"Dignity was the first to leave": Godinez v. Moran, Colin Ferguson, and the trial of mentally disabled criminal defendants

Behavioral Sciences and the Law

Volumn 14, Issue 1, 1996, Pages 61-81

  Perlin, Michael L ^a  

^a NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ARTICLE; BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE; COMPETENCE; CRIMINAL LAW; EMOTION; GUILT; MASS MEDIUM; MENTAL DEFICIENCY; OFFENDER; QUALITY OF LIFE; SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY;

EID: 0030070226     PISSN: 07353936     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1002/(SICI)1099-0798(199624)14:1<61::AID-BSL226>3.0.CO;2-G     Document Type: Article

References (189)

1. See e.g., In re Boggs, 522 N.Y.S. 2d 407 (Sup.), rev'd, 523 N.Y.S. 2d 71 (App. Div. 1987); Seltzer V. Hogue, 594 N.Y.S. 2d 781 (App. Div. 1993).
2. 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (striking down restrictive zoning ordinance).
3. 115 S. Ct. 1776 (1995) (municipal zoning code's definition of a "family" not a maximum occupancy restriction exempt from Federal Fair Housing Act Amendments banning discrimination against disabled persons).
4. 113 S. Ct. 2680 (1993).
5. See generally Michael L. Perlin, The Supreme Court, the Mentally Disabled Criminal Defendant, and Symbolic Values: Random Decisions, Hidden Rationales, or Doctrinal Abyss? 29 Ariz. L. Rev. 1 (1987).
6. See, respectively, Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989); Riggins v. Nevada, 112 S. Ct. 1810 (1992); Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990); Foucha v. Louisiana, 112 S. Ct. 1780 (1992); Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354(1983); Medina v. California, 113 S. Ct. 2572 (1992). See generally MICHAEL L. PERLIN, LAW AND MENTAL DISABILITY ch. 4 (1994).
7. Godinez, 113 S.Ct. at 2686. See generally 3 MICHAEL L. PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL (1989), §§14.20A-14.21 (1995 Supp.).
8. Moran v. Godinez, 972 F. 2d 263, 266-67 (9th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 113 S. Ct. 2680 (1993).
9. Godinez, 113 S. Ct. at 2686.
10. 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960), quoted in Godinez, 113 S. Ct. at 2686.
11. For students' notes, see Brian Boch, Note, Fourteenth Amendment - the Standard of Mental Competency to Waive Constitutional Rights Versus the Competency Standard to Stand Trial, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOL. 883, 883 (1994)
12. (Godinez is a "correct[]" decision); Luke Vadas, Note, Godinez v. Moran: An Insane Rule for Competency? 39 LOY. L. REV. 903 (1994) (Godinez leaves "unprotected the basic due process rights of mentally ill criminal defendants").
13. For Dr. Felthous's analysis, see Alan Felthous, The Right to Represent Oneself Incompetently: Competency to Waive Counsel and Conduct One's Own Defense Before and After Godinez, 18 MENT. & PHYS. DIS. IL. REP. 105, 110 (1994) (in Godinez, Supreme Court "missed an opportunity to promote reason, logic, and justice in American jurisprudence").
14. See also Sheila Taub, Competency Standard Clarified, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 18, 1993, at 25 (majority decision in Godinez "appears to be contrary to much professional opinion, both legal and medical, and to prevailing trends in the law").
15. See articles cited in 2 PERLIN, supra note 7, §5.65A, at 99-100 n.1088.60 (1995 Supp.).
16. See articles cited in 3 id., §15.25A, at 207-09 n.479.46 (1995 Supp.).
17. A search of the NEXIS/CURNWS database in LEXIS revealed not a single contemporaneous newspaper editorial commenting on the decision. The only law review commentary has been the articles cited supra note 11.
18. See generally MICHAEL L. PERLIN, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE INSANITY DEFENSE 34 (1994); see also 3 PERLIN, supra note 7, §14.02, at 206-07 n.1.
