Will the real scientists please stand up? Dead ends and live issues in the explanation of scientific knowledge

Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A

Volumn 27, Issue 1, 1996, Pages 43-68

  Roth, Paul A ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI ST LOUIS   (United States)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 0030103092     PISSN: 00393681     EISSN: 18792510     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/0039-3681(95)00036-4     Document Type: Article

References (142)

1. 1 'Reply to Dreyfus and Taylor', Review of Metaphysics 24 (1980), p. 55.
2. 2 'Pragmatism, Relativism, Irrationalism', in Consequences of Pragmatism (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1982), p. 166.
3. 3 The 'contrasting practices of evaluation' alluded to in the opening paragraph includes a wholesale disagreement between philosophers and sociologists of science with regard to the analysis of norms. On the one hand, philosophers concern themselves with the norms qua norms, i.e. as genuine methodological 'oughts' prescribing the course of inquiry. Sociologists of science, on the other hand, take the stated norms of science descriptively, as part of a repertoire of rationalizations that can be variously deployed as the situation warrants. As Michael Mulkay put it in one early formulation of the sociological challenge, 'the standardized verbal formulations to be found in the scientific community provide a repertoire which can be used flexibly to categorise the professional actions differently in various social contexts and, presumably, in accordance with varying social interests. It seems to me misleading to refer to this diffuse repertoire of verbal formulations as the normative structure of science or to maintain that it contributes in any obvious way to the advance of scientific knowledge.' ('Norms and ideology in science', Social Science Information 15 (1976), 637-656, p. 645.) What one might call the 'full sociological turn' in science studies comes just here, with the claim that Merton's 'original functional analysis did identify a genuine social reality, but one better conceived as an ideology than as a normative structure' (ibid., p. 646) and the attendant call for social scientists to no longer accept this ideology at face value (ibid., p. 654). In this regard, the first part of this paper examines how philosophers have reacted to the sociological turn, while the second part chronicles reactions within social studies of science to some of the directions taken in this field. However, the fixed point of concern remains understanding how norms are invoked by either philosophers or sociologists by way of justifying the picture of science they produce. There are two excellent survey articles on these general issues by Steven Shapin. See his 'History of Science and Its Sociological Reconstructions', History of Science 20 (1982), 157-211, and 'Discipline and Bounding: The History and Sociology of Science as Seen Through the Externalism-Internalism Debate', History of Science 30 (1992), 333-369. A case study challenging the role of scientific method in both synchronic and diachronic accounts of belief maintenance and change is Andrew Pickering's Constructing Quarks (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984). Pickering denies an explanatory role to scientific method along both axes, preferring to account for belief maintenance synchronically by the 'symbiotic' relation of theoreticians and experimenters in physics, and for change diachronically by what he calls there 'opportunism in context'.
4. 3 The 'contrasting practices of evaluation' alluded to in the opening paragraph includes a wholesale disagreement between philosophers and sociologists of science with regard to the analysis of norms. On the one hand, philosophers concern themselves with the norms qua norms, i.e. as genuine methodological 'oughts' prescribing the course of inquiry. Sociologists of science, on the other hand, take the stated norms of science descriptively, as part of a repertoire of rationalizations that can be variously deployed as the situation warrants. As Michael Mulkay put it in one early formulation of the sociological challenge, 'the standardized verbal formulations to be found in the scientific community provide a repertoire which can be used flexibly to categorise the professional actions differently in various social contexts and, presumably, in accordance with varying social interests. It seems to me misleading to refer to this diffuse repertoire of verbal formulations as the normative structure of science or to maintain that it contributes in any obvious way to the advance of scientific knowledge.' ('Norms and ideology in science', Social Science Information 15 (1976), 637-656, p. 645.) What one might call the 'full sociological turn' in science studies comes just here, with the claim that Merton's 'original functional analysis did identify a genuine social reality, but one better conceived as an ideology than as a normative structure' (ibid., p. 646) and the attendant call for social scientists to no longer accept this ideology at face value (ibid., p. 654). In this regard, the first part of this paper examines how philosophers have reacted to the sociological turn, while the second part chronicles reactions within social studies of science to some of the directions taken in this field. However, the fixed point of concern remains understanding how norms are invoked by either philosophers or sociologists by way of justifying the picture of science they produce. There are two excellent survey articles on these general issues by Steven Shapin. See his 'History of Science and Its Sociological Reconstructions', History of Science 20 (1982), 157-211, and 'Discipline and Bounding: The History and Sociology of Science as Seen Through the Externalism-Internalism Debate', History of Science 30 (1992), 333-369. A case study challenging the role of scientific method in both synchronic and diachronic accounts of belief maintenance and change is Andrew Pickering's Constructing Quarks (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984). Pickering denies an explanatory role to scientific method along both axes, preferring to account for belief maintenance synchronically by the 'symbiotic' relation of theoreticians and experimenters in physics, and for change diachronically by what he calls there 'opportunism in context'.
5. 3 The 'contrasting practices of evaluation' alluded to in the opening paragraph includes a wholesale disagreement between philosophers and sociologists of science with regard to the analysis of norms. On the one hand, philosophers concern themselves with the norms qua norms, i.e. as genuine methodological 'oughts' prescribing the course of inquiry. Sociologists of science, on the other hand, take the stated norms of science descriptively, as part of a repertoire of rationalizations that can be variously deployed as the situation warrants. As Michael Mulkay put it in one early formulation of the sociological challenge, 'the standardized verbal formulations to be found in the scientific community provide a repertoire which can be used flexibly to categorise the professional actions differently in various social contexts and, presumably, in accordance with varying social interests. It seems to me misleading to refer to this diffuse repertoire of verbal formulations as the normative structure of science or to maintain that it contributes in any obvious way to the advance of scientific knowledge.' ('Norms and ideology in science', Social Science Information 15 (1976), 637-656, p. 645.) What one might call the 'full sociological turn' in science studies comes just here, with the claim that Merton's 'original functional analysis did identify a genuine social reality, but one better conceived as an ideology than as a normative structure' (ibid., p. 646) and the attendant call for social scientists to no longer accept this ideology at face value (ibid., p. 654). In this regard, the first part of this paper examines how philosophers have reacted to the sociological turn, while the second part chronicles reactions within social studies of science to some of the directions taken in this field. However, the fixed point of concern remains understanding how norms are invoked by either philosophers or sociologists by way of justifying the picture of science they produce. There are two excellent survey articles on these general issues by Steven Shapin. See his 'History of Science and Its Sociological Reconstructions', History of Science 20 (1982), 157-211, and 'Discipline and Bounding: The History and Sociology of Science as Seen Through the Externalism-Internalism Debate', History of Science 30 (1992), 333-369. A case study challenging the role of scientific method in both synchronic and diachronic accounts of belief maintenance and change is Andrew Pickering's Constructing Quarks (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984). Pickering denies an explanatory role to scientific method along both axes, preferring to account for belief maintenance synchronically by the 'symbiotic' relation of theoreticians and experimenters in physics, and for change diachronically by what he calls there 'opportunism in context'.
6. 3 The 'contrasting practices of evaluation' alluded to in the opening paragraph includes a wholesale disagreement between philosophers and sociologists of science with regard to the analysis of norms. On the one hand, philosophers concern themselves with the norms qua norms, i.e. as genuine methodological 'oughts' prescribing the course of inquiry. Sociologists of science, on the other hand, take the stated norms of science descriptively, as part of a repertoire of rationalizations that can be variously deployed as the situation warrants. As Michael Mulkay put it in one early formulation of the sociological challenge, 'the standardized verbal formulations to be found in the scientific community provide a repertoire which can be used flexibly to categorise the professional actions differently in various social contexts and, presumably, in accordance with varying social interests. It seems to me misleading to refer to this diffuse repertoire of verbal formulations as the normative structure of science or to maintain that it contributes in any obvious way to the advance of scientific knowledge.' ('Norms and ideology in science', Social Science Information 15 (1976), 637-656, p. 645.) What one might call the 'full sociological turn' in science studies comes just here, with the claim that Merton's 'original functional analysis did identify a genuine social reality, but one better conceived as an ideology than as a normative structure' (ibid., p. 646) and the attendant call for social scientists to no longer accept this ideology at face value (ibid., p. 654). In this regard, the first part of this paper examines how philosophers have reacted to the sociological turn, while the second part chronicles reactions within social studies of science to some of the directions taken in this field. However, the fixed point of concern remains understanding how norms are invoked by either philosophers or sociologists by way of justifying the picture of science they produce. There are two excellent survey articles on these general issues by Steven Shapin. See his 'History of Science and Its Sociological Reconstructions', History of Science 20 (1982), 157-211, and 'Discipline and Bounding: The History and Sociology of Science as Seen Through the Externalism-Internalism Debate', History of Science 30 (1992), 333-369. A case study challenging the role of scientific method in both synchronic and diachronic accounts of belief maintenance and change is Andrew Pickering's Constructing Quarks (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984). Pickering denies an explanatory role to scientific method along both axes, preferring to account for belief maintenance synchronically by the 'symbiotic' relation of theoreticians and experimenters in physics, and for change diachronically by what he calls there 'opportunism in context'.
