Fiscal adjustment and official reserves in sovereign debt negotiations

Economica

Volumn 63, Issue 249, 1996, Pages 81-95

  Detragiache, Enrica ^a  

^a INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

CREDIT WORTHINESS; CREDITWORTHINESS; DEBT BARGAINING; DEBT NEGOTIATION; FISCAL ADJUSTMENT; OFFICIAL RESERVES; SOVEREIGN DEBT; THEORETICAL STUDIES;

EID: 0029749973     PISSN: 00130427     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2554635     Document Type: Article

References (25)

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