19. Bruce Winick, Restructuring Competency to Stand Trial, 32 UCLA L. Rev. 921, 922 n.3, 925 (1985).
20. See generally id. at 921-31.
21. See Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
22. But see Henry Steadman et al., Maintenance of an Insanity Defense Under Montana's "Abolition" of the Insanity Defense, 146 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 357 (1989) (after Montana abolished its insanity defense, the ultimate effect was that courts found more defendants who would likely been previously found not guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI) to be incompetent to stand trial, and committed them to the same forensic maximum security facilities to which NGRI acquittees were previously sent).
23. DeWayne Wickham, Line Between Justice, Revenge, Gannet News Service, Feb. 2, 1995.
24. David Van Bieman, A Fool for a Client, TIME, Feb. 6, 1995, at 66.
25. Larry McShane, Ferguson's Defense of Himself May Be Grounds for Appeal, AUSTIN (TX) AMERICAN-STATESMAN, Feb. 19, 1995, at A9.
26. PERLIN, supra note 15, at 111-12.
27. McShane, supra note 22.
28. PERLIN, supra note 15.
29. McShane, supra note 22.
30. Maureen Fan, Ferguson Speaks: In Interview, Reiterates His Innocence, NEWSDAY (Nassau-Suffolk ed.), Mar. 17, 1995, at A6.
31. See generally Michael L. Perlin, The ADA and Persons with Mental Disabilities: Can Sanist Attitudes Be Undone? 8 J. L. & HEALTH 15 (1993-94).
32. This section is generally adapted from Michael L. Perlin, A Major Step Backwards: Deciphering Godinez v. Moran, 2 CRIM. PRAC. L. REP. 89 (1994); PERLIN, supra note 6, §4.13; 3 PERLIN, supra note 7, §§14.20A-14.21 (1995 Supp.).
33. James Ellis & Ruth Luckasson, Mentally Retarded Criminal Defendants, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 414, 460 (1985); see generally 3 PERLIN, supra note 7, §§14.20, at 265-69.
34. Ellis & Luckasson, supra note 30, at 461.
35. Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960); see generally 3 PERLIN, supra note 7, §14.20, at 140-41 n.317.1 (1995 Supp.) (listing recent cases).
36. See, e.g., Malinauskas v. United States, 505 F.2d 649 (5th Cir. 1974); Stinson v. Wainwright, 710 F.2d 743 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 984 (1983); United States ex rel. McGough v. Hewitt, 528 F.2d 339 (3d Cir. 1975); Williams v. Bordenkircher, 696 F.2d 464 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 916 (1983); People v. Turner, 443 N.E.2d 1167 (Ill. App. 1982); State ex rel. Kessick v. Bordenkircher, 294 S.E.2d 134 (W. Va. 1982).
37. 342 N.E. 2d 34, 37 (Ill. 1976), citing Comment, Competence to Plead Guilty: A New Standard, 1974 DUKE L. J. 149, 170.
38. Seiling v. Eyman, 478 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1973); Steinsvik v. Vinzant, 640 F.2d 949 (9th Cir. 1981); State v. Walton, 228 N.W.2d/21 (Iowa 1975).
39. See United States v. Masthers, 539 F. 2d 721 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
40. Seiling, 478 F. 2d at 215; see also Schoeller v. Dunbar, 423 F. 2d 1183, 1194 (9th Cir. 1970).
41. Seiling, 478 F. 2d at 215.
42. Ellis & Luckasson, supra note 30, at 462-63.
43. Selling, 478 F. 2d at 214-15.
44. 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975).
45. People v. Clark, 213 Cal. Rptr. 837, 840 (App. 1985) (emphasis in original). See generally 3 PERLIN, supra note 7, §14.21, at 269-74. But see In re Irwin, 529 N.W.2d 366, 371 (Minn. 1995) (patient in psychopathic personality commitment case had no right to self-representation).
46. Curry v. Superior Court of Fresno County, 141 Cal. Rptr. 884, 888 (App. 1977).
47. People v. Miller, 167 Cal. Rptr. 816, 818 (App. 1980).
48. Curry, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 888.
49. State v. Evans, 610 P. 2d 35 (Ariz. 1980).
50. People v. Kessler, 447 N.E.2d 495, 499 (Ill. App. 1983), citing Heral, 342 N.E.2d at 37-38.
51. Heral, 342 37-38. Id.
52. Id., citing People v. Feliciano, 417 N.E. 824 (Ill. App. 1981).
53. See, e.f., United States ex rel. Konigsberg v. Vincent, 526 F.2d 131 (2d Cir. 1975); State v. Kolocotronis, 436 P.2d 774 (Wash. 1968); Pickens v. State, 292 N.W.2d 601 (Wis. 1980); State v. Harding, 670 P.2d 383, 391 (Ariz. 1983).
