On the strategic role of high leverage in entry deterrence

Journal of Banking and Finance

Volumn 20, Issue 1, 1996, Pages 1-23

  Fulghieri, P ^a   Nagarajan, S ^b  

^a Howard Hughes Medical Institute   (United States)

^b MCGILL UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

Author keywords

Asymmetric information; Debt; Predatory pricing

Indexed keywords

EID: 0029690307     PISSN: 03784266     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/0378-4266(94)00124-3     Document Type: Article

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