The evidential significance of thought experiment in science

Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A

Volumn 27, Issue 2, 1996, Pages 233-250

  McAllister, James W ^a  

^a LEIDEN UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

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EID: 0030161339     PISSN: 00393681     EISSN: 18792510     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/0039-3681(95)00044-5     Document Type: Article

References (49)

1. 1 Among alternatives to the experimentalist view are the view that a thought experiment is a reconceptualization of old empirical data, advanced by T. S. Kuhn, 'A Function for Thought Experiments' (1964), in T. S. Kuhn, The Essential Tension: Selected Studies in Scientific Tradition and Change (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1977), pp. 240-265; the view that it is an argument of a particular sort, advanced by J. Norton, 'Thought Experiments in Einstein's Work', in T. Horowitz and G. J. Massey (eds), Thought Experiments in Science and Philosophy (Savage, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1991), pp. 129-148; and the view that it is the manipulation of a mental model, advanced by N. Miščević, 'Mental Models and Thought Experiments', International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 6 (1992), 215-226.
2. 1 Among alternatives to the experimentalist view are the view that a thought experiment is a reconceptualization of old empirical data, advanced by T. S. Kuhn, 'A Function for Thought Experiments' (1964), in T. S. Kuhn, The Essential Tension: Selected Studies in Scientific Tradition and Change (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1977), pp. 240-265; the view that it is an argument of a particular sort, advanced by J. Norton, 'Thought Experiments in Einstein's Work', in T. Horowitz and G. J. Massey (eds), Thought Experiments in Science and Philosophy (Savage, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1991), pp. 129-148; and the view that it is the manipulation of a mental model, advanced by N. Miščević, 'Mental Models and Thought Experiments', International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 6 (1992), 215-226.
3. 1 Among alternatives to the experimentalist view are the view that a thought experiment is a reconceptualization of old empirical data, advanced by T. S. Kuhn, 'A Function for Thought Experiments' (1964), in T. S. Kuhn, The Essential Tension: Selected Studies in Scientific Tradition and Change (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1977), pp. 240-265; the view that it is an argument of a particular sort, advanced by J. Norton, 'Thought Experiments in Einstein's Work', in T. Horowitz and G. J. Massey (eds), Thought Experiments in Science and Philosophy (Savage, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1991), pp. 129-148; and the view that it is the manipulation of a mental model, advanced by N. Miščević, 'Mental Models and Thought Experiments', International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 6 (1992), 215-226.
4. 2 R. A. Sorensen, Thought Experiments (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992) , and 'Thought Experiments and the Epistemology of Laws', Canadian Journal of Philosophy 22 (1992), 15-44; J. R. Brown, The Laboratory of the Mind: Thought Experiments in the Natural Sciences (London: Routledge, 1991), and 'Why Empiricism Won't Work', in D. Hull, M. Forbes and K. Okruhlik (eds), PSA 1992: Proceedings of the 1992 Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, 2 vols (East Lansing, MI: Philosophy of Science Association, 1993), vol. 2, pp. 271-279.
5. 2 R. A. Sorensen, Thought Experiments (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992) , and 'Thought Experiments and the Epistemology of Laws', Canadian Journal of Philosophy 22 (1992), 15-44; J. R. Brown, The Laboratory of the Mind: Thought Experiments in the Natural Sciences (London: Routledge, 1991), and 'Why Empiricism Won't Work', in D. Hull, M. Forbes and K. Okruhlik (eds), PSA 1992: Proceedings of the 1992 Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, 2 vols (East Lansing, MI: Philosophy of Science Association, 1993), vol. 2, pp. 271-279.
6. 2 R. A. Sorensen, Thought Experiments (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992) , and 'Thought Experiments and the Epistemology of Laws', Canadian Journal of Philosophy 22 (1992), 15-44; J. R. Brown, The Laboratory of the Mind: Thought Experiments in the Natural Sciences (London: Routledge, 1991), and 'Why Empiricism Won't Work', in D. Hull, M. Forbes and K. Okruhlik (eds), PSA 1992: Proceedings of the 1992 Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, 2 vols (East Lansing, MI: Philosophy of Science Association, 1993), vol. 2, pp. 271-279.
