Uniformity and conformity: Regionalism and the adjudication of the married women's property acts

Polity

Volumn 28, Issue 4, 1996, Pages 466-493

  Zeigler, Sara L ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 0030167059     PISSN: 00323497     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/3235342     Document Type: Article

References (120)

1. Norma Basch, In the Eyes of the Law: Women's Property Rights in Nineteenth Century New York (New York University: Dissertation, 1979); Peggy A. Rabkin, Fathers to Daughters: The Legal Foundations of Female Emancipation (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1980); Nancy Cott, The Bonds of Womanhood: Woman's Sphere in New England, 1780-1835 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977). Cott's study pertains to regional culture and social history rather than specifically to reforms of the marriage law. Michael Grossberg makes a general argument tracing the evolution of what he terms a distinctly American and republican family law. Although his argument applied to the United States as a whole, he provides no sustained discussion of regional differences (or their absence). See Grossberg, Governing the Hearth: Law and Family in Nineteenth Century America (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1985). Grossberg's analysis also suggests that family law became less hierarchical and more republican over the course of the nineteenth century. It is true that judges began to favor maternal rights in deciding child custody cases and that they often ruled in favor of women in breach of promise suits. I maintain that for intact marriages, judges adhered rather closely to common law rules.
2. Norma Basch, In the Eyes of the Law: Women's Property Rights in Nineteenth Century New York (New York University: Dissertation, 1979); Peggy A. Rabkin, Fathers to Daughters: The Legal Foundations of Female Emancipation (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1980); Nancy Cott, The Bonds of Womanhood: Woman's Sphere in New England, 1780-1835 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977). Cott's study pertains to regional culture and social history rather than specifically to reforms of the marriage law. Michael Grossberg makes a general argument tracing the evolution of what he terms a distinctly American and republican family law. Although his argument applied to the United States as a whole, he provides no sustained discussion of regional differences (or their absence). See Grossberg, Governing the Hearth: Law and Family in Nineteenth Century America (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1985). Grossberg's analysis also suggests that family law became less hierarchical and more republican over the course of the nineteenth century. It is true that judges began to favor maternal rights in deciding child custody cases and that they often ruled in favor of women in breach of promise suits. I maintain that for intact marriages, judges adhered rather closely to common law rules.
3. Norma Basch, In the Eyes of the Law: Women's Property Rights in Nineteenth Century New York (New York University: Dissertation, 1979); Peggy A. Rabkin, Fathers to Daughters: The Legal Foundations of Female Emancipation (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1980); Nancy Cott, The Bonds of Womanhood: Woman's Sphere in New England, 1780-1835 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977). Cott's study pertains to regional culture and social history rather than specifically to reforms of the marriage law. Michael Grossberg makes a general argument tracing the evolution of what he terms a distinctly American and republican family law. Although his argument applied to the United States as a whole, he provides no sustained discussion of regional differences (or their absence). See Grossberg, Governing the Hearth: Law and Family in Nineteenth Century America (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1985). Grossberg's analysis also suggests that family law became less hierarchical and more republican over the course of the nineteenth century. It is true that judges began to favor maternal rights in deciding child custody cases and that they often ruled in favor of women in breach of promise suits. I maintain that for intact marriages, judges adhered rather closely to common law rules.
4. Norma Basch, In the Eyes of the Law: Women's Property Rights in Nineteenth Century New York (New York University: Dissertation, 1979); Peggy A. Rabkin, Fathers to Daughters: The Legal Foundations of Female Emancipation (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1980); Nancy Cott, The Bonds of Womanhood: Woman's Sphere in New England, 1780-1835 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977). Cott's study pertains to regional culture and social history rather than specifically to reforms of the marriage law. Michael Grossberg makes a general argument tracing the evolution of what he terms a distinctly American and republican family law. Although his argument applied to the United States as a whole, he provides no sustained discussion of regional differences (or their absence). See Grossberg, Governing the Hearth: Law and Family in Nineteenth Century America (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1985). Grossberg's analysis also suggests that family law became less hierarchical and more republican over the course of the nineteenth century. It is true that judges began to favor maternal rights in deciding child custody cases and that they often ruled in favor of women in breach of promise suits. I maintain that for intact marriages, judges adhered rather closely to common law rules.
