John Dewey, Myrtle Mcgraw and logic: An unusual collaboration in the 1930s

Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A

Volumn 27, Issue 1, 1996, Pages 69-107

  Dalton, Thomas C ^a   Bergenn, Victor W ^b  

^a CALIFORNIA POLYTECHNIC STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b Council on Educational Psychology ^*  (United States)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 0030103093     PISSN: 00393681     EISSN: 18792510     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/0039-3681(95)00025-9     Document Type: Article

References (222)

1. 1 J. Dewey, 'Experience, Knowledge and Value: A Rejoinder', in P. Schilpp (ed.), The Philosophy of John Dewey (New York: Tudor, 1939), pp. 515-608.
2. 2 J. Dewey, 'Studies in Logical Theory', in J. A. Boydston (ed.), John Dewey: The Middle Works, Vol. 2, 1901-1903 [hereafter, MW] (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 1976), see p. 310.
3. 3 J. Dewey, 'Logic: A Theory of Inquiry', in J. A. Boydston (ed.), John Dewey: The Later Works, Vol. 12, 1925-1953 [hereafter, LW] (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 1986). For example, Dewey wrote How We Think, MW: Vol. 6, pp. 177-356, to show the correspondence between thinking and inquiry. Dewey also reissued Studies in Logical Theory under the title Essays in Experimental Logic, MW: Vol. 10, pp. 317-394, including a rejoinder to criticisms of the earlier book.
4. 3 J. Dewey, 'Logic: A Theory of Inquiry', in J. A. Boydston (ed.), John Dewey: The Later Works, Vol. 12, 1925-1953 [hereafter, LW] (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 1986). For example, Dewey wrote How We Think, MW: Vol. 6, pp. 177-356, to show the correspondence between thinking and inquiry. Dewey also reissued Studies in Logical Theory under the title Essays in Experimental Logic, MW: Vol. 10, pp. 317-394, including a rejoinder to criticisms of the earlier book.
5. 3 J. Dewey, 'Logic: A Theory of Inquiry', in J. A. Boydston (ed.), John Dewey: The Later Works, Vol. 12, 1925-1953 [hereafter, LW] (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 1986). For example, Dewey wrote How We Think, MW: Vol. 6, pp. 177-356, to show the correspondence between thinking and inquiry. Dewey also reissued Studies in Logical Theory under the title Essays in Experimental Logic, MW: Vol. 10, pp. 317-394, including a rejoinder to criticisms of the earlier book.
6. 4 Dewey scholars adopting the continuity thesis include: J. Ratner, Intelligence in the Modern World (New York: Modern Library, 1939), p. 155; J. Ratner and R. Altman (eds), John Dewey and Arthur Bentley: A Philosophical Correspondence, 1932-1951 (New Brunswick, 1964), pp. 36-39; E. Nagel, 'Introduction', LW: Vol. 12, pp. ix-xxvii; S. Hook, 'Introduction', in MW: Vol. 2, p. xvi; and R. Sleeper, The Necessity of Pragmatism (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986), pp. 4-5.
7. 4 Dewey scholars adopting the continuity thesis include: J. Ratner, Intelligence in the Modern World (New York: Modern Library, 1939), p. 155; J. Ratner and R. Altman (eds), John Dewey and Arthur Bentley: A Philosophical Correspondence, 1932-1951 (New Brunswick, 1964), pp. 36-39; E. Nagel, 'Introduction', LW: Vol. 12, pp. ix-xxvii; S. Hook, 'Introduction', in MW: Vol. 2, p. xvi; and R. Sleeper, The Necessity of Pragmatism (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986), pp. 4-5.
8. 4 Dewey scholars adopting the continuity thesis include: J. Ratner, Intelligence in the Modern World (New York: Modern Library, 1939), p. 155; J. Ratner and R. Altman (eds), John Dewey and Arthur Bentley: A Philosophical Correspondence, 1932-1951 (New Brunswick, 1964), pp. 36-39; E. Nagel, 'Introduction', LW: Vol. 12, pp. ix-xxvii; S. Hook, 'Introduction', in MW: Vol. 2, p. xvi; and R. Sleeper, The Necessity of Pragmatism (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986), pp. 4-5.
9. 4 Dewey scholars adopting the continuity thesis include: J. Ratner, Intelligence in the Modern World (New York: Modern Library, 1939), p. 155; J. Ratner and R. Altman (eds), John Dewey and Arthur Bentley: A Philosophical Correspondence, 1932-1951 (New Brunswick, 1964), pp. 36-39; E. Nagel, 'Introduction', LW: Vol. 12, pp. ix-xxvii; S. Hook, 'Introduction', in MW: Vol. 2, p. xvi; and R. Sleeper, The Necessity of Pragmatism (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986), pp. 4-5.
10. 4 Dewey scholars adopting the continuity thesis include: J. Ratner, Intelligence in the Modern World (New York: Modern Library, 1939), p. 155; J. Ratner and R. Altman (eds), John Dewey and Arthur Bentley: A Philosophical Correspondence, 1932-1951 (New Brunswick, 1964), pp. 36-39; E. Nagel, 'Introduction', LW: Vol. 12, pp. ix-xxvii; S. Hook, 'Introduction', in MW: Vol. 2, p. xvi; and R. Sleeper, The Necessity of Pragmatism (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986), pp. 4-5.
11. 5 J. Dewey, 'From Absolutism to Experimentalism', in R. Bernstein (ed.), John Dewey: On Experience, Nature and Freedom (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1960), p. 14.
12. 6 Nagel, op. cit., note 4, p. xviii.
13. 7 J. Dewey, 'From Absolutism to Experimentalism', LW: Vol. 5, p. 12.
14. 8 For pertinent passages from Hegel, see A. V. Miller, Hegel's Science of Logic (London: Allen and Unwin, 1969), pp. 67-71; and A. V. Miller, Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977), pp. 13-16.
15. 8 For pertinent passages from Hegel, see A. V. Miller, Hegel's Science of Logic (London: Allen and Unwin, 1969), pp. 67-71; and A. V. Miller, Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977), pp. 13-16.
16. 9 Dewey, op. cit., note 7, p. 10.
17. 10 ibid. p. 12.
18. 11 Dewey speculated, for example, that the competing perspectives of morphology and physiology could be reconciled in experimental studies because biological structures and functions were linked through a common 'chemico-physical process'. See 'The Evolutionary Method as Applied to Morality: Its Scientific Necessity', MW: Vol. 2, p. 15. Dewey acknowledged his intellectual debt to Thomas H. Huxley, a nineteenth-century zoologist. See Schilpp (ed.), op. cit., note 1, p. 10. Huxley argued that experimental embryologists such as Karl von Baer were better able than Darwin to account for the developmental patterns underlying human evolution. See T. H. Huxley and A. Henfrey (eds), Scientific Memoirs (London: Taylor and Francis, 1853; reprinted New York: Johnson Corporation, 1966), and M. A. di Gregorio, T. H. Huxley's Place in Natural Science (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), pp. 26-33.
19. 11 Dewey speculated, for example, that the competing perspectives of morphology and physiology could be reconciled in experimental studies because biological structures and functions were linked through a common 'chemico-physical process'. See 'The Evolutionary Method as Applied to Morality: Its Scientific Necessity', MW: Vol. 2, p. 15. Dewey acknowledged his intellectual debt to Thomas H. Huxley, a nineteenth-century zoologist. See Schilpp (ed.), op. cit., note 1, p. 10. Huxley argued that experimental embryologists such as Karl von Baer were better able than Darwin to account for the developmental patterns underlying human evolution. See T. H. Huxley and A. Henfrey (eds), Scientific Memoirs (London: Taylor and Francis, 1853; reprinted New York: Johnson Corporation, 1966), and M. A. di Gregorio, T. H. Huxley's Place in Natural Science (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), pp. 26-33.
20. 11 Dewey speculated, for example, that the competing perspectives of morphology and physiology could be reconciled in experimental studies because biological structures and functions were linked through a common 'chemico-physical process'. See 'The Evolutionary Method as Applied to Morality: Its Scientific Necessity', MW: Vol. 2, p. 15. Dewey acknowledged his intellectual debt to Thomas H. Huxley, a nineteenth-century zoologist. See Schilpp (ed.), op. cit., note 1, p. 10. Huxley argued that experimental embryologists such as Karl von Baer were better able than Darwin to account for the developmental patterns underlying human evolution. See T. H. Huxley and A. Henfrey (eds), Scientific Memoirs (London: Taylor and Francis, 1853; reprinted New York: Johnson Corporation, 1966), and M. A. di Gregorio, T. H. Huxley's Place in Natural Science (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), pp. 26-33.
21. 11 Dewey speculated, for example, that the competing perspectives of morphology and physiology could be reconciled in experimental studies because biological structures and functions were linked through a common 'chemico-physical process'. See 'The Evolutionary Method as Applied to Morality: Its Scientific Necessity', MW: Vol. 2, p. 15. Dewey acknowledged his intellectual debt to Thomas H. Huxley, a nineteenth-century zoologist. See Schilpp (ed.), op. cit., note 1, p. 10. Huxley argued that experimental embryologists such as Karl von Baer were better able than Darwin to account for the developmental patterns underlying human evolution. See T. H. Huxley and A. Henfrey (eds), Scientific Memoirs (London: Taylor and Francis, 1853; reprinted New York: Johnson Corporation, 1966), and M. A. di Gregorio, T. H. Huxley's Place in Natural Science (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), pp. 26-33.
22. 12 American pragmatist Charles Peirce criticized Dewey's failure in Studies to show how physiology could possibly elucidate the evolution of function or how comparative anatomy could be applied to the 'anatomy of thought'. A. W. Burks (ed.) Collected Papers of C. S. Peirce (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1958), p., 181. Peirce also chided Dewey by saying: 'There is no anatomy of possibilities because no one can say in advance how pure possibilities vary or diverge from one another... What renders a comparative anatomy possible is that certain conceivable forms do not appear' (ibid.). Interestingly, McGraw anticipated this problem by devising a means to reveal the variety of behavioral forms hidden in the developmental process.
