The Turkish state discourse and the exclusion of Kurdish identity

Middle Eastern Studies

Volumn 32, Issue 2, 1996, Pages 216-229

  Yeǧen, Mesut ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ETHNIC IDENTITY; KURDISH PEOPLE; STATE-MINORITY RELATIONS;

TURKEY;

EID: 0029907453     PISSN: 00263206     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/00263209608701112     Document Type: Article

References (34)

1. As I have indicated in another study, Turkish state discourse did not represent or misrepresent the Kurdish question, but rather the Kurdish question was reconstituted in the discourse of the Turkish state. See M. Yeǧen, 'The Archaeology of Republican Turkish State Discourse (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Essex, Colchester, 1994). Rejecting the notion of the Turkish state as an 'author' which is capable of (mis)representing the Kurdish question, I suggested that the Kurdish question was reconstituted in Turkish state discourse as a question of reactionary politics, of tribal resistance, or of regional backwardness, for the Turkish state discourse appeared in a particular 'discursive formation' (for the concept of 'discursive formation', see M. Foucault, The Archeology of Knowledge, London: Routledge, 1989, pp.1-76). In other words, it was the particular discursive formation within which the Turkish state discourse was constituted which made possible the appearance of particular statements through which the Kurdish question was reconstituted as a question of reactionary politics, of tribal resistance, and of regional backwardness. Contemporary Turkish state discourse appeared in a discursive formation, the constitutive components of which were the discourses of nationalism, secularism, westernization/ modernization, and centralization. The struggle with the political order of the 'past', consolidation of a centralized state power, and the building of a national market economy were also indispensable components of the same discursive formation. Having appeared in this discursive formation, the discourse of the Turkish state necessarily read the Kurdish question in terms of the tensions between the past and the present; tradition and modernity; the periphery and the centre; Islam and reason. Being a necessary outcome of a particular discursive formation, this reading led to the Kurdish question being reconstituted as an issue of reactionary politics; of tribal resistance and of regional backwardness.
2. As I have indicated in another study, Turkish state discourse did not represent or misrepresent the Kurdish question, but rather the Kurdish question was reconstituted in the discourse of the Turkish state. See M. Yeǧen, 'The Archaeology of Republican Turkish State Discourse (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Essex, Colchester, 1994). Rejecting the notion of the Turkish state as an 'author' which is capable of (mis)representing the Kurdish question, I suggested that the Kurdish question was reconstituted in Turkish state discourse as a question of reactionary politics, of tribal resistance, or of regional backwardness, for the Turkish state discourse appeared in a particular 'discursive formation' (for the concept of 'discursive formation', see M. Foucault, The Archeology of Knowledge, London: Routledge, 1989, pp.1-76). In other words, it was the particular discursive formation within which the Turkish state discourse was constituted which made possible the appearance of particular statements through which the Kurdish question was reconstituted as a question of reactionary politics, of tribal resistance, and of regional backwardness. Contemporary Turkish state discourse appeared in a discursive formation, the constitutive components of which were the discourses of nationalism, secularism, westernization/ modernization, and centralization. The struggle with the political order of the 'past', consolidation of a centralized state power, and the building of a national market economy were also indispensable components of the same discursive formation. Having appeared in this discursive formation, the discourse of the Turkish state necessarily read the Kurdish question in terms of the tensions between the past and the present; tradition and modernity; the periphery and the centre; Islam and reason. Being a necessary outcome of a particular discursive formation, this reading led to the Kurdish question being reconstituted as an issue of reactionary politics; of tribal resistance and of regional backwardness.
