Bargaining in uncertain environments: A systematic distortion of perfect equilibrium demands

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 14, Issue 2, 1996, Pages 260-286

  Weg, Eythan ^a   Zwick, Rami ^b   Rapoport, Amnon ^c  

^a PURDUE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF AUCKLAND   (New Zealand)

^c UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0030167185     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/game.1996.0052     Document Type: Article

References (26)

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