23. 13 Nagel found this tendency frustrating when he recalled in an interview that, 'he [Dewey] introduced fundamental questions without preparing his readers for them'. Nagel added: 'One didn't quite know what the argument was until you had the wit to discover that he was discussing a position related to the one he was advancing'. Interview with Ernest Nagel, New York City, 10 October 1966, conducted by the Center for Dewey Studies, Morris Library, Southern Illinois University, Carbondale, Illinois, p. 4.
24. 14 MW: Vol. 12.
25. 15 For Dewey's most extensive elaboration of his neurodynamic model see: D. F. Koch (ed.), John Dewey: Lectures on Psychological and Political Ethics, 1898 (New York: Hafner, 1976), pp. 110-142; 271-323.
26. 16 See Dewey, op. cit., note 3, p. 30.
27. 17 See Miller, Science of Logic, op. cit., note 8, pp. 334; 348.
28. 17 See Miller, Science of Logic, op. cit., note 8, pp. 334; 348.
29. 18 See P. Dennis, ' "Johnny's a Gentleman but Jimmy's a Mug": Press Coverage During the 1930s of Myrtle McGraw's Study of Johnny and Jimmy Woods', Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences 25 (1989), 356-370.
30. 19 Adolf Meyer was a close personal friend of Dewey whom Meyer first met when he lectured as a docent at the University of Chicago from 1893-1895. Meyer acknowledged C. L. Herrick's pioneering role in the study of the brain and nervous system and impressive command of philosophical and psychological issues and concepts. See A. Meyer's intellectual tribute to Herrick, 'The Contemporary Setting of the Pioneer', Journal of Comparative Neurology 74 (1941), 1-24. Meyer wrote extensively about the latest scientific advances in the nervous system and proposed theories, which Dewey read, about the structure and function of neurons. See, for example, A. Meyer, 'Critical Review of the Data and General Methods and Deductions of Modern Neurology', Journal of Comparative Neurology 8 (1898), 249-313. Dewey was familiar with Sullivan's conception of 'selective inattention', which he used in his classes when explaining the process of judgment.
31. 19 Adolf Meyer was a close personal friend of Dewey whom Meyer first met when he lectured as a docent at the University of Chicago from 1893-1895. Meyer acknowledged C. L. Herrick's pioneering role in the study of the brain and nervous system and impressive command of philosophical and psychological issues and concepts. See A. Meyer's intellectual tribute to Herrick, 'The Contemporary Setting of the Pioneer', Journal of Comparative Neurology 74 (1941), 1-24. Meyer wrote extensively about the latest scientific advances in the nervous system and proposed theories, which Dewey read, about the structure and function of neurons. See, for example, A. Meyer, 'Critical Review of the Data and General Methods and Deductions of Modern Neurology', Journal of Comparative Neurology 8 (1898), 249-313. Dewey was familiar with Sullivan's conception of 'selective inattention', which he used in his classes when explaining the process of judgment.
32. 20 D. A. Dewsbury, 'Psychobiology', American Psychologist 46 (1991), 198-205. See also A. Meyer, 'The Psychobiological Point of View', in E. Winters (ed.), The Collected Papers of Adolf Meyer, Vol. 3 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1950-1952).
33. 20 D. A. Dewsbury, 'Psychobiology', American Psychologist 46 (1991), 198-205. See also A. Meyer, 'The Psychobiological Point of View', in E. Winters (ed.), The Collected Papers of Adolf Meyer, Vol. 3 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1950-1952).
34. 21 See, for example, 'Psychological Corollaries of Modern Neurological Discoveries', Journal of Comparative Neurology 7 (1896), 155-161, and 'The Vital Equilibrium and the Nervous System', Science 7 (1898), 813-818. Dewey mentioned these works and others in his three-quarter class 'Theory of Logic' taught in the 1899-1900 school year. The Joseph Ratner Papers, Center for Dewey Studies, Morris Library, Southern Illinois University, Carbondale, Illinois.
35. 21 See, for example, 'Psychological Corollaries of Modern Neurological Discoveries', Journal of Comparative Neurology 7 (1896), 155-161, and 'The Vital Equilibrium and the Nervous System', Science 7 (1898), 813-818. Dewey mentioned these works and others in his three-quarter class 'Theory of Logic' taught in the 1899-1900 school year. The Joseph Ratner Papers, Center for Dewey Studies, Morris Library, Southern Illinois University, Carbondale, Illinois.
36. 22 H. Lotze, Outlines of Psychology (Minneapolis, MN: S. M. Williams, 1885; reprint. New York: Arno Press, 1973). Lotze sketched the psychological principles he believed underpinned logic. Herrick took the opportunity afforded by his translation to write an afterword on the 'Structure of the Brain', identifying evidence from neuroanatomy that supported Lotze's propositions about the integrative role that consciousness, mind and memory play in human thought and understanding.
37. 23 Accounts of Herrick's career and his difficulties with the University of Chicago can be found in C. J. Herrick, 'Clarence Luther Herrick: Pioneer Naturalist, Teacher and Psychobiologist', Transactions of the American Philosophical Society 45 (1955), 1-85, and W. F. Windle, The Pioneering Role of Clarence Luther Herrick in American Neuroscience (Hicksville, NY: Exposition Press, 1979). Meyer indicated that Herrick's troubles with President Harper dissuaded him from joining the faculty at the University of Chicago, op. cit., note 19, p. 15.
38. 23 Accounts of Herrick's career and his difficulties with the University of Chicago can be found in C. J. Herrick, 'Clarence Luther Herrick: Pioneer Naturalist, Teacher and Psychobiologist', Transactions of the American Philosophical Society 45 (1955), 1-85, and W. F. Windle, The Pioneering Role of Clarence Luther Herrick in American Neuroscience (Hicksville, NY: Exposition Press, 1979). Meyer indicated that Herrick's troubles with President Harper dissuaded him from joining the faculty at the University of Chicago, op. cit., note 19, p. 15.
39. 23 Accounts of Herrick's career and his difficulties with the University of Chicago can be found in C. J. Herrick, 'Clarence Luther Herrick: Pioneer Naturalist, Teacher and Psychobiologist', Transactions of the American Philosophical Society 45 (1955), 1-85, and W. F. Windle, The Pioneering Role of Clarence Luther Herrick in American Neuroscience (Hicksville, NY: Exposition Press, 1979). Meyer indicated that Herrick's troubles with President Harper dissuaded him from joining the faculty at the University of Chicago, op. cit., note 19, p. 15.
40. 24 C. J. Herrick, 'The Origin and Evolution of the Cerebellum', Archives of Neurology and Psychology 2 (1924), 621-652.
41. 25 Herrick argued in 'The Evolution of Intelligence and its Origins', Science 3 (1910), 7-18, that consciousness reflected the pause between anticipation and consummation of an act during which central and peripheral reactions are coordinated. Later, in 'Some Reflections on the Origin and Significance of the Cerebral Cortex', The Journal of Animal Behavior (1913), 222-236, Herrick claimed the neurological evidence strongly supported Dewey's conception of behavior as an 'organic circuit' by saying that the "'backstroke'" action of motor discharge...may in a literal physiological sense act into the cortical stimulus complex and become an integral part of it' (p. 233).
42. 25 Herrick argued in 'The Evolution of Intelligence and its Origins', Science 3 (1910), 7-18, that consciousness reflected the pause between anticipation and consummation of an act during which central and peripheral reactions are coordinated. Later, in 'Some Reflections on the Origin and Significance of the Cerebral Cortex', The Journal of Animal Behavior (1913), 222-236, Herrick claimed the neurological evidence strongly supported Dewey's conception of behavior as an 'organic circuit' by saying that the "'backstroke'" action of motor discharge...may in a literal physiological sense act into the cortical stimulus complex and become an integral part of it' (p. 233).
43. 26 C. J. Herrick, The Evolution of Human Nature (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949).
44. 27 M. B. McGraw to C. J. Herrick, 9 December 1932, Neurology Collection, C. Judson Herrick Papers, Spencer Research Library, University of Kansas, Lawrence, Kansas.
45. 28 See P. Pauly, Controlling Life: Jacques Loeb and the Engineering Ideal in Biology (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), who describes Dewey's relationship with Loeb and Donaldson.
46. 29 In a class on Hegel's Logic, Dewey criticized Hegel for conceiving force as external Spirit when it should be understood as internal to growth. See J. Dewey, 'Hegel's Logic, Section 136, Dialectic of Force', at the University of Chicago, 1897, Joseph Ratner Papers, Center for Dewey Studies, Morris Library, Southern Illinois University, Carbondale, Illinois.
47. 29 In a class on Hegel's Logic, Dewey criticized Hegel for conceiving force as external Spirit when it should be understood as internal to growth. See J. Dewey, 'Hegel's Logic, Section 136, Dialectic of Force', at the University of Chicago, 1897, Joseph Ratner Papers, Center for Dewey Studies, Morris Library, Southern Illinois University, Carbondale, Illinois.
48. 30 C. M. Child, The Origin and Development of the Nervous System (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1921).
49. 31 C. J. Herrick, 'The Relations of the Central and Peripheral Nervous Systems in Phylogeny', Anatomical Record 36 (1910), 645-652.
50. 32 Dewey grasped more fully the potential that Child and Herrick saw in experimental embryology in elucidating generic traits in 1926 when he announced rather dramatically that: 'Recent advances in some fundamental generalizations regarding biological functions in general and those of the nervous system in particular, make possible a definite conception of continuous development from the lower functions to the higher'. See Dewey, 'Affective Thought', LW: Vol. 2, p. 104. Indeed, the 1920s marked a watershed for experimental embryology. Hans Spemann discovered the mechanisms governing the early development of the nervous system, leading to a revolution in the understanding of the development of the nervous system. See H. Spemann, Embryonic Development and Induction (New York: Hafner, 1962) [Originally published, 1938]. Dewey made an intriguing observation about embryogenesis in a letter referring to works by Herrick and Child when he said: 'I have always thought that the evolution of the ectoderm and mesoderm structures has a deep significance, but I have never followed it through'. See Dewey to C. Chisholm, 28 February 1930, Rare Books and Manuscripts, Butler Library, Columbia University, New York. Significantly, the processes signified by these embryological terms provided the analogies Dewey used to characterize the process of inquiry. The outcome of inquiry, like the fate of individual cells, according to Dewey, is determined only after a process involving, 'the controlled or directed transformation of an indeterminate situation into one that is so determinate in its constituent distinctions and relations as to convert the elements of the original situation into a unified whole' (op. cit., note 3, p. 108). Moreover, Dewey sometimes seemed to be arguing that the antecedents of judgment commence in embryogenesis when he declared that: 'Integration and differentiation are biological processes foreshadowing [affirmation and negation in judgment]....They are themselves prepared for and foreshadowed in the physical processes of conjunction and separation' (ibid., p. 199).