3. The pioneer of the view that the Turkish state discourse is an ideological narrative, which both misrepresents and conceals the true nature of the Kurdish question, is Ismail Besikci, whose reasoning had a defining impact on all critical accounts of the Turkish state discourse. In his numerous works Besikci advocated that the Turkish state discourse is an ideological narrative based on lie/falsity. See, for instance, Besikci's following works: Kürtlerin Mecburi İşkani [The Compulsory Settlement of Kurds], Istanbul: Komal, 1978; Devletlerarasi Sömürge Kürdistan [Kurdistan: the Inter-state Colony], Istanbul: Alan Yayincilik, 1990a; Bilim-Resmi Ideoloji, Devlet - Demokrasi ve Kürt Sorunu [Science - Official Ideology, State - Democracy and the Kurdish Question], Istanbul: Alan Yayincilik, 1990b; Tunceli Kanunu (1935) ve Dersim Jenosidi [The Tunceli Law (1935) and the Dersim Genoside], Istanbul: Belge Yayinlari, 1990c. Cumhuriyet Halk Firkasinin Programi (1931) ve Kürt Sorunu [The Programme of the Republican People's Party (1931) and the Kurdish Question), Istanbul: Belge Yayinlari, 1991a. Türk Tarih Tezi, Güneş, - Dil Teorisi ve Kürt Sorunu [The Turkish History Thesis, The Sun-Language Theory and the Kurdish Question] Ankara: Yurt Yayinlari, 1991b.
4. The pioneer of the view that the Turkish state discourse is an ideological narrative, which both misrepresents and conceals the true nature of the Kurdish question, is Ismail Besikci, whose reasoning had a defining impact on all critical accounts of the Turkish state discourse. In his numerous works Besikci advocated that the Turkish state discourse is an ideological narrative based on lie/falsity. See, for instance, Besikci's following works: Kürtlerin Mecburi İşkani [The Compulsory Settlement of Kurds], Istanbul: Komal, 1978; Devletlerarasi Sömürge Kürdistan [Kurdistan: the Inter-state Colony], Istanbul: Alan Yayincilik, 1990a; Bilim-Resmi Ideoloji, Devlet - Demokrasi ve Kürt Sorunu [Science - Official Ideology, State - Democracy and the Kurdish Question], Istanbul: Alan Yayincilik, 1990b; Tunceli Kanunu (1935) ve Dersim Jenosidi [The Tunceli Law (1935) and the Dersim Genoside], Istanbul: Belge Yayinlari, 1990c. Cumhuriyet Halk Firkasinin Programi (1931) ve Kürt Sorunu [The Programme of the Republican People's Party (1931) and the Kurdish Question), Istanbul: Belge Yayinlari, 1991a. Türk Tarih Tezi, Güneş, - Dil Teorisi ve Kürt Sorunu [The Turkish History Thesis, The Sun-Language Theory and the Kurdish Question] Ankara: Yurt Yayinlari, 1991b.
5. The pioneer of the view that the Turkish state discourse is an ideological narrative, which both misrepresents and conceals the true nature of the Kurdish question, is Ismail Besikci, whose reasoning had a defining impact on all critical accounts of the Turkish state discourse. In his numerous works Besikci advocated that the Turkish state discourse is an ideological narrative based on lie/falsity. See, for instance, Besikci's following works: Kürtlerin Mecburi İşkani [The Compulsory Settlement of Kurds], Istanbul: Komal, 1978; Devletlerarasi Sömürge Kürdistan [Kurdistan: the Inter-state Colony], Istanbul: Alan Yayincilik, 1990a; Bilim-Resmi Ideoloji, Devlet - Demokrasi ve Kürt Sorunu [Science - Official Ideology, State - Democracy and the Kurdish Question], Istanbul: Alan Yayincilik, 1990b; Tunceli Kanunu (1935) ve Dersim Jenosidi [The Tunceli Law (1935) and the Dersim Genoside], Istanbul: Belge Yayinlari, 1990c. Cumhuriyet Halk Firkasinin Programi (1931) ve Kürt Sorunu [The Programme of the Republican People's Party (1931) and the Kurdish Question), Istanbul: Belge Yayinlari, 1991a. Türk Tarih Tezi, Güneş, - Dil Teorisi ve Kürt Sorunu [The Turkish History Thesis, The Sun-Language Theory and the Kurdish Question] Ankara: Yurt Yayinlari, 1991b.
6. The pioneer of the view that the Turkish state discourse is an ideological narrative, which both misrepresents and conceals the true nature of the Kurdish question, is Ismail Besikci, whose reasoning had a defining impact on all critical accounts of the Turkish state discourse. In his numerous works Besikci advocated that the Turkish state discourse is an ideological narrative based on lie/falsity. See, for instance, Besikci's following works: Kürtlerin Mecburi İşkani [The Compulsory Settlement of Kurds], Istanbul: Komal, 1978; Devletlerarasi Sömürge Kürdistan [Kurdistan: the Inter-state Colony], Istanbul: Alan Yayincilik, 1990a; Bilim-Resmi Ideoloji, Devlet - Demokrasi ve Kürt Sorunu [Science - Official Ideology, State - Democracy and the Kurdish Question], Istanbul: Alan Yayincilik, 1990b; Tunceli Kanunu (1935) ve Dersim Jenosidi [The Tunceli Law (1935) and the Dersim Genoside], Istanbul: Belge Yayinlari, 1990c. Cumhuriyet Halk Firkasinin Programi (1931) ve Kürt Sorunu [The Programme of the Republican People's Party (1931) and the Kurdish Question), Istanbul: Belge Yayinlari, 1991a. Türk Tarih Tezi, Güneş, - Dil Teorisi ve Kürt Sorunu [The Turkish History Thesis, The Sun-Language Theory and the Kurdish Question] Ankara: Yurt Yayinlari, 1991b.
