The political economy of immigration policies

International Review of Law and Economics

Volumn 16, Issue 1, 1996, Pages 81-99

  Buckley, F H ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0030102640     PISSN: 01448188     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/0144-8188(95)00056-9     Document Type: Article

References (99)

1. 1 On interstate migration markets in a federal system, see Margaret F. Brinig and F.H. Buckley, "The Market for Deadbeats," Journal Legal Studies 25(1996): 197.
2. 2 This plausibly explains why the United States exports unskilled workers to Canada and Canada exports skilled workers to the United States. George Borjas. Friends or Strangers: The Impact of Immigrants on the U.S. Economy (New York, Basic Books, 1990), p. 215.
3. 3 On "deadbeat" migration, see Brinig and Buckley, supra, note 1.
4. 4 Immigrants Admitted by Selected Class of Admission and State of Intended Residence, Fiscal Year 1985-91. (Washington D.C.: Immigration and Nationalization Service, 1994). Data available from the author on request.
5. 5 8 U.S.C.A. §1151(b)(2)(A) (Supp. 1994).
6. 6 8 U.S.C.A. §1153(a) (Supp. 1994).
7. 7 Refugees seek admittance to the United States from outside the country; asylees seek permission to remain in the United States after they have entered the country. 8 U.S.C.A. §§1101(a)42, 1158 (Supp. 1994).
8. 8 8 U.S.C.A. §1153(b) (Supp. 1994).
9. 9 Art of November 6, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359.
10. 10 For a description of the above categories, see U.S. Immigration Policy: Restoring Credibility, 1994 Report to Congress, U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform, pp. 190-214 (hereafter "Jordan Report").
11. 11 Under endogeneity, the dependent variable influences an independent variable, as well as vice versa. For example, increased immigration might expand an economy, and an expanded economy might attract immigrants. Damodar N. Gujarati, Basic Econometrics, 2d ed. New York: McGraw, 1988, pp. 573-85.
12. 12 On the Box-Cox test, see George G. Judge, W.E. Griffiths, R. Carter Hill, Helmut Lutkepohl, and Tsoung-Chao Lee, The Theory and Practice of Econometrics, New York, John Wiley & Sons, 2d ed. (1985), pp. 839-42.
13. 13 All cost-of living deflators in the model are taken from data provided by the U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Affairs, Table SA05 (Total Personal Income by Major Sources 1969-1983), Washington, D.C.
14. 14 See Thomas Muller, Immigrants and the American City (New York: New York University Press, 1993), pp. 200-01.
15. 15 See Brinig and Buckley, supra, note 1.
16. 16 See infra section II, on American Screening Policies.
17. 17 Brinig and Buckley, supra, note 1.
18. 18 Poverty levels for immigrant families in 1990 were 24.8%, compared to 12.3% for native families. Michael Fix and Jeffrey S. Passel, Immigration and Migration: Setting the Record Straight (Washington, D.C.: Urban Institute Press, 1994), p. 38.
19. 19 Brinig and Buckley, supra, note 1.
20. 20 Gujarati, supra, note 11, pp. 145-46.
21. 21 Under multicollinearity, two or more independent variables are strongly correlated. G.S. Maddala, Introduction to Econometrics, 2d ed. New York: Macmillan, 1992), pp. 269-273.
22. 22 Elaine Sorensen, Frank D. Bean, Leighton Ku, and Wendy Zimmerman, "Immigrant Categories and the U.S. Job Market: Do They Make a Difference?, Urban Institute Report, 68 (1992): 74-75, 80, Tables B.7-B.8.
23. 23 Ann P. Bartel, "Where Do New U.S. Immigrants Live?," Journal of Labor Economics 7 (1989): 371.
24. 24 George J. Borjas, "Immigration Policy, National Origin, and Immigrant Skills: A Comparison of Canada and the United States," in Small Differences That Matter: Labor Markets and Income Maintenance in Canada and the United States, eds. D. Card and R.B. Freeman (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993) p. 21.
25. 25 Arnold deSilva, Earnings of Immigrants: A Comparative Analysis (Economic Council of Canada, 1992).
26. 26 DeSilva, supra, note 25, p. 8.
27. 27 Jane Badets and Yina W. Chui, Canada's Changing Immigrant Population (Ottawa, Statistics Canada, 1994), p. 28.
28. 28 About one-quarter of all immigrants reported that they spoke English "not well" or "not at all." See Fix and Passel, supra, note 18, p. 32.
