Ethnic tension and the struggle for order: China's policies in Tibet

Pacific Affairs

Volumn 68, Issue 4, 1995, Pages 485-508

  Karmel, Solomon M ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

CHINESE POLICY; DEVELOPING COUNTRY; DOMESTIC POLITICS; ETHNIC TENSION; NATIONALISM; POLITICAL REGULATION;

CHINA, TIBET;

EID: 0029472687     PISSN: 0030851X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2761273     Document Type: Article

References (118)

1. From 1975-1991, one million are said to have died in ethnic conflicts, matching the 1945-1975 figure of one million. James G. Kellas, The Politics of Nationalism and Ethnicity (London: Macmillan, 1991).
2. For Hu Yaobang's policies on Tibet, see "Six Requirements for Tibet," Xinhua, 30 May 1980. For Wang Meng's policies, see "Wang Meng on Modernization for Tibet," Lhasa Tibet Regional [News] Service (hereafter LTRS), 8 August 1986, in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts (hereafter BBC), 13 August 1986.
3. For Hu Yaobang's policies on Tibet, see "Six Requirements for Tibet," Xinhua, 30 May 1980. For Wang Meng's policies, see "Wang Meng on Modernization for Tibet," Lhasa Tibet Regional [News] Service (hereafter LTRS), 8 August 1986, in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts (hereafter BBC), 13 August 1986.
4. For Hu Yaobang's policies on Tibet, see "Six Requirements for Tibet," Xinhua, 30 May 1980. For Wang Meng's policies, see "Wang Meng on Modernization for Tibet," Lhasa Tibet Regional [News] Service (hereafter LTRS), 8 August 1986, in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts (hereafter BBC), 13 August 1986.
5. "Dissatisfaction with Housing and Employment in Tibet," Renmin Ribao, 14 February 1988.
6. "First Meeting of Tibetan Language Commission on Problems Caused by Leftism," LTRS, 13 March 1988, in BBC, 16 March 1988; "Tibet: 'A Great Deal of Outstanding Culture Has Been Ruined' by Leftism," LTRS, 22 December 1985, in BBC, 31 December 1985.
7. "First Meeting of Tibetan Language Commission on Problems Caused by Leftism," LTRS, 13 March 1988, in BBC, 16 March 1988; "Tibet: 'A Great Deal of Outstanding Culture Has Been Ruined' by Leftism," LTRS, 22 December 1985, in BBC, 31 December 1985.
8. "First Meeting of Tibetan Language Commission on Problems Caused by Leftism," LTRS, 13 March 1988, in BBC, 16 March 1988; "Tibet: 'A Great Deal of Outstanding Culture Has Been Ruined' by Leftism," LTRS, 22 December 1985, in BBC, 31 December 1985.
9. "First Meeting of Tibetan Language Commission on Problems Caused by Leftism," LTRS, 13 March 1988, in BBC, 16 March 1988; "Tibet: 'A Great Deal of Outstanding Culture Has Been Ruined' by Leftism," LTRS, 22 December 1985, in BBC, 31 December 1985.
10. For Wu's criticism of hardliners' religious policies, see "Tibet: Buddhist Scriptures Treated by Some as Spiritual Pollution," LTRS, 20 November 1985, in BBC, 23 November 1985. On the Panchen Lama's support for the Dalai Lama and his (watered-down) criticisms of Chinese rule, see "Tibetan Leader Describes Panchen Lama as a Patriot," Xinhua, 16 February 1989; "Panchen Further Analyses Causes and Handling of Lhasa Riots," LTRS, 8 February 1988, in BBC, 12 February 1988; and "Panchen Lama's Last Speech," Xinhua, 7 February 1989.
11. For Wu's criticism of hardliners' religious policies, see "Tibet: Buddhist Scriptures Treated by Some as Spiritual Pollution," LTRS, 20 November 1985, in BBC, 23 November 1985. On the Panchen Lama's support for the Dalai Lama and his (watered-down) criticisms of Chinese rule, see "Tibetan Leader Describes Panchen Lama as a Patriot," Xinhua, 16 February 1989; "Panchen Further Analyses Causes and Handling of Lhasa Riots," LTRS, 8 February 1988, in BBC, 12 February 1988; and "Panchen Lama's Last Speech," Xinhua, 7 February 1989.
