fall 1989): 29-49.
22. 20 Joe-Won Yoo and Deil S. Wright, "Public Policy and Intergovernmental Relations: Measuring Perceived Changes in National Influence - The Effects of the Federalism Decade." Policy Studies Journal 21 (Winter 1993); 687-699.
23. 21 Roger H. Bezdek and Jonathan D. Jones, "Federal Categorical Grants-In-Aid and State-Local Government Expenditures," Public Finance 43 (Spring 1988): 39-55.
24. 22 Paul L. Posner, "State Managerial Responses to the New Federalism." Administering The New Federalism, ed. Lewis G. Bender and James A. Stever (Boulder, CO. Westview Press, 1986). pp. 96-123.
25. 23 Richard P. Nathan and Fred C. Doolittle, "Federal Grants: Giving and Taking Away." Political Science Quarterly 100 (Spring 1985); 53-74.
26. 24 U.S. General Accounting Office. Block Grants: Increases in Set-Asides and Cost Ceilings Since 1982 (Washington, D.C.: GAO, 1992). GAO HRD-92-58FS.
27. 25 Mayhew, Congress: The Electoral Connection.
28. 26 John E. Chubb, "Federalism and the Bias for Centralization." The New Direction in American Politics. eds. Paul E. Peterson and John E. Chubb (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1985). pp. 273-306.
29. 27 Daniel J. Elazar, "Opening the Third Century of American Federalism: Issues and Prospects" Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 509 (May 1990): 14-21.
30. 28 James G. March and Johan P. Olsen. Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basics of Politics, (New York: The Free Press, 1989). p. 50.
31. 29 U.S. General Accounting Office. Program Consolidation: Budgetary Implication and Other Issues (Washington, D.C.: GAO, 1995). GAO T-AIMD-95-145.
32. 30 U.S. General Accounting Office, Multiple Employment Training Programs: Major Overhaul is Needed to Create a Mare Efficient Customer-Driven System (Washington, D.C.: GAO, 1995), GAO/T-HEHS-95-70 and Multiple Employment Training Programs: Major Overhaul is Needed to Reduce Costs, Streamline the Bureaucracy, and Improve Results (Washington, D.C.: GAO. 1995). GAO/T-HEHS-95-53.
33. 30 U.S. General Accounting Office, Multiple Employment Training Programs: Major Overhaul is Needed to Create a Mare Efficient Customer-Driven System (Washington, D.C.: GAO, 1995). GAO/T-HEHS-9D-70 and Multiple Employment Training Programs: Major Overhaul is Needed to Reduce Costs, Streamline the Bureaucracy, and Improve Results (Washington, D.C.: GAO. 1995). GAO/T-HEHS-95-53.
34. 31 Robert Rector and William Lauber. America's Failed $5.4 Trillion War on Poverty (Washington, D.C.: The Heritage Foundation, 1995) and U.S. General Accounting Office, Welfare to Work: States Move University to Serve Teen Parents in JOBS (Washington, D.C.: GAO, 1993). GAO/HRD-93-74.
35. 31 Robert Rector and William Lauber. America's Failed $5.4 Trillion War on Poverty (Washington, D.C.: The Heritage Foundation, 1995) and U.S. General Accounting Office, Welfare to Work: States Move University to Serve Teen Parents in JOBS (Washington, D.C.: GAO, 1993). GAO/HRD-93-74.
36. 32 See, for example, U. S. General Accounting Office. Food Assistance Programs (Washington, D.C.: GAO, 1995). GAO RCED-95-115R; Food Assistance. USDA'S Multiprogram Approach (Washington, D.C.: GAO, 1993). GAO RCED-94-33, and Rural Development Patchwork of Federal Programs Needs to be Reappraised (Washington, D.C.: GAO, 1994). GAO RCED-94-165.
37. 32 See, for example, U. S. General Accounting Office. Food Assistance Programs (Washington, D.C.: GAO, 1995). GAO RCED-95-115R; Food Assistance. USDA'S Multiprogram Approach (Washington, D.C.: GAO, 1993). GAO RCED-94-33, and Rural Development Patchwork of Federal Programs Needs to be Reappraised (Washington, D.C.: GAO, 1994). GAO RCED-94-165.
38. 32 See, for example, U. S. General Accounting Office. Food Assistance Programs (Washington, D.C.: GAO, 1995). GAO RCED-95-115R; Food Assistance. USDA'S Multiprogram Approach (Washington, D.C.: GAO, 1993). GAO RCED-94-33, and Rural Development Patchwork of Federal Programs Needs to be Reappraised (Washington, D.C.: GAO, 1994). GAO RCED-94-165.
