Penalty as a component of review strategies for effective enforcement of environmental regulations

Environmetrics

Volumn 7, Issue 1, 1996, Pages 77-95

  Fukuyama, Kei ^a   Kilgour, D Marc ^a,b   Hipel, Keith W ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WATERLOO   (Canada)

^b WILFRID LAURIER UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

Author keywords

Enforcement; Environmental regulations; Game theory; Penalty; Review strategies

Indexed keywords

ENFORCEMENT POLICY; ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION; GAME THEORY; PENALTY STRATEGY; REGULATORY ENFORCEMENT; REVIEW STRATEGY;

EID: 0029667376     PISSN: 11804009     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1002/(SICI)1099-095X(199601)7:1<77::AID-ENV199>3.0.CO;2-V     Document Type: Article

References (48)

1. Allingham, M. G. and Sandmo, A. (1972). 'Income tax evasion: A theoretical analysis', Journal of Public Economics, 1, 323-338.
2. Aumann, R. J. (1985). 'Repeated games', in Feiwel, G. R. (ed), Issues in Contemporary Microeconomics and Welfare, Macmillan, London, UK.
3. Axelrod, R. (1984). The Evolution of Cooperation, Basic Books, New York, USA.
4. Becker, G. S. (1968). 'Crime and punishment: an economic approach', Journal of Political Economy, 76, 69-217.
5. Brams, S. J. (1994). Theory of Moves, Cambridge University Press, New York, USA.
6. Brams, S. J. and Kilgour, D. M. (1988). Game Theory and National Security, Basil Blackwell, New York, USA.
7. Brams, S. J. and Mattli, W. (1993). 'Theory of moves: overview and examples', Conflict Management and Peace Science, 12, (2), 1-39.
8. Ehrlich, I. (1974). 'Participation in illegitimate activities: an economic analysis', in Becker, G. S. and Landes, W. M. (eds), Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, Columbia University Press, New York, USA.
9. El-Shaarawi, A. H. (1993). 'Environmental monitoring, assessment and prediction of change', Environmetrics, 4, (4), 381-398.
10. Esterby, S. R. (1993). 'Trend analysis methods for environmental data', Environmetrics, 4, (4), 459-481.
11. Fang, L., Hipel, K. W. and Kilgour, D. M. (1993). Interactive Decision Making: the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution, Wiley, New York, USA.
12. Flora, J. D. Jr. (1991). 'Statistics and environmental regulations', Environmetrics, 2, (2), 129-137.
13. Friedman, J. E. (1986). Game Theory with Applications to Economics, Oxford University Press, New York, USA.
14. Fukuyama, K., Kilgour, D. M. and Hipel, K. W. (1994a). 'Systematic policy development for enforcement of environmental regulations', IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man and Cybernetics, 24, (9), 1289-1305.
15. Fukuyama, K., Kilgour, D. M. and Hipel, K. W. (1994b). 'A policy for inducing compliance to environmental regulations', in Hipel, K. and Fang, L. (eds), Effective Environmental Management for Sustainable Development, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, The Netherlands, pp. 29-42.
16. Gilbert, R. O. (1987). Statistical Methods for Environmental Pollution Monitoring, Van Nostrand, New York, USA.
17. Government of Canada (1990). Canada's Green Plan, Minister of Supply and Services, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada.
18. Graetz, M. J. and Wilde, L. L. (1985). 'The economics of tax compliance: fact and fantasy', National Tax Journal, 38, 355-363.
19. Harrington, W. (1988). 'Enforcement leverage when penalties are restricted', Journal of Public Economics, 37, 29-53.
20. Hipel, K. W. and Fang, L. (eds) (1994). Effective Environmental Management for Sustainable Development, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, The Netherlands.
21. Hipel, K. W., and McLeod, A. I. (1994). Time Series Modelling of Water Resources and Environmental Systems, Elsevier, Amsterdam, The Netherlands.
22. Hirsch, R. M. and Slack, J. R. (1984). 'A nonparametric trend test for seasonal data with serial dependence', Water Resources Research, 20, (6), 727-732.