7. 3 The 'contrasting practices of evaluation' alluded to in the opening paragraph includes a wholesale disagreement between philosophers and sociologists of science with regard to the analysis of norms. On the one hand, philosophers concern themselves with the norms qua norms, i.e. as genuine methodological 'oughts' prescribing the course of inquiry. Sociologists of science, on the other hand, take the stated norms of science descriptively, as part of a repertoire of rationalizations that can be variously deployed as the situation warrants. As Michael Mulkay put it in one early formulation of the sociological challenge, 'the standardized verbal formulations to be found in the scientific community provide a repertoire which can be used flexibly to categorise the professional actions differently in various social contexts and, presumably, in accordance with varying social interests. It seems to me misleading to refer to this diffuse repertoire of verbal formulations as the normative structure of science or to maintain that it contributes in any obvious way to the advance of scientific knowledge.' ('Norms and ideology in science', Social Science Information 15 (1976), 637-656, p. 645.) What one might call the 'full sociological turn' in science studies comes just here, with the claim that Merton's 'original functional analysis did identify a genuine social reality, but one better conceived as an ideology than as a normative structure' (ibid., p. 646) and the attendant call for social scientists to no longer accept this ideology at face value (ibid., p. 654). In this regard, the first part of this paper examines how philosophers have reacted to the sociological turn, while the second part chronicles reactions within social studies of science to some of the directions taken in this field. However, the fixed point of concern remains understanding how norms are invoked by either philosophers or sociologists by way of justifying the picture of science they produce. There are two excellent survey articles on these general issues by Steven Shapin. See his 'History of Science and Its Sociological Reconstructions', History of Science 20 (1982), 157-211, and 'Discipline and Bounding: The History and Sociology of Science as Seen Through the Externalism-Internalism Debate', History of Science 30 (1992), 333-369. A case study challenging the role of scientific method in both synchronic and diachronic accounts of belief maintenance and change is Andrew Pickering's Constructing Quarks (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984). Pickering denies an explanatory role to scientific method along both axes, preferring to account for belief maintenance synchronically by the 'symbiotic' relation of theoreticians and experimenters in physics, and for change diachronically by what he calls there 'opportunism in context'.
8. 3 The 'contrasting practices of evaluation' alluded to in the opening paragraph includes a wholesale disagreement between philosophers and sociologists of science with regard to the analysis of norms. On the one hand, philosophers concern themselves with the norms qua norms, i.e. as genuine methodological 'oughts' prescribing the course of inquiry. Sociologists of science, on the other hand, take the stated norms of science descriptively, as part of a repertoire of rationalizations that can be variously deployed as the situation warrants. As Michael Mulkay put it in one early formulation of the sociological challenge, 'the standardized verbal formulations to be found in the scientific community provide a repertoire which can be used flexibly to categorise the professional actions differently in various social contexts and, presumably, in accordance with varying social interests. It seems to me misleading to refer to this diffuse repertoire of verbal formulations as the normative structure of science or to maintain that it contributes in any obvious way to the advance of scientific knowledge.' ('Norms and ideology in science', Social Science Information 15 (1976), 637-656, p. 645.) What one might call the 'full sociological turn' in science studies comes just here, with the claim that Merton's 'original functional analysis did identify a genuine social reality, but one better conceived as an ideology than as a normative structure' (ibid., p. 646) and the attendant call for social scientists to no longer accept this ideology at face value (ibid., p. 654). In this regard, the first part of this paper examines how philosophers have reacted to the sociological turn, while the second part chronicles reactions within social studies of science to some of the directions taken in this field. However, the fixed point of concern remains understanding how norms are invoked by either philosophers or sociologists by way of justifying the picture of science they produce. There are two excellent survey articles on these general issues by Steven Shapin. See his 'History of Science and Its Sociological Reconstructions', History of Science 20 (1982), 157-211, and 'Discipline and Bounding: The History and Sociology of Science as Seen Through the Externalism-Internalism Debate', History of Science 30 (1992), 333-369. A case study challenging the role of scientific method in both synchronic and diachronic accounts of belief maintenance and change is Andrew Pickering's Constructing Quarks (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984). Pickering denies an explanatory role to scientific method along both axes, preferring to account for belief maintenance synchronically by the 'symbiotic' relation of theoreticians and experimenters in physics, and for change diachronically by what he calls there 'opportunism in context'.
9. 4 Steven Shapin, 'Discipline and Bounding', op. cit., note 3.
10. 5 Ibid., p. 360.
11. 6 In M. Hollis and S. Lukes (eds), Rationality and Relativism (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1982), pp. 21-47.
12. 7 See Barry Barnes, 'How Not to Do the Sociology of Knowledge', Annals of Scholarship 8 (1991), 321-335.
13. 8 This characterization of their own position can be found in even early writings, such as Bloor's Knowledge and Social Imagery (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1976), and Barnes' Interests and the Growth of Knowledge (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977). Harry Collins embraces this characterization as well: see 'What is TRASP? The Radical Programme as a Methodological Imperative'. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 11 (1981), 215-224, esp. p. 216.
14. 8 This characterization of their own position can be found in even early writings, such as Bloor's Knowledge and Social Imagery (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1976), and Barnes' Interests and the Growth of Knowledge (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977). Harry Collins embraces this characterization as well: see 'What is TRASP? The Radical Programme as a Methodological Imperative'. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 11 (1981), 215-224, esp. p. 216.
15. 8 This characterization of their own position can be found in even early writings, such as Bloor's Knowledge and Social Imagery (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1976), and Barnes' Interests and the Growth of Knowledge (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977). Harry Collins embraces this characterization as well: see 'What is TRASP? The Radical Programme as a Methodological Imperative'. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 11 (1981), 215-224, esp. p. 216.
16. 9 Barnes and Bloor, op. cit., note 6, pp. 22-23.
17. 10 Evidence for this is the existence of the volume in which the Barnes and Bloor essay appears, op. cit., note 6.
18. 11 This is explicit in Barnes and Bloor, op. cit., note 6, p. 22.
19. 12 As will become evident later, this project is closely allied to Quine's proposal to naturalize epistemology. Collins, op. cit., note 8, explicitly contrasts what he sees as the weaknesses of rationality explanations of scientific beliefs and the merits 'hidden hand' accounts of same.
20. 13 The reason for speaking of 'so-called local factors' will become evident below. For the moment, however, the point is to emphasize that the choice of the term 'local' in the context of this dispute is to underline that the appeal, for purposes of explanation, is not to some universally applicable standard for the having of good reasons. What makes for the goodness of reasons, on the sociological account, is purely a contextual matter. If all politics is local, so too, on this view, is all acceptable reasoning.
21. 14 See Martin Hollis, 'The Social Destruction of Reality', in Hollis and Lukes, op. cit., note 6, pp. 67-86. Hollis repeats this argument in 'Social Thought and Social Action', in E. McMullin (ed.), The Social Dimension of Science (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992), pp. 68-84.
22. 14 See Martin Hollis, 'The Social Destruction of Reality', in Hollis and Lukes, op. cit., note 6, pp. 67-86. Hollis repeats this argument in 'Social Thought and Social Action', in E. McMullin (ed.), The Social Dimension of Science (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992), pp. 68-84.
23. 15 Hollis, 'The Social Destruction of Reality', op. cit., note 14, p. 67.
24. 16 Ibid., p. 69.
25. 17 Ibid.
26. 18 Ronald Giere, Explaining Science (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1988).
27. 19 Philip Kitcher, The Advancement of Science (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), and 'Contrasting Conceptions of Social Epistemology', in F. Schmitt (ed.) Socializing Epistemology (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1994), pp. 111-134.
28. 19 Philip Kitcher, The Advancement of Science (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), and 'Contrasting Conceptions of Social Epistemology', in F. Schmitt (ed.) Socializing Epistemology (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1994), pp. 111-134.
29. 20 Thomas S. Kuhn, 'The Trouble with the Historical Philosophy of Science', Robert and Maurine Rothschild Distinguished Lecture (Cambridge, MA: Department of the History of Science, Harvard University, 1992).
30. 21 Larry Laudan, 'The Pseudo-Science of Science', Philosophy of the Social Sciences 11 (1981), 173-198.
31. 22 Differences exist among philosophers regarding the role causal accounts - (a) - may play.
32. 23 See Section II below.
33. 24 See, in particular, Kitcher, op. cit., note 19, chs. 2, 3, 6 and 7. In addition to the works of Giere and Kitcher, Peter Galison offers a case study approach that favors reason explanations; see his How Experiments End (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1987).
34. 24 See, in particular, Kitcher, op. cit., note 19, chs. 2, 3, 6 and 7. In addition to the works of Giere and Kitcher, Peter Galison offers a case study approach that favors reason explanations; see his How Experiments End (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1987).
35. 25 Kuhn, op. cit., note 20, pp. 7-9.