51. 32 Dewey grasped more fully the potential that Child and Herrick saw in experimental embryology in elucidating generic traits in 1926 when he announced rather dramatically that: 'Recent advances in some fundamental generalizations regarding biological functions in general and those of the nervous system in particular, make possible a definite conception of continuous development from the lower functions to the higher'. See Dewey, 'Affective Thought', LW: Vol. 2, p. 104. Indeed, the 1920s marked a watershed for experimental embryology. Hans Spemann discovered the mechanisms governing the early development of the nervous system, leading to a revolution in the understanding of the development of the nervous system. See H. Spemann, Embryonic Development and Induction (New York: Hafner, 1962) [Originally published, 1938]. Dewey made an intriguing observation about embryogenesis in a letter referring to works by Herrick and Child when he said: 'I have always thought that the evolution of the ectoderm and mesoderm structures has a deep significance, but I have never followed it through'. See Dewey to C. Chisholm, 28 February 1930, Rare Books and Manuscripts, Butler Library, Columbia University, New York. Significantly, the processes signified by these embryological terms provided the analogies Dewey used to characterize the process of inquiry. The outcome of inquiry, like the fate of individual cells, according to Dewey, is determined only after a process involving, 'the controlled or directed transformation of an indeterminate situation into one that is so determinate in its constituent distinctions and relations as to convert the elements of the original situation into a unified whole' (op. cit., note 3, p. 108). Moreover, Dewey sometimes seemed to be arguing that the antecedents of judgment commence in embryogenesis when he declared that: 'Integration and differentiation are biological processes foreshadowing [affirmation and negation in judgment]....They are themselves prepared for and foreshadowed in the physical processes of conjunction and separation' (ibid., p. 199).
52. 32 Dewey grasped more fully the potential that Child and Herrick saw in experimental embryology in elucidating generic traits in 1926 when he announced rather dramatically that: 'Recent advances in some fundamental generalizations regarding biological functions in general and those of the nervous system in particular, make possible a definite conception of continuous development from the lower functions to the higher'. See Dewey, 'Affective Thought', LW: Vol. 2, p. 104. Indeed, the 1920s marked a watershed for experimental embryology. Hans Spemann discovered the mechanisms governing the early development of the nervous system, leading to a revolution in the understanding of the development of the nervous system. See H. Spemann, Embryonic Development and Induction (New York: Hafner, 1962) [Originally published, 1938]. Dewey made an intriguing observation about embryogenesis in a letter referring to works by Herrick and Child when he said: 'I have always thought that the evolution of the ectoderm and mesoderm structures has a deep significance, but I have never followed it through'. See Dewey to C. Chisholm, 28 February 1930, Rare Books and Manuscripts, Butler Library, Columbia University, New York. Significantly, the processes signified by these embryological terms provided the analogies Dewey used to characterize the process of inquiry. The outcome of inquiry, like the fate of individual cells, according to Dewey, is determined only after a process involving, 'the controlled or directed transformation of an indeterminate situation into one that is so determinate in its constituent distinctions and relations as to convert the elements of the original situation into a unified whole' (op. cit., note 3, p. 108). Moreover, Dewey sometimes seemed to be arguing that the antecedents of judgment commence in embryogenesis when he declared that: 'Integration and differentiation are biological processes foreshadowing [affirmation and negation in judgment]....They are themselves prepared for and foreshadowed in the physical processes of conjunction and separation' (ibid., p. 199).
53. 32 Dewey grasped more fully the potential that Child and Herrick saw in experimental embryology in elucidating generic traits in 1926 when he announced rather dramatically that: 'Recent advances in some fundamental generalizations regarding biological functions in general and those of the nervous system in particular, make possible a definite conception of continuous development from the lower functions to the higher'. See Dewey, 'Affective Thought', LW: Vol. 2, p. 104. Indeed, the 1920s marked a watershed for experimental embryology. Hans Spemann discovered the mechanisms governing the early development of the nervous system, leading to a revolution in the understanding of the development of the nervous system. See H. Spemann, Embryonic Development and Induction (New York: Hafner, 1962) [Originally published, 1938]. Dewey made an intriguing observation about embryogenesis in a letter referring to works by Herrick and Child when he said: 'I have always thought that the evolution of the ectoderm and mesoderm structures has a deep significance, but I have never followed it through'. See Dewey to C. Chisholm, 28 February 1930, Rare Books and Manuscripts, Butler Library, Columbia University, New York. Significantly, the processes signified by these embryological terms provided the analogies Dewey used to characterize the process of inquiry. The outcome of inquiry, like the fate of individual cells, according to Dewey, is determined only after a process involving, 'the controlled or directed transformation of an indeterminate situation into one that is so determinate in its constituent distinctions and relations as to convert the elements of the original situation into a unified whole' (op. cit., note 3, p. 108). Moreover, Dewey sometimes seemed to be arguing that the antecedents of judgment commence in embryogenesis when he declared that: 'Integration and differentiation are biological processes foreshadowing [affirmation and negation in judgment]....They are themselves prepared for and foreshadowed in the physical processes of conjunction and separation' (ibid., p. 199).
54. 33 For Coghill's biography see: C. J. Herrick, George Elliott Coghill, A Naturalist and Philosopher (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1949).
55. 34 G. E. Coghill, 'The Neuro-Embryologic Study of Behavior: Principles, Perspectives, and Aims', Science 78 (1933), 131-136. See also Herrick, ibid.
56. 34 G. E. Coghill, 'The Neuro-Embryologic Study of Behavior: Principles, Perspectives, and Aims', Science 78 (1933), 131-136. See also Herrick, ibid.
57. 35 Coghill, ibid., p. 137.
58. 36 Dewey acknowledged Maxwell's influence in a letter to Arthur Bentley in 1946 saying: 'Years ago I had a copy of Maxwell's little book [Matter in Motion] - I think when I was at Ann Arbor, [University of Michigan] I remember thinking it was the only thing on physical science principles I could understand'. Dewey to Bentley, 22 January 1946, Arthur Bentley Papers, Manuscripts Department, Lilly Library, Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana.
59. 37 See L. Rosenfeld (ed.), Niels Bohr, 1885-1962: Collected Works (Amsterdam: New Holland, 1972). Jane Dewey corresponded with her father during this time, keeping him informed about her work with personal anecdotes about Bohr. Dewey visited Jane at Bohr's Institute in Copenhagen in the summer of 1926 as Jane noted in a letter to her father, 17 August 1926, John Dewey Papers, Center for Dewey Studies, Morris Library, Southern Illinois University, Carbondale, Illinois.
60. 38 N. Bohr, 'Life and Light', Nature 131 (1937), 421-423; 457-459.
61. 39 L. von Bertalanffy, Modern Theories of Development (New York: Oxford University Press, 1933); J. H. Woodger, The Axiomatic Method in Biology (London: Cambridge University Press, 1937). A. Lotka, Elements of Mathematical Biology (New York: Dover, 1956). Dewey also found population biologist Alfred Lotka's attempt to understand the energetics of consciousness and growth a complementary way to translate into biological terms physicist James Clerk Maxwell's idea that all matter is motion. Lotka proposed that the evolution of biological systems could be understood best by conceiving of life forms as 'moving equlibria' whose position and vector depends upon energy transformations and displacements from collisions that occur during development (ibid., p. 388). Lotka contended that consciousness evolved as a mechanism to simplify the processes involved in the transformation of an organism from one state to another, by enabling it to control the timing, scope, and expenditure of energy (through adjustments in metabolic rate) in response to factors impinging on its growth and development (ibid., pp. 388-345). Dewey first mentions Lotka's book in a letter to Chisholm on 28 October 1932, op. cit., note 32, p. 2. Dewey indicates in correspondence with Corinne Chisholm, 12 April 1942, op. cit., note 32, that he began a preliminary attempt to sketch a notational system that identifies the different forms energy might assume through their interaction - a move indicative of his continual efforts to conceptually integrate neurodynamic and neuroembryological perspectives. Dewey clearly demonstrates, with this notational system, his belief that consciousness (allied with memory) possesses the energy necessary to modify structures sufficiently to displace old behavior patterns and form new ones.
62. 39 L. von Bertalanffy, Modern Theories of Development (New York: Oxford University Press, 1933); J. H. Woodger, The Axiomatic Method in Biology (London: Cambridge University Press, 1937). A. Lotka, Elements of Mathematical Biology (New York: Dover, 1956). Dewey also found population biologist Alfred Lotka's attempt to understand the energetics of consciousness and growth a complementary way to translate into biological terms physicist James Clerk Maxwell's idea that all matter is motion. Lotka proposed that the evolution of biological systems could be understood best by conceiving of life forms as 'moving equlibria' whose position and vector depends upon energy transformations and displacements from collisions that occur during development (ibid., p. 388). Lotka contended that consciousness evolved as a mechanism to simplify the processes involved in the transformation of an organism from one state to another, by enabling it to control the timing, scope, and expenditure of energy (through adjustments in metabolic rate) in response to factors impinging on its growth and development (ibid., pp. 388-345). Dewey first mentions Lotka's book in a letter to Chisholm on 28 October 1932, op. cit., note 32, p. 2. Dewey indicates in correspondence with Corinne Chisholm, 12 April 1942, op. cit., note 32, that he began a preliminary attempt to sketch a notational system that identifies the different forms energy might assume through their interaction - a move indicative of his continual efforts to conceptually integrate neurodynamic and neuroembryological perspectives. Dewey clearly demonstrates, with this notational system, his belief that consciousness (allied with memory) possesses the energy necessary to modify structures sufficiently to displace old behavior patterns and form new ones.
