Beijing's reach in the South China Sea

Orbis

Volumn 40, Issue 3, 1996, Pages 353-374

  Chang, Felix K ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0030159174     PISSN: 00304387     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0030-4387(96)90002-2     Document Type: Article

References (102)

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67. Since the first of its class was completed in 1971, the Luda class has undergone several upgrades, and as a result, the armament and electronic equipment aboard the sixteen operational ships of the class vary.
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