36. 26 Laudan, op. cit., note 21. p. 176.
37. 21 Ibid., p. 184.
38. 28 Giere, op. cit., note 18, pp. 52-61, esp. pp. 52 and 56.
39. 29 Ibid., pp. 107-108.
40. 30 Kitcher, op. cit., note 19, pp. 184-185.
41. 31 Kitcher, op. cit., note 19, pp. 184-188.
42. 32 Kitcher, 'Contrasting Conceptions', op. cit., note 19, p. 122.
43. 33 Ibid., p. 120.
44. 34 Ibid.
45. 35 Ibid., p. 121.
46. 36 Ibid.
47. 37 Kitcher, op. cit., note 19, p. 186.
48. 38 Paul Roth, Meaning and Method in the Social Sciences (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987), chs 1-4, and Paul Roth, 'Politics and Epistemology: Rorty, MacIntyre, and the Ends of Philosophy', History of the Human Sciences 2 (1989), 171-191.
49. 38 Paul Roth, Meaning and Method in the Social Sciences (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987), chs 1-4, and Paul Roth, 'Politics and Epistemology: Rorty, MacIntyre, and the Ends of Philosophy', History of the Human Sciences 2 (1989), 171-191.
50. 39 'The position [regarding symmetry] we shall defend is that the incidence of all beliefs without exception calls for empirical investigation and must be accounted for by finding the specific, local causes of this credibility. This means that regardless of whether the sociologist evaluates a belief as true or rational, or as false and irrational, he must search for the causes of its credibility'. Barnes and Bloor, op. cit., note 6, p. 23.
51. 40 Questions understandably arise at this point with regard to how the philosophers just discussed manage to go, at one point or another, so awry in their characterization of the issues. My suggestion is that the 40 continued various mischaracterizations are symptomatic of a strong antipathy, certainly within philosophy of science, with respect to fully naturalizing epistemology. For, in its full-blooded Quinean form, naturalized epistemology just does replace explanations of belief in terms of agent evaluation by ones in terms of causes. It is neither an accident nor a mistake that Barnes, op. cit., note 7, recognizes Quine et al. as kindred spirits. Indeed, debates within philosophy reproduce disputes concerning the role of norms found in the debates chronicled so far. See, for example, Hilary Kornblith, 'Introduction: What is Naturalistic Epistemology?', and Jaegwon Kim, 'What is "Naturalized Epistemology"?', both in H. Kornblith (ed.), Naturalizing Epistemology, 2nd edn (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1994), pp. 1-13 and 33-56, respectively. Although the central debate about naturalizing epistemology focuses on the citing of norms vs the citing of causes, there are naturalizing accounts that stress the role of norms. See, e.g. Larry Laudan, 'Progress or Rationality? The Prospects for a Normative Naturalism', American Philosophical Quarterly 24 (1987), 19-31, or the recent book by Susan Haack, Evidence and Inquiry (Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell, 1993). Likewise, the hostile reception of Richard Rorty's work, from the publication of his Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979), is indicative of the problem. An appreciation of how philosophers shy away from the implications of naturalizing projects is found in Steve Fuller, 'Epistemology Radically Naturalized: Recovering the Normative, the Experimental, and the Social', in R. Giere (ed.), Cognitive Models of Science (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1992), pp. 427-459.
52. 40 Questions understandably arise at this point with regard to how the philosophers just discussed manage to go, at one point or another, so awry in their characterization of the issues. My suggestion is that the 40 continued various mischaracterizations are symptomatic of a strong antipathy, certainly within philosophy of science, with respect to fully naturalizing epistemology. For, in its full-blooded Quinean form, naturalized epistemology just does replace explanations of belief in terms of agent evaluation by ones in terms of causes. It is neither an accident nor a mistake that Barnes, op. cit., note 7, recognizes Quine et al. as kindred spirits. Indeed, debates within philosophy reproduce disputes concerning the role of norms found in the debates chronicled so far. See, for example, Hilary Kornblith, 'Introduction: What is Naturalistic Epistemology?', and Jaegwon Kim, 'What is "Naturalized Epistemology"?', both in H. Kornblith (ed.), Naturalizing Epistemology, 2nd edn (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1994), pp. 1-13 and 33-56, respectively. Although the central debate about naturalizing epistemology focuses on the citing of norms vs the citing of causes, there are naturalizing accounts that stress the role of norms. See, e.g. Larry Laudan, 'Progress or Rationality? The Prospects for a Normative Naturalism', American Philosophical Quarterly 24 (1987), 19-31, or the recent book by Susan Haack, Evidence and Inquiry (Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell, 1993). Likewise, the hostile reception of Richard Rorty's work, from the publication of his Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979), is indicative of the problem. An appreciation of how philosophers shy away from the implications of naturalizing projects is found in Steve Fuller, 'Epistemology Radically Naturalized: Recovering the Normative, the Experimental, and the Social', in R. Giere (ed.), Cognitive Models of Science (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1992), pp. 427-459.
53. 40 Questions understandably arise at this point with regard to how the philosophers just discussed manage to go, at one point or another, so awry in their characterization of the issues. My suggestion is that the 40 continued various mischaracterizations are symptomatic of a strong antipathy, certainly within philosophy of science, with respect to fully naturalizing epistemology. For, in its full-blooded Quinean form, naturalized epistemology just does replace explanations of belief in terms of agent evaluation by ones in terms of causes. It is neither an accident nor a mistake that Barnes, op. cit., note 7, recognizes Quine et al. as kindred spirits. Indeed, debates within philosophy reproduce disputes concerning the role of norms found in the debates chronicled so far. See, for example, Hilary Kornblith, 'Introduction: What is Naturalistic Epistemology?', and Jaegwon Kim, 'What is "Naturalized Epistemology"?', both in H. Kornblith (ed.), Naturalizing Epistemology, 2nd edn (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1994), pp. 1-13 and 33-56, respectively. Although the central debate about naturalizing epistemology focuses on the citing of norms vs the citing of causes, there are naturalizing accounts that stress the role of norms. See, e.g. Larry Laudan, 'Progress or Rationality? The Prospects for a Normative Naturalism', American Philosophical Quarterly 24 (1987), 19-31, or the recent book by Susan Haack, Evidence and Inquiry (Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell, 1993). Likewise, the hostile reception of Richard Rorty's work, from the publication of his Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979), is indicative of the problem. An appreciation of how philosophers shy away from the implications of naturalizing projects is found in Steve Fuller, 'Epistemology Radically Naturalized: Recovering the Normative, the Experimental, and the Social', in R. Giere (ed.), Cognitive Models of Science (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1992), pp. 427-459.
54. 40 Questions understandably arise at this point with regard to how the philosophers just discussed manage to go, at one point or another, so awry in their characterization of the issues. My suggestion is that the 40 continued various mischaracterizations are symptomatic of a strong antipathy, certainly within philosophy of science, with respect to fully naturalizing epistemology. For, in its full-blooded Quinean form, naturalized epistemology just does replace explanations of belief in terms of agent evaluation by ones in terms of causes. It is neither an accident nor a mistake that Barnes, op. cit., note 7, recognizes Quine et al. as kindred spirits. Indeed, debates within philosophy reproduce disputes concerning the role of norms found in the debates chronicled so far. See, for example, Hilary Kornblith, 'Introduction: What is Naturalistic Epistemology?', and Jaegwon Kim, 'What is "Naturalized Epistemology"?', both in H. Kornblith (ed.), Naturalizing Epistemology, 2nd edn (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1994), pp. 1-13 and 33-56, respectively. Although the central debate about naturalizing epistemology focuses on the citing of norms vs the citing of causes, there are naturalizing accounts that stress the role of norms. See, e.g. Larry Laudan, 'Progress or Rationality? The Prospects for a Normative Naturalism', American Philosophical Quarterly 24 (1987), 19-31, or the recent book by Susan Haack, Evidence and Inquiry (Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell, 1993). Likewise, the hostile reception of Richard Rorty's work, from the publication of his Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979), is indicative of the problem. An appreciation of how philosophers shy away from the implications of naturalizing projects is found in Steve Fuller, 'Epistemology Radically Naturalized: Recovering the Normative, the Experimental, and the Social', in R. Giere (ed.), Cognitive Models of Science (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1992), pp. 427-459.
