Bioethics and caring

Journal of Medical Ethics

Volumn 22, Issue 2, 1996, Pages 83-89

  Van Hooft, Stan ^a  

^a DEAKIN UNIVERSITY   (Australia)

Author keywords

Caring; Ethical theory; Human nature; Pain; Particularism; Virtue

Indexed keywords

ARTICLE; ETHICS; HUMAN; SOCIAL BEHAVIOR;

EID: 0029892354     PISSN: 03066800     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1136/jme.22.2.83     Document Type: Article

References (18)

1. Pincoffs E L. Quandaries and virtues. Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1986.
2. The most notable examples of this trend are Williams B, Ethics and the limits of philosophy, London: William Collins, 1985, and MacIntyre A., After virtue: a study in moral theory, London: Duckworth, 1981. For a more recent discussion of more limited scope in which impartial reason is criticised as a basis for ethical judgment, see MacLean A, The elimination of morality: reflections on utilitarianism and bioethics, London and New York: Routledge, 1993.
3. The most notable examples of this trend are Williams B, Ethics and the limits of philosophy, London: William Collins, 1985, and MacIntyre A., After virtue: a study in moral theory, London: Duckworth, 1981. For a more recent discussion of more limited scope in which impartial reason is criticised as a basis for ethical judgment, see MacLean A, The elimination of morality: reflections on utilitarianism and bioethics, London and New York: Routledge, 1993.
4. The most notable examples of this trend are Williams B, Ethics and the limits of philosophy, London: William Collins, 1985, and MacIntyre A., After virtue: a study in moral theory, London: Duckworth, 1981. For a more recent discussion of more limited scope in which impartial reason is criticised as a basis for ethical judgment, see MacLean A, The elimination of morality: reflections on utilitarianism and bioethics, London and New York: Routledge, 1993.
5. Even recent discussions of 'virtue ethics' can fail to note this distinction. The demand to be virtuous is often seen as just another external demand rather than one that arises from the motivational structure of the agent. (For example, see Louden R B, On some vices of virtue ethics and Beauchamp T L, What's so special about the virtues?, both in Haber J G, ed, Doing and being: selected readings in moral philosophy, New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1993.
6. I discuss this further in my Caring and professional commitment, The Australian journal of advanced nursing, 1987; 4, 4: 29-38
7. Van Hooft S. Caring: an essay in the philosophy of ethics. Niwot, Colorado: University Press of Colorado, 1995.
8. Heidegger M. Being and time [trans by Macquarie J, Robinson E]. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1973: sections 64 and 65.
9. I am not using this phrase in the somewhat defensive and solipsistic way that Sartre uses it in his analysis of 'The Look' in his Being and nothingness [trans by Barnes H], New York: Washington Square Press, 1966: 340 ff.
10. For a thorough exposition of this debate see Dancy J, Moral reasons, Oxford: Blackwell, 1993.
11. The paradigm that both beliefs and desires are needed to explain actions was articulated by Donald Davidson in recent times in his Essays on actions and events, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980, but is at least as old as Hume.
12. See reference (2): Williams B: 188.
13. Mill J S. Utilitarianism. In: Ryan A, ed. John Stuart Mill and Jeremy Bentham, utilitarianism and other essays. London: Penguin Books, 1987: 303.
14. Gilligan C. In a different voice: psychological theory and women's development. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1982
15. For an interesting discussion of these issues see Blum L A. Vocation, friendship, and community: limitations of the personal-impersonal framework in his .Moral perception and particularity Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994: 98-123
16. The nature of this objectivity is explored by Julius Kovesi in his Moral notions, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1967. Following Wittgenstein, Kovesi develops the idea that moral notions are objective although tied to the practices of particular language communities.
17. I have developed these ideas, without the aid of my model, in my Moral education for nursing decisions. Journal of advanced nursing 1990; 15: 210-5.
18. For an introduction to the particularist position, see reference (13): Blum L A, Iris Murdoch and the domain of the moral: 12-29.