12. For Wu's criticism of hardliners' religious policies, see "Tibet: Buddhist Scriptures Treated by Some as Spiritual Pollution," LTRS, 20 November 1985, in BBC, 23 November 1985. On the Panchen Lama's support for the Dalai Lama and his (watered-down) criticisms of Chinese rule, see "Tibetan Leader Describes Panchen Lama as a Patriot," Xinhua, 16 February 1989; "Panchen Further Analyses Causes and Handling of Lhasa Riots," LTRS, 8 February 1988, in BBC, 12 February 1988; and "Panchen Lama's Last Speech," Xinhua, 7 February 1989.
13. For Wu's criticism of hardliners' religious policies, see "Tibet: Buddhist Scriptures Treated by Some as Spiritual Pollution," LTRS, 20 November 1985, in BBC, 23 November 1985. On the Panchen Lama's support for the Dalai Lama and his (watered-down) criticisms of Chinese rule, see "Tibetan Leader Describes Panchen Lama as a Patriot," Xinhua, 16 February 1989; "Panchen Further Analyses Causes and Handling of Lhasa Riots," LTRS, 8 February 1988, in BBC, 12 February 1988; and "Panchen Lama's Last Speech," Xinhua, 7 February 1989.
14. For Wu's criticism of hardliners' religious policies, see "Tibet: Buddhist Scriptures Treated by Some as Spiritual Pollution," LTRS, 20 November 1985, in BBC, 23 November 1985. On the Panchen Lama's support for the Dalai Lama and his (watered-down) criticisms of Chinese rule, see "Tibetan Leader Describes Panchen Lama as a Patriot," Xinhua, 16 February 1989; "Panchen Further Analyses Causes and Handling of Lhasa Riots," LTRS, 8 February 1988, in BBC, 12 February 1988; and "Panchen Lama's Last Speech," Xinhua, 7 February 1989.
15. For Wu's criticism of hardliners' religious policies, see "Tibet: Buddhist Scriptures Treated by Some as Spiritual Pollution," LTRS, 20 November 1985, in BBC, 23 November 1985. On the Panchen Lama's support for the Dalai Lama and his (watered-down) criticisms of Chinese rule, see "Tibetan Leader Describes Panchen Lama as a Patriot," Xinhua, 16 February 1989; "Panchen Further Analyses Causes and Handling of Lhasa Riots," LTRS, 8 February 1988, in BBC, 12 February 1988; and "Panchen Lama's Last Speech," Xinhua, 7 February 1989.
16. "Tibet Deputies Urge More Favorable Policies for Minority Nationalities," Xinhua, 29 March 1988; "Dorje Tsering Answers Questions on Lhasa Riots," LTRS, 26 January 1988, in BBC, 30 January 1988.
17. "Tibet Deputies Urge More Favorable Policies for Minority Nationalities," Xinhua, 29 March 1988; "Dorje Tsering Answers Questions on Lhasa Riots," LTRS, 26 January 1988, in BBC, 30 January 1988.
18. "Tibet Deputies Urge More Favorable Policies for Minority Nationalities," Xinhua, 29 March 1988; "Dorje Tsering Answers Questions on Lhasa Riots," LTRS, 26 January 1988, in BBC, 30 January 1988.
19. Tseten Wangchuk Sharlho, "China's Reforms in Tibet: Issues and Dilemmas," Journal of Contemporary China, vol. 1, no. 1 (Fall 1992), p. 52.
20. Currently, Dorje is working to round up aid at home and abroad for China's 200 million annual victims of natural calamities. He is also promoting "villagers' autonomy" experiments, underway in fifty-eight areas around the country, to prevent rural warlordism, banditry, and deadly clan feuds. Jeffrey Parker, "China Tries Rural Democracy to Curb Warlords," Reuters, 7-8 May 1994.