55. 40 Questions understandably arise at this point with regard to how the philosophers just discussed manage to go, at one point or another, so awry in their characterization of the issues. My suggestion is that the 40 continued various mischaracterizations are symptomatic of a strong antipathy, certainly within philosophy of science, with respect to fully naturalizing epistemology. For, in its full-blooded Quinean form, naturalized epistemology just does replace explanations of belief in terms of agent evaluation by ones in terms of causes. It is neither an accident nor a mistake that Barnes, op. cit., note 7, recognizes Quine et al. as kindred spirits. Indeed, debates within philosophy reproduce disputes concerning the role of norms found in the debates chronicled so far. See, for example, Hilary Kornblith, 'Introduction: What is Naturalistic Epistemology?', and Jaegwon Kim, 'What is "Naturalized Epistemology"?', both in H. Kornblith (ed.), Naturalizing Epistemology, 2nd edn (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1994), pp. 1-13 and 33-56, respectively. Although the central debate about naturalizing epistemology focuses on the citing of norms vs the citing of causes, there are naturalizing accounts that stress the role of norms. See, e.g. Larry Laudan, 'Progress or Rationality? The Prospects for a Normative Naturalism', American Philosophical Quarterly 24 (1987), 19-31, or the recent book by Susan Haack, Evidence and Inquiry (Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell, 1993). Likewise, the hostile reception of Richard Rorty's work, from the publication of his Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979), is indicative of the problem. An appreciation of how philosophers shy away from the implications of naturalizing projects is found in Steve Fuller, 'Epistemology Radically Naturalized: Recovering the Normative, the Experimental, and the Social', in R. Giere (ed.), Cognitive Models of Science (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1992), pp. 427-459.
56. 40 Questions understandably arise at this point with regard to how the philosophers just discussed manage to go, at one point or another, so awry in their characterization of the issues. My suggestion is that the 40 continued various mischaracterizations are symptomatic of a strong antipathy, certainly within philosophy of science, with respect to fully naturalizing epistemology. For, in its full-blooded Quinean form, naturalized epistemology just does replace explanations of belief in terms of agent evaluation by ones in terms of causes. It is neither an accident nor a mistake that Barnes, op. cit., note 7, recognizes Quine et al. as kindred spirits. Indeed, debates within philosophy reproduce disputes concerning the role of norms found in the debates chronicled so far. See, for example, Hilary Kornblith, 'Introduction: What is Naturalistic Epistemology?', and Jaegwon Kim, 'What is "Naturalized Epistemology"?', both in H. Kornblith (ed.), Naturalizing Epistemology, 2nd edn (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1994), pp. 1-13 and 33-56, respectively. Although the central debate about naturalizing epistemology focuses on the citing of norms vs the citing of causes, there are naturalizing accounts that stress the role of norms. See, e.g. Larry Laudan, 'Progress or Rationality? The Prospects for a Normative Naturalism', American Philosophical Quarterly 24 (1987), 19-31, or the recent book by Susan Haack, Evidence and Inquiry (Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell, 1993). Likewise, the hostile reception of Richard Rorty's work, from the publication of his Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979), is indicative of the problem. An appreciation of how philosophers shy away from the implications of naturalizing projects is found in Steve Fuller, 'Epistemology Radically Naturalized: Recovering the Normative, the Experimental, and the Social', in R. Giere (ed.), Cognitive Models of Science (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1992), pp. 427-459.
57. 40 Questions understandably arise at this point with regard to how the philosophers just discussed manage to go, at one point or another, so awry in their characterization of the issues. My suggestion is that the 40 continued various mischaracterizations are symptomatic of a strong antipathy, certainly within philosophy of science, with respect to fully naturalizing epistemology. For, in its full-blooded Quinean form, naturalized epistemology just does replace explanations of belief in terms of agent evaluation by ones in terms of causes. It is neither an accident nor a mistake that Barnes, op. cit., note 7, recognizes Quine et al. as kindred spirits. Indeed, debates within philosophy reproduce disputes concerning the role of norms found in the debates chronicled so far. See, for example, Hilary Kornblith, 'Introduction: What is Naturalistic Epistemology?', and Jaegwon Kim, 'What is "Naturalized Epistemology"?', both in H. Kornblith (ed.), Naturalizing Epistemology, 2nd edn (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1994), pp. 1-13 and 33-56, respectively. Although the central debate about naturalizing epistemology focuses on the citing of norms vs the citing of causes, there are naturalizing accounts that stress the role of norms. See, e.g. Larry Laudan, 'Progress or Rationality? The Prospects for a Normative Naturalism', American Philosophical Quarterly 24 (1987), 19-31, or the recent book by Susan Haack, Evidence and Inquiry (Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell, 1993). Likewise, the hostile reception of Richard Rorty's work, from the publication of his Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979), is indicative of the problem. An appreciation of how philosophers shy away from the implications of naturalizing projects is found in Steve Fuller, 'Epistemology Radically Naturalized: Recovering the Normative, the Experimental, and the Social', in R. Giere (ed.), Cognitive Models of Science (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1992), pp. 427-459.
58. 41James Bohman, The New Philosophy of Social Science (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991), ch. 1. See also W. Newton-Smith, The Rationality of Science (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981), ch. X, esp. section 7, for similar conclusions on the strong programme conception of science and, especially, causality.
59. 41James Bohman, The New Philosophy of Social Science (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991), ch. 1. See also W. Newton-Smith, The Rationality of Science (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981), ch. X, esp. section 7, for similar conclusions on the strong programme conception of science and, especially, causality.
60. 42Indeed, despite their regular recourse to and dependence on skeptical arguments, the socio-logists in question hardly count as skeptics either. They are not skeptics inasmuch as the skeptical lessons about reasoning are quite general, applying to efforts to justify all purported first principles, including imputations of causal connections. The SSK ignores the reach of skepticism altogether.
61. 43 This section expands upon and revises some material from my 'What Does the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge Explain? or, When Epistemological Chickens Come Home to Roost,' History of the Human Sciences 7 (1994), 95-108.
62. 44 Giere, op. cit., note 18, p. 109, notes, like Hollis, the Humean propensities of the sociologists. While I discuss this more below, one more irony in this debate is the extent to which writers in the SSK tradition, imagining themselves to represent the 'overcoming' of positivism, in actuality attempt to redo strict empiricism in sociological dress.
63. 45 Oddly, Barnes and Bloor use Humean critiques to justify preferring causal explanation over ones in terms of justification by reasons, without appearing to recognize that the same problems reappear for their own favored strategy. Barnes and Bloor, op. cit., note 6, pp. 40-47.
64. 46 In ch. 8 of my Meaning and Method in the Social Sciences, op. cit., note 38, I also critique the fast and easy way that SSK has with its account of causality, but from a different perspective than that urged here.
65. 47 These issues are well canvassed in Stephen Turner (ed.), Causality in Crisis (Proceedings of Conference on 'Causality in Crisis', Notre Dame, Indiana, 15-17 October 1993), forthcoming. See, in particular, the papers by Stephen Turner and Daniel Freedman.
66. 48 See the 'Afterword' to David Bloor, Knowledge and Social Imagery, 2nd edn (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1991), pp. 163-185.
67. 49 Ibid., p. 166.
68. 50 Ibid., p. 167.
69. 51 Rather oddly, Bloor offers, as a counter example to this well-known philosophical scoff, the following: 'All concept application is contestable and negotiable, and all accepted applications have the character of social institutions' (ibid., p. 167). The problem here, apart from quibbling over what counts as a scientific law, is that this does not appear to go anywhere to providing the causal explanations, underwritten by laws, which are called for by the strong programme.
70. 52 Discussions of relativism has too often sidetracked debate away from the issue of whether the explanations offered by the numerous SSK studies deliver the particular type of explanation promised. As Bloor insists, sociologists offer explanations 'in the same causal idiom as those of any other scientist. Their concern will be to locate the regularities and general principles or processes which appear to be at work within the field of their data. The aim will be to build theories to explain these regularities.' Bloor, op. cit., note 48, p. 5. The aim, in short, is to be scientists.
71. 53 This dispute has smoldered for a number of years, flaring up now and again in journal articles and conferences. A recent, sustained flare-up can be found in various essays in Andrew Pickering (ed.), Science as Practice and Culture (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1992).
72. 54 See, in particular, the essays by Woolgar, Latour and Callon, and Collins and Yearley in Pickering, op. cit., note 53.
73. 55 Consider, in this regard, the following remark: '. . . the only observables are the traces left by objects, arguments, skills, and tokens circulating through the collective. We never see either social relations or things. We may only document the circulation of network-tracing tokens, statements, and skills. This is so important that one of us made it the first principle of science studies [reference to Latour]. Although we have not yet fully articulated this argument, it is the basis of our empirical methods.' M. Callon and B. Latour, 'Don't Throw the Baby out with the Bath School!: A Reply to Collins and Yearley', in Pickering, op. cit., note 41, p. 351. The 'more-empirical-than-thou' tone to much of the controversy here is philosophically fascinating. It suggests a strangely unreflexive (extremely odd, in fact, given that one of the authors here is Latour) invoking of some form of the theory/observation distinction. In this respect, Steve Woolgar takes a much more philosophically/skeptically consistent line in his, 'Some Remarks about Positionism: A Reply to Collins and Yearley', in Pickering, op. cit., note 53, pp. 327-342.