5. Elizabeth Bowles Warbasse, The Changing Legal Rights of Married Women: 1800-1861 (New York: Garland, 1987).
6. Marylynn Salmon, Women and the Law of Property in Early America (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1986).
7. Richard H. Chused, "Married Women's Property Law: 1800-1850," Georgetown Law Journal, 71 (1983): 1359-1425, at 1371.
8. Slave marriages do constitute a key regional difference. However, slave marriages received no legal recognition, and my claims about the law of marriage do not apply to them.
9. Gordon Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution (New York: Vintage Books, 1992).
10. This argument has been made with regard to the law of master and servant by Karen Orren, "Labor Regulation and Theory in the United States and England," Political Theory, 22 (February 1994): 98-123. Like Orren, I contend that the United States did not reject feudal categories, but preserved the characteristic dependencies embodied in the law of domestic relations.
11. New York, Massachusetts, and Illinois provide particularly clear examples. See the section on judicial construction of the acts, below. On New York, see also Basch, In the Eyes of the Law and Rabkin, Fathers to Daughters. George Lovell, "The Ambiguities of Labor's Legislative Reforms in New York State in the Late Nineteenth Century," Studies in American Political Development, 8 (Spring 1994): 81-102, contends that judicial independence is overstated and that reforms failed because the legislatures deliberately enacted toothless statutes. He suggests that any genuine attempt at reform would be accompanied by limits upon judicial discretion (p. 87). Although he does not discuss reforms of the marriage law, his insights are pertinent. The New York property and earnings acts were enacted in the context of a broader attempt to codify the law, eliminate vestiges of feudalism, and sharply curtail judicial discretion. In other states, the situation was less clear. However, most legislatures did respond to narrow readings of a statute with a new, more specific statute.
12. New York, Massachusetts, and Illinois provide particularly clear examples. See the section on judicial construction of the acts, below. On New York, see also Basch, In the Eyes of the Law and Rabkin, Fathers to Daughters. George Lovell, "The Ambiguities of Labor's Legislative Reforms in New York State in the Late Nineteenth Century," Studies in American Political Development, 8 (Spring 1994): 81-102, contends that judicial independence is overstated and that reforms failed because the legislatures deliberately enacted toothless statutes. He suggests that any genuine attempt at reform would be accompanied by limits upon judicial discretion (p. 87). Although he does not discuss reforms of the marriage law, his insights are pertinent. The New York property and earnings acts were enacted in the context of a broader attempt to codify the law, eliminate vestiges of feudalism, and sharply curtail judicial discretion. In other states, the situation was less clear. However, most legislatures did respond to narrow readings of a statute with a new, more specific statute.
13. In most of the states, the common law was a ceiling capping wifely rights at a fairly low level. However, in Georgia, the common law effectively liberalized statutory marriage law. Under Georgia statutes, a husband acquired absolute title to his wife's real property, just as he did for her personal property. Georgia judges mitigated the impact of the statute by interpreting equitable marriage settlements liberally, imposing less stringent requirements for the creation of separate estates and giving the wife control over the property in the absence of contrary language in the document creating the separate estate. Judges in other states typically recognized a wife's contractual rights over her separate estate only if such rights were explicitly granted in the settlement. See Sara L. Zeigler, "Case Studies: Massachusetts, Illinois and Georgia," in Family Service: Labor, the Family and Legal Reform in the United States (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Dept. of Political Science, UCLA, in progress).
14. Sari S. Escovitz, Fred Kurland, and Nan Gold, Judicial Selection and Tenure (American Judicature Society, 1975), pp. 5-6. Maine elected its probate judges.
15. Escovitz, Kurland, and Gold, Judicial Selection and Tenure, p. 6.
16. For activity in North and West, see Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Susan B. Anthony, and Matilda Joslyn Gage, eds., The History of Woman Suffrage, 3 vols. (New York: Fowler and Wells, 1881); Ellen C. Dubois, Feminism and Suffrage: The Emergence of an Independent Women's Movement in America, 1848-1869 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1978).