54. Pickens, 292 N.W. 2d at 611, citing Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835.
55. State v. Slattery, 571 A.2d 1314, 1320-21 (N.J. App. Div. 1990) (citations omitted) (defendant functioned at "low average" range of intelligence).
56. 113 S. Ct. at 2685, quoting Dusky, 362 U.S. at 402.
57. Godinez, 113 S. Ct. at 2682.
58. Id. at 2682-83.
59. Id. at 2683.
60. Moran v. State, 734 P. 2d 712 (Nev. 1987).
61. Godinez, 113 S. Ct at 2683.
62. Moran v. Warden, 810 P. 2d 335 (Nev. 1989), cert. den., 493 U.S. 874 (1989).
63. Moran v. Godinez, 972 F. 2d 263, 265-67 (9th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 113 S. Ct. 2680 (1993).
64. Id. at 265, 268.
65. Godinez, 113 S. Ct at 2686.
66. Id.
67. Id., quoting Parke v. Raley, 113 S. Ct. 517, 523 (1992).
68. Godinez, 113 S. Ct. at 2688, citing, in a cf. reference, Medina v. California, 112 S. Ct. 2572 (1992) (not unconstitutional to place burden of proof on defendant at competency to stand trial proceeding).
69. Godinez, 113 S. Ct. at 2688-89.
70. Id. at 2692.
71. Id. See also id. at 2696 ("such drugs often possess side effects that may 'compromise the right of a medicated criminal defendant to receive a fair trial ... by rendering him unable or unwilling to assist counsel,'" quoting Riggins v. Nevada, 112 S. Ct. 1810, 181819 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring)). See generally 2 PERLIN, supra note 7, §5.65A (1995 pocket part); Michael L. Perlin, Forced Drugging and Fair Trial Rights: Understanding Riggins v. Nevada, 1 CRIM. PRAC. L. REP. 37 (1993);
72. Michael L. Perlin & Deborah A. Dorfman, Sanism, Social Science, and the Development of Mental Disability Law Jurisprudence, 11 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 47 (1993). The drugs given Moran were primarily antiseizure medications, see Godinez, 113 S. Ct. at 2683 n.2; Riggins had been receiving Mellaril. The fact that different types of drug were involved in the two cases was explored nowhere in any of the Godinez opinions.
73. Id. at 2694, citing Richard Bonnie, The Competence of Criminal Defendants: A Theoretical Reformulation, 10 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 291, 299 (1992);
74. RONALD ROESCH & STEPHEN GOLDING, COMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL 1013 (1980).
75. Godinez, 113 S. Ct. at 2694.
76. See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, Pretexts and Mental Disability Law: The Case of Competency, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 625 (1993) (Perlin, Pretexts). See also infra Part IV B.
77. See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986). See generally 3 PERLIN, supra note 7, §17.05, at 498-512; compare Douglas Mossman, The Psychiatrist and Execution Competency: Fording Murky Waters, 43 CASE W. RES. U. L. REV. 1 (1992).
78. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989). See generally 3 PERLIN, supra, note 7, §17.06A (1995 Supp.).
79. See Perry v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 38 (1990). See generally 3 PERLIN, supra, note 7, §17.06B (1995 Supp.); compare Douglas Mossman, Denouement of an Execution Case: Is Perry Pyrrhic? 23 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 269 (1995).
80. See, e.g., United States v. Day, 998 F. 2d 662 (8th Cir. 1993) (rejecting defendant's claim that the court should have conducted a competency hearing prior to allowing him to proceed pro se); compare State v. Pollard, 657 A. 2d 185, 18990 (Vt. 1995) (construing Godinez to reverse trial court order allowing waiver of counsel in case of defendant who did not have "rational" understanding of proceedings).
81. Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1814-16.