74. 55 Consider, in this regard, the following remark: '. . . the only observables are the traces left by objects, arguments, skills, and tokens circulating through the collective. We never see either social relations or things. We may only document the circulation of network-tracing tokens, statements, and skills. This is so important that one of us made it the first principle of science studies [reference to Latour]. Although we have not yet fully articulated this argument, it is the basis of our empirical methods.' M. Callon and B. Latour, 'Don't Throw the Baby out with the Bath School!: A Reply to Collins and Yearley', in Pickering, op. cit., note 41, p. 351. The 'more-empirical-than-thou' tone to much of the controversy here is philosophically fascinating. It suggests a strangely unreflexive (extremely odd, in fact, given that one of the authors here is Latour) invoking of some form of the theory/observation distinction. In this respect, Steve Woolgar takes a much more philosophically/skeptically consistent line in his, 'Some Remarks about Positionism: A Reply to Collins and Yearley', in Pickering, op. cit., note 53, pp. 327-342.
75. 55 Consider, in this regard, the following remark: '. . . the only observables are the traces left by objects, arguments, skills, and tokens circulating through the collective. We never see either social relations or things. We may only document the circulation of network-tracing tokens, statements, and skills. This is so important that one of us made it the first principle of science studies [reference to Latour]. Although we have not yet fully articulated this argument, it is the basis of our empirical methods.' M. Callon and B. Latour, 'Don't Throw the Baby out with the Bath School!: A Reply to Collins and Yearley', in Pickering, op. cit., note 41, p. 351. The 'more-empirical-than-thou' tone to much of the controversy here is philosophically fascinating. It suggests a strangely unreflexive (extremely odd, in fact, given that one of the authors here is Latour) invoking of some form of the theory/observation distinction. In this respect, Steve Woolgar takes a much more philosophically/skeptically consistent line in his, 'Some Remarks about Positionism: A Reply to Collins and Yearley', in Pickering, op. cit., note 53, pp. 327-342.
76. 55 Consider, in this regard, the following remark: '. . . the only observables are the traces left by objects, arguments, skills, and tokens circulating through the collective. We never see either social relations or things. We may only document the circulation of network-tracing tokens, statements, and skills. This is so important that one of us made it the first principle of science studies [reference to Latour]. Although we have not yet fully articulated this argument, it is the basis of our empirical methods.' M. Callon and B. Latour, 'Don't Throw the Baby out with the Bath School!: A Reply to Collins and Yearley', in Pickering, op. cit., note 41, p. 351. The 'more-empirical-than-thou' tone to much of the controversy here is philosophically fascinating. It suggests a strangely unreflexive (extremely odd, in fact, given that one of the authors here is Latour) invoking of some form of the theory/observation distinction. In this respect, Steve Woolgar takes a much more philosophically/skeptically consistent line in his, 'Some Remarks about Positionism: A Reply to Collins and Yearley', in Pickering, op. cit., note 53, pp. 327-342.
77. 56 Harry Collins and Steve Yearley, 'Epistemological Chicken', in Pickering, op. cit., note 53, p. 309.
78. 56 Harry Collins and Steve Yearley, 'Epistemological Chicken', in Pickering, op. cit., note 53, p. 309.
79. 57 Ibid.
80. 58 Harry Collins and Steve Yearley, 'Journey into Space', in Pickering, op. cit., note 53, p. 372.
81. 58 Harry Collins and Steve Yearley, 'Journey into Space', in Pickering, op. cit., note 53, p. 372.
82. 59 Ibid., p. 384.
83. 60 By 'scientism' I mean the view that all and only the methods of natural science are appropriate to the study of all subject matters. What is scientistic, in this respect, about the position Collins and Yearley defend is the assumption that only the 'method of science' - however they would spell that out - is appropriate to the study of human social behavior.
84. 61 For a brief consideration of the problems here, see the 'Introduction', in A. J. Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, 2nd edn (New York: Dover Publications, 1952). This edition was originally published in 1946.
85. 62 Collins and Yearley, op. cit., note 53, pp. 308-309.
86. 63 Ibid., p. 309.
87. 64 There is a further deep puzzle here. Collins and Yearley speak of three methods for making progress with regard to our relation to 'machines and other artifacts'. These are the methods of modeling, natural science, and that of the SSK. 'What sociology of scientific knowledge provides is a third method, no longer subservient to accounts of the work of the scientists and technologists and the stories of philosophers but rooted in special understanding of social life' (ibid., p. 321 ). What is puzzling is that this method is explicitly contrasted with 'the false ally of the counterfactual method' (ibid.). Yet causal explanations are taken to support counterfactuals - if being exposed to a virus caused Jones' disease, then, presumably, if not exposed, Jones would not have had the disease. More generally, in non-laboratory sciences, explanations that could not support counterfactuals would not usually be thought to be providing causal explanations at all. If, as Collins and Yearley complain, in 'their emphasis on form, the reflexivity and actor-network theory approaches both exclude explanation', (ibid., p. 323) it is difficult to see where Collins and Yearley imagine their account provides for it.
88. 64 There is a further deep puzzle here. Collins and Yearley speak of three methods for making progress with regard to our relation to 'machines and other artifacts'. These are the methods of modeling, natural science, and that of the SSK. 'What sociology of scientific knowledge provides is a third method, no longer subservient to accounts of the work of the scientists and technologists and the stories of philosophers but rooted in special understanding of social life' (ibid., p. 321 ). What is puzzling is that this method is explicitly contrasted with 'the false ally of the counterfactual method' (ibid.). Yet causal explanations are taken to support counterfactuals - if being exposed to a virus caused Jones' disease, then, presumably, if not exposed, Jones would not have had the disease. More generally, in non-laboratory sciences, explanations that could not support counterfactuals would not usually be thought to be providing causal explanations at all. If, as Collins and Yearley complain, in 'their emphasis on form, the reflexivity and actor-network theory approaches both exclude explanation', (ibid., p. 323) it is difficult to see where Collins and Yearley imagine their account provides for it.
89. 64 There is a further deep puzzle here. Collins and Yearley speak of three methods for making progress with regard to our relation to 'machines and other artifacts'. These are the methods of modeling, natural science, and that of the SSK. 'What sociology of scientific knowledge provides is a third method, no longer subservient to accounts of the work of the scientists and technologists and the stories of philosophers but rooted in special understanding of social life' (ibid., p. 321 ). What is puzzling is that this method is explicitly contrasted with 'the false ally of the counterfactual method' (ibid.). Yet causal explanations are taken to support counterfactuals - if being exposed to a virus caused Jones' disease, then, presumably, if not exposed, Jones would not have had the disease. More generally, in non-laboratory sciences, explanations that could not support counterfactuals would not usually be thought to be providing causal explanations at all. If, as Collins and Yearley complain, in 'their emphasis on form, the reflexivity and actor-network theory approaches both exclude explanation', (ibid., p. 323) it is difficult to see where Collins and Yearley imagine their account provides for it.
90. 65 Collins and Yearley, op. cit., note 58, p. 381.
91. 66 These comments also exhibits the favorite fallacious argument form of the SSK - argumentum ad hominem. No one should be cowed by this SSK version of guilt by association. Find an aspect of an opponent's position that is also some view that any positivist ever held and, voilà, the argument is refuted. In this case, the fact that positivists made light of claims to understanding does not show, now that we are all properly post-positivist, that suddenly all is well with the so-called method of empathetic identification. Collins and Yearley are correct to maintain that there is nothing particularly methodologically outré about an appeal to unobservables. However, when the appeal is for the purpose of justifying one's entire way of proceeding, without additional empirical check, then some more compelling reasons for accepting the posit is needed. Use of this argument form is also rampant in Pickering's work. See, for example, Andrew Pickering, 'Philosophy Naturalized a Bit', Social Studies of Science 21 (1991), 575-585. Setting up straw man positivists and knocking them down occupies most of Pickering's 'Knowledge, Practice and Mere Construction', Social Studies of Science 20 (1990), 682-729.
92. 66 These comments also exhibits the favorite fallacious argument form of the SSK - argumentum ad hominem. No one should be cowed by this SSK version of guilt by association. Find an aspect of an opponent's position that is also some view that any positivist ever held and, voilà, the argument is refuted. In this case, the fact that positivists made light of claims to understanding does not show, now that we are all properly post-positivist, that suddenly all is well with the so-called method of empathetic identification. Collins and Yearley are correct to maintain that there is nothing particularly methodologically outré about an appeal to unobservables. However, when the appeal is for the purpose of justifying one's entire way of proceeding, without additional empirical check, then some more compelling reasons for accepting the posit is needed. Use of this argument form is also rampant in Pickering's work. See, for example, Andrew Pickering, 'Philosophy Naturalized a Bit', Social Studies of Science 21 (1991), 575-585. Setting up straw man positivists and knocking them down occupies most of Pickering's 'Knowledge, Practice and Mere Construction', Social Studies of Science 20 (1990), 682-729.