23. Howard, N. (1994a). 'Drama theory and its relation to game theory: Part I - Dramatic resolution vs rational solution', Group Decision and Negotiation, 3, (2), 187-206.
24. Howard, N. (1994b). 'Drama theory and its relation to game theory: Part II - Formal model of the resolution process', Group Decision and Negotiation, 3, (2), 207-236.
25. Kilgour, D. M., Fang, L. and Hipel, K. W. (1992). 'Game-theoretic analysis of enforcement of environmental laws and regulations', Water Resources Bulletin, 28, (1), 141-153.
26. Kilgour, D. M., Fang, L. and Hipel, K. W. (1994). 'How penalty affects enforcement of environmental regulations', in Hipel, K. and Fang, L. (eds), Effective Environmental Management for Sustainable Development, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, The Netherlands, pp. 57-71.
27. Macdonald, D. (1991). The Politics of Pollution - Why Canadians Are Failing Their Environment, McClelland & Stewart Inc., The Canadian Publishers, Toronto, Canada.
28. Nash, J. (1951), 'Non-cooperative games', Annals of Mathematics, 54, 286-295.
29. Nonet, P. and Selznick, P. (1978). Law and Society in Transition: Towards Responsive Law, Octagon, New York, USA.
30. Ontario Ministry of Environment and Energy (1992). 'Report on the 1990 Industrial Direct Discharges in Ontario - Volume I: Summary of Compliance Assessment', Water Resources Branch, Toronto, Ontario, Canada.
31. Ontario Ministry of Environment and Energy (1993). Bill 26: An Act respecting Environmental Bill of Rights in Ontario, The Legislative Assembly of Ontario, Toronto, Ontario, Canada.
32. Pyle, D. I. (1983). The Economics of Crime and Law Enforcement, MacMillan, New York, USA.
33. Radner, R. (1981). 'Monitoring cooperative agreements in a repeated principal-agent relationship', Econometrica, 49, 1127-1148.
34. Radner, R. (1985). 'Repeated principal-agent games with discounting', Econometrica, 53, (5), 1173-1199.
35. Reinganum, J. F. and Wilde, L. L. (1985). 'Income tax compliance in a principal-agent framework', Journal of Public Economics, 26, 1-18.
36. Rogers, J. (1992). 'Assessing attainment of ground water cleanup standards using modified sequential t-tests', Environmetrics, 3, (3), 335-359.
37. Russell, C. S. (1990). 'Game models for structuring monitoring and enforcement systems', Natural Resource Modeling, 4, (2), 143-173.
38. Russell, C. S., Harrington, W. and Vaughan, W. J. (1986). Enforcing Pollution Control Laws, Resources for the Future, Washington, DC, USA.
39. Scholz, J. T. (1984a). 'Voluntary compliance and regulatory enforcement', Law and Policy, 6, 385-424.
40. Scholz, J. T. (1984b). 'Cooperation, deterrence, and the ecology of regulatory enforcement', Law and Society Review, 18, (2), 179-224.
41. Srinivasan, T. N. (1973). 'Tax evasion: A model', Journal of Public Economics, 2, 339-346.
42. Stern, N. (1978). 'On the economic theory of policy toward crime', in Heinke, J. M. (ed), Economic Models of Criminal Behavior, North-Holland, Amsterdam, The Netherlands.
43. Stigler, G. J. (1970). 'The optimum enforcement of laws', Journal of Political Economy, 78, 526-536.
44. Tietenberg, T. H. (ed) (1992). Innovation in Environmental Policy: Economic and Legal Aspects of Recent Developments in Environmental Enforcement and Liability, Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, Hants, UK.
45. Tsebelis, G. (1989). 'The abuse of probability in political analysis: the Robinson Crusoe fallacy', American Political Science Review, 83, (1), 93-122.
46. Tsebelis, G. (1990). 'Penalty has no impact on crime: a game-theoretical analysis', Rationality and Society, 2, (3), 255-286.
47. Tsebelis, G. (1991). 'The effect of fines on regulated industries: game theory vs. decision theory', Journal of Theoretical Politics, 3, (1), 81-101.
48. von Neumann, J. and Morgenstern, O. (1953). Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, USA.