82. Id. at 1816.
83. Id. at 1815.
84. Godinez, 113 S. Ct. at 2696.
85. 494 U.S. 210 (1990).
86. See generally 2 PERLIN, supra, note 7, §5.64A (1995 Supp.).
87. See id. at 82; see generally, Perlin & Dorfman, supra note 68.
88. Godinez, 113 S. Ct. at 2682.
89. Id. at 2686-87 (emphasis in original).
90. 422 U.S. 806 (1975); see supra text accompanying note 41.
91. Godinez, 113 S.Ct. at 2687.
92. Id. at 2693.
93. John T. McQuiston, In the Bizarre L.I.R.R. Trial, Equally Bizarre Confrontation, N.Y. TIMES (L.I. ed.), Feb. 5, 1995, sec. 13LI, at 1.
94. Bruce Frankel, Justice "Its Worst"/NY Defendant Acts as Lawyer, USA TODAY, Jan. 27, 1995, at 40.
95. Sheryl McCarthy, Ferguson: Madness or Just Manipulation? NEWSDAY (city ed.), Feb. 22, 1995, at 6.
96. Van Bieman, supra note 21. See, e.g., Claire Finkelstein, Duress: A Philosophical Account of the Defense in Law, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 251, 280 (1995);
97. J. Thomas Sullivan, Psychiatric Defenses in Arkansas Criminal Trials, 48 ARK. L. REV. 439, 454 (1995).
98. The defense was rejected in State v. Lamar, 698 P. 2d 735, 741 (Ariz. App. 1984). For a recent discussion of "syndromic defenses" in general, see Stephen Morse, The "New Syndrome Excuse Syndrome," CRIM. JUST. ETHICS, Winter/Spring 1995, at 3.
99. John T. McQuiston, Adviser Says L.I.R.R. Suspect Prefers Conviction to Insanity Finding, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 1995, at B5.
100. Wickham, supra note 20.
101. Robin Topping, Weighing Competence vs. Sanity, NEWSDAY, (Nassau & Suffolk ed.), Feb. 5, 1995, at A6.
102. Robin Topping, Weighing Competence vs. Sanity, NEWSDAY, 1995, A6. Id.
103. See, e.g., People v. Reason, 372 N.Y.S. 2d 614, 618 (1975) (determination that defendant was competent to stand trial, coupled with trial judge's "searching inquiry" as to whether decision was made "knowingly and intelligently with full awareness of risks and consequences," sufficient to support waiver); People v. Schoolfield, 608 N.Y.S. 2d 413, 41617 (App. Div. 1994) ("A criminal defendant is entitled to be master of his own fate and 'respect for individual autonomy requires that he be allowed to go to jail under his own banner if he so desires and if he makes the choice "with eyes open,"'" quoting, in part, from People v. Vivenzio, 477 N.Y.S. 2d 318, 319 (App. Div. 1984) (Godinez not cited); People v. Meurer, 621 N.Y.S. 2d 422, 42324 (App. Div. 1994) (affirming conviction where, after defendant was found competent to stand trial, trial court found decision to waive was made "knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily with full awareness of the risks and consequences") (Godinez not cited).
104. Topping, supra note 94, at A6.
105. Transcript 1109-5, NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO, WEEKEND EDITION, FEB. 5, 1995.
106. Frederic Biddle, In Ferguson, TV Gets New Spectacle, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 16, 1995, at 1.
107. John T. McQuiston, Commuter Killing Trial Goes to Jury: Ferguson Gives Incoherent Summation, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Feb. 17, 1995, at A2.
108. For a flavor of other defense tactics, see, e.g., McShane, supra note 11; Andrew Blum, LIRR Gunman Goes Pro Se With Perplexing Voir Dire, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 6, 1995, at A11;
109. John T. McQuiston, Abrupt End to Defense in Rail Case, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 1995, at B1. The delusion that a microchip has been planted in one's head may be symptomatic of paranoid schizophrenia, raising the question of whether another incompetency to stand trial inquiry should have been made at this point in the proceedings. See Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162 (1971).
110. Court TV: Tape FER5610104 (Television broadcast, Feb. 2, 1995), Log timecode 12:50.
111. John T. McQuiston, Murder Trial in L.I.R.R. Case Goes to the Jury for Deliberation, N.Y. Times (Feb.17, 1995), at B1.