21. Tang Daxian, a Mainland journalist turned dissident, claims a secret report stated 469 were killed in Tibet's March 1989 crackdown. "Journalist Claims Chinese Killed Hundreds of Tibetans Last Year," AP, 15 August 1990.
22. On Hu Jintao's background and views, see Ho Pin and Kao Hsin, "The Career and Background of Hu Jintao," Dangdai (HK), 15 December 1992, pp. 48-51, in BBC, 20 January 1993. On Chen Kaiyuan, see "Xinhua Profiles New Tibet Party Secretary," Xinhua, 1 December 1992, in FBIS, 2 December 1992, p. 55; "Party Appoints New Chief in Tibet," SCMP, 2 December 1992.
23. On Hu Jintao's background and views, see Ho Pin and Kao Hsin, "The Career and Background of Hu Jintao," Dangdai (HK), 15 December 1992, pp. 48-51, in BBC, 20 January 1993. On Chen Kaiyuan, see "Xinhua Profiles New Tibet Party Secretary," Xinhua, 1 December 1992, in FBIS, 2 December 1992, p. 55; "Party Appoints New Chief in Tibet," SCMP, 2 December 1992.
24. On Hu Jintao's background and views, see Ho Pin and Kao Hsin, "The Career and Background of Hu Jintao," Dangdai (HK), 15 December 1992, pp. 48-51, in BBC, 20 January 1993. On Chen Kaiyuan, see "Xinhua Profiles New Tibet Party Secretary," Xinhua, 1 December 1992, in FBIS, 2 December 1992, p. 55; "Party Appoints New Chief in Tibet," SCMP, 2 December 1992.
25. On Hu Jintao's background and views, see Ho Pin and Kao Hsin, "The Career and Background of Hu Jintao," Dangdai (HK), 15 December 1992, pp. 48-51, in BBC, 20 January 1993. On Chen Kaiyuan, see "Xinhua Profiles New Tibet Party Secretary," Xinhua, 1 December 1992, in FBIS, 2 December 1992, p. 55; "Party Appoints New Chief in Tibet," SCMP, 2 December 1992.
26. On Hu Jintao's background and views, see Ho Pin and Kao Hsin, "The Career and Background of Hu Jintao," Dangdai (HK), 15 December 1992, pp. 48-51, in BBC, 20 January 1993. On Chen Kaiyuan, see "Xinhua Profiles New Tibet Party Secretary," Xinhua, 1 December 1992, in FBIS, 2 December 1992, p. 55; "Party Appoints New Chief in Tibet," SCMP, 2 December 1992.
27. For information on Tibet's twenty-one "riots" from 1987-1989, see, for example, "Tibet-Based Officer on Lhasa Riots and Martial law," Zhongguo Xinwen She (China News), 23 March 1989, in BBC, 30 March 1989.
28. For information on Tibet's twenty-one "riots" from 1987-1989, see, for example, "Tibet-Based Officer on Lhasa Riots and Martial law," Zhongguo Xinwen She (China News), 23 March 1989, in BBC, 30 March 1989.
29. "Nationalism among Minorities Growing in China," Reuters, 3 February 1989.
30. Detained in China and Tibet (New York: Human Rights Watch, February 1994), p. xi; Amnesty International, Persistent Human Rights Violations in Tibet, 1995; "Arrests of Tibetan Separatists Rose in 1994," Agence France Presse, 22 June 1995; "Tibet Procuratorate Work Report," Xizang Ribao, 13 June 1995.
31. Detained in China and Tibet (New York: Human Rights Watch, February 1994), p. xi; Amnesty International, Persistent Human Rights Violations in Tibet, 1995; "Arrests of Tibetan Separatists Rose in 1994," Agence France Presse, 22 June 1995; "Tibet Procuratorate Work Report," Xizang Ribao, 13 June 1995.