17. For activity in North and West, see Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Susan B. Anthony, and Matilda Joslyn Gage, eds., The History of Woman Suffrage, 3 vols. (New York: Fowler and Wells, 1881); Ellen C. Dubois, Feminism and Suffrage: The Emergence of an Independent Women's Movement in America, 1848-1869 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1978).
18. There were two exceptions. Lucy Stone delivered three lectures in Kentucky in 1853 and Clarina I. Howard Nichols gave lectures and began organization efforts along the Missouri-Kansas border in the spring of 1858. See Stanton, et al., History of Woman Suffrage, III: 818, on Kentucky; History of Woman Suffrage, I: 194-98, on Missouri.
19. There were two exceptions. Lucy Stone delivered three lectures in Kentucky in 1853 and Clarina I. Howard Nichols gave lectures and began organization efforts along the Missouri-Kansas border in the spring of 1858. See Stanton, et al., History of Woman Suffrage, III: 818, on Kentucky; History of Woman Suffrage, I: 194-98, on Missouri.
20. George Elliott Howard, A History of Matrimonial Institutions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1904), pp. 365-76.
21. Warbasse, The Changing Legal Rights, p. 21.
22. Howard, A History of Matrimonial Institutions, pp. 160-74; William E. Nelson, Americanization of the Common Law: The Impact of Legal Change on Massachusetts Society, 1760-1830 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1975), pp. 4, 39-41, 110.
23. Howard, A History of Matrimonial Institutions, pp. 160-74; William E. Nelson, Americanization of the Common Law: The Impact of Legal Change on Massachusetts Society, 1760-1830 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1975), pp. 4, 39-41, 110.
24. Anne Norton, Alternative Americas: A Reading of Antebellum Political Culture (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986), pp. 4, 120.
25. Lawrence Friedman, A History of American Law (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1973), pp. 21-22.
26. Friedman, A History of American Law, p. 23.
27. Tapping Reeve, The Law of Baron and Femme, of Parent and Child, Guardian and Ward, Master and Servant, and of the Powers of the Courts of Chancery, with an Essay on the Terms Heir, Heirs, Heirs of the Body, 3d ed. (Albany, NY: William Gould Law Publ., 1862), pp. 55-57.
28. Friedman, A History of American Law, p. 130.
29. Louisiana, Arizona, Idaho, California, Nevada, and New Mexico adopted community property systems. Texas and Florida combined civil and common law forms in their marriage laws. I have selected examples only from those states which adopted the common law system. My conclusions do not necessarily apply to the eight states listed above.
30. Joseph Story, Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence, 3rd ed. (London: Sweet and Maxwell, Ltd., 1920), p. 576.
31. Irving Browne, The Law of Domestic Relations and of Employer and Employed (Boston: The Boston Book Company, 1890), p. 39. However, a husband who sought the aid of the equity courts to reduce his wife's choses in action to possession was usually required to make some settlement out of the proceeds to accrue to the benefit of his wife. See Story, Commentaries, p. 587.
32. Irving Browne, The Law of Domestic Relations and of Employer and Employed (Boston: The Boston Book Company, 1890), p. 39. However, a husband who sought the aid of the equity courts to reduce his wife's choses in action to possession was usually required to make some settlement out of the proceeds to accrue to the benefit of his wife. See Story, Commentaries, p. 587.