7. 2 R. A. Sorensen, Thought Experiments (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992) , and 'Thought Experiments and the Epistemology of Laws', Canadian Journal of Philosophy 22 (1992), 15-44; J. R. Brown, The Laboratory of the Mind: Thought Experiments in the Natural Sciences (London: Routledge, 1991), and 'Why Empiricism Won't Work', in D. Hull, M. Forbes and K. Okruhlik (eds), PSA 1992: Proceedings of the 1992 Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, 2 vols (East Lansing, MI: Philosophy of Science Association, 1993), vol. 2, pp. 271-279.
8. 3 Taxonomies of thought experiment are offered by Brown, The Laboratory of the Mind, op. cit., note 2, pp. 33-48, and Norton, op. cit., note 1, p. 131. The claim that concrete experiments have various forms and purposes is substantiated for example by I. Hacking, Representing and Intervening: Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp. 149-275.
9. 3 Taxonomies of thought experiment are offered by Brown, The Laboratory of the Mind, op. cit., note 2, pp. 33-48, and Norton, op. cit., note 1, p. 131. The claim that concrete experiments have various forms and purposes is substantiated for example by I. Hacking, Representing and Intervening: Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp. 149-275.
10. 3 Taxonomies of thought experiment are offered by Brown, The Laboratory of the Mind, op. cit., note 2, pp. 33-48, and Norton, op. cit., note 1, p. 131. The claim that concrete experiments have various forms and purposes is substantiated for example by I. Hacking, Representing and Intervening: Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp. 149-275.
11. 4 K. R. Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery (London: Hutchinson, 1959; tenth impression, revised, 1980), pp. 106-111. Popper puts forward a logicist account of thought experiment, ibid., pp. 442-456.
12. 4 K. R. Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery (London: Hutchinson, 1959; tenth impression, revised, 1980), pp. 106-111. Popper puts forward a logicist account of thought experiment, ibid., pp. 442-456.
13. 5 What I call the 'historicist premise' for concrete experiment is set out for example by S. Shapin and S. Schaffer, Leviathan and the Air-Pump: Hobbes, Boyle, and the Experimental Life (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985), pp. 3-21.
14. 6 Other episodes in and aspects of concrete experiment's acquisition of evidential significance in physical science in the seventeenth century are studied by Shapin and Schaffer, op. cit., note 5; S. Schaffer, 'Glass Works: Newton's Prisms and the Uses of Experiment', in D. Gooding, T. Pinch and S. Schaffer (eds), The Uses of Experiment: Studies in the Natural Sciences (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 67-104; and P. Dear, 'Narratives, Anecdotes, and Experiments: Turning Experience into Science in the Seventeenth Century', in P. Dear (ed.), The Literary Structure of Scientific Argument: Historical Studies (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1991), pp. 135-163.
15. 6 Other episodes in and aspects of concrete experiment's acquisition of evidential significance in physical science in the seventeenth century are studied by Shapin and Schaffer, op. cit., note 5; S. Schaffer, 'Glass Works: Newton's Prisms and the Uses of Experiment', in D. Gooding, T. Pinch and S. Schaffer (eds), The Uses of Experiment: Studies in the Natural Sciences (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 67-104; and P. Dear, 'Narratives, Anecdotes, and Experiments: Turning Experience into Science in the Seventeenth Century', in P. Dear (ed.), The Literary Structure of Scientific Argument: Historical Studies (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1991), pp. 135-163.