32. Detained in China and Tibet (New York: Human Rights Watch, February 1994), p. xi; Amnesty International, Persistent Human Rights Violations in Tibet, 1995; "Arrests of Tibetan Separatists Rose in 1994," Agence France Presse, 22 June 1995; "Tibet Procuratorate Work Report," Xizang Ribao, 13 June 1995.
33. Detained in China and Tibet (New York: Human Rights Watch, February 1994), p. xi; Amnesty International, Persistent Human Rights Violations in Tibet, 1995; "Arrests of Tibetan Separatists Rose in 1994," Agence France Presse, 22 June 1995; "Tibet Procuratorate Work Report," Xizang Ribao, 13 June 1995.
34. "Speech by Gyaincain Norbu," Xizang Ribao, 6 June 1993.
35. Chen Kaiyuan's views on "infiltration" are contained in Chen Kaiyuan, "Earnest Implementation of the Basic Party Line to Succeed in Party Construction for the New Era" (speech delivered by Chen in the first weeks of 1993, at a meeting of Communist party representatives of the T.A.R., obtained and released by the International Campaign for Tibet, 12 February 1993). Elements of this speech were subsequently publicly echoed by officials, and there is reason to believe that it is genuine. For more on turmoil in rural areas, see Yang Yungnian, "Tibet Further Stabilizes Situation," Wen Wei Po (HK), 27 June 1994, p. A2, in FBIS, 28 June 1994, p. 78; "Text of Speech by Raidi," Xizang Ribao, 24 May 1994, pp. 1, 3.
36. Chen Kaiyuan's views on "infiltration" are contained in Chen Kaiyuan, "Earnest Implementation of the Basic Party Line to Succeed in Party Construction for the New Era" (speech delivered by Chen in the first weeks of 1993, at a meeting of Communist party representatives of the T.A.R., obtained and released by the International Campaign for Tibet, 12 February 1993). Elements of this speech were subsequently publicly echoed by officials, and there is reason to believe that it is genuine. For more on turmoil in rural areas, see Yang Yungnian, "Tibet Further Stabilizes Situation," Wen Wei Po (HK), 27 June 1994, p. A2, in FBIS, 28 June 1994, p. 78; "Text of Speech by Raidi," Xizang Ribao, 24 May 1994, pp. 1, 3.
37. Chen Kaiyuan's views on "infiltration" are contained in Chen Kaiyuan, "Earnest Implementation of the Basic Party Line to Succeed in Party Construction for the New Era" (speech delivered by Chen in the first weeks of 1993, at a meeting of Communist party representatives of the T.A.R., obtained and released by the International Campaign for Tibet, 12 February 1993). Elements of this speech were subsequently publicly echoed by officials, and there is reason to believe that it is genuine. For more on turmoil in rural areas, see Yang Yungnian, "Tibet Further Stabilizes Situation," Wen Wei Po (HK), 27 June 1994, p. A2, in FBIS, 28 June 1994, p. 78; "Text of Speech by Raidi," Xizang Ribao, 24 May 1994, pp. 1, 3.
38. Chen Kaiyuan's views on "infiltration" are contained in Chen Kaiyuan, "Earnest Implementation of the Basic Party Line to Succeed in Party Construction for the New Era" (speech delivered by Chen in the first weeks of 1993, at a meeting of Communist party representatives of the T.A.R., obtained and released by the International Campaign for Tibet, 12 February 1993). Elements of this speech were subsequently publicly echoed by officials, and there is reason to believe that it is genuine. For more on turmoil in rural areas, see Yang Yungnian, "Tibet Further Stabilizes Situation," Wen Wei Po (HK), 27 June 1994, p. A2, in FBIS, 28 June 1994, p. 78; "Text of Speech by Raidi," Xizang Ribao, 24 May 1994, pp. 1, 3.