112. Court TV: Tape FER5610204 (Television broadcast, Feb. 16, 1995), Log timecode 11:18.
113. Diana Rojas, LIRR Massacre Gunman Convicted of Murder; The Verdict, Guilty; N.J. Family Says Ordeal Not Over, BERGEN (NJ) RECORD, Feb. 18, 1995, at A1.
114. Maureen Fan, 315 2/3 Years For Ferguson; Protesting to the End, LIRR Killer Sentenced, NEWSDAY (Nassau & Suffolk ed.), Mar. 23, 1995, at A4.
115. Railroad Shooter Telephones Lawyers: Kunstler Willing to Handle Ferguson Process of Appeals, SPRINGFIELD STATE JOURNAL-REGISTER, Feb. 19, 1995, at 3.
116. Robin Topping, Crime and Courts; Law and Order, "The Pitfalls of Self-Representation," NEWSDAY (Nassau & Suffolk ed.), Feb. 1, 1995, at A29. Pre-Godinez caselaw on the right of criminal defendants to represent themselves is discussed supra note 96.
117. E.g., State v. Ploof, 649 A. 2d 774, 778 (Vt. 1994); Boag v. Raines, 769 F. 2d 1341, 1343 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. den., 474 U.S. 1086 (1986); People v. Holma, 450 N.E. 2d 432, 435 (Ill. 1983). See generally, 3 PERLIN, supra note 7, §14.04 at 218-19.
118. Godinez, 113 S. Ct. at 2687.
119. Id. at 2688.
120. Felthous, supra note 11, at 105; Taub, supra note 11, at 28, 29.
121. See Topping, supra note 107. Courts and commentators have regularly discussed "dignity" in a fair trial context both in cases involving mentally disabled criminal defendants and in other settings. See, e.g., Marquez v. Collins, 11 F. 3d 1241. 1243 (5th Cir. 1994) ("Solemnity ... and respect for individuals are components of a fair trial"); Heffeman v. Norris, 48 F. 3d 331, 336 (8th Cir. 1995) (Bright, J., dissenting) ("the forced ingestion of mildaltering drugs not only jeopardizes an accused's rights to a fair trial, it also tears away another layer of individual dignity . . ."). See Felthous, supra note 11, quoting Bruce Ennis & Christopher Hansen, Memorandum of Law: Competency to Stand Trial, 4 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 491, 512 (1976) (one of the four purposes of incompetency to stand trial determination is to "preserve the dignity and integrity of legal processes");
122. Keith Nicholson, Would You Like Some More Salt in That Wound? Post-Sentence Victim Allocution in Texas, 26 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1103, 1128 (1995) (for trial to be fair, "it must be conducted in an atmosphere of respect, order, decorum and dignity befitting its importance both to the prosecution and the defense");
123. see also Tom R. Tyler, The Psychological Consequences of Judicial Procedures: Implications for Civil Commitment Hearings, 46 SMU L. REV. 433, 444 (1992) (significance of dignity values in involuntary civil commitment hearings);
124. Deborah A. Dorfman, Effectively Implementing Title I of the Americans With Disabilities Act for Mentally Disabled Persons: A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Analysis, 8 J. L. & HEALTH 105, 121 (1993-94) (same).
125. See generally Perlin, Pretexts, supra note 71.
126. See, e.g., Winick, supra note 15, at 936 n. 57, cited in Commonwealth v. DelVerde, 496 N.E 2d 1357, 1360 (Mass. 1986); State v. Wilkins, 736 S.W. 2d 409, 415 (Mo. 1987).
127. See, e.g., Riggins v. Nevada, 112 S. Ct. 1810 (1992), discussed supra notes 76-78; see also Heller v. Doe, 113 S. Ct. 2637, 2645 (1993) (institutionalized mentally ill persons are subjected to "invasive" treatments such as the use of psychotropic drugs).
128. For an important recent debate on this issue, compare Richard Bonnie, The Competence of Criminal Defendants: Beyond Dusky and Drope, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 539 (1993),
129. to Bruce Winick, Reforming Incompetency to Stand Trial and Plead Guilty: A Proposal and Response to Professor Bonnie, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOL. 571 (1995).