16. 6 Other episodes in and aspects of concrete experiment's acquisition of evidential significance in physical science in the seventeenth century are studied by Shapin and Schaffer, op. cit., note 5; S. Schaffer, 'Glass Works: Newton's Prisms and the Uses of Experiment', in D. Gooding, T. Pinch and S. Schaffer (eds), The Uses of Experiment: Studies in the Natural Sciences (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 67-104; and P. Dear, 'Narratives, Anecdotes, and Experiments: Turning Experience into Science in the Seventeenth Century', in P. Dear (ed.), The Literary Structure of Scientific Argument: Historical Studies (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1991), pp. 135-163.
17. 7 N. Koertge, 'Galileo and the Problem of Accidents', Journal of the History of Ideas 38 (1977), 389-408; E, McMullin, 'Galilean Idealization', Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 16 (1985), 247-273.
18. 7 N. Koertge, 'Galileo and the Problem of Accidents', Journal of the History of Ideas 38 (1977), 389-408; E, McMullin, 'Galilean Idealization', Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 16 (1985), 247-273.
19. 8 Changes in the meaning of 'experiment' in the late sixteenth century are discussed by C. B. Schmitt, 'Experience and Experiment: A Comparison of Zabarella's View with Galileo's in De motu', Studies in the Renaissance 16 (1969), 80-138, Previous studies of concrete experiment in Galileo include M. Segre, 'The Role of Experiment in Galileo's Physics', Archive for History of Exact Sciences 23 (1980), 227-252, and R. H. Naylor, 'Galileo's Experimental Discourse', in Gooding, Pinch and Schaffer, op. cit., note 6, pp. 117-134, where also further references may be found.
20. 8 Changes in the meaning of 'experiment' in the late sixteenth century are discussed by C. B. Schmitt, 'Experience and Experiment: A Comparison of Zabarella's View with Galileo's in De motu', Studies in the Renaissance 16 (1969), 80-138, Previous studies of concrete experiment in Galileo include M. Segre, 'The Role of Experiment in Galileo's Physics', Archive for History of Exact Sciences 23 (1980), 227-252, and R. H. Naylor, 'Galileo's Experimental Discourse', in Gooding, Pinch and Schaffer, op. cit., note 6, pp. 117-134, where also further references may be found.
21. 8 Changes in the meaning of 'experiment' in the late sixteenth century are discussed by C. B. Schmitt, 'Experience and Experiment: A Comparison of Zabarella's View with Galileo's in De motu', Studies in the Renaissance 16 (1969), 80-138, Previous studies of concrete experiment in Galileo include M. Segre, 'The Role of Experiment in Galileo's Physics', Archive for History of Exact Sciences 23 (1980), 227-252, and R. H. Naylor, 'Galileo's Experimental Discourse', in Gooding, Pinch and Schaffer, op. cit., note 6, pp. 117-134, where also further references may be found.
22. 9 G. Galilei, Two New Sciences (1638), translated by S. Drake (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1974), pp. 223-227.
23. 10 This requirement is stipulated for example by K. V. Wilkes, Real People: Personal Identity Without Thought Experiments (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), pp. 15-21.
24. 11 Brown, The Laboratory of the Mind, op. cit., note 2, pp. 76-98.
25. 12 Sorensen, Thought Experiments, op. cit., note 2, pp. 132-166.
26. 13 An experimentalist view of thought experiment that is compatible with the historicist premise is put forward by D. Gooding, 'What is Experimental About Thought Experiments?', in Hull, Forbes and Okruhlik, op. cit., note 2, vol. 2, pp. 280-290; see also D. Gooding, 'Imaginary Science', British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 45 (1994), 1029-1045.
27. 13 An experimentalist view of thought experiment that is compatible with the historicist premise is put forward by D. Gooding, 'What is Experimental About Thought Experiments?', in Hull, Forbes and Okruhlik, op. cit., note 2, vol. 2, pp. 280-290; see also D. Gooding, 'Imaginary Science', British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 45 (1994), 1029-1045.