33. Reeves v. Webster, 71 Ill. 309 (1874). Also Johnson v. Johnson, 72 Ill. 489 (1874).
34. Reeves v. Webster, 71 Ill. 309 (1874). Also Johnson v. Johnson, 72 Ill. 489 (1874).
35. See Swift v. Luce, 27 Me. 285 (1847); Pelzer, Rodgers & Co. v. Campbell and Co., 15 S.C. 581 (1880).
36. See Swift v. Luce, 27 Me. 285 (1847); Pelzer, Rodgers & Co. v. Campbell and Co., 15 S.C. 581 (1880).
37. Reeve, The Law of Baron and Femme, p. 49; Browne, The Law of Domestic Relations, pp. 25-30.
38. Reeve, The Law of Baron and Femme, p. 49; Browne, The Law of Domestic Relations, pp. 25-30.
39. Dunn v. Sargent, 101 Mass. 339 (1869).
40. Reeve, The Law of Baron and Femme, p. 55; Browne, The Law of Domestic Relations, pp. 25-30.
41. Reeve, The Law of Baron and Femme, p. 55; Browne, The Law of Domestic Relations, pp. 25-30.
42. Holmes v. Holmes, 4 Barb. 295 (1848).
43. Shaeffer v. Shepherd, 54 Ala. 244 (1875).
44. Also see Duncan v. Roselle, 15 Iowa 501 (1864).
45. Reeve, The Law of Baron and Femme, p. 99.
46. Reeve, The Law of Baron and Femme, p. 100.
47. Reeve, The Law of Baron and Femme, p. 100.
48. Browne, The Law of Domestic Relations, pp. 30-36.
49. See, for example, Duncan v. Roselle, 15 Iowa 501 (1864); Abbey v. Deyo, 44 Barb. 374 (1863); Martin v. Robson, 65 Ill. 129 (1872).
50. See, for example, Duncan v. Roselle, 15 Iowa 501 (1864); Abbey v. Deyo, 44 Barb. 374 (1863); Martin v. Robson, 65 Ill. 129 (1872).
51. See, for example, Duncan v. Roselle, 15 Iowa 501 (1864); Abbey v. Deyo, 44 Barb. 374 (1863); Martin v. Robson, 65 Ill. 129 (1872).
52. Abbey v. Deyo, 44 Barb. 374 (1863).
53. Reeve, 3 The Law of Baron and Femme, pp. 30-36.
54. Carey & Co. v. Burruss and Pitzer, 20 W. Va. 574, pp. 574-75 (1882).
55. Commonwealth v. Cullins, 1 Mass. 116 (1804).
56. Martin v. Robson, 65 Ill. 313 (1872).
57. These steps might include the filing of a declaration to work independently or a stipulation that earnings or property would be the wife's separate property in the employment contract or property settlement. See Norma Basch, In the Eyes of the Law, pp. 308-44, for a discussion of the legal presumptions. Also see Peggy A. Rabkin, Fathers to Daughters, pp. 126-31.
58. These steps might include the filing of a declaration to work independently or a stipulation that earnings or property would be the wife's separate property in the employment contract or property settlement. See Norma Basch, In the Eyes of the Law, pp. 308-44, for a discussion of the legal presumptions. Also see Peggy A. Rabkin, Fathers to Daughters, pp. 126-31.
59. The common law regarding services remained unchanged because the statutes made explicit changes only with regard to property. Under the prevalent rules of statutory construction, the common law was presumed to remain in effect except where the legislature specifically modified it.
60. Information contained in tables was derived from information from Elizabeth Bowles Warbasse, The Changing Legal Rights. Warbasse discusses the legislative battle over the bill on pp. 138-55. Also see Richard H. Chused, "Married Women's Property Law." For complete discussions of the New York statutes see Peggy A. Rabkin, "Origins of Law Reform: The Social Significance of the Nineteenth Century Codification Movement and Its Contribution to the Passage of the Early Married Women's Property Acts," Buffalo Law Review, 24(1975): 683; Rabkin, Fathers to Daughters; and Norma Basch, In the Eyes of the Law. For Southern states, see Suzanne D. Lebsock, "Radical Reconstruction and the Property Rights of Southern Women," Journal of Southern History, 43 (1977): 195.
61. Information contained in tables was derived from information from Elizabeth Bowles Warbasse, The Changing Legal Rights. Warbasse discusses the legislative battle over the bill on pp. 138-55. Also see Richard H. Chused, "Married Women's Property Law." For complete discussions of the New York statutes see Peggy A. Rabkin, "Origins of Law Reform: The Social Significance of the Nineteenth Century Codification Movement and Its Contribution to the Passage of the Early Married Women's Property Acts," Buffalo Law Review, 24(1975): 683; Rabkin, Fathers to Daughters; and Norma Basch, In the Eyes of the Law. For Southern states, see Suzanne D. Lebsock, "Radical Reconstruction and the Property Rights of Southern Women," Journal of Southern History, 43 (1977): 195.