130. 465 U.S. 168 (1984).
131. Id. at 176-79. These aspects of McKaskle are carefully discussed in Felthous, supra note 11, at 107.
132. Text accompanying notes 120-35 is generally adapted from Perlin, supra note 28.
133. The classic treatise is GORDON ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE (1955). On the way that sanism incorporates a multistep "prejudice assimilation model," see Keri Gould, "Madness in the Streets" Rides the Waves of Sanism, 9 N.Y. L. Sch. J. Hum. Rts. 567, 574-81 (1992)
134. (book review of R.J. ISAAC & V.C. ARMAT, MADNESS IN THE STREETS: HOW PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW ABANDONED THE MENTALLY ILL (1990)).
135. The phrase "sanism" appears to have been coined by Dr. Monon Birnbaum. See Morton Birnbaum, The Right to Treatment: Some Comments on its Development, in MEDICAL, MORAL AND LEGAL ISSUES IN HEALTH CARE 97, 106-07 (F. Ayd ed. 1974); see Perlin, supra note 27, at 9293 (discussing Birnbaum's insights). See also Koe v. Califano, 573 F. 2d 761, 764 (2d Cir. 1978). Dr. Birnbaum is universally regarded as having first developed and articulated the constitutional basis of the right to treatment doctrine for institutionalized mental patients.
136. See Morton Birnbaum, The Right to Treatment, 46 A.B.A. J. 499 (1960), discussed in 2 PERLIN, supra note 7, §4.03, at 8-13.
137. Anthony D'Amato, Harmful Speech and the Culture of Indeterminacy, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 329, 332 (1991).
138. The discomfort that judges often feel in having to decide mental disability law cases is often palpable. See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, Are Courts Competent To Decide Competency Questions? Stripping the Facade From United States v. Charters, 38 U. KAN. L. REV. 957, 991 (1990) (court's characterization in Charters, 863 F. 2d 302, 310 (4th Cir 1988) (en banc), cert. den., 494 U.S. 1016 (1990), of judicial involvement in right to refuse antipsychotic medication cases as "'already perilous' . . . reflects the court's almost palpable discomfort in having to confront the questions before it").
139. Michael L. Perlin, Psychodynamics and the Insanity Defense: "Ordinary Common Sense" and Heuristic Reasoning, 69 NEB. L. REV. 3, 61-69 (1990)
140. (Perlin, Psychodynamics);
141. Michael L. Perlin, Unpacking the Myths: The Symbolism Mythology of Insanity Defense Jurisprudence, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 599, 618-30 (1989-90).
142. See Michael L. Perlin, On "Sanism," 46 SMU L. REV. 373, 400-04 (1992).
143. See, e.g., Corn v. Zant, 708 F. 2d 549, 569 (11th Cir. 1983), reh. den., 714 F. 2d 159 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. den., 467 U.S. 1220 (1984) (defendant referred to as a "lunatic"); Sinclair v. Wainwright, 814 F. 2d 1516, 1522 (11th Cir., 1987), quoting Shuler v. Wainwright, 491 F. 2d 213 (5th Cir. 1974) (using "lunatic"); Brown v. People, 134 N.E. 2d 760, 762 (Ill. 1956) (judge asked defendant, "You are not crazy at this time, are you?"); Pyle v. Boles, 250 F. Supp. 285; 289 (N.D. W. Va. 1966) (trial judge accused habeas petitioner of "being crazy"); but cf. State v. Penner, 772 P. 2d 819 (Kan. 1989) (unpublished disposition), at *3 (witnesses admonished not to refer to defendant as "crazy" or "nuts").
144. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Musolino, 467 A. 2d 605 (Pa. Super. 1983) (reversible error for trial judge to refer to expert witnesses as "headshrinkers"). Compare State v. Percy, 507 A. 2d 955, 956 (Vt. 1986), app'l after remand, 595 A. 2d 248 (Vt. 1990), cert. den., 112 S. Ct. 344 (1991) (conviction reversed where prosecutor, in closing argument, referred to expert testimony as "psychobabble"), to Commonwealth v. Cosme, 575 N.E. 2d 726, 731 (Mass. 1991) (not error where prosecutor referred to defendant's expert witnesses as "a little head specialist" and a "wizard").