28. 14 Previous discussions of thought experiment in Galileo include L. Geymonat and A. Carugo, 'I cosiddetti "esperimenti mentali" nei Discorsi galileiani e i loro legami con la tecnica' (1960), in L. Geymonat, Per Galileo: attualità del razionalismo, edited by M. Quaranta (Verona: Bertani, 1981), pp. 79-98; A. Koyré, 'Galileo's Treatise De motu gravium: The Use and Abuse of Imaginary Experiment' (1960), in A. Koyré, Metaphysics and Measurement: Essays in Scientific Revolution (London: Chapman & Hall, 1968), pp. 44-88; and Naylor, op. cit., note 8, pp. 124-127.
29. 14 Previous discussions of thought experiment in Galileo include L. Geymonat and A. Carugo, 'I cosiddetti "esperimenti mentali" nei Discorsi galileiani e i loro legami con la tecnica' (1960), in L. Geymonat, Per Galileo: attualità del razionalismo, edited by M. Quaranta (Verona: Bertani, 1981), pp. 79-98; A. Koyré, 'Galileo's Treatise De motu gravium: The Use and Abuse of Imaginary Experiment' (1960), in A. Koyré, Metaphysics and Measurement: Essays in Scientific Revolution (London: Chapman & Hall, 1968), pp. 44-88; and Naylor, op. cit., note 8, pp. 124-127.
30. 14 Previous discussions of thought experiment in Galileo include L. Geymonat and A. Carugo, 'I cosiddetti "esperimenti mentali" nei Discorsi galileiani e i loro legami con la tecnica' (1960), in L. Geymonat, Per Galileo: attualità del razionalismo, edited by M. Quaranta (Verona: Bertani, 1981), pp. 79-98; A. Koyré, 'Galileo's Treatise De motu gravium: The Use and Abuse of Imaginary Experiment' (1960), in A. Koyré, Metaphysics and Measurement: Essays in Scientific Revolution (London: Chapman & Hall, 1968), pp. 44-88; and Naylor, op. cit., note 8, pp. 124-127.
31. 15 Galilei, Two New Sciences, op. cit., note 9, pp. 66-72.
32. 16 For further discussion of Aristotle's account of free fall and Galileo's interpretation of it, see B. M. Casper, 'Galileo and the Fall of Aristotle: A Case of Historical Injustice?', American Journal of Physics 45 (1977), 325-330.
33. 17 Brown, The Laboratory of the Mind, op. cit., note 2, pp. 1-3 and 77-79; Sorensen, Thought Experiments, op. cit., note 2, pp. 126-127; Sorensen, 'Thought Experiments and the Epistemology of Laws', op. cit., note 2, pp. 17-18.
34. 17 Brown, The Laboratory of the Mind, op. cit., note 2, pp. 1-3 and 77-79; Sorensen, Thought Experiments, op. cit., note 2, pp. 126-127; Sorensen, 'Thought Experiments and the Epistemology of Laws', op. cit., note 2, pp. 17-18.
35. 17 Brown, The Laboratory of the Mind, op. cit., note 2, pp. 1-3 and 77-79; Sorensen, Thought Experiments, op. cit., note 2, pp. 126-127; Sorensen, 'Thought Experiments and the Epistemology of Laws', op. cit., note 2, pp. 17-18.
36. 18 P. King, 'Mediaeval Thought-Experiments: The Metamethodology of Mediaeval Science', in Horowitz and Massey, op. cit., note 1, pp. 43-64, suggests that thought experiment was used in medieval natural philosophy; as he concedes, however, his examples can be regarded equally validly as instances of reasoning from hypothesis and analogy familiar to Aristotelian dialectic.
37. 19 Reports of actual falls cited against Galileo by Aristotelian natural philosophers are documented in W. R. Shea, Galileo's Intellectual Revolution (London: Macmillan, 1972), p. 11, note 10. For a present-day review of the evidence that the speed of fall of a body in natural circumstances depends on its weight, see G. Feinberg, 'Fall of Bodies Near the Earth', American Journal of Physics 33 (1965), 501-502, and C. G. Adler and B. L. Coulter, 'Aristotle: Villain or Victim?', Physics Teacher 13 (1975), 35-37.