93. 67 Of course, there is a method textbooks call 'participant observation', and a vast literature on qualitative research generally. The sense in which invoking 'participation in forms of life' represents a claim and not a method is the one most directly relevant to the debate, i.e. the question of the purported objectivity/reliability/validity of these forms of study. There is no need to rehearse the Methodenstreit to make the point that there exists no consensus on the validity of such methods. The crisis in anthropology induced by post-modern critiques of ethnographies concerns precisely this point, i.e. the 'scientific standing' of ethnographic methods such as participant observation. Nice historical work on the development of this style of research method in British and American anthropology and sociology can be found in the writings of Jennifer Platt, e.g. 'The Development of the "Participant Observation" Method in Sociology', Journal of the History of the Behavioural Sciences 19 (1983), 379-393, and her 'The Chicago School and Firsthand Data', History of the Human Sciences 7 (1994), 57-80. The claim that appeal to these methods is the basis of a crisis in social science, not its resolution, is generally accepted. See, e.g. the section on the 'Crisis of Representation' in the 'Introduction', Handbook of Qualitative Research, N. K. Denzin and Y. S. Lincoln (eds) (London: Sage, 1994), pp. 9-11. This essay also contains an extensive bibliography to the relevant literature. See also, 'Qualitative Methods: Their History in Sociology and Anthropology', A. J. Vidich and S. M. Lyman, ibid., pp. 23-49, but especially p. 41 ff. Relevant also are sources cited in note 70 below. For balanced general historical overviews of this particular controversy, insofar as it concerns the status and the nature of the distinction between the Geisteswissenschaften and the Naturwissenschaften, see J. Habermas, On the Logic of the Social Sciences (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1988), or K.-O. Apel, Understanding and Explanation (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1984).
94. 67 Of course, there is a method textbooks call 'participant observation', and a vast literature on qualitative research generally. The sense in which invoking 'participation in forms of life' represents a claim and not a method is the one most directly relevant to the debate, i.e. the question of the purported objectivity/reliability/validity of these forms of study. There is no need to rehearse the Methodenstreit to make the point that there exists no consensus on the validity of such methods. The crisis in anthropology induced by post-modern critiques of ethnographies concerns precisely this point, i.e. the 'scientific standing' of ethnographic methods such as participant observation. Nice historical work on the development of this style of research method in British and American anthropology and sociology can be found in the writings of Jennifer Platt, e.g. 'The Development of the "Participant Observation" Method in Sociology', Journal of the History of the Behavioural Sciences 19 (1983), 379-393, and her 'The Chicago School and Firsthand Data', History of the Human Sciences 7 (1994), 57-80. The claim that appeal to these methods is the basis of a crisis in social science, not its resolution, is generally accepted. See, e.g. the section on the 'Crisis of Representation' in the 'Introduction', Handbook of Qualitative Research, N. K. Denzin and Y. S. Lincoln (eds) (London: Sage, 1994), pp. 9-11. This essay also contains an extensive bibliography to the relevant literature. See also, 'Qualitative Methods: Their History in Sociology and Anthropology', A. J. Vidich and S. M. Lyman, ibid., pp. 23-49, but especially p. 41 ff. Relevant also are sources cited in note 70 below. For balanced general historical overviews of this particular controversy, insofar as it concerns the status and the nature of the distinction between the Geisteswissenschaften and the Naturwissenschaften, see J. Habermas, On the Logic of the Social Sciences (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1988), or K.-O. Apel, Understanding and Explanation (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1984).
95. 67 Of course, there is a method textbooks call 'participant observation', and a vast literature on qualitative research generally. The sense in which invoking 'participation in forms of life' represents a claim and not a method is the one most directly relevant to the debate, i.e. the question of the purported objectivity/reliability/validity of these forms of study. There is no need to rehearse the Methodenstreit to make the point that there exists no consensus on the validity of such methods. The crisis in anthropology induced by post-modern critiques of ethnographies concerns precisely this point, i.e. the 'scientific standing' of ethnographic methods such as participant observation. Nice historical work on the development of this style of research method in British and American anthropology and sociology can be found in the writings of Jennifer Platt, e.g. 'The Development of the "Participant Observation" Method in Sociology', Journal of the History of the Behavioural Sciences 19 (1983), 379-393, and her 'The Chicago School and Firsthand Data', History of the Human Sciences 7 (1994), 57-80. The claim that appeal to these methods is the basis of a crisis in social science, not its resolution, is generally accepted. See, e.g. the section on the 'Crisis of Representation' in the 'Introduction', Handbook of Qualitative Research, N. K. Denzin and Y. S. Lincoln (eds) (London: Sage, 1994), pp. 9-11. This essay also contains an extensive bibliography to the relevant literature. See also, 'Qualitative Methods: Their History in Sociology and Anthropology', A. J. Vidich and S. M. Lyman, ibid., pp. 23-49, but especially p. 41 ff. Relevant also are sources cited in note 70 below. For balanced general historical overviews of this particular controversy, insofar as it concerns the status and the nature of the distinction between the Geisteswissenschaften and the Naturwissenschaften, see J. Habermas, On the Logic of the Social Sciences (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1988), or K.-O. Apel, Understanding and Explanation (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1984).
96. 67 Of course, there is a method textbooks call 'participant observation', and a vast literature on qualitative research generally. The sense in which invoking 'participation in forms of life' represents a claim and not a method is the one most directly relevant to the debate, i.e. the question of the purported objectivity/reliability/validity of these forms of study. There is no need to rehearse the Methodenstreit to make the point that there exists no consensus on the validity of such methods. The crisis in anthropology induced by post-modern critiques of ethnographies concerns precisely this point, i.e. the 'scientific standing' of ethnographic methods such as participant observation. Nice historical work on the development of this style of research method in British and American anthropology and sociology can be found in the writings of Jennifer Platt, e.g. 'The Development of the "Participant Observation" Method in Sociology', Journal of the History of the Behavioural Sciences 19 (1983), 379-393, and her 'The Chicago School and Firsthand Data', History of the Human Sciences 7 (1994), 57-80. The claim that appeal to these methods is the basis of a crisis in social science, not its resolution, is generally accepted. See, e.g. the section on the 'Crisis of Representation' in the 'Introduction', Handbook of Qualitative Research, N. K. Denzin and Y. S. Lincoln (eds) (London: Sage, 1994), pp. 9-11. This essay also contains an extensive bibliography to the relevant literature. See also, 'Qualitative Methods: Their History in Sociology and Anthropology', A. J. Vidich and S. M. Lyman, ibid., pp. 23-49, but especially p. 41 ff. Relevant also are sources cited in note 70 below. For balanced general historical overviews of this particular controversy, insofar as it concerns the status and the nature of the distinction between the Geisteswissenschaften and the Naturwissenschaften, see J. Habermas, On the Logic of the Social Sciences (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1988), or K.-O. Apel, Understanding and Explanation (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1984).
97. 67 Of course, there is a method textbooks call 'participant observation', and a vast literature on qualitative research generally. The sense in which invoking 'participation in forms of life' represents a claim and not a method is the one most directly relevant to the debate, i.e. the question of the purported objectivity/reliability/validity of these forms of study. There is no need to rehearse the Methodenstreit to make the point that there exists no consensus on the validity of such methods. The crisis in anthropology induced by post-modern critiques of ethnographies concerns precisely this point, i.e. the 'scientific standing' of ethnographic methods such as participant observation. Nice historical work on the development of this style of research method in British and American anthropology and sociology can be found in the writings of Jennifer Platt, e.g. 'The Development of the "Participant Observation" Method in Sociology', Journal of the History of the Behavioural Sciences 19 (1983), 379-393, and her 'The Chicago School and Firsthand Data', History of the Human Sciences 7 (1994), 57-80. The claim that appeal to these methods is the basis of a crisis in social science, not its resolution, is generally accepted. See, e.g. the section on the 'Crisis of Representation' in the 'Introduction', Handbook of Qualitative Research, N. K. Denzin and Y. S. Lincoln (eds) (London: Sage, 1994), pp. 9-11. This essay also contains an extensive bibliography to the relevant literature. See also, 'Qualitative Methods: Their History in Sociology and Anthropology', A. J. Vidich and S. M. Lyman, ibid., pp. 23-49, but especially p. 41 ff. Relevant also are sources cited in note 70 below. For balanced general historical overviews of this particular controversy, insofar as it concerns the status and the nature of the distinction between the Geisteswissenschaften and the Naturwissenschaften, see J. Habermas, On the Logic of the Social Sciences (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1988), or K.-O. Apel, Understanding and Explanation (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1984).
98. 67 Of course, there is a method textbooks call 'participant observation', and a vast literature on qualitative research generally. The sense in which invoking 'participation in forms of life' represents a claim and not a method is the one most directly relevant to the debate, i.e. the question of the purported objectivity/reliability/validity of these forms of study. There is no need to rehearse the Methodenstreit to make the point that there exists no consensus on the validity of such methods. The crisis in anthropology induced by post-modern critiques of ethnographies concerns precisely this point, i.e. the 'scientific standing' of ethnographic methods such as participant observation. Nice historical work on the development of this style of research method in British and American anthropology and sociology can be found in the writings of Jennifer Platt, e.g. 'The Development of the "Participant Observation" Method in Sociology', Journal of the History of the Behavioural Sciences 19 (1983), 379-393, and her 'The Chicago School and Firsthand Data', History of the Human Sciences 7 (1994), 57-80. The claim that appeal to these methods is the basis of a crisis in social science, not its resolution, is generally accepted. See, e.g. the section on the 'Crisis of Representation' in the 'Introduction', Handbook of Qualitative Research, N. K. Denzin and Y. S. Lincoln (eds) (London: Sage, 1994), pp. 9-11. This essay also contains an extensive bibliography to the relevant literature. See also, 'Qualitative Methods: Their History in Sociology and Anthropology', A. J. Vidich and S. M. Lyman, ibid., pp. 23-49, but especially p. 41 ff. Relevant also are sources cited in note 70 below. For balanced general historical overviews of this particular controversy, insofar as it concerns the status and the nature of the distinction between the Geisteswissenschaften and the Naturwissenschaften, see J. Habermas, On the Logic of the Social Sciences (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1988), or K.-O. Apel, Understanding and Explanation (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1984).