62. Information contained in tables was derived from information from Elizabeth Bowles Warbasse, The Changing Legal Rights. Warbasse discusses the legislative battle over the bill on pp. 138-55. Also see Richard H. Chused, "Married Women's Property Law." For complete discussions of the New York statutes see Peggy A. Rabkin, "Origins of Law Reform: The Social Significance of the Nineteenth Century Codification Movement and Its Contribution to the Passage of the Early Married Women's Property Acts," Buffalo Law Review, 24(1975): 683; Rabkin, Fathers to Daughters; and Norma Basch, In the Eyes of the Law. For Southern states, see Suzanne D. Lebsock, "Radical Reconstruction and the Property Rights of Southern Women," Journal of Southern History, 43 (1977): 195.
63. Information contained in tables was derived from information from Elizabeth Bowles Warbasse, The Changing Legal Rights. Warbasse discusses the legislative battle over the bill on pp. 138-55. Also see Richard H. Chused, "Married Women's Property Law." For complete discussions of the New York statutes see Peggy A. Rabkin, "Origins of Law Reform: The Social Significance of the Nineteenth Century Codification Movement and Its Contribution to the Passage of the Early Married Women's Property Acts," Buffalo Law Review, 24(1975): 683; Rabkin, Fathers to Daughters; and Norma Basch, In the Eyes of the Law. For Southern states, see Suzanne D. Lebsock, "Radical Reconstruction and the Property Rights of Southern Women," Journal of Southern History, 43 (1977): 195.
64. Information contained in tables was derived from information from Elizabeth Bowles Warbasse, The Changing Legal Rights. Warbasse discusses the legislative battle over the bill on pp. 138-55. Also see Richard H. Chused, "Married Women's Property Law." For complete discussions of the New York statutes see Peggy A. Rabkin, "Origins of Law Reform: The Social Significance of the Nineteenth Century Codification Movement and Its Contribution to the Passage of the Early Married Women's Property Acts," Buffalo Law Review, 24(1975): 683; Rabkin, Fathers to Daughters; and Norma Basch, In the Eyes of the Law. For Southern states, see Suzanne D. Lebsock, "Radical Reconstruction and the Property Rights of Southern Women," Journal of Southern History, 43 (1977): 195.
65. Information contained in tables was derived from information from Elizabeth Bowles Warbasse, The Changing Legal Rights. Warbasse discusses the legislative battle over the bill on pp. 138-55. Also see Richard H. Chused, "Married Women's Property Law." For complete discussions of the New York statutes see Peggy A. Rabkin, "Origins of Law Reform: The Social Significance of the Nineteenth Century Codification Movement and Its Contribution to the Passage of the Early Married Women's Property Acts," Buffalo Law Review, 24(1975): 683; Rabkin, Fathers to Daughters; and Norma Basch, In the Eyes of the Law. For Southern states, see Suzanne D. Lebsock, "Radical Reconstruction and the Property Rights of Southern Women," Journal of Southern History, 43 (1977): 195.
66. This is the position taken by Suzanne D. Lebsock, "Radical Reconstruction and the Property Rights of Southern Women." See also Eric Foner, "Politics and Ideology in the Shaping of Reconstruction: The Constitutional Conventions of 1867-1869," in The Evolution of Southern Culture (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1988), pp. 28-46.
67. This is the position taken by Suzanne D. Lebsock, "Radical Reconstruction and the Property Rights of Southern Women." See also Eric Foner, "Politics and Ideology in the Shaping of Reconstruction: The Constitutional Conventions of 1867-1869," in The Evolution of Southern Culture (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1988), pp. 28-46.
68. The law governing marriage was somewhat different in the states of Louisiana and Texas, both of which incorporated elements of community property doctrine. In Louisiana, all marital property was jointly owned, and divided in half at the dissolution of the marriage. However, the law stipulated that the husband was "head and master" of the household and had the right to administer and alienate the property without his wife's consent. In common law states, wives had to waive their right of dower in a specific piece of property in order for the sale or transfers to be secure. In Texas, the lands and slaves of either party and the woman's paraphernalia was considered separate and all other property formed the marital community. The husband had the right to administer separate and community property and could alienate community property without his wife's consent. Upon dissolution of marriage, the property was divided in half. Under the common law, the wife was not recognized as a partner in property ownership, and the dower was limited to one-third of the property. See Warbasse, The Changing Legal Rights, pp. 48-56, 160-64.