29. 29 For a study of factors associated with higher immigrant earnings, see Barry R. Chiswick, "Speaking, Reading, and Earnings among Low-skilled Immigrants," Journal of Labor Economics 9 (1991): 149; Economic and Social Impacts of Immigration 89 (Economic Council of Canada 1991) (hereafter "Economic Council Report").
30. 29 For a study of factors associated with higher immigrant earnings, see Barry R. Chiswick, "Speaking, Reading, and Earnings among Low-skilled Immigrants," Journal of Labor Economics 9 (1991): 149; Economic and Social Impacts of Immigration 89 (Economic Council of Canada 1991) (hereafter "Economic Council Report").
31. 30 Badets and Chui, supra, note 27, p. 56; Economic Council Report, supra note 29, p. 86.
32. 30 Badets and Chui, supra, note 27, p. 56; Economic Council Report, supra note 29, p. 86.
33. 31 Economic Council Report, supra, note 29, p. 17.
34. 32 Economic Council Report, supra, note 29, p. 87.
35. 33 Fix and Passel, supra, note 18, p. 65.
36. 34 Facts and Figures: Overview of Immigration, Citizenship and Immigration Canada (1994) p. (hereafter "Facts and Figures"). The mean 1985-1994 intake was 190,000, and the mean 1992-1994 intake was 246,000. "A Broader Vision: Immigration and Citizenship Plan 1995-2000, " Annual Report to Parliament, Citizenship and Immigration Canada (1994) p. 6 (hereafter "Broader Vision").
37. 34 Facts and Figures: Overview of Immigration, Citizenship and Immigration Canada (1994) p. (hereafter "Facts and Figures"). The mean 1985-1994 intake was 190,000, and the mean 1992-1994 intake was 246,000. "A Broader Vision: Immigration and Citizenship Plan 1995-2000, " Annual Report to Parliament, Citizenship and Immigration Canada (1994) p. 6 (hereafter "Broader Vision").
38. 35 Facts and Figures, supra, note 34, p. 5.
39. 36 From 1991-1993, Canada admitted an average of 33,000 refugees per year, or 0.13% of its population. Facts and Figures, supra, note 34, p. 3.
40. 37 Julian L. Simon, The Economic Consequences of Immigration (Oxford, B. Blackwell, 1989), p. 29.
41. 38 Statistical Abstract of the United States 1993 xii (1993); "Building a Framework," Annual Report to Parliament, Citizenship and Immigration Canada (1994).
42. 38 Statistical Abstract of the United States 1993 xii (1993); "Building a Framework," Annual Report to Parliament, Citizenship and Immigration Canada (1994).
43. 39 Table available from author.
44. 40 Statistical Abstract of the United States 1994, Table 1376 (1994) (giving tax receipts as a percentage of GDP for selected first world countries).
45. 41 The Jordan Report suggests that this might explain the failure of American investor immigration policies. Jordan Report, supra, note 10, p. 207.
46. 42 Fix and Passel, supra, note 18, pp. 62-63. Refugees may seek welfare immediately on arrival and are disproportionately heavy users of the welfare system. Other immigrants might in theory be deported if they become a public charge within 5 years of admission. During the 7-year period of this study, however, a total of eight immigrants were deported as public charges.
47. 1991 Statistical Yearbook of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, p. 152. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1992).
48. 43 Canadian Immigration Regulations §§6(1)(b)(I) and 2 ("undertaking").
49. 44 Pub. L. 89-236, Oct. 3, 1965, 79 Stat. 911. See 8 U.S.C.A. §1152(a)(1) (Supp. 1994) (proscribing national origin preferences).
50. 45 Fix and Passel, supra, note 18, p. 26.
51. 46 For a summary of the evidence of declining immigrant quality, see George J. Borjas, "The Economics of Immigration," Journal of Economic Literature 32 (1994): 1667.
52. 47 8 U.S.C.A. § 1151(e), 1153 © (Supp. 1994). The projected 1994 level is 42,000. Jordan Report, supra, note 10, p. 191.
53. 48 Queuing was a particular problem during the 1985-1991 period of Tables 1-4. During that period, skilled immigrants and professionals typically had to wait from 2 to 5 years for Labor Certification and INS approval. The Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. 102-110, Dec. 12, 1991 (IMMACT) has reportedly greatly shortened the waiting periods. See Jordan Report, supra, note 10, pp. 205-07.
54. 49 8 U.S.C.A. §1153(b)(1) (Supp. 1994).