38. 19 Reports of actual falls cited against Galileo by Aristotelian natural philosophers are documented in W. R. Shea, Galileo's Intellectual Revolution (London: Macmillan, 1972), p. 11, note 10. For a present-day review of the evidence that the speed of fall of a body in natural circumstances depends on its weight, see G. Feinberg, 'Fall of Bodies Near the Earth', American Journal of Physics 33 (1965), 501-502, and C. G. Adler and B. L. Coulter, 'Aristotle: Villain or Victim?', Physics Teacher 13 (1975), 35-37.
39. 19 Reports of actual falls cited against Galileo by Aristotelian natural philosophers are documented in W. R. Shea, Galileo's Intellectual Revolution (London: Macmillan, 1972), p. 11, note 10. For a present-day review of the evidence that the speed of fall of a body in natural circumstances depends on its weight, see G. Feinberg, 'Fall of Bodies Near the Earth', American Journal of Physics 33 (1965), 501-502, and C. G. Adler and B. L. Coulter, 'Aristotle: Villain or Victim?', Physics Teacher 13 (1975), 35-37.
40. 20 The moving ship thought experiments are in G. Galilei, Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief World Systems - Ptolemaic and Copernican (1632), translated by S. Drake (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1953), pp. 143-145; the reaction to them by Aristotelian natural philosophers is described in Shea, op. cit., note 19, p. 156, and E. Grant, 'In Defense of the Earth's Centrality and Immobility: Scholastic Reaction to Copernicanism in the Seventeenth Century', Transactions of the American Philosophical Society 74 (1984), part 4, p. 41.
41. 20 The moving ship thought experiments are in G. Galilei, Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief World Systems - Ptolemaic and Copernican (1632), translated by S. Drake (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1953), pp. 143-145; the reaction to them by Aristotelian natural philosophers is described in Shea, op. cit., note 19, p. 156, and E. Grant, 'In Defense of the Earth's Centrality and Immobility: Scholastic Reaction to Copernicanism in the Seventeenth Century', Transactions of the American Philosophical Society 74 (1984), part 4, p. 41.
42. 20 The moving ship thought experiments are in G. Galilei, Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief World Systems - Ptolemaic and Copernican (1632), translated by S. Drake (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1953), pp. 143-145; the reaction to them by Aristotelian natural philosophers is described in Shea, op. cit., note 19, p. 156, and E. Grant, 'In Defense of the Earth's Centrality and Immobility: Scholastic Reaction to Copernicanism in the Seventeenth Century', Transactions of the American Philosophical Society 74 (1984), part 4, p. 41.
43. 21 The pendulum thought experiment is in Galilei, Two New Sciences, op. cit., note 9, pp. 97-99.
44. 22 C. Huygens, De motu corporum ex percussione (1703), in Oeuvres complètes de Christiaan Huygens, 22 vols (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1888-1950), vol. 16 (1929), pp. 29-91, on pp. 29-49.
45. 23 For the Newtonian account of the relation between occurrences, regularities, and initial conditions, see for example E. P. Wigner, 'Events, Laws of Nature, and Invariance Principles' (1964), in E. P. Wigner, Symmetries and Reflections: Scientific Essays (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1967), pp. 38-50, on pp. 38-42.
46. 24 R. Laymon, 'Newton's Bucket Experiment', Journal of the History of Philosophy 16 (1978), 399-413.
47. 25 J. G. Lennox, 'Darwinian Thought Experiments: A Function for Just-So Stories', in Horowitz and Massey, op. cit., note 1, pp. 223-245.
48. 26 Brown, The Laboratory of the Mind, op. cit., note 2, pp. 76-98; Sorensen, 'Thought Experiments and the Epistemology of Laws', op. cit., note 2.
49. 26 Brown, The Laboratory of the Mind, op. cit., note 2, pp. 76-98; Sorensen, 'Thought Experiments and the Epistemology of Laws', op. cit., note 2.