69. The rules of construction have their origin in Heydon's Case, 3 Co. Rep. 7 (1584).
70. Holmes v. Holmes, 4 Barbour 300 (1848).
71. Warbasse, The Changing Legal Rights, pp. 234-35.
72. 54 Ala. 244 (1875). Also see Kidd v. Montague, 19 Ala. 619 (1851); Manning v. Manning, 24 Ala. 386 (1854); Sterns v. Weathers, 30 Ala. 712 (1857).
73. 54 Ala. 244 (1875). Also see Kidd v. Montague, 19 Ala. 619 (1851); Manning v. Manning, 24 Ala. 386 (1854); Sterns v. Weathers, 30 Ala. 712 (1857).
74. 54 Ala. 244 (1875). Also see Kidd v. Montague, 19 Ala. 619 (1851); Manning v. Manning, 24 Ala. 386 (1854); Sterns v. Weathers, 30 Ala. 712 (1857).
75. 54 Ala. 244 (1875). Also see Kidd v. Montague, 19 Ala. 619 (1851); Manning v. Manning, 24 Ala. 386 (1854); Sterns v. Weathers, 30 Ala. 712 (1857).
76. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 385 (1798). On vested rights, see Edward S. Corwin, Liberty Against Government: The Rise, Flowering, and Decline of a Famous Juridical Concept (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1978).
77. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 385 (1798). On vested rights, see Edward S. Corwin, Liberty Against Government: The Rise, Flowering, and Decline of a Famous Juridical Concept (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1978).
78. Retroactivity alone was not a fatal flaw in state legislation. See Thomas M. Cooley, A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations which Rest Upon the Legislative Power of the States of the American Union (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1927), pp. 772-94.
79. During the mid-nineteenth century, courts were moving toward a will theory of contracts, permitting parties to set terms, alter terms, and terminate contracts by agreement. See Morton J. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law, 1780-1860 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977).
80. The statute permitted a wife to hold a limited amount of money or earnings ($1000) as separate property. Joseph Warren, "Husband's Right to Wife's Services," Harvard Law Review, 38 (February 1925): 421-46. The ceiling was lifted in 1888.
81. Schindel v. Schindel, 12 Md. 294 (1858).
82. See Turton v. Turton, 6 Md. 375 (1854); Rawlings v. Adams, 7 Md. 26 (1854); Logan v. McGill, 8 Md. 461 (1855); Peacock v. Pembroke, 4 Md. 280 (1853); and Ungar v. Price, 9 Md. 553 (1856).
83. See Turton v. Turton, 6 Md. 375 (1854); Rawlings v. Adams, 7 Md. 26 (1854); Logan v. McGill, 8 Md. 461 (1855); Peacock v. Pembroke, 4 Md. 280 (1853); and Ungar v. Price, 9 Md. 553 (1856).
84. See Turton v. Turton, 6 Md. 375 (1854); Rawlings v. Adams, 7 Md. 26 (1854); Logan v. McGill, 8 Md. 461 (1855); Peacock v. Pembroke, 4 Md. 280 (1853); and Ungar v. Price, 9 Md. 553 (1856).
85. See Turton v. Turton, 6 Md. 375 (1854); Rawlings v. Adams, 7 Md. 26 (1854); Logan v. McGill, 8 Md. 461 (1855); Peacock v. Pembroke, 4 Md. 280 (1853); and Ungar v. Price, 9 Md. 553 (1856).
86. See Turton v. Turton, 6 Md. 375 (1854); Rawlings v. Adams, 7 Md. 26 (1854); Logan v. McGill, 8 Md. 461 (1855); Peacock v. Pembroke, 4 Md. 280 (1853); and Ungar v. Price, 9 Md. 553 (1856).