39. For statistics on Tibet's exports and tourist trade, see "Report on Government Work Delivered by Gyaincain Norbu," Xizang Ribao, 8 June 1995, pp. 1, 3, and 6 June 1994, pp. 1-3. On foreign sources of Tibet's troubles, see Yang Gongsu, Suowei "Xizang Duli" Huodong de Youlai (The cause behind all discussions of "Tibetan independence") (Beijing: China Tibet Publishing House, 1990); Huang Yin, "Xifang Diguozhuyi shi Zhizao 'Xizang Duli' de Zuikui" (Western imperialism is the master criminal creating the issue of "Tibetan independence"), Xizang Yanjiu (Tibetan Studies), 1991:2, pp. 40-48.
40. For statistics on Tibet's exports and tourist trade, see "Report on Government Work Delivered by Gyaincain Norbu," Xizang Ribao, 8 June 1995, pp. 1, 3, and 6 June 1994, pp. 1-3. On foreign sources of Tibet's troubles, see Yang Gongsu, Suowei "Xizang Duli" Huodong de Youlai (The cause behind all discussions of "Tibetan independence") (Beijing: China Tibet Publishing House, 1990); Huang Yin, "Xifang Diguozhuyi shi Zhizao 'Xizang Duli' de Zuikui" (Western imperialism is the master criminal creating the issue of "Tibetan independence"), Xizang Yanjiu (Tibetan Studies), 1991:2, pp. 40-48.
41. For statistics on Tibet's exports and tourist trade, see "Report on Government Work Delivered by Gyaincain Norbu," Xizang Ribao, 8 June 1995, pp. 1, 3, and 6 June 1994, pp. 1-3. On foreign sources of Tibet's troubles, see Yang Gongsu, Suowei "Xizang Duli" Huodong de Youlai (The cause behind all discussions of "Tibetan independence") (Beijing: China Tibet Publishing House, 1990); Huang Yin, "Xifang Diguozhuyi shi Zhizao 'Xizang Duli' de Zuikui" (Western imperialism is the master criminal creating the issue of "Tibetan independence"), Xizang Yanjiu (Tibetan Studies), 1991:2, pp. 40-48.
42. The dilemmas of economic reform in Tibet under a vastly limited version of "market socialism" are detailed in Sun Yong, ed., Xizang: Feidianxing Erjiegouxia de Fazhan Gaige (Tibet: Development and reform under the non-typical dual structure) (Beijing: China Tibet Publishing House, 1991).
43. On following "higher authorities," see Deng Zhujia, "Roundup," Xizang Ribao, 4 July 1994, p. 3, in FBIS, 19 July 1994, p. 51. On the management of prisons, see Detained in China and Tibet, pp. xxiv-xxv.
44. On following "higher authorities," see Deng Zhujia, "Roundup," Xizang Ribao, 4 July 1994, p. 3, in FBIS, 19 July 1994, p. 51. On the management of prisons, see Detained in China and Tibet, pp. xxiv-xxv.
45. On following "higher authorities," see Deng Zhujia, "Roundup," Xizang Ribao, 4 July 1994, p. 3, in FBIS, 19 July 1994, p. 51. On the management of prisons, see Detained in China and Tibet, pp. xxiv-xxv.
46. On the 1991 exhibition in Beijing, see "Tibet's Social, Historical Articles on Display," Xinhua, 18 May 1991. Admittedly, the White Paper on Tibet also focuses on expanded health care, education, and other issues. For a complete text, see "China on its Ownership and Human Rights in Tibet," Xinhua, 22 September 1992.
47. On the 1991 exhibition in Beijing, see "Tibet's Social, Historical Articles on Display," Xinhua, 18 May 1991. Admittedly, the White Paper on Tibet also focuses on expanded health care, education, and other issues. For a complete text, see "China on its Ownership and Human Rights in Tibet," Xinhua, 22 September 1992.
48. For information on the Beijing boycott, see "Tibetans Stage Boycott," Tibet Press Watch, vol. 4, no. 1 (February 1992), p. 2; for Xinhua quotations, see Ren Haiping, "It Is Not Too Late To Return after Going Astray," People's Daily (Overseas), 28 September 1992, p. 3, in FBIS, 29 September 1992, p. 30.