63. 39 L. von Bertalanffy, Modern Theories of Development (New York: Oxford University Press, 1933); J. H. Woodger, The Axiomatic Method in Biology (London: Cambridge University Press, 1937). A. Lotka, Elements of Mathematical Biology (New York: Dover, 1956). Dewey also found population biologist Alfred Lotka's attempt to understand the energetics of consciousness and growth a complementary way to translate into biological terms physicist James Clerk Maxwell's idea that all matter is motion. Lotka proposed that the evolution of biological systems could be understood best by conceiving of life forms as 'moving equlibria' whose position and vector depends upon energy transformations and displacements from collisions that occur during development (ibid., p. 388). Lotka contended that consciousness evolved as a mechanism to simplify the processes involved in the transformation of an organism from one state to another, by enabling it to control the timing, scope, and expenditure of energy (through adjustments in metabolic rate) in response to factors impinging on its growth and development (ibid., pp. 388-345). Dewey first mentions Lotka's book in a letter to Chisholm on 28 October 1932, op. cit., note 32, p. 2. Dewey indicates in correspondence with Corinne Chisholm, 12 April 1942, op. cit., note 32, that he began a preliminary attempt to sketch a notational system that identifies the different forms energy might assume through their interaction - a move indicative of his continual efforts to conceptually integrate neurodynamic and neuroembryological perspectives. Dewey clearly demonstrates, with this notational system, his belief that consciousness (allied with memory) possesses the energy necessary to modify structures sufficiently to displace old behavior patterns and form new ones.
64. 39 L. von Bertalanffy, Modern Theories of Development (New York: Oxford University Press, 1933); J. H. Woodger, The Axiomatic Method in Biology (London: Cambridge University Press, 1937). A. Lotka, Elements of Mathematical Biology (New York: Dover, 1956). Dewey also found population biologist Alfred Lotka's attempt to understand the energetics of consciousness and growth a complementary way to translate into biological terms physicist James Clerk Maxwell's idea that all matter is motion. Lotka proposed that the evolution of biological systems could be understood best by conceiving of life forms as 'moving equlibria' whose position and vector depends upon energy transformations and displacements from collisions that occur during development (ibid., p. 388). Lotka contended that consciousness evolved as a mechanism to simplify the processes involved in the transformation of an organism from one state to another, by enabling it to control the timing, scope, and expenditure of energy (through adjustments in metabolic rate) in response to factors impinging on its growth and development (ibid., pp. 388-345). Dewey first mentions Lotka's book in a letter to Chisholm on 28 October 1932, op. cit., note 32, p. 2. Dewey indicates in correspondence with Corinne Chisholm, 12 April 1942, op. cit., note 32, that he began a preliminary attempt to sketch a notational system that identifies the different forms energy might assume through their interaction - a move indicative of his continual efforts to conceptually integrate neurodynamic and neuroembryological perspectives. Dewey clearly demonstrates, with this notational system, his belief that consciousness (allied with memory) possesses the energy necessary to modify structures sufficiently to displace old behavior patterns and form new ones.
65. 39 L. von Bertalanffy, Modern Theories of Development (New York: Oxford University Press, 1933); J. H. Woodger, The Axiomatic Method in Biology (London: Cambridge University Press, 1937). A. Lotka, Elements of Mathematical Biology (New York: Dover, 1956). Dewey also found population biologist Alfred Lotka's attempt to understand the energetics of consciousness and growth a complementary way to translate into biological terms physicist James Clerk Maxwell's idea that all matter is motion. Lotka proposed that the evolution of biological systems could be understood best by conceiving of life forms as 'moving equlibria' whose position and vector depends upon energy transformations and displacements from collisions that occur during development (ibid., p. 388). Lotka contended that consciousness evolved as a mechanism to simplify the processes involved in the transformation of an organism from one state to another, by enabling it to control the timing, scope, and expenditure of energy (through adjustments in metabolic rate) in response to factors impinging on its growth and development (ibid., pp. 388-345). Dewey first mentions Lotka's book in a letter to Chisholm on 28 October 1932, op. cit., note 32, p. 2. Dewey indicates in correspondence with Corinne Chisholm, 12 April 1942, op. cit., note 32, that he began a preliminary attempt to sketch a notational system that identifies the different forms energy might assume through their interaction - a move indicative of his continual efforts to conceptually integrate neurodynamic and neuroembryological perspectives. Dewey clearly demonstrates, with this notational system, his belief that consciousness (allied with memory) possesses the energy necessary to modify structures sufficiently to displace old behavior patterns and form new ones.
66. 39 L. von Bertalanffy, Modern Theories of Development (New York: Oxford University Press, 1933); J. H. Woodger, The Axiomatic Method in Biology (London: Cambridge University Press, 1937). A. Lotka, Elements of Mathematical Biology (New York: Dover, 1956). Dewey also found population biologist Alfred Lotka's attempt to understand the energetics of consciousness and growth a complementary way to translate into biological terms physicist James Clerk Maxwell's idea that all matter is motion. Lotka proposed that the evolution of biological systems could be understood best by conceiving of life forms as 'moving equlibria' whose position and vector depends upon energy transformations and displacements from collisions that occur during development (ibid., p. 388). Lotka contended that consciousness evolved as a mechanism to simplify the processes involved in the transformation of an organism from one state to another, by enabling it to control the timing, scope, and expenditure of energy (through adjustments in metabolic rate) in response to factors impinging on its growth and development (ibid., pp. 388-345). Dewey first mentions Lotka's book in a letter to Chisholm on 28 October 1932, op. cit., note 32, p. 2. Dewey indicates in correspondence with Corinne Chisholm, 12 April 1942, op. cit., note 32, that he began a preliminary attempt to sketch a notational system that identifies the different forms energy might assume through their interaction - a move indicative of his continual efforts to conceptually integrate neurodynamic and neuroembryological perspectives. Dewey clearly demonstrates, with this notational system, his belief that consciousness (allied with memory) possesses the energy necessary to modify structures sufficiently to displace old behavior patterns and form new ones.
67. 39 L. von Bertalanffy, Modern Theories of Development (New York: Oxford University Press, 1933); J. H. Woodger, The Axiomatic Method in Biology (London: Cambridge University Press, 1937). A. Lotka, Elements of Mathematical Biology (New York: Dover, 1956). Dewey also found population biologist Alfred Lotka's attempt to understand the energetics of consciousness and growth a complementary way to translate into biological terms physicist James Clerk Maxwell's idea that all matter is motion. Lotka proposed that the evolution of biological systems could be understood best by conceiving of life forms as 'moving equlibria' whose position and vector depends upon energy transformations and displacements from collisions that occur during development (ibid., p. 388). Lotka contended that consciousness evolved as a mechanism to simplify the processes involved in the transformation of an organism from one state to another, by enabling it to control the timing, scope, and expenditure of energy (through adjustments in metabolic rate) in response to factors impinging on its growth and development (ibid., pp. 388-345). Dewey first mentions Lotka's book in a letter to Chisholm on 28 October 1932, op. cit., note 32, p. 2. Dewey indicates in correspondence with Corinne Chisholm, 12 April 1942, op. cit., note 32, that he began a preliminary attempt to sketch a notational system that identifies the different forms energy might assume through their interaction - a move indicative of his continual efforts to conceptually integrate neurodynamic and neuroembryological perspectives. Dewey clearly demonstrates, with this notational system, his belief that consciousness (allied with memory) possesses the energy necessary to modify structures sufficiently to displace old behavior patterns and form new ones.
68. 40 D. J. Dewey, 'Principles of Mental Development as Illustrated in Early Infancy', in J. A. Boydston (ed.), John Dewey: The Early Works, Vol. 1: 1899-1901 [hereafter EW] (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 1976), pp. 175-191. See also K. Mayhew and A. Edwards, The Dewey School (New York: Appleton Century Co., 1936; reprinted, New York: Atherton, 1976). For an intriguing discussion of Dewey's psychology of education within the broader context of educational reforms advanced by turn-of-the-century educators G. Stanley Hall and Edward L. Thorndike, see S. H. White, 'Three Visions of a Psychology of Education', in L. T. Landsmann (ed.), Culture, Schooling and Psychological Development (Norwood, NJ: Ablex), pp. 1-39.
69. 40 D. J. Dewey, 'Principles of Mental Development as Illustrated in Early Infancy', in J. A. Boydston (ed.), John Dewey: The Early Works, Vol. 1: 1899-1901 [hereafter EW] (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 1976), pp. 175-191. See also K. Mayhew and A. Edwards, The Dewey School (New York: Appleton Century Co., 1936; reprinted, New York: Atherton, 1976). For an intriguing discussion of Dewey's psychology of education within the broader context of educational reforms advanced by turn-of-the-century educators G. Stanley Hall and Edward L. Thorndike, see S. H. White, 'Three Visions of a Psychology of Education', in L. T. Landsmann (ed.), Culture, Schooling and Psychological Development (Norwood, NJ: Ablex), pp. 1-39.
70. 40 D. J. Dewey, 'Principles of Mental Development as Illustrated in Early Infancy', in J. A. Boydston (ed.), John Dewey: The Early Works, Vol. 1: 1899-1901 [hereafter EW] (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 1976), pp. 175-191. See also K. Mayhew and A. Edwards, The Dewey School (New York: Appleton Century Co., 1936; reprinted, New York: Atherton, 1976). For an intriguing discussion of Dewey's psychology of education within the broader context of educational reforms advanced by turn-of-the-century educators G. Stanley Hall and Edward L. Thorndike, see S. H. White, 'Three Visions of a Psychology of Education', in L. T. Landsmann (ed.), Culture, Schooling and Psychological Development (Norwood, NJ: Ablex), pp. 1-39.
71. 41 Ibid., pp. 184; 187-188.
72. 42 J. Dewey and J. McLellan, The Psychology of Number and Its Application to Methods of Teaching (New York: D. Appleton and Co., 1898). The Hegelian W. T. Harris wrote an editor's preface saying that the authors had captured the fundamentally qualitative, functional attributes involved in the use of quantitative measures and methods. Dewey and McLellan argued that every form of mathematical calculation involved the same objective, namely of distributing parts in some order and assigning value in relation to the whole. Hegel made precisely the same argument in his analysis of measurement in Science of Logic. See Miller, op. cit., note 8, pp. 314-385.
73. 42 J. Dewey and J. McLellan, The Psychology of Number and Its Application to Methods of Teaching (New York: D. Appleton and Co., 1898). The Hegelian W. T. Harris wrote an editor's preface saying that the authors had captured the fundamentally qualitative, functional attributes involved in the use of quantitative measures and methods. Dewey and McLellan argued that every form of mathematical calculation involved the same objective, namely of distributing parts in some order and assigning value in relation to the whole. Hegel made precisely the same argument in his analysis of measurement in Science of Logic. See Miller, op. cit., note 8, pp. 314-385.