7. The pioneer of the view that the Turkish state discourse is an ideological narrative, which both misrepresents and conceals the true nature of the Kurdish question, is Ismail Besikci, whose reasoning had a defining impact on all critical accounts of the Turkish state discourse. In his numerous works Besikci advocated that the Turkish state discourse is an ideological narrative based on lie/falsity. See, for instance, Besikci's following works: Kürtlerin Mecburi İşkani [The Compulsory Settlement of Kurds], Istanbul: Komal, 1978; Devletlerarasi Sömürge Kürdistan [Kurdistan: the Inter-state Colony], Istanbul: Alan Yayincilik, 1990a; Bilim-Resmi Ideoloji, Devlet - Demokrasi ve Kürt Sorunu [Science - Official Ideology, State - Democracy and the Kurdish Question], Istanbul: Alan Yayincilik, 1990b; Tunceli Kanunu (1935) ve Dersim Jenosidi [The Tunceli Law (1935) and the Dersim Genoside], Istanbul: Belge Yayinlari, 1990c. Cumhuriyet Halk Firkasinin Programi (1931) ve Kürt Sorunu [The Programme of the Republican People's Party (1931) and the Kurdish Question), Istanbul: Belge Yayinlari, 1991a. Türk Tarih Tezi, Güneş, - Dil Teorisi ve Kürt Sorunu [The Turkish History Thesis, The Sun-Language Theory and the Kurdish Question] Ankara: Yurt Yayinlari, 1991b.
8. The pioneer of the view that the Turkish state discourse is an ideological narrative, which both misrepresents and conceals the true nature of the Kurdish question, is Ismail Besikci, whose reasoning had a defining impact on all critical accounts of the Turkish state discourse. In his numerous works Besikci advocated that the Turkish state discourse is an ideological narrative based on lie/falsity. See, for instance, Besikci's following works: Kürtlerin Mecburi İşkani [The Compulsory Settlement of Kurds], Istanbul: Komal, 1978; Devletlerarasi Sömürge Kürdistan [Kurdistan: the Inter-state Colony], Istanbul: Alan Yayincilik, 1990a; Bilim-Resmi Ideoloji, Devlet - Demokrasi ve Kürt Sorunu [Science - Official Ideology, State - Democracy and the Kurdish Question], Istanbul: Alan Yayincilik, 1990b; Tunceli Kanunu (1935) ve Dersim Jenosidi [The Tunceli Law (1935) and the Dersim Genoside], Istanbul: Belge Yayinlari, 1990c. Cumhuriyet Halk Firkasinin Programi (1931) ve Kürt Sorunu [The Programme of the Republican People's Party (1931) and the Kurdish Question), Istanbul: Belge Yayinlari, 1991a. Türk Tarih Tezi, Güneş, - Dil Teorisi ve Kürt Sorunu [The Turkish History Thesis, The Sun-Language Theory and the Kurdish Question] Ankara: Yurt Yayinlari, 1991b.
9. Needless to say, in this study language is not considered as the mirror function of an extra-linguistic practice.
10. S. Gavan, Kurdistan: Divided Nation of the Middle East (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1958).
11. This war of ascendancy resulted in the 'first' division of 'Kurdistan'. Most Kurdish tribes were subordinated by the Ottoman Empire, while the rest were subordinated by the Iranian Empire. This division determined the frontiers between these two empires, and the same frontiers still divide the Kurds in Iran and Turkey.
12. M. V. Bruinessen, Osmanliciliktan Ayrilikciliǧa. Seyh Sait Ayaklanmasinin Dini ve Etnik Arka Plani' [From Ottomanism to Separatism: The Religious and Ethnic Background of the Sheikh Said Rebellion], in Kürdistan Üzerine Yazilar (Writings on Kurdistan], Istanbul: Iletişim, 1992a, p.127.
13. Note that here the term periphery also refers to a politico-cultural space as much as it refers to the space of the economy.
14. See M.V. Bruinessen, 'Kürtler Arasinda Bir Siyasi Protesto Araci Olarak Nakçibendi Tarikati' [The Naqshbandi tariqa as a vehicle of political protest among Kurds], in Kurdistan Üzerine Yazilar [Writings on Kurdistan], İstanbul: Iletişim, I992b, p.108. and R. Olson, The Emergence of Kurdish Nationalism and the Sheikh Said Rebellion (Texas: University of Texas Press, 1989), p.xvi.
15. See M.V. Bruinessen, 'Kürtler Arasinda Bir Siyasi Protesto Araci Olarak Nakçibendi Tarikati' [The Naqshbandi tariqa as a vehicle of political protest among Kurds], in Kurdistan Üzerine Yazilar [Writings on Kurdistan], İstanbul: Iletişim, I992b, p.108. and R. Olson, The Emergence of Kurdish Nationalism and the Sheikh Said Rebellion (Texas: University of Texas Press, 1989), p.xvi.