39. 33 U.S. General Accounting Office. Block Grants: Issues in Designing Accountability Previsions, (Washington, ~D.C.: GAO, 1995). GAO/AIMD-95-226.
40. 34 Peterson, The Price of Federalism.
41. 35 Addressing sharp increases in state welfare and Medicaid costs due to unanticipated economic down-turns is an important and unresolved issue in the block grant debates. What role, if any, the federal government would have in helping states manage economic contingencies in a block grant context has received substantial congressional attention although no firm resolution. H.R 4. the congressional welfare-reform legislation, provided for a federal revolving loan fund of between $1 billion and $2 billion to minimize federal fiscal liability. Under this approach, states would be allowed to borrow the lesser of 50 percent of the amount of their block grants or $100 million. The loan would be repaid on a three-year schedule and would be subject to market interest rates, similar to Treasury Bills. Other "rainy day fund" approaches to counter-cyclical assistance for block granted entitlements include (1) a federal insurance program similar to federal crop and flood insurance, (2) contingent federal appropriations set aside as a percentage of the block grant, (3) a federally funded relief fund based or historical experience and made available to states in keeping with some economic trigger, and (4) a combination of a federal loan fund and a state trust fund.
42. 36 Center on Budget and Policy Priorities. Governors' Welfare Proposal Would Permit States to Withdraw Significant State Resources From Programs For Poor Families (Washington, D.C.: Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, 1996).
43. 37 Federal cuts in nonentitlement programs, by contrast, are likely to present themselves not as shifts in prices for aided services but rather as a loss of income subsidizing established state programs. Here, states are likely to maintain priorities, and the brunt of federal cuts may fall on other state programs or tax increases if efficiency gains are not sufficient to make up the difference. Steven D. Gold provided testimony, "The Potential Impacts of Devolution on State Programs and Finances," on these issues to the U.S. House Budget Committee on 6 March 1996.
44. 38 U.S. General Accounting Office. The Deficit and the Economy: An Update of LongTerm Simulations (Washington, D.C.: GAO, 1995). GAO/AIMD/OCE-95-119.
45. 39 As these officials also noted, "It is hard to estimate how much a block grant can save. This is because obtaining information on the budgetary savings created through administrative efficiencies at state and local levels is even more difficult than at the federal level. As in federally-managed programs, there is not uniform definition of administrative activities across states and localities. Moreover, variance in state accounting systems means that there is little comparability in accounting for administrative proposals." Program Consolidation: Budgetary Implications and Other Issues (Washington, D.C.: GAO, 1995). p. 12. GAO/ T-AIMD-95-145.
46. 40 Congressional Budget Office. The Economic and Budget Outlook: An Update (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Budget Office, 1995).
47. 41 Mandatory spending and entitlement spending is not the same. As currently defined by the Budget Enforcement Act, mandatory spending is spending for entitlement authority, the Food Stamp program, and budget authority provided by law other than appropriations acts. Although all entitlements are mandatory programs, not all mandatories are entitlements.
48. 42 Congressional Budget Office. The Economic and Budget Outlook: December 1995 Update (Washington, D.C: Congressional Budget Office. 1995). p. 24.
49. 43 U.S. General Accounting Office. Budget Process: Issues Concerning the 1990 Reconciliation Act (Washington, DC.: GAO, 1995). GAO AIMD-95-3.
50. 44 See, for example. U.S. General Accounting Office. Budget Policy: Issues in Capping Mandatory Spending (Washington, D.C.: GAO, 1994). GAO AIMD-94-455.
51. 45 See Richard P. Nathan, "Federalism - The Great 'Composition'," The New American Political System, ed. Anthony King, 2nd ed. (Washington, D.C.: AEI Press. 1990). pp. 231-262.
52. 46 John J. Dilulio, Jr. and Donald F. Kettl. Fine Print: The Contract with America. Devolution, and the Administrative Realities of American Federalism (Washington. D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1995). p. 61.
53. 47 Frank R. Baumgartner and Bryan D. Jones. Agendas and Instability in American Politics (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1993).
54. 48 Timothy J. Conlan. New Federalism: Intergovernmental Reform From Nixon to Reagan (Washington. D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1988). p. 237.
55. 49 David R. Beam, "Federalism Past, Present, and Future." (paper presented at the conference on Federal Mandates sponsored by the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Washington, D.C.: 27 February 1996).