99. 68 Shapin, 'Discipline and Bounding,' op. cit., note 3, p. 354.
100. 69 Ibid.
101. 70 Ibid., p. 353. This despite Shapin's characteristically candid acknowledgement of the shortcomings of his preferred approach on the critical issue of causality: see especially pp. 345-351). While Shapin cites as exemplary here S. Schaffer and S. Shapin's Leviathan and the Air Pump (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985), it is instructive to note how their account can be challenged by another self-professed naturalist and read to the advantage of a more philosophical account, i.e. one that emphasizes just the factors as determinative that Shapin would discount. See the discussion in P. Kitcher's The Advancement of Science, op. cit., note 19, pp. 294-302. The point here is that the historical data too are underdetermined and so can be read to many different effects. If the issue is who has the best explanation of the shape which scientific practice takes, appeals to historicist matters hardly strengthens the SSK position. The problems with a historicist methodology are well canvassed by historians. See, for example, the magisterial work by G. Iggers, The German Conception of History (Middletown, CT.: Wesleyan University Press, 1968). One might say that the time has come for the SSK to stop worrying about Karl Popper 70 continued et al. and start thinking seriously about their relation to Hayden White. Although not directly tied to the issues of this paper, I remain fascinated how the two most influential schools pursuing social constructivism-those who, like the SSK, claim to follow Kuhn and those who take their lead, rather, from Hayden White and various schools of semiotics (see, e.g. work by James Clifford in anthropology)-ply their trades in apparent ignorance of one another. Moreover, the types of relativism to which each school subscribes show important differences as well. For an account of how the notion of historical objectivity has played out on the American scene, told in a way in which the SSK ought to be sympathetic, see P. Novick, That Noble Dream: The 'Objectivity Question' and the American Historical Profession (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988). Novick's book should convince them that attempts to found their account of scientific objectivity on historicist notions is building on quicksand.
102. 70 Ibid., p. 353. This despite Shapin's characteristically candid acknowledgement of the shortcomings of his preferred approach on the critical issue of causality: see especially pp. 345-351). While Shapin cites as exemplary here S. Schaffer and S. Shapin's Leviathan and the Air Pump (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985), it is instructive to note how their account can be challenged by another self-professed naturalist and read to the advantage of a more philosophical account, i.e. one that emphasizes just the factors as determinative that Shapin would discount. See the discussion in P. Kitcher's The Advancement of Science, op. cit., note 19, pp. 294-302. The point here is that the historical data too are underdetermined and so can be read to many different effects. If the issue is who has the best explanation of the shape which scientific practice takes, appeals to historicist matters hardly strengthens the SSK position. The problems with a historicist methodology are well canvassed by historians. See, for example, the magisterial work by G. Iggers, The German Conception of History (Middletown, CT.: Wesleyan University Press, 1968). One might say that the time has come for the SSK to stop worrying about Karl Popper 70 continued et al. and start thinking seriously about their relation to Hayden White. Although not directly tied to the issues of this paper, I remain fascinated how the two most influential schools pursuing social constructivism-those who, like the SSK, claim to follow Kuhn and those who take their lead, rather, from Hayden White and various schools of semiotics (see, e.g. work by James Clifford in anthropology)-ply their trades in apparent ignorance of one another. Moreover, the types of relativism to which each school subscribes show important differences as well. For an account of how the notion of historical objectivity has played out on the American scene, told in a way in which the SSK ought to be sympathetic, see P. Novick, That Noble Dream: The 'Objectivity Question' and the American Historical Profession (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988). Novick's book should convince them that attempts to found their account of scientific objectivity on historicist notions is building on quicksand.
103. 70 Ibid., p. 353. This despite Shapin's characteristically candid acknowledgement of the shortcomings of his preferred approach on the critical issue of causality: see especially pp. 345-351). While Shapin cites as exemplary here S. Schaffer and S. Shapin's Leviathan and the Air Pump (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985), it is instructive to note how their account can be challenged by another self-professed naturalist and read to the advantage of a more philosophical account, i.e. one that emphasizes just the factors as determinative that Shapin would discount. See the discussion in P. Kitcher's The Advancement of Science, op. cit., note 19, pp. 294-302. The point here is that the historical data too are underdetermined and so can be read to many different effects. If the issue is who has the best explanation of the shape which scientific practice takes, appeals to historicist matters hardly strengthens the SSK position. The problems with a historicist methodology are well canvassed by historians. See, for example, the magisterial work by G. Iggers, The German Conception of History (Middletown, CT.: Wesleyan University Press, 1968). One might say that the time has come for the SSK to stop worrying about Karl Popper 70 continued et al. and start thinking seriously about their relation to Hayden White. Although not directly tied to the issues of this paper, I remain fascinated how the two most influential schools pursuing social constructivism-those who, like the SSK, claim to follow Kuhn and those who take their lead, rather, from Hayden White and various schools of semiotics (see, e.g. work by James Clifford in anthropology)-ply their trades in apparent ignorance of one another. Moreover, the types of relativism to which each school subscribes show important differences as well. For an account of how the notion of historical objectivity has played out on the American scene, told in a way in which the SSK ought to be sympathetic, see P. Novick, That Noble Dream: The 'Objectivity Question' and the American Historical Profession (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988). Novick's book should convince them that attempts to found their account of scientific objectivity on historicist notions is building on quicksand.
104. 70 Ibid., p. 353. This despite Shapin's characteristically candid acknowledgement of the shortcomings of his preferred approach on the critical issue of causality: see especially pp. 345-351). While Shapin cites as exemplary here S. Schaffer and S. Shapin's Leviathan and the Air Pump (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985), it is instructive to note how their account can be challenged by another self-professed naturalist and read to the advantage of a more philosophical account, i.e. one that emphasizes just the factors as determinative that Shapin would discount. See the discussion in P. Kitcher's The Advancement of Science, op. cit., note 19, pp. 294-302. The point here is that the historical data too are underdetermined and so can be read to many different effects. If the issue is who has the best explanation of the shape which scientific practice takes, appeals to historicist matters hardly strengthens the SSK position. The problems with a historicist methodology are well canvassed by historians. See, for example, the magisterial work by G. Iggers, The German Conception of History (Middletown, CT.: Wesleyan University Press, 1968). One might say that the time has come for the SSK to stop worrying about Karl Popper 70 continued et al. and start thinking seriously about their relation to Hayden White. Although not directly tied to the issues of this paper, I remain fascinated how the two most influential schools pursuing social constructivism-those who, like the SSK, claim to follow Kuhn and those who take their lead, rather, from Hayden White and various schools of semiotics (see, e.g. work by James Clifford in anthropology)-ply their trades in apparent ignorance of one another. Moreover, the types of relativism to which each school subscribes show important differences as well. For an account of how the notion of historical objectivity has played out on the American scene, told in a way in which the SSK ought to be sympathetic, see P. Novick, That Noble Dream: The 'Objectivity Question' and the American Historical Profession (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988). Novick's book should convince them that attempts to found their account of scientific objectivity on historicist notions is building on quicksand.
105. 70 Ibid., p. 353. This despite Shapin's characteristically candid acknowledgement of the shortcomings of his preferred approach on the critical issue of causality: see especially pp. 345-351). While Shapin cites as exemplary here S. Schaffer and S. Shapin's Leviathan and the Air Pump (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985), it is instructive to note how their account can be challenged by another self-professed naturalist and read to the advantage of a more philosophical account, i.e. one that emphasizes just the factors as determinative that Shapin would discount. See the discussion in P. Kitcher's The Advancement of Science, op. cit., note 19, pp. 294-302. The point here is that the historical data too are underdetermined and so can be read to many different effects. If the issue is who has the best explanation of the shape which scientific practice takes, appeals to historicist matters hardly strengthens the SSK position. The problems with a historicist methodology are well canvassed by historians. See, for example, the magisterial work by G. Iggers, The German Conception of History (Middletown, CT.: Wesleyan University Press, 1968). One might say that the time has come for the SSK to stop worrying about Karl Popper 70 continued et al. and start thinking seriously about their relation to Hayden White. Although not directly tied to the issues of this paper, I remain fascinated how the two most influential schools pursuing social constructivism-those who, like the SSK, claim to follow Kuhn and those who take their lead, rather, from Hayden White and various schools of semiotics (see, e.g. work by James Clifford in anthropology)-ply their trades in apparent ignorance of one another. Moreover, the types of relativism to which each school subscribes show important differences as well. For an account of how the notion of historical objectivity has played out on the American scene, told in a way in which the SSK ought to be sympathetic, see P. Novick, That Noble Dream: The 'Objectivity Question' and the American Historical Profession (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988). Novick's book should convince them that attempts to found their account of scientific objectivity on historicist notions is building on quicksand.