87. Worthington v. Cooke, 52 Md. 297 (1879).
88. Mahon v. Gormley, 24 Pa. 82 (1858). The rule allowing a married woman to make herself liable for necessaries is a bit odd. Under the common law, the husband is liable for necessaries and his obligation to support had not been removed. Perhaps the court gave the wife the option of paying her own way if she could or allowed her to pay if the husband was unavailable or destitute or if merchants refused to supply the wife on her husband's credit.
89. 47 Barb. 155 (1866).
90. 47 Barb. 155, 157-58 (1866).
91. See also Yale v. Dederer, 18 N.Y. 265 (1858); Salmon v. McEnany, 23 Hun. 87 (1880); Vanderheyden v. Mallory and Hunter, 1 N.Y. 452 (1848); Sherman v. Elder, 24 N.Y. 381 (1857).
92. See also Yale v. Dederer, 18 N.Y. 265 (1858); Salmon v. McEnany, 23 Hun. 87 (1880); Vanderheyden v. Mallory and Hunter, 1 N.Y. 452 (1848); Sherman v. Elder, 24 N.Y. 381 (1857).
93. See also Yale v. Dederer, 18 N.Y. 265 (1858); Salmon v. McEnany, 23 Hun. 87 (1880); Vanderheyden v. Mallory and Hunter, 1 N.Y. 452 (1848); Sherman v. Elder, 24 N.Y. 381 (1857).
94. See also Yale v. Dederer, 18 N.Y. 265 (1858); Salmon v. McEnany, 23 Hun. 87 (1880); Vanderheyden v. Mallory and Hunter, 1 N.Y. 452 (1848); Sherman v. Elder, 24 N.Y. 381 (1857).
95. Nash v. Mitchell, 71 N.Y. 199 (1877).
96. 76 N.Y. 196 (1879).
97. 95 Tenn. 568 (1895).
98. Swift v. Luce, 27 Me. 285, 286 (1847).
99. 27 Me. 285 (1847).
100. 31 Pa. 396 (1858).
101. Bear's Administrator v. Bear, 33 Pa. 528 (1859).
102. Ritter v. Ritter, 31 Pa. 396, 398 (1858).
103. 33 Pa. 528, 530 (1859).
104. Manning v. Manning, 79 N.C. 227 (1878).
105. McLure v. Lancaster, 24 S.C. 273 (1885).
106. Raybold v. Raybold, 20 Pa. 309 (1853). See also Bucher v. Ream, 68 Pa. St. 421 (1871).
107. Raybold v. Raybold, 20 Pa. 309 (1853). See also Bucher v. Ream, 68 Pa. St. 421 (1871).
108. 20 Pa. 309, 311 (1853).
109. 17 Wis. 610 (1863).
110. 15 Iowa 503 (1864).
111. 37 Ind. 349 (1871).
112. 37 Ind. 349 (1871). Also Baxter v. Prickett's Administrator, 27 Ind. 490 (1867); Yopst v. Yopst, 51 Ind. 61 (1875).
113. 37 Ind. 349 (1871). Also Baxter v. Prickett's Administrator, 27 Ind. 490 (1867); Yopst v. Yopst, 51 Ind. 61 (1875).
114. 37 Ind. 349 (1871). Also Baxter v. Prickett's Administrator, 27 Ind. 490 (1867); Yopst v. Yopst, 51 Ind. 61 (1875).
115. 37 Ind. 349, 352 (1871). See also Hasheagen v. Specker, 36 Ind. 413 (1871).
116. 37 Ind. 349, 352 (1871). See also Hasheagen v. Specker, 36 Ind. 413 (1871).
117. Cooper v. Ham, 49 Ind. 394 (1875). This case also contains an excellent summary of the law in this area.
118. Glaze v. Blake, 56 Ala. 379 (1876).
119. For similar holdings, see Shaeffer v. Sheppard, 54 Ala. 244 (1875), and Bridgers v. Howell, 27 S.C. 425 (1887).
120. For similar holdings, see Shaeffer v. Sheppard, 54 Ala. 244 (1875), and Bridgers v. Howell, 27 S.C. 425 (1887).