Axiomatizing ordinal welfare egalitarianism when preferences may vary

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 68, Issue 1, 1996, Pages 77-110

  Sprumont, Yves ^a  

^a UNIVERSITÉ DE MONTRÉAL   (Canada)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0029687438     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.1996.0005     Document Type: Article

References (24)

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