106. 71 Andrew Pickering, 'Objectivity and the Mangle of Practice', Annals of Scholarship 8 (1991), 409-425
107. 72 Ibid, p. 411.
108. 73 Ibid., p. 412.
109. 74 The notion of mangle is to emphasize the contingent nature of scientific productions, how they are jury-rigged rather than constructed by some cook-book of scientific method. 'The particular resistances and accommodations that give content to this new instrument, fact or theory, arise unpredictably in the real-time of scientific practice and cannot be explained by reference to any catalog of enduring regulatory principles. What emerges from the mangle has therefore a truly historical character, and this is what I mean by describing the appreciation of knowledge outlined here as a historicist one' (ibid.). 'Historicist', for Pickering, connects then to the gloss by Shapin cited above; the point is to emphasize the localism and particularity of the object or theory under discussion.
110. 75 Pickering, 'Philosophy Naturalized a Bit', op. cit., note 66, p. 578.
111. 76 R. Giere, 'The Cognitive Construction of Scientific Knowledge: Response to Pickering', Social Studies of Science 22 (1992), 100-101.
112. 77 See A. Pickering and A. Stephanides, 'Constructing Quaternions: On the Analysis of Conceptual Practice', in Pickering, op. cit., note 53, pp. 139-167; see particularly p. 163, fns. 23 and 24.
113. 77 See A. Pickering and A. Stephanides, 'Constructing Quaternions: On the Analysis of Conceptual Practice', in Pickering, op. cit., note 53, pp. 139-167; see particularly p. 163, fns. 23 and 24.
114. 78 Alan Nelson suggests a similar conclusion, although his argument for it travels a path very different from the one sketched here. Nelson notes, regarding the arguments for explanatory priority waged between social constructivists and scientific rationalists, that the dispute may well be rationally irresolvable. 'Perhaps it would be better to say that there should not really be a dispute. Rationalists are determined to interpret the history of science such that the really rational choices always prevail in the long run, and since some of them are ingenious, they will succeed by their own lights. Constructivists are just as determined and ingenious, and will enjoy equal success.' Alan Nelson, 'How Could Scientific Facts be Socially Constructed?', Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 25 (1994), 537-547, p. 546.
115. 79 See the etymological reflections in Sydney Ross, 'Scientist: The Story of a Word', Annals of Science 18 (1962), 65-85, esp. p. 72. Ross's comments in the last three pages of his article make plain how the notion of scientist is parasitic on the belief in a special method owing to the practices of the natural sciences and generalizable to other disciplines as well.
116. 80 See, for example, Andrew Cunningham and Perry Williams, 'De-centering the "big picture" ', British Journal for the History of Science 26 (1993), pp. 407-432, esp. p. 411. Philip Kitcher offers a nice characterization of this view in the first chapter, 'Legend's Legacy', of his The Advancement of Science, op. cit., note 19. Kitcher appreciates the extent to which the SSK arguments are skeptical ones in the service of rejecting rationality-based explanations in particular, and progressive evaluations of the scientific enterprise in general.
117. 80 See, for example, Andrew Cunningham and Perry Williams, 'De-centering the "big picture" ', British Journal for the History of Science 26 (1993), pp. 407-432, esp. p. 411. Philip Kitcher offers a nice characterization of this view in the first chapter, 'Legend's Legacy', of his The Advancement of Science, op. cit., note 19. Kitcher appreciates the extent to which the SSK arguments are skeptical ones in the service of rejecting rationality-based explanations in particular, and progressive evaluations of the scientific enterprise in general.
118. 81 In this regard, Barnes, op. cit., note 7, correctly links SSK with the naturalizing push in philosophy, especially as found in the writings of Quine. For Quine too endorses the Humean project of explaining what people believe, including all of natural science, by using science to provide causal accounts of these beliefs. Quine, of course, claims that the apparent circularity of this project is benign once one surrenders the hope of doing 'first philosophy', i.e. justifying the practice of science from some standpoint independent of and firmer than our scientific practices themselves. The locus classicus here is Quine's essay, 'Epistemology Naturalized', in Ontological Relativity (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), pp. 69-90.
119. 81 In this regard, Barnes, op. cit., note 7, correctly links SSK with the naturalizing push in philosophy, especially as found in the writings of Quine. For Quine too endorses the Humean project of explaining what people believe, including all of natural science, by using science to provide causal accounts of these beliefs. Quine, of course, claims that the apparent circularity of this project is benign once one surrenders the hope of doing 'first philosophy', i.e. justifying the practice of science from some standpoint independent of and firmer than our scientific practices themselves. The locus classicus here is Quine's essay, 'Epistemology Naturalized', in Ontological Relativity (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), pp. 69-90.
120. 82 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
121. 84 From the frontispiece.
122. 84 Ibid., p. 143.
123. 85 Ibid., p. 144.
124. 86 Kuhn, op. cit., note 20, p. 18.
125. 87Kuhn, op. cit., note 20, p. 18.
126. 88 John Dupré, The Disorder of Things (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993), p. 242.
127. 89 Zuzana Parusnikova, 'Is a Postmodern Philosophy of Science Possible?', Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 23 (1992), 21-37, p. 30.
128. 90 John Dupré, op. cit., note 88, ch. 10.
129. 91 Parusnikova, op. cit., note 89, pp. 36-37.
130. 92 Cunningham and Williams, op. cit., note 80, esp. pp. 415-417, and footnotes therein, also comment on how little even the proponents of a unity thesis are able to offer. Somewhat surprisingly, their suggestion to replace a timeless notion of science by a rather thoroughly historicized one (ibid. , p. 418) leads them to propose emphasizing questions about explaining the objectivity of science (ibid., p. 419) which would, of course, put them back in the reason vs causes dialectic now fruitlessly occupying the energies of sociologists and philosophers.
131. 92 Cunningham and Williams, op. cit., note 80, esp. pp. 415-417, and footnotes therein, also comment on how little even the proponents of a unity thesis are able to offer. Somewhat surprisingly, their suggestion to replace a timeless notion of science by a rather thoroughly historicized one (ibid. , p. 418) leads them to propose emphasizing questions about explaining the objectivity of science (ibid., p. 419) which would, of course, put them back in the reason vs causes dialectic now fruitlessly occupying the energies of sociologists and philosophers.
132. 92 Cunningham and Williams, op. cit., note 80, esp. pp. 415-417, and footnotes therein, also comment on how little even the proponents of a unity thesis are able to offer. Somewhat surprisingly, their suggestion to replace a timeless notion of science by a rather thoroughly historicized one (ibid. , p. 418) leads them to propose emphasizing questions about explaining the objectivity of science (ibid., p. 419) which would, of course, put them back in the reason vs causes dialectic now fruitlessly occupying the energies of sociologists and philosophers.
133. 93 Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1971), esp. pp. 16-18.
134. 94 'Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology', in R. Carnap, Meaning and Necessity, 2nd edn (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958), pp. 205-221.
135. 95 Ibid., p. 206.
136. 96 ibid., p. 214.
137. 97 The endorsement of Carnap here is not to contravene the sort of criticisms of Carnap's distinction entered by Quine in, e.g. 'Carnap and Logical Truth' and 'On Carnap's View on Ontology'. Quine's criticisms of the distinction between internal and external questions is that he thinks that these distinctions, as Carnap developed them, lead back to a distinction between analytic and synthetic statements and to objectionable ways of discriminating among things which are said to exist within a framework. Quine will have no truck with either consequence, and in this I follow Quine. However, using Carnap's distinction need not lead in this direction. Quine, in the last sentence of 'On Carnap's Views on Ontology,' puts the matter as follows. 'Carnap maintains that ontological questions, and likewise questions of logical or mathematical principle, are questions not of fact but of choosing a convenient conceptual scheme or framework for science: and with this I agree only if the same be conceded for every scientific hypothesis'. Put another way, my call is for explicitness in matters regarding one's analytic framework. None of the objectionable consequences follow from this. I thank James Maffie and Georg Vielmetter for pressing me to clarify this point.
138. 98 Shapin, 'Discipline and Bounding', op. cit., note 3, p. 367, fn. 64.
139. 99 S. Shapin and S. Schaffer, op. cit., note 70.
140. 100 Bruno Latour, 'Postmodern? No, Simply Amodern! Steps Towards an Anthropology of Science', Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 21 (1990), 145-171, p. 158.
141. 101 In Meaning and Method in the Social Sciences, op. cit., note 38, I argue that there is no way to distinguish between claims that one has discovered what someone else actually meant and the charge that one is imposing a translation.
142. 102 Latour, op. cit., note 100, p. 159.