145. Perlin, supra note 125, at 396. See, e.g., J.M. Balkin, The Rhetoric of Responsibility, 76 VA. L. REV. 197, 238 (1990) (Hinckley prosecutor suggested to jurors, "if Hinckley had emotional problems, they were largely his own fault"). See also State v. Duckworth, 496 So. 2d 624, 635 (La. App. 1985) (juror who felt defendant would be responsible for actions as long as he "wanted to do them" not excused for cause) (no error).
146. Michael L. Perlin, Morality and Pretextuality, Psychiatry and Law: Of "Ordinary Common Sense," Heuristic Reasoning, and Cognitive Dissonance, 19 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 131, 133 (1991).
147. See also Charles Sevilla, The Exclusionary Rule and Police Perjury, 11 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 839, 840 (1974).
148. See, e.g., Streicher v. Prescott, 663 F. Supp. 335, 343 (D.D.C. 1987) (although District of Columbia Code contained provision that patient could invoke to seek periodic review of commitment or independent psychiatric evaluation, in 22 years since passage of relevant statute, not a single patient exercised rights to statutory review). The significance of Streicher is discussed in Arlene Kanter, Abandoned but Not Forgotten: The Illegal Confinement of Elderly People in State Psychiatric Institutions, 19 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC'L CHANGE 273, 304-06 (1991-92).
149. See, e.g., Cassia Spohn & Julia Horney, "The Law's the Law, But Fair Is Fair": Rape Shield Laws and Officials' Assessments of Sexual History Evidence, 29 CRIMINOL. 137, 139 (1991) (a legal reform that contradicts deeply held beliefs may result either in open defiance of the law or in a surreptitious attempt to modify the law).
150. Compare H. RICHARD UVILLER, TEMPERED ZEAL 116-18 (1988) (police sanction perjury in cases where Supreme Court has imposed constitutional rules that do not comport with officers' "own idea of fair play"),
151. with Tracey Maclin, Seeing the Constitution from the Backseat of a Police Squad Car (Book Review of H.R. UVILLER, supra) 70 B.U. L. REV. 543, 580-82 (1990) (criticizing view).
152. See, e.g., Perlin, Pretexts, supra note 71, at 135-36.
153. See, e.g., People v. Doan, 366 N.W. 2d 593, 598 (Mich. App. 1985), app'l den. (1985) (expert testified that defendant was "out in left field" and went "bananas").
154. See generally Perlin, supra note 125; Perlin & Dorfman, supra note 68.
155. See generally Perlin, Pretexts, supra note 71.
156. Fan, supra note 27. Ironically, Justice Thomas and Ferguson are "twinned" in an opinion piece written shortly after O.J. Simpson was apprehended: A black person says, "The same spot in my heart that was bruised over Clarence Thomas, Mike Tyson, Michael Jackson, Tupac Shakur, and Colin Ferguson, the same spot that gets bruised by the nightly local news parade of black hands in handcuffs has been rebruised."
157. Alison Taylor, "Girl, There's Another Black Man Gone," PALM BEACH POST, June 26, 1994, at IF (emphasis added).
158. 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (establishing a pallid, almost-impossible-to-violate "reasonably effective assistance" standard in criminal cases).
159. See Michael L. Perlin, Fatal Assumption: A Critical Evaluation of the Role of Counsel in Mental Disability Cases, 16 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 39 (1992).
160. See generally Perlin, supra note 5; Perlin, Psychodynamics, supra note 124; Perlin & Dorfman, supra note 68.
161. Perlin, supra note 125.
162. Nightline (ABC News television broadcast, Feb. 10, 1995), Transcript 3580.
163. Associated Press, LIRR Shooting Suspfect Rejects Insanity Defense; Contends That Court Wants to Cover Up the Facts, BERGEN (NJ) RECORD, Aug. 20, 1994, at A4.
164. Bruce Frankel, NY Rail Suspect Will Represent Self in Court, USA TODAY, Jan. 17, 1995, at 2A.
165. Alyson Alert, United States: Lawyer/Killer Tests Rules for Mental Competence, InterPress Service, Nov. 22, 1994.
166. Otis Pike, Insane Policy, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, Feb. 23, 1995, at B7.
167. Letter From a Different Trial: Raising the Images of Lawyers By Proceeding Without Them, WASH. POST, Feb. 3, 1995, at A2.
168. Jan Hoffman, Lingering Emptiness, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18. 1995, at 26.
169. Marilyn Goldstein, LIRR Case a "Catch22" in Reverse, Newsday (Nassau & Suffolk ed.), Feb. 3, 1995, at A8 (characterizing Belfi's decision as "a mistake").
170. Hoffman, supra note 147, at 26.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. John T. McQuiston, Reporter's Notebook: Views Shift on Insanity in Killings on L.I.R.R., N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 1995, at 42.
174. McQuiston, supra note 88.
175. On remand, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the trial court's denial of Moran's habeas petition, finding that his guilty plea entry was voluntary and intelligent. Moran v. Godinez, 40 F. 3d 1557 (9th Cir. 1994), amended on denial of rehearing, 1994 WL 805772 (9th Cir. 1994), but see id., 40 F. 3d at 1577 (Pregerson, J., dissenting).
176. See 1993 WL 751849 (transcript of oral argument in Godinez v. Moran, 113 S. Ct. 2680 (1993)).
177. In 1992, the Supreme Court had ruled in Medina v. California, 112 S. Ct. 2572 (1992), that it was not unconstitutional to place the burden of proof at an incompetency to stand trial hearing on the defendant. Thus, if the scales are equally balanced between competence and incompetency, cases may proceed to trial.
178. See e.g., Perlin, supra note 123; Perlin, supra note 124, Perlin, Psychodynamics, supra note 124.
179. PERLIN, supra note 15.
180. Beyond the scope of this paper is an inquiry into an irony that seems never to have been considered in the literature: the parallels between the post-Hinckley insanity defense "reform" debate (on whether the affective/behavioral prong of the insanity defense should be jettisoned, leaving only a cognitive prong, see id. at 17-27) and the inquiry posed here (as to whether a cognitive inquiry is sufficient in a competence-waiver case, or whether a functional standard must be met as well).
181. See id. at 428-29 (offering similar argument against abolition of the insanity defense).
182. Profound therapeutic jurisprudence questions are also raised by both the Godinez decision and the Ferguson trial. See generally PERLIN, supra note 6; Michael L. Perlin, What Is Therapeutic Jurisprudence? 10 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 623 (1993);
183. David Wexler, Putting Mental Health Into Mental Health Law, 16 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 27 (1992);
184. David Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Changing Concepts of Legal Scholarship, 11 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 12 (1993). Resolution of these questions including specifically the question of the extent to which some measure of carefully modulated paternalism (as would be reflected in a refusal to allow mentally disabled defendants such as Ferguson to waive counsel) is sanist is also beyond the scope of this paper.
185. See Christopher Johns, Kafkaesque Nightmare of a Trial, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Mar. 5, 1995, at F3: The justice system also fails victims. In the Ferguson case, the trial must have been a Kafkaesque nightmare. There is no justice when an accused roams the courtroom incapable of defending himself or taking responsibility for his actions. It was a spectacle, not a trial. It undermined the court's integrity and fostered the belief that the criminal justice system is not fair.
186. Michael L. Perlin, The Sanist Lives of Jurors in Death Penalty Cases: The Puzzling Role of "Mitigating" Mental Disability Evidence, 8 NOTRE DAME J. L., ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 239 (1994).
187. Michael L. Perlin & Keri K. Gould, Rashomon and the Criminal Law: Mental Disability and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 22 AM. J. CRIM. L. 431 (1995).
188. See Johns, supra note 162 ("Regrettably, Thomas' opinion does not fit reality or serve justice. It's a backward step in the face of a mushrooming population of mentally ill, developmentally disabled, and mentally retarded people ensnared in the criminal justice system").
189. E.g., In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955); Walker v. Lockhart, 726 F. 2d 1238, 1244 (8th Cir. 1984); City of Cleveland v. Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co., 503 F. Supp. 368, 381 (M.D. Ohio 1980).