The red herring and the pet fish: Why concepts still can't be prototypes

Cognition

Volumn 58, Issue 2, 1996, Pages 253-270

  Fodor, Jerry ^a   Lepore, Ernest ^a  

^a RUTGERS UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ARTICLE; CONCEPT FORMATION; HUMAN; LANGUAGE;

CONCEPT FORMATION; HUMANS; LANGUAGE;

EID: 0030073406     PISSN: 00100277     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/0010-0277(95)00694-X     Document Type: Article

References (13)

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3. Fodor, J. (1981). The present status of the innateness controversy. In Representations. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
4. Fodor, J., & Lepore, E. (1995). What can't be valued can't be valued, and it can't be supervalued either, manuscript. Center for Cognitive Science, Rugers University.
5. Fodor, J., & Pylyshyn, Z. (1988). Connectionism and cognitive architecture: a critical analysis. Cognition, 28, 3-71.
6. Huttenlocher, J., & Hedges, L. (1994). Combining graded categories. Psycho. Rev., 101 (1), 157-165.
7. Jackendoff, R. (1992). The problem of reality. In Languages of the mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
8. Kamp, H., & Partee B., (1995). Prototype theory and compositionality. Cognition, 57, 129-191.
9. Osherson, D.N., & Smith, E.E. (1981). On the adequacy of prototype theory as a theory of concepts. Cognition, 9, 35-58.
10. Osherson, D.N., & Smith, E.E. (1988). Conceptual combination with prototype concepts. In A. Collins & E. Smith (Eds.), Readings in cognitive science. San Mateo, CA: Morgan Kaufman.
11. Russell, B., (1956). On denoting. In R. Marsh (Ed.), Logic and Knowledge. Unwin/Hyman: London.
12. Smith, E.E., & Medin, D. L. (1981). Categories and concepts. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
13. Stich, S. (1983). From folk psychology to cognitive science. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.