74. 42 J. Dewey and J. McLellan, The Psychology of Number and Its Application to Methods of Teaching (New York: D. Appleton and Co., 1898). The Hegelian W. T. Harris wrote an editor's preface saying that the authors had captured the fundamentally qualitative, functional attributes involved in the use of quantitative measures and methods. Dewey and McLellan argued that every form of mathematical calculation involved the same objective, namely of distributing parts in some order and assigning value in relation to the whole. Hegel made precisely the same argument in his analysis of measurement in Science of Logic. See Miller, op. cit., note 8, pp. 314-385.
75. 43 Ibid., p. 191.
76. 44 See J. Antler, 'Progressive Education and the Scientific Study of the Child: An Analysis of the Bureau of Educational Experiments', Teachers College Record 83 (1982), 559-591. Evelyn Dewey was a member of the working council and held various research positions from 1916-1920. Although John Dewey served as an honorary member of the working council, his participation and influence extended well beyond his formal title as indicated by Wesley Mitchell's diary and the Bank Street Archives. See Wesley Mitchell Papers, Rare Books and Manuscripts, Butler Library, Columbia University, New York.
77. 45 B. Johnson, Mental Growth of Children, in Relation to the Growth in Bodily Development (New York: Dutton, 1925), see pp. 79; 145-149.
78. 46 In a grant application to the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial, Lucy Mitchell insisted that her methods were comparable but superior to Gesell's because, she said, 'our conception of growth is not based on formal tests but on natural behavior in a carefully standardized situation of a much broader scope than that arranged by Gesell'. Mitchell to Trustees, 6 May 1925, Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial Record Group I, Series 3.5, Box 27, Folder 279, Rockefeller Archive Center, Tarrytown, New York [Hereinafter RAC-LSRM].
79. 47 A. Gesell, Infant Behavior: Its Genesis and Growth (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1934). See also E. Thelen and K. E. Adolf, 'Arnold L. Gesell: The Paradox of Nature and Nurture', Developmental Psychology 28 (1992), 368-380.
80. 47 A. Gesell, Infant Behavior: Its Genesis and Growth (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1934). See also E. Thelen and K. E. Adolf, 'Arnold L. Gesell: The Paradox of Nature and Nurture', Developmental Psychology 28 (1992), 368-380.
81. 48 See C. Eisberg, The Story of a Hospital: The Neurological Institute of New York, 1909-1938 (New York: Paul F. Hoeber, 1944), and Lawrence Pool, The Neurological Institute of New York, 1909-1974 (Lakeville, CT: Pocketknife Press, 1975), for historical studies.
82. 48 See C. Eisberg, The Story of a Hospital: The Neurological Institute of New York, 1909-1938 (New York: Paul F. Hoeber, 1944), and Lawrence Pool, The Neurological Institute of New York, 1909-1974 (Lakeville, CT: Pocketknife Press, 1975), for historical studies.
83. 49 F. Tilney, 'Genesis of Cerebellar Functions', Archives of Neurology and Psychiatry 9 (1923), 137-169; F. Tilney and L. Casamajor, 'Myelinogeny as Applied to the Study of Behavior', Archives of Neurology and Psychiatry 12 (1924), 1-66; and F. Tilney and L. Kubie, 'Behavior in its Relation to the Development of the Brain', Bulletin of the Neurological Institute 1 (1931), 226-213.
84. 49 F. Tilney, 'Genesis of Cerebellar Functions', Archives of Neurology and Psychiatry 9 (1923), 137-169; F. Tilney and L. Casamajor, 'Myelinogeny as Applied to the Study of Behavior', Archives of Neurology and Psychiatry 12 (1924), 1-66; and F. Tilney and L. Kubie, 'Behavior in its Relation to the Development of the Brain', Bulletin of the Neurological Institute 1 (1931), 226-213.
85. 49 F. Tilney, 'Genesis of Cerebellar Functions', Archives of Neurology and Psychiatry 9 (1923), 137-169; F. Tilney and L. Casamajor, 'Myelinogeny as Applied to the Study of Behavior', Archives of Neurology and Psychiatry 12 (1924), 1-66; and F. Tilney and L. Kubie, 'Behavior in its Relation to the Development of the Brain', Bulletin of the Neurological Institute 1 (1931), 226-213.
86. 50 See Tilney to F. P. Keppel, The Normal Child Development Project, Carnegie Corporation, 22 March 1933, and J. Merriam to F. P. Keppel, 15 March 1943, Carnegie Corporation Papers.
87. 51 J. Dewey, Experience and Nature, LW: Vol. 1, pp. 197-211.
88. 52 F. Tilney, Master of Destiny (New York: Hoeber, 1929; reprinted New York: Doubleday, 1968), pp. 281-290.
89. 53 See Tilney and Kubie, op. cit., note 49, pp. 233-237.
90. 54 See M. McGraw, 'Memories, Deliberate Recall and Speculation', American Psychologist 45 (1990) 936.
91. 55 Telephone interview with Katherine Agate Heyl, Norwich, Vermont, 23 December 1989. Heyl shared an apartment with McGraw and worked as a laboratory assistant for three years until she married a neurosurgeon from the Institute. Heyl noted that Dewey used to come over for dinner (or take McGraw out to dinner) every Wednesday evening. Heyl was not privy to their conversations but was generally under the impression that Dewey had originated the NCDS study.
92. 56 See M. Senn, Interview with Myrtle McGraw, Hastings-on-Hudson, New York, 9 May 1972. Milton Senn Collection, History of Medicine Division, National Library of Medicine, Bethesda, MD, p. 41.
93. 57 Memorandum of an interview with M. McGraw at Babies Hospital, Columbia Medical Center, by L. K. Frank, 13 March 1933, RAC-GEB, Record Group I., Series 1.3, Box 370, Folder 3858.
94. 58 See for example, L. K. Frank, 'Structure, Function, and Growth', Philosophy of Science 2 (1935), 210-235, and 'The Problem of Child Development', Child Development 1 (1935), 7-18.
95. 58 See for example, L. K. Frank, 'Structure, Function, and Growth', Philosophy of Science 2 (1935), 210-235, and 'The Problem of Child Development', Child Development 1 (1935), 7-18.
96. 59 L. K. Frank, 'The Beginnings of Child Development and Family Life Education in the Twentieth Century', Merrill-Palmer Quarterly of Behavior and Development 8 (1962), 207-228; see also H. Cravens, Before Head Start: The Iowa Station and America's Children (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1993). For an alternative account to Cravens that singles out Dewey's influence in child study and attaches more significance to McGraw's research at Columbia than Iowa, see T. C. Dalton, 'Challenging the Group Bias of American Culture', Journal of Contemporary Psychology, March, 1995.
97. 59 L. K. Frank, 'The Beginnings of Child Development and Family Life Education in the Twentieth Century', Merrill-Palmer Quarterly of Behavior and Development 8 (1962), 207-228; see also H. Cravens, Before Head Start: The Iowa Station and America's Children (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1993). For an alternative account to Cravens that singles out Dewey's influence in child study and attaches more significance to McGraw's research at Columbia than Iowa, see T. C. Dalton, 'Challenging the Group Bias of American Culture', Journal of Contemporary Psychology, March, 1995.
98. 59 L. K. Frank, 'The Beginnings of Child Development and Family Life Education in the Twentieth Century', Merrill-Palmer Quarterly of Behavior and Development 8 (1962), 207-228; see also H. Cravens, Before Head Start: The Iowa Station and America's Children (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1993). For an alternative account to Cravens that singles out Dewey's influence in child study and attaches more significance to McGraw's research at Columbia than Iowa, see T. C. Dalton, 'Challenging the Group Bias of American Culture', Journal of Contemporary Psychology, March, 1995.
99. 60 Dewey is listed as a past founding member of the Board of Directors in a report by Willard Rappleye, President from 1941-1964, titled The Josiah Macy, Jr Foundation: Twentieth Anniversary Review, 1930-1955 (New York: Josiah Macy, Jr Foundation, 1955), p. ix. McGraw's research is also described in this report (see p. 25). Ludwig Kast (1930-1941), describes funded research in growth including McGraw and Coghill's studies in a report titled A Review by the President of Activities for the Six Years Ending December 31, 1936 (New York: Josiah Macy, Jr Foundation, 1937), pp., 34-37. Dr. Thomas Meikle, Executive Director of the Macy Foundation, indicated to the authors that all minutes of trustee meetings and other memoranda concerning grant awards in the foundation's early years, including material documenting Dewey's involvement, had been destroyed due to limited storage space. Interview with Meikle, New York City, 27 April 1992).
100. 60 Dewey is listed as a past founding member of the Board of Directors in a report by Willard Rappleye, President from 1941-1964, titled The Josiah Macy, Jr Foundation: Twentieth Anniversary Review, 1930-1955 (New York: Josiah Macy, Jr Foundation, 1955), p. ix. McGraw's research is also described in this report (see p. 25). Ludwig Kast (1930-1941), describes funded research in growth including McGraw and Coghill's studies in a report titled A Review by the President of Activities for the Six Years Ending December 31, 1936 (New York: Josiah Macy, Jr Foundation, 1937), pp., 34-37. Dr. Thomas Meikle, Executive Director of the Macy Foundation, indicated to the authors that all minutes of trustee meetings and other memoranda concerning grant awards in the foundation's early years, including material documenting Dewey's involvement, had been destroyed due to limited storage space. Interview with Meikle, New York City, 27 April 1992).
101. 61 E. Dewey, Behavior Development in Infants: A Survey of the Literature on Prenatal and Postnatal Activity, 1920-1924 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1935; reprint, New York: Arno, 1972), pp. 354-356.
102. 62 Letter to M. McGraw, 15 September 1935, and 16 November 1936, Center for Dewey Studies and Morris Library, Southern Illinois University, Carbondale, IL.
103. 63 See L. Kast, op. cit., note 36, pp. 11, 34-37, and Letter to McGraw, 31 May 1934 and 1 September 1935, ibid.
104. 63 See L. Kast, op. cit., note 36, pp. 11, 34-37, and Letter to McGraw, 31 May 1934 and 1 September 1935, ibid.