55. 50 8 U.S.C.A. §1153(b)(2) (Supp. 1994).
56. 51 8 U.S.C.A. §1182(a)(5) (Supp. 1994).
57. 52 For a critique of the labor certificate process, see Alan O. Sykes, "The Welfare Economics of Immigration Law: A Theoretical Survey with an Analysis of U.S. Policy," in Justice in Immigration, ed. Warren F. Schwartz (forthcoming 1996).
58. 53 Immigration Act, R.S.C. 1975, c. I-2, §§6-7.
59. 54 Annuaire du Canada 1994, (Ottawa, Statistics Canada, 1994) Table 3.9.
60. 55 Broader Vision, supra, note 34, p. 36.
61. 56 Table available from author.
62. 57 Jordan Report, supra, note 10, pp. 35-36.
63. 58 Broader Vision, supra, note 34, p. 36; Jordan Report, supra, note 10, p. 191. The formal U.S. figure is 129,000, but from this should be deducted 25,000 Chinese student refugee admissions under the Chinese Student Protection Act.
64. 58 Broader Vision, supra, note 34, p. 36; Jordan Report, supra, note 10, p. 191. The formal U.S. figure is 129,000, but from this should be deducted 25,000 Chinese student refugee admissions under the Chinese Student Protection Act.
65. See Jordan Report, supra, note 10, pp. 215-216.
66. 59 The points system is prescribed by Immigration Act Regulations, §§9-11.1, and Schedule I.
67. 60 Facts and Figures, supra, note 34, p. 38.
68. 61 Visa officers retain the discretion to waive these rules to pass or fail applicants if the points system does not reflect the applicant's chances of economic success in Canada. Canadian Immigration Regulations §11(3).
69. 62 Facts and Figures, supra, note 34, p. 38.
70. 63 Immigration Act Regulations §§6.11-6.19.
71. 64 Canadian Immigration Regulations §2(e).
72. 65 Doris M. Misener, Robert D. Hormats, Antonio G. Walker and Shijuro Ogata, International Migration Challenges in a New Era: Policy Perspectives and Priorities for Europe, Japan, North American and the International Community 108 n. 17 (1993). For a defense of such programs, see Gary Becker, "An Open Door for Immigrants - the Auction," Wall Street Journal Oct. 14, 1992, p. A16; Michael J. Trebilcock, "The Case for a Liberal Immigration Policy," mimeo (U. Toronto Faculty of Law, 1992).
73. 65 Doris M. Misener, Robert D. Hormats, Antonio G. Walker and Shijuro Ogata, International Migration Challenges in a New Era: Policy Perspectives and Priorities for Europe, Japan, North American and the International Community 108 n. 17 (1993). For a defense of such programs, see Gary Becker, "An Open Door for Immigrants - the Auction," Wall Street Journal Oct. 14, 1992, p. A16; Michael J. Trebilcock, "The Case for a Liberal Immigration Policy," mimeo (U. Toronto Faculty of Law, 1992).
74. 65 Doris M. Misener, Robert D. Hormats, Antonio G. Walker and Shijuro Ogata, International Migration Challenges in a New Era: Policy Perspectives and Priorities for Europe, Japan, North American and the International Community 108 n. 17 (1993). For a defense of such programs, see Gary Becker, "An Open Door for Immigrants - the Auction," Wall Street Journal Oct. 14, 1992, p. A16; Michael J. Trebilcock, "The Case for a Liberal Immigration Policy," mimeo (U. Toronto Faculty of Law, 1992).
75. 66 8 U.S.C.A. §1153(a)(5) (Supp. 1994) ("employment creation" immigration). Thus far, no immigrants have been admitted under 8 U.S.C.A. §1186b (Supp. 1994), which offered conditional permanent resident status to entrepreneurs. The provision was added in 1992 but the conditions were left unspecified until April 1994. Jordan Report, supra, note 10, pp. 207-08.
76. 67 Jordan Report, supra, note 10, p. 191.
77. 68 Borjas, supra, note 3, pp. 31, 118-23, 199-217; George J. Borjas, "National Origin and the Skills of Immigrants in the Postwar Period," in Immigration and the Work Force: Economic Consequences for the United States and Source Areas, eds. George J. Borjas and Richard B. Freeman (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992) p, 17.
78. 68 Borjas, supra, note 3, pp. 31, 118-23, 199-217; George J. Borjas, "National Origin and the Skills of Immigrants in the Postwar Period," in Immigration and the Work Force: Economic Consequences for the United States and Source Areas, eds. George J. Borjas and Richard B. Freeman (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992) p, 17.
