Getting to the core: Coalitional integrity as a constraint on the power of agenda setters

Journal of Conflict Resolution

Volumn 40, Issue 2, 1996, Pages 298-319

  Bottom, William P ^a   Eavey, Cheryl L ^a   Miller, Gary J ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0030167001     PISSN: 00220027     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0022002796040002004     Document Type: Article

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