49. For information on the Beijing boycott, see "Tibetans Stage Boycott," Tibet Press Watch, vol. 4, no. 1 (February 1992), p. 2; for Xinhua quotations, see Ren Haiping, "It Is Not Too Late To Return after Going Astray," People's Daily (Overseas), 28 September 1992, p. 3, in FBIS, 29 September 1992, p. 30.
50. For information on the Beijing boycott, see "Tibetans Stage Boycott," Tibet Press Watch, vol. 4, no. 1 (February 1992), p. 2; for Xinhua quotations, see Ren Haiping, "It Is Not Too Late To Return after Going Astray," People's Daily (Overseas), 28 September 1992, p. 3, in FBIS, 29 September 1992, p. 30.
51. On 1959 "reforms," see Dorje Tsedain, "Tibet: Human Rights and China's Sovereignty," Beijing Review, vol. 9, 28 March 1992, pp. 22-25; on Mao as Boddhisatva, see Qin Guanglong, Lasa: Saoluan yu Jieyan (Lhasa: Riots and the imposition of martial law) (Beijing: PLA Cultural Publishing House, 1990), p. 44.
52. On 1959 "reforms," see Dorje Tsedain, "Tibet: Human Rights and China's Sovereignty," Beijing Review, vol. 9, 28 March 1992, pp. 22-25; on Mao as Boddhisatva, see Qin Guanglong, Lasa: Saoluan yu Jieyan (Lhasa: Riots and the imposition of martial law) (Beijing: PLA Cultural Publishing House, 1990), p. 44.
53. On architecture: At least fifteen historic sites in the old section of Lhasa have been demolished in the past ten years. Most have been replaced by Chinese commercial and public buildings. "Demolition Derby," Tibet Press Watch, vol. 5, no. 4 (September 1993), pp. 5-6; "Urban Crisis on the Tibetan Plateau," Tibet Press Watch, vol. 6, no. 2 (May 1994), pp. 14-15. On "still-backward" Tibet: "Tibetans Always 'Grateful' to 'Inland,'" Xinhua, 4 October 1992; "Report on Government Work Delivered by Gyaincain Norbu," Xizang Ribao, 8 June 1995, pp. 1 and 3, and 6 June 1994, pp. 1-3; Zhou Xiyin, "Lun Zangzu Renmin dui Zuguo de Zhoyue Gongxian" (The outstanding contribution of Tibetan people to China), Xizang Yanjiu (Tibetan Studies), 1990:2; Raidi on "frigid" plateau: "U.S. Senators Complete Visit to Tibet," Xinhua, 24 August 1993, in FBIS, 25 August 1993, p. 3.
54. On architecture: At least fifteen historic sites in the old section of Lhasa have been demolished in the past ten years. Most have been replaced by Chinese commercial and public buildings. "Demolition Derby," Tibet Press Watch, vol. 5, no. 4 (September 1993), pp. 5-6; "Urban Crisis on the Tibetan Plateau," Tibet Press Watch, vol. 6, no. 2 (May 1994), pp. 14-15. On "still-backward" Tibet: "Tibetans Always 'Grateful' to 'Inland,'" Xinhua, 4 October 1992; "Report on Government Work Delivered by Gyaincain Norbu," Xizang Ribao, 8 June 1995, pp. 1 and 3, and 6 June 1994, pp. 1-3; Zhou Xiyin, "Lun Zangzu Renmin dui Zuguo de Zhoyue Gongxian" (The outstanding contribution of Tibetan people to China), Xizang Yanjiu (Tibetan Studies), 1990:2; Raidi on "frigid" plateau: "U.S. Senators Complete Visit to Tibet," Xinhua, 24 August 1993, in FBIS, 25 August 1993, p. 3.
55. On architecture: At least fifteen historic sites in the old section of Lhasa have been demolished in the past ten years. Most have been replaced by Chinese commercial and public buildings. "Demolition Derby," Tibet Press Watch, vol. 5, no. 4 (September 1993), pp. 5-6; "Urban Crisis on the Tibetan Plateau," Tibet Press Watch, vol. 6, no. 2 (May 1994), pp. 14-15. On "still-backward" