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Economics, QALYs and medical ethics - a health economist's perspective
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The wall paper re-examined
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Klein, R. (1993). Dimensions of rationing: who should do what? In, Rationing in Action, BMJ Publishing Group, London. (Klein's realistic account is to be admired. It is revealing, and unfortunate, that he feels the need to make excuses for speaking the truth, and to attempt to find implications which are not so 'negative': as if his paper could not be deemed a success until he had found something positive to say.)
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Loughlin, M. (1994). The silence of philosophy. Health Care Analysis 2(4), 310-316.
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BMJ Publishing Group, London
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Chadwick, R. (1993). Justice in priority setting. In, Rationing in Action, BMJ Publishing Group, London.
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note
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This question is far more complex than Williams' treatment of it implies. According to consequentialist moral theory it follows as a matter of logic (not 'commonsense') that what we ought to do is bring about the best consequences, however one determines what they are. Thus, Williams seems committed to some form of consequentialism, although as far as I know he offers no defence of this view. Philosophers who reject consequentialism often claim there is a logical distinction between what it is right to do and what it is 'best' (in consequential terms) to do, and that it is at least sometimes true that we ought to do what is right as opposed to what is best. Some authors who take this view appeal to arguments and illustrations which purport to show that 'commonsense' is in fact on their side.
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