16. Ibid., p.xvi.
17. Brunessen, 'Kürtler Arasinda Bir Siyasi Protesto Araci Olarak Nakşibendi Tarikati', pp.105-9.
18. Olson, op.cit. p.17.
19. Seyyid Abdulkadir was a high-level politician in the last years of the Ottoman Empire. After the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in the First World War, he did not support the project of an independent 'Kurdistan'. As a loyal Ottoman, he pursued an autonomous administration for Kurdistan within the unity of the Ottoman state.
20. W.F. Tucker 'Introduction', in R. Olson The Emergence of Kurdish Nationalism, pxvii.
21. Ibid., p.xix.
22. Olson, op.cit., p.16.
23. Bruinessen, Osmanliciliktan Ayrilikciliǧa', p.125.
24. The reflections of a nationalist sheikh are of interest in terms of explaining the role of religion in securing the social space wherein Kurdishness was constituted. As Bruinessen observes, this particular sheikh argued that the assimilation policies of the Turkish state were less effective in the regions where religious sentiment was strong. According to this sheikh Kurdish culture was protected more in these regions than anywhere else. See Bruinessen, 'Osmanliciliktan Ayrilikciliǧa', p.168.
25. M.V. Bruinessen, Agha, Sheikh, and State. On the Social and Political Organization of Kurdistan (Rijswick: Enroprint, 1978), p.10.
26. Olson, op.cit., pp.153-5.
27. Bruinessen, Agha, Sheikh, and State, p.242.
28. Bruinessen makes a similar comment in his assessment of the Kurdish resistance of the nineteenth centuries. In his view, 'the earliest phase of Kurdish nationalism was characterised by local ruler's attempt to make themselves independent of the central state apparatus'. Ibid., p.357.
29. The two opposition parties, the Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Firkasi (Progressive Republican Party) and Serbest Firka (Free Republican Party) were closed down in 1925 and 1930 respectively.
30. N. Kutlay, İttihat Terakki ve Kürtler [The Committee of Union and Progress and Kurds], Istanbul: Firat-Dicle Yayinlari, 1991, p.10.
31. Kutlay, op.cit., p.18.
32. R. Olson, the author of the most serious work on the Sheikh Said rebellion, has different views on the rebellion. In his view, 'the Sheikh Said rebellion was the first large-scale nationalist rebellion of Kurds. The role of the Azadi [an illegal Kurdish organization] was fundamental in its unfolding. Kurdish intellectuals and military officers lay at the heart of the nationalist movement....The fact that the rebellion had a religious character was the result of Azadi's assessment of the strategy and tactics necessary for carrying out a successful revolution. While the Sheikh Said rebellion was a nationalist rebellion, its mobilisation, propaganda, and symbols were those of a religious rebellion'. Olson, op.cit., p.153.
33. The present essay does not claim to be a study of Kurdish identity. An exhaustive discussion on the constitution and the exclusion of Kurdish identity is beyond the essential concerns of this piece. I am concerned instead with the constitution and the exclusion of Kurdish identity only in connection with the contemporary Turkish state discourse.
34. The defining role of the seemingly a-national elements/figures in the constitution of the social space wherein Kurdishness was excluded and Turkishness constituted implies the following: the tension between Kurds (as an ethnic identity) and the Turkish state (as a national organization) have always intermingled with other 'sociological' tensions. Therefore, it is possible to argue that today's confrontation between the Kurds and the Turkish state will merge with the 'sociological' tensions of the 1990s, just as the confrontations of early twentieth century intermingled with the tensions between tradition and modernity, Islam and secularism, and the periphery and the centre. In other words, just as the Kurdishness of the early 1990s was not a self-referential category, neither will it be in the 1990s. This argument rests on the idea that each single identity, including ethnic and national identities, is possible only through other identities/relations. It is impossible to contemplate any identity which does not owe its very existence to other identities/relations. In the case of the Kurds, tradition, popular practices of religion and the periphery, in opposition to centralism, modernism, and secularism of the Turkish state, conditioned the social space wherein Kurdishness was constituted.