Imperfect mobility and local government behaviour in an overlapping-generations model

Journal of Public Economics

Volumn 60, Issue 2, 1996, Pages 177-198

  Wildasin, David E ^a   Wilson, John Douglas ^b  

^a VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b INDIANA UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Labor mobility; Local government; Local taxation; Mobility costs; Overlapping generations

Indexed keywords

EID: 0030137319     PISSN: 00472727     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/0047-2727(95)01533-7     Document Type: Article

References (24)

1. Berglas, E. and D. Pines, 1981, Clubs, local public goods, and transportation models: A synthesis, Journal of Public Economics 15, 141-162.
2. Bergstrom, T.C., and R.P. Goodman, 1973, Private demands for public goods, American Economic Review 63, 280-296.
3. Borcherding, T.E. and R.T. Deacon, 1972, The demand for the services of non-federal governments, American Economic Review 62, 891-901.
4. Brueckner, J.K., 1982, A test for allocative efficiency in the local public sector, Journal of Public Economics 19, 311-331.
5. Brueckner, J. and M.-S. Joo, 1991, Voting with capitalization, Regional Science and Urban Economics 21, 453-467.
6. Cukierman, A., Z. Hercowitz and D. Pines, 1993, Political economics of migration, unpublished.
7. Hamilton, B.W., 1975, Zoning and property taxation in a system of local governments, Urban Studies 12, 205-211.
8. Henderson, J.V., 1980, Community development: The effects of growth and uncertainty, American Economic Review 70, 894-910.
9. Henderson, J.V., 1985, The Tiebout model: Bring back the entrepreneurs, Journal of Political Economy 93, 248-264.
10. Hercowitz, Z. and D. Pines, 1991, Migration with fiscal externalities, Journal of Public Economics 46, 163-180.
11. Hercowitz, Z. and D. Pines, forthcoming, Migration between home country and diaspora: An economic analysis, Journal of Public Economics, in press.
12. Inman, R.P., 1978, Testing political economy's 'as if' proposition; Is the median voter really decisive?, Public Choice 33, 45-65.
13. Mansoorian, A. and G.M. Myers, 1996, On the consequences of government objectives for economies with mobile populations, Journal of Public Economics, in press.
14. Mieszkowski, P. and J.R. Zodrow, 1989, Taxation and the Tiebout model, Journal of Economic Literature 27, 1098-1146.
15. Oates, W.E., 1969, The effects of property taxes and local public spending on property values: An empirical study of tax capitalization and the Tiebout hypothesis, Journal of Political Economy 77, 957-971.
16. Pines, D., 1991, Tiebout without politics, Regional Science and Urban Economics 21, 469-490.
17. Rubinfeld, D.L., 1987, The economics of the local public sector, in: A. Auerbach and M. Feldstein, eds., Handbook of public economics (North-Holland, Amsterdam) 571-645.
18. Sonstelie, J.C. and P.R. Portney, 1978, Profit maximizing communities and the theory of local public expenditure, Journal of Urban Economics 5, 163-277.
19. Tiebout, C.M., 1956, A pure theory of local expenditures, Journal of Political Economy 64, 416-424.
20. Topel, R.H., 1986, Local labor markets, Journal of Political Economy 94, S111-S143.
21. Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1992 (USGPO, Washington, DC).
22. Wildasin, D.E., 1979, Local public goods, property values, and local public choice, Journal of Urban Economics 6, 521-534.
23. Wildasin D.E., 1986, Urban public finance (Harwood Academic Publishers, New York).
24. Wilson, J.D., 1987, Trade in a Tiebout economy, American Economic Review 77, 431-441.