105. 64 Letter to McGraw, Sat. ca. 1933; Wednesday ca. 1935; 20 July 1935; 16 November 1936, ibid.
106. 65 See Senn, op. cit., note 56, p. 15.
107. 66 M. McGraw, op cit., note 54, see p. 934. For a more detailed account of McGraw's career and contributions to developmental psychology see V. W. Bergenn, T. C. Dalton and L. P. Lipsitt, 'Myrtle McGraw: A Growth Scientist', Developmental Psychology 28 (1992), 381-395.
108. 66 M. McGraw, op cit., note 54, see p. 934. For a more detailed account of McGraw's career and contributions to developmental psychology see V. W. Bergenn, T. C. Dalton and L. P. Lipsitt, 'Myrtle McGraw: A Growth Scientist', Developmental Psychology 28 (1992), 381-395.
109. 67 K. Duckett, 'Interview with Myrtle McGraw', 9 February 1967, p. 6. Hastings-on-Hudson, New York, Center for Dewey Studies, Morris Library, Southern Illinois University, Carbondale, Illinois.
110. 68 See McGraw, op. cit., note 54, p. 934.
111. 69 See Senn, op. cit., note 56, p. 32.
112. 70 New York Times 1935, p. 19. McGraw's research was comparable to Faraday's in the sense that she used biological and physical analogues to understand human behavior in a new way just as Faraday did to create a new perspective about the properties of electricity.
113. 71 Dewey, 'Introduction', in M. B. McGraw, Growth: A Study of Johnny and Jimmy (New York: Appleton Century, 1935; reprinted, New York: Arno, 1975), p. xiii.
114. 72 See McGraw, op. cit., note 62.
115. 73 Letter to A. Bentley, 26 July 1935, Arthur Bentley Papers, Manuscripts Department, Lilly Library, Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana.
116. 74 K. Poulos, 'Textual Commentary', LW: Vol. 12, pp. 533-549.
117. 75 Letter to C. Chisholm, 1 July 1930, Rare Books and Manuscripts, Butler Library, Columbia University, New York.
118. 76 See Dewey, op. cit., note 71, p. ix.
119. 77 See W. Rappleye to L. K. Frank, 2 December 1935, RAC-GEB., Record Group I, Series 1.3, Box 370, Folder 3858.
120. 78 G. E. Coghill, Anatomy and the Problem of Behavior (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1929; reprinted, New York: Hafner Publishing Co., 1964), p. 38.
121. 79 G. E. Coghill, 'Individuation Verses Integration in the Development of Behavior', Journal of Genetic Psychology 3 (1930), 432-433, see p. 432.
122. 80 See Coghill, op. cit., note 78, p. 109.
123. 81 A. Gesell, Infant Behavior: Its Genesis and Growth (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1934).
124. 82 Z. Y. Kuo, 'Total Pattern or Local Reflexes?' Psychological Review 46 (1939), 93-122; W. F. Windle, 'Correlation Between the Development of Local Reflexes and the Reflex Arcs in the Spinal Cord of Cat Embryos', Journal of Comparative Neurology 59 (1934), 487-505; and see Oppenheim, op. cit., note 83, pp. 55-56.
125. 82 Z. Y. Kuo, 'Total Pattern or Local Reflexes?' Psychological Review 46 (1939), 93-122; W. F. Windle, 'Correlation Between the Development of Local Reflexes and the Reflex Arcs in the Spinal Cord of Cat Embryos', Journal of Comparative Neurology 59 (1934), 487-505; and see Oppenheim, op. cit., note 83, pp. 55-56.
126. 82 Z. Y. Kuo, 'Total Pattern or Local Reflexes?' Psychological Review 46 (1939), 93-122; W. F. Windle, 'Correlation Between the Development of Local Reflexes and the Reflex Arcs in the Spinal Cord of Cat Embryos', Journal of Comparative Neurology 59 (1934), 487-505; and see Oppenheim, op. cit., note 83, pp. 55-56.
127. 83 R. W. Oppenheim, 'G. E. Coghill (1872-1941): Pioneer Neuroembryologist and Developmental Psychobiologist', Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 22 (1978) 45-64.
128. 84 Letter to C. J. Herrick, 27 October 1933, Neurology Collection, Herrick Papers, Spencer Research Library, University of Kansas, Lawrence, Kansas.
129. 85 See McGraw, op. cit., note 71, p. 10.
130. 86 Letter to R. Oppenheim, 31 December 1979, Myrtle B. McGraw Papers, Leonia, NJ.
131. 87 See Duckett, op. cit., note 67, p. 16. The discourse Dewey employs in Art As Experience, LW: Vol. 10, pp. 1-366, is dominated by embryological metaphors such as the terms 'impulsion' and 'compression' to describe the release of energy involved in artistic expression. These terms are used by developmental biologists to describe how mesoderm and ectoderm interact during the early stages of gastrulation to form presumptive tissue and organic functions.
132. 87 See Duckett, op. cit., note 67, p. 16. The discourse Dewey employs in Art As Experience, LW: Vol. 10, pp. 1-366, is dominated by embryological metaphors such as the terms 'impulsion' and 'compression' to describe the release of energy involved in artistic expression. These terms are used by developmental biologists to describe how mesoderm and ectoderm interact during the early stages of gastrulation to form presumptive tissue and organic functions.
133. 88 See Duckett, op. cit., note 67, p. 16.
134. 89 Ibid.
135. 90 See McGraw, op. cit., note 86.
136. 91 See Dewey, op. cit., note 51, pp. 201, 210.
137. 92 Ibid., pp. 226-241.
138. 93 E. Nagel, 'Can Logic be Divorced from Ontology?', in S. Morgenbesser (ed.), Dewey and His Critics (New York: Journal of Philosophy Press, 1977), pp. 507-514. See also Nagel, op cit., note 4.
139. 93 E. Nagel, 'Can Logic be Divorced from Ontology?', in S. Morgenbesser (ed.), Dewey and His Critics (New York: Journal of Philosophy Press, 1977), pp. 507-514. See also Nagel, op cit., note 4.
140. 94 See McGraw, op cit., note 71, pp. 22-23.
141. 95 M. B. McGraw, 'Swimming Behavior of the Human Infant', Journal of Pediatrics 15 (1939), 485-490.
142. 96 See McGraw, op. cit., note 71, pp. 160-164.
143. 97 M. B. McGraw, The Neuromuscular Maturation of the Human Infant (New York: Columbia University Press, 1943), p. 123.
144. 98 Ibid., pp. 267-268; 294.
145. 99 Ibid. p. 271.
146. 100 Ibid., p. 277. McGraw's associates Livingston Welch and Louis Long (both psychologists) also demonstrated how children rely on suggestive ideas in demarcating the boundaries of generic concepts involving geometric objects. Significantly, the experimental subjects were better able, as Dewey supposed, to accurately identify the shapes at the opposing ends of a scale (i.e. comprehending the limits of the universe of objects) than to properly differentiate shapes towards the middle. Discriminating accurately between these shapes occurred only after the children had sufficient time rearranging the sequence of objects in an order that best highlighted the differences. These studies by McGraw and her associates provided the ground that Dewey sought for his argument in Logic that reasoning with concepts is subject to the same alternating forces of expansion and contraction as are the processes of neuromuscular growth and development in that disputes about meaning stem from uncertainty over the boundaries or applicability of terms and hypotheses. Accordingly, Dewey says that the extensiveness or intensiveness (i.e. connotation and denotation) of a term depend ultimately on whether objects designated by terms share the same qualitative attributes.
147. 101 See McGraw, op. cit., note 71, pp. 306-308.
148. 102 Dewey, op cit., note 3, pp. 197-199.
149. 103 Ibid., pp. 191-192.
150. 104 Ibid., pp. 193-194.
151. 105 Ibid., pp. 194-195.
152. 106 J. Dewey, 'The Theory of Emotion', EW: Vol. 4, pp. 152-188.
153. 107 C. Sherrington, The Integrative Action of the Nervous System (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962).
154. 108 J. Dewey, 'Hegel's Philosophy of Spirit', Lectures given at the University of Chicago, 1897, p. 3; Joseph Ratner Papers, Center for Dewey Studies, Morris Library, Southern Illinois University, Carbondale, Illinois.
155. 109 B. Russell, 'Dewey's New Logic', in Schilpp, op. cit., note 1, pp. 135-156.
156. 110 J. Dewey, 'Theory of Logic', Lecture notes, Autumn Quarter, 1899, p. 74, University of Chicago, transcribed by H. H. Bawden, Jr., Joseph Ratner Papers, Center for Dewey Studies, Morris Library, Southern Illinois University, Carbondale, Illinois.
157. 111 Dewey urged McGraw to devise methods to determine how infants use gestures to communicate their feelings and reason, by writing: 'I have a hunch that the beginning of language is your best problem now. It doesn't seem like the work that has been done gets very far. Your general principles of development ought to be well exemplified in control both of sounds and ideas and it is the best field it seems to me for studying relations of sensory and motor control'. Letter to McGraw, 6 June 1934, pp. 3-4, see note 62.
158. 112 J. Dewey, op. cit., note 21, p. 3.
159. 113 LW: Vol. 1, pp. 132-145.
160. 114 Ibid., p. 293; LW: Vol. 12, pp. 285; 291-293.
161. 114 Ibid., p. 293; LW: Vol. 12, pp. 285; 291-293.
162. 115 Dewey, MW: Vol. 12, p. 70.
163. 116 Ibid., p. 253. See also H. S. Harris, Hegel's Development (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), pp. 238-255; 419-427, for the significance of free-falling bodies in Hegel's philosophy of Spirit and understanding.
164. 116 Ibid., p. 253. See also H. S. Harris, Hegel's Development (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), pp. 238-255; 419-427, for the significance of free-falling bodies in Hegel's philosophy of Spirit and understanding.
165. 117 Dewey exchanged ideas with Herrick about biological mechanisms governing human development when stimulated by a manuscript they read by Owens (first name unknown) titled 'The Principles and Mechanisms of Evolution'. Dewey thought Owens' work particularly admirable because it involved the collaboration between a philosopher and biologist. Dewey to Herrick, 29 November; 5 and 11 December 1941 (see note 58).
166. 118 E. Rignano, The Psychology of Reasoning (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1923), p. 4.