79. 69 Facts and Figures, supra, note 34, p. 5.
80. 70 Statistical Abstract of the United States 1994, p. 11.
81. 71 Facts and Figures, supra, note 34, p. 5.
82. 72 Statistical Abstract of the United States 1994, p. 11.
83. 73 In 1993, Hong Kong provided Canada with 36,000 immigrants. The next most important source country was India, with 20,000 immigrants. Facts and Figures, supra, note 34, p. 5.
84. 74 For an interest group explanation of immigration enforcement policies, see William F. Shughart, Robert D. Tollison and Mwangi S. Kimenyi, "The Political Economy of Immigration Restrictions," Yale Journal of Reg. 4 (1986): 79 (reporting that deportation rates are positively correlated with economic downturns, as a political model would predict).
85. 75 Vernon M. Briggs, Immigration Policy and the American Labor Force (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984) pp. 24-49.
86. 76 Maldwyn Jones, American Immigration, 2d ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992) p. 224. Immigrants provided a cheaper source of labor and were also useful as strike-breakers. Id. at 190.
87. 77 B. Lindsay Lowell, Frank D. Bean, and Rodolpho O. de la Graza, "Undocumented Immigration: An Analysis of the 1984 Simpson-Mazzoli Vote," Social Science Quarterly 67 (1986): 118 (finding that Congressmen from Hispanic districts were more likely to oppose restrictions on the hiring of illegal aliens).
88. 78 Jones, supra, note 76, pp. 67-70.
89. 79 Id. p. 123. During the debate over immigration that culminated in the closed door policies of the 1920s, Congressman were more likely to support open borders if they had a high proportion of foreign-born in their district. See Claudia Goldin, "The Political Economy of Immigration Restrictions in the U.S., 1890 to 1921," in The Regulated Economy: A Historical Approach to Political Economy eds. Claudia Golden and Gary Libecap (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994) p. 223.
90. 79 Id. p. 123. During the debate over immigration that culminated in the closed door policies of the 1920s, Congressman were more likely to support open borders if they had a high proportion of foreign-born in their district. See Claudia Goldin, "The Political Economy of Immigration Restrictions in the U.S., 1890 to 1921," in The Regulated Economy: A Historical Approach to Political Economy eds. Claudia Golden and Gary Libecap (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994) p. 223.
91. 80 Jones, supra, note 76, p. 224.
92. 81 Vote-buying theories do not explain why, from 1932-1952, a Democratic administration and Congress retained the 1920s legislation. The most plausible explanation is that the Democratic coalition assembled in 1932 was one in which unions were given a privileged voice, with the lack of interest in immigration reform attributed to their interest group clout.
93. 82 By most accounts, the draftsmen of the U.S. Immigration Act had little notion of how radically it would change the direction of U.S. immigration. See Borjas, supra, note 3, pp. 31-32; Vernon M. Briggs, Mass Immigration and the National Interest (Armon K, NY: M.F. Sharpe, 1992). Within a few years, however, the sea change was evident, and the change in immigrant voting patterns might perhaps explain why politicians resisted amending the statute.
94. 82 By most accounts, the draftsmen of the U.S. Immigration Act had little notion of how radically it would change the direction of U.S. immigration. See Borjas, supra, note 3, pp. 31-32; Vernon M. Briggs, Mass Immigration and the National Interest (Armon K, NY: M.F. Sharpe, 1992). Within a few years, however, the sea change was evident, and the change in immigrant voting patterns might perhaps explain why politicians resisted amending the statute.
95. 83 Constitution Act, 1867, §95.
96. 84 Canada-Quebec Accord Relating to Immigration and Temporary Admission of Aliens, February 5, 1991, Employment and Immigration Canada. See L.Q. 1991, c.3; L.Q. 1992, c.5; L.Q. 1993, c. 70; L.Q. 1994, c. 15.
97. 85 See Canada-Quebec Accord, supra, note 84, Art. 12.
98. 86 State laws that restrict the eligibility of legal aliens for welfare benefits merely because of their alienage conflict with the exclusive federal power over immigration and the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Nor does it appear that states may curtail welfare benefits to aliens. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 378 (1971); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (impeaching state barriers to public schooling of children of illegal aliens).
99. 87 For an argument that national welfare policies usefully reduce the deadweight costs of welfare-motivated migration, see Paul E. Peterson and Mark C. Rom, Welfare Magnets: A New Case for a National Standard (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1990).