167. 119 E. Dewey, Behavior Development in Infants: A Survey of the Literature on Prenatal and Postnatal Activity, 1920-1924 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1935; reprint, New York: Arno, 1972).
168. 120 See, for example, Dewey's letters to C. Chisholm, 1 July 1930; 6 January 1932; 26 July 1936; and 25 June 1937 (see note 32).
169. 121 Myrtle B. McGraw, 'Neuro-Motor Maturation of Anti-Gravity Functions as Reflected in the Development of a Sitting Posture', Journal of Genetic Psychology 59 (1941), 160-172.
170. 122 J. Roy Smith, 'The Electroencephalogram During Normal Infancy and Childhood: Rhythmic Activities Present in the Neonate and their Subsequent Development', Journal of Genetic Psychology 53 (1938), 431-453; J. Roy Smith, 'The Electroencephalogram During Normal Infancy and Childhood: The Nature of the Growth of the Alpha Waves', Journal of Genetic Psychology 53 (1938), 455-459.
171. 122 J. Roy Smith, 'The Electroencephalogram During Normal Infancy and Childhood: Rhythmic Activities Present in the Neonate and their Subsequent Development', Journal of Genetic Psychology 53 (1938), 431-453; J. Roy Smith, 'The Electroencephalogram During Normal Infancy and Childhood: The Nature of the Growth of the Alpha Waves', Journal of Genetic Psychology 53 (1938), 455-459.
172. 123 J. Roy Smith, 'The "Occipital" and "Pre-Central" Alpha Rhythms During the First Two Years', Journal of Psychology 7 (1939), 223-227.
173. 124 Dewey, LW: Vol. 12, p. 12.
174. 125 Ibid., p. 220.
175. 126 Ibid., p. 35.
176. 127 Ibid., pp. 32-33.
177. 128 Ibid., p. 40. Dewey is explicit about this when he says: Integration is more fundamental than is the distinction designated by interaction of organism and environment. The latter is indicative of a partial disintegration of a prior integration, but one which is of such a dynamic nature that it moves (as long as life continues) toward reintegration (p. 40).
178. 129 Ibid., pp. 452-453.
179. 130 Ibid., pp. 211-213.
180. 131 Dewey also told Sidney Hook in early 1938 that he would further delay revisions on mathematics chapters, picking up work a month later (see Poulos, op.cit., note 3, p. 540). The NCDS annual progress report documenting preliminary findings by McGraw's associates, Weinbach, Smith, and Weech was available in June 1938. Report of the Normal Child Development Study, July 1937-June 1938, GEB-RAC, Record Group I, Series 1.3, Box 370, Folder 3859. Dewey sent his manuscript to the publisher in early June 1938, after making extensive revisions in the mathematics chapters. In addition, Dewey made additional extensive changes in the galleys in July before sending them back to the publisher in September (see Poulos, ibid., p. 543).
181. 131 Dewey also told Sidney Hook in early 1938 that he would further delay revisions on mathematics chapters, picking up work a month later (see Poulos, op.cit., note 3, p. 540). The NCDS annual progress report documenting preliminary findings by McGraw's associates, Weinbach, Smith, and Weech was available in June 1938. Report of the Normal Child Development Study, July 1937-June 1938, GEB-RAC, Record Group I, Series 1.3, Box 370, Folder 3859. Dewey sent his manuscript to the publisher in early June 1938, after making extensive revisions in the mathematics chapters. In addition, Dewey made additional extensive changes in the galleys in July before sending them back to the publisher in September (see Poulos, ibid., p. 543).
182. 131 Dewey also told Sidney Hook in early 1938 that he would further delay revisions on mathematics chapters, picking up work a month later (see Poulos, op.cit., note 3, p. 540). The NCDS annual progress report documenting preliminary findings by McGraw's associates, Weinbach, Smith, and Weech was available in June 1938. Report of the Normal Child Development Study, July 1937-June 1938, GEB-RAC, Record Group I, Series 1.3, Box 370, Folder 3859. Dewey sent his manuscript to the publisher in early June 1938, after making extensive revisions in the mathematics chapters. In addition, Dewey made additional extensive changes in the galleys in July before sending them back to the publisher in September (see Poulos, ibid., p. 543).
183. 132 H. Cravens and J. C. Burnham, 'Psychology and Evolutionary Naturalism in American Thought, 1890-1940', American Quarterly 23 (1971), 635-657; G. W. Stockings, 'Lamarckianism in American Social Science, 1890-1915', Journal of the History of Ideas 23 (1962), 239-256.
184. 132 H. Cravens and J. C. Burnham, 'Psychology and Evolutionary Naturalism in American Thought, 1890-1940', American Quarterly 23 (1971), 635-657; G. W. Stockings, 'Lamarckianism in American Social Science, 1890-1915', Journal of the History of Ideas 23 (1962), 239-256.
185. 133 Lawrence K. Frank, 'Structure, Function and Growth', Philosophy of Science 2 (1935), 210-235, see p. 213.
186. 134 Ibid., pp. 215-230.
187. 135 Ibid., p. 220. See also: Lawrence Frank, 'The Management of Tensions' (first published in 1928), in his collection of essays, Society as the Patient (New Brunswick NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1949), pp. 11-142.
188. 135 Ibid., p. 220. See also: Lawrence Frank, 'The Management of Tensions' (first published in 1928), in his collection of essays, Society as the Patient (New Brunswick NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1949), pp. 11-142.
189. 136 Letter to McGraw, October 1935, p. 2 (no day) (see note 64).
190. 137 Ibid. Dewey stresses that: 'Locomotion is a function, not a process, the processes are all the changes, muscular, nervous, skeletal etc., that come together to do the walking'. Frank argued that the value assigned to any specific structural and functional properties of an organism was relative to the field in which they were situated and that therefore, the energetics of each field possessed incommensurate magnitudes. See Frank to Brody, 4 August 1938, Lawrence K. Frank Papers, MS C, 280b, Box 1, General Correspondence, History of Medicine Division, National Library of Medicine, Bethesda, Maryland. In contrast, Dewey believed that energy was a form of motion that could be assigned a common value despite differences in the attributes of energy characteristic of any single organic field. Thus, differences in the velocity of the growth of energy complexes were evened out by rhythms issuing from a central neural mechanism. See N. C. Wetzel, 'On the Motion of Growth, XVII. Theoretical Foundations', Growth 1 (1937), 6-59, for a complete elaboration of the principles underpinning Dewey's position. Dewey discusses the evolutionary implications of this conception of entropy with Chisholm. See Dewey to Chisholm, 22 July 1935, note 75.
191. 137 Ibid. Dewey stresses that: 'Locomotion is a function, not a process, the processes are all the changes, muscular, nervous, skeletal etc., that come together to do the walking'. Frank argued that the value assigned to any specific structural and functional properties of an organism was relative to the field in which they were situated and that therefore, the energetics of each field possessed incommensurate magnitudes. See Frank to Brody, 4 August 1938, Lawrence K. Frank Papers, MS C, 280b, Box 1, General Correspondence, History of Medicine Division, National Library of Medicine, Bethesda, Maryland. In contrast, Dewey believed that energy was a form of motion that could be assigned a common value despite differences in the attributes of energy characteristic of any single organic field. Thus, differences in the velocity of the growth of energy complexes were evened out by rhythms issuing from a central neural mechanism. See N. C. Wetzel, 'On the Motion of Growth, XVII. Theoretical Foundations', Growth 1 (1937), 6-59, for a complete elaboration of the principles underpinning Dewey's position. Dewey discusses the evolutionary implications of this conception of entropy with Chisholm. See Dewey to Chisholm, 22 July 1935, note 75.
192. 138 McGraw, op. cit., note 71, pp. 73-86; 292-293.
193. 139 M. B. McGraw and A. P. Weinbach, 'Quantitative Measures in Studying Development of Behavior Patterns (Erect Locomotion)', Bulletin of the Neurological Institute of New York 4 (1936), 553-571, see p. 553. The problem of recurrence was of foremost concern to Dewey at the time as indicated in his correspondence with Chisholm (see note 120).
194. 140 Several memoranda document differences between McGraw and Frank as to the roles of additional researchers recruited to the NCDS, who included a pediatrician, a biochemist and a neurophysiologist. See, for example: Frank memorandum of interview with McGraw and Tilney, 8 May 1935; McGraw to Frank, 11 June 1935; McGraw to Frank, 12 June 1935; and Frank memorandum of interview with McGraw 18 August 18, 1935 (RAC-GEB, Record Group I, Series 1.3, Box 370, Folder 3859). The research that McGraw's associates eventually completed differed significantly from what McGraw proposed to the Advisory Council 17 May 1935. For example, although designated to assist McGraw in the study of bladder control and enuresis, biochemist A. P. Weinbach derived an acceleration constant with which to calculate the growth curve over the life span. Similarly, although neurophysiologist Ray Smith was assigned to determine how brain waves affect the development of vision and contribute to nystigmus, he actually completed a series of studies differentiating the source and effects of brain waves on sensori-motor development. These diversions of effort did not cost McGraw her job. Rockefeller officials offered to extend her grant if she focused on growth dysfunctions contributing to brain abnormalities. McGraw refused to take this approach because she did not feel that enough was understood yet about early developmental processes.
195. 141 M. J. Petry (ed.), Hegel's Philosophy of Nature, Vol. 1 (London: Allen and Unwin, 1970). pp. 242-248.
196. 142 Dewey made this argument in a class he taught on 'Hegel's Logic' (op. cit., note 29), Section 160, at the University of Chicago, just before the turn of the century.
197. 143 Ibid.
198. 144 Maxwell, op. cit., note 36.
199. 145 Dewey, op. cit., note 115, p. 29.
200. 146 A. P. Weinbach, 'Contour Maps, Center of Gravity, Moment of Inertia and Surface of the Human Body', Human Biology 10 (1938), 356-371.
201. 147 Ibid., p. 295.
202. 148 M. McGraw and K. Breeze, 'Quantitative Studies in the Development of Erect Locomotion', Child Development 12 (1941), 267-303, see p. 286. Although unable to develop a behavior constant, they overcame technical difficulties by adapting projectile theory to measure key variables. They believed that the stages of erect locomotion were analogous to the trajectory taken by a projectile through a viscous medium. The speed of the projectile is slowed as it encounters resistance and its energy is dissipated, causing it to assume a parabolic trajectory. Similarly, McGraw found that at the outset, a baby will spend a disproportionate amount of time and energy in moving with characteristic staccato-like steps, contributing to sudden bursts of forward movement. Over time, however, as the center of gravity shifts with the lengthening of the legs and movement in the lower body is brought under increased cortical control, a greater amount of time is consumed on the ground stroke, reducing energy input and stabilizing the gait.
203. 149 A. P. Weinbach, 'Some Physiological Phenomena Fitted to Growth Equations IV. Time and Power Relations for a Human Infant Climbing Inclines of Various Slopes', Growth 4 (1938), 123-134.
204. 150 V. T. Dammann, 'Developmental Changes in Attitudes as one Factor Determining Energy Output in a Motor Performance', Child Development 12 (1941), 241-246.
205. 151 See also, A. P. Weinbach, 'Some Physiological Phenomena Fitted to Growth Equations I. Moro Reflex', Human Biology 9 (1937), 549-555; 'Some Physiological Phenomena Fitted to Growth Equations II. Brain Potentials', Human Biology 10 (1938), 145-150; and 'Some Physiological Phenomena fitted to Growth Equations III. Rate of Growth of Brain Potentials (Alpha Frequency) Compared with Rate of Growth of the Brain', Growth 2 (1938), 247-251. See also A. P. Weinbach, 'The Human Growth Curve: I. Prenatal', Growth 5 (1941), 217-233, and 'The Human Growth Curve: II. Birth to Puberty', Growth 5 (1941), 233-255. Davenport's longitudinal skeletal studies of a sample of babies from the NCDS further supported Weinbach's growth equations. See C. B. Davenport, 'Interpretation of Certain Infantile Growth Curves', Growth 1 (1937), 279-283.
206. 151 See also, A. P. Weinbach, 'Some Physiological Phenomena Fitted to Growth Equations I. Moro Reflex', Human Biology 9 (1937), 549-555; 'Some Physiological Phenomena Fitted to Growth Equations II. Brain Potentials', Human Biology 10 (1938), 145-150; and 'Some Physiological Phenomena fitted to Growth Equations III. Rate of Growth of Brain Potentials (Alpha Frequency) Compared with Rate of Growth of the Brain', Growth 2 (1938), 247-251. See also A. P. Weinbach, 'The Human Growth Curve: I. Prenatal', Growth 5 (1941), 217-233, and 'The Human Growth Curve: II. Birth to Puberty', Growth 5 (1941), 233-255. Davenport's longitudinal skeletal studies of a sample of babies from the NCDS further supported Weinbach's growth equations. See C. B. Davenport, 'Interpretation of Certain Infantile Growth Curves', Growth 1 (1937), 279-283.
207. 151 See also, A. P. Weinbach, 'Some Physiological Phenomena Fitted to Growth Equations I. Moro Reflex', Human Biology 9 (1937), 549-555; 'Some Physiological Phenomena Fitted to Growth Equations II. Brain Potentials', Human Biology 10 (1938), 145-150; and 'Some Physiological Phenomena fitted to Growth Equations III. Rate of Growth of Brain Potentials (Alpha Frequency) Compared with Rate of Growth of the Brain', Growth 2 (1938), 247-251. See also A. P. Weinbach, 'The Human Growth Curve: I. Prenatal', Growth 5 (1941), 217-233, and 'The Human Growth Curve: II. Birth to Puberty', Growth 5 (1941), 233-255. Davenport's longitudinal skeletal studies of a sample of babies from the NCDS further supported Weinbach's growth equations. See C. B. Davenport, 'Interpretation of Certain Infantile Growth Curves', Growth 1 (1937), 279-283.
208. 151 See also, A. P. Weinbach, 'Some Physiological Phenomena Fitted to Growth Equations I. Moro Reflex', Human Biology 9 (1937), 549-555; 'Some Physiological Phenomena Fitted to Growth Equations II. Brain Potentials', Human Biology 10 (1938), 145-150; and 'Some Physiological Phenomena fitted to Growth Equations III. Rate of Growth of Brain Potentials (Alpha Frequency) Compared with Rate of Growth of the Brain', Growth 2 (1938), 247-251. See also A. P. Weinbach, 'The Human Growth Curve: I. Prenatal', Growth 5 (1941), 217-233, and 'The Human Growth Curve: II. Birth to Puberty', Growth 5 (1941), 233-255. Davenport's longitudinal skeletal studies of a sample of babies from the NCDS further supported Weinbach's growth equations. See C. B. Davenport, 'Interpretation of Certain Infantile Growth Curves', Growth 1 (1937), 279-283.
209. 151 See also, A. P. Weinbach, 'Some Physiological Phenomena Fitted to Growth Equations I. Moro Reflex', Human Biology 9 (1937), 549-555; 'Some Physiological Phenomena Fitted to Growth Equations II. Brain Potentials', Human Biology 10 (1938), 145-150; and 'Some Physiological Phenomena fitted to Growth Equations III. Rate of Growth of Brain Potentials (Alpha Frequency) Compared with Rate of Growth of the Brain', Growth 2 (1938), 247-251. See also A. P. Weinbach, 'The Human Growth Curve: I. Prenatal', Growth 5 (1941), 217-233, and 'The Human Growth Curve: II. Birth to Puberty', Growth 5 (1941), 233-255. Davenport's longitudinal skeletal studies of a sample of babies from the NCDS further supported Weinbach's growth equations. See C. B. Davenport, 'Interpretation of Certain Infantile Growth Curves', Growth 1 (1937), 279-283.
210. 151 See also, A. P. Weinbach, 'Some Physiological Phenomena Fitted to Growth Equations I. Moro Reflex', Human Biology 9 (1937), 549-555; 'Some Physiological Phenomena Fitted to Growth Equations II. Brain Potentials', Human Biology 10 (1938), 145-150; and 'Some Physiological Phenomena fitted to Growth Equations III. Rate of Growth of Brain Potentials (Alpha Frequency) Compared with Rate of Growth of the Brain', Growth 2 (1938), 247-251. See also A. P. Weinbach, 'The Human Growth Curve: I. Prenatal', Growth 5 (1941), 217-233, and 'The Human Growth Curve: II. Birth to Puberty', Growth 5 (1941), 233-255. Davenport's longitudinal skeletal studies of a sample of babies from the NCDS further supported Weinbach's growth equations. See C. B. Davenport, 'Interpretation of Certain Infantile Growth Curves', Growth 1 (1937), 279-283.
211. 152 Dewey, LW: Vol. 12, pp. 397-399. Noteworthy in this regard is Herrick's argument that the cerebral cortex consists of 'projection centers' that enable humans to adapt to new circumstances through the continuous correlation and translation of unfamiliar stimuli into familiar terms. See Herrick, op.cit., note 26, p. 273).
212. 152 Dewey, LW: Vol. 12, pp. 397-399. Noteworthy in this regard is Herrick's argument that the cerebral cortex consists of 'projection centers' that enable humans to adapt to new circumstances through the continuous correlation and translation of unfamiliar stimuli into familiar terms. See Herrick, op.cit., note 26, p. 273).
213. 153 Stuart Nagel, 'Dewey's Theory of Natural Science', in Sidney Hook (ed.), John Dewey: Philosopher of Science and Freedom (New York: Dial Press, 1950), pp. 247-248).
214. 154 Bernstein, op. cit., note 4, p., 12.
215. 155 M. B. McGraw, 'Professional and Personal Blunders in Child Development Research', Psychological Record 35 (1985), 165-170, see p. 170. McGraw also complained that a prejudice against subjective judgments favored established methods that 'precluded the evolvement of new techniques which could adequately handle the type of data obtained only through the mental integration of the trained observer'. McGraw, 'Appraising Test Responses of Infants and Young Children', The Journal of Psychology 14 (1942), 89-100, see p. 99.
216. 155 M. B. McGraw, 'Professional and Personal Blunders in Child Development Research', Psychological Record 35 (1985), 165-170, see p. 170. McGraw also complained that a prejudice against subjective judgments favored established methods that 'precluded the evolvement of new techniques which could adequately handle the type of data obtained only through the mental integration of the trained observer'. McGraw, 'Appraising Test Responses of Infants and Young Children', The Journal of Psychology 14 (1942), 89-100, see p. 99.
217. 156 For an analysis of the factors contributing to misinterpretations of McGraw's work and an examination by contemporary researchers of why her discoveries and Dewey's ideas about inquiry remain pertinent today see T. C. Dalton and V. W. Bergenn (eds), Beyond Heredity and Environment: Myrtle McGraw and the Maturation Controversy (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1995.
218. 157 The widely reported fact that Johnny's special stimulation did not result in any significant differences in ultimate performance, since Jimmy eventually was able to complete the same tasks as Johnny, overshadowed the significant qualitative differences in Johny's capacity for problem solving. See Dennis, op. cit., note 18, pp. 362-363.
219. 158 Dewey's defense of Logic was consumed largely by responding to challenges posed about the validity of the psychological premises underpinning his theory of knowledge. Dewey's frequent but perfunctory appeals to the 'facts' of sensori-motor processes and oblique reference to the term 'integration' seemed insufficient gestures to support the psychological validity of theory of inquiry. These rhetorical skirmishes left little opportunity for Dewey to demonstrate the transformational nature of inquiry, or to illustrate in more detail the principles he proposed to replace the traditional canons of formal logic. See Dewey, op. cit., note 1.
220. 158 Dewey's defense of Logic was consumed largely by responding to challenges posed about the validity of the psychological premises underpinning his theory of knowledge. Dewey's frequent but perfunctory appeals to the 'facts' of sensori-motor processes and oblique reference to the term 'integration' seemed insufficient gestures to support the psychological validity of theory of inquiry. These rhetorical skirmishes left little opportunity for Dewey to demonstrate the transformational nature of inquiry, or to illustrate in more detail the principles he proposed to replace the traditional canons of formal logic. See Dewey, op. cit., note 1.
221. 159 F. T. Sulloway, Freud, Biologist of the Mind: Beyond the Psychoanalytic Legend (New York: Basic Books, 1979).
222. 160 R. Rorty, 'Science as Solidarity', in J. Nelson (ed.), The Rhetoric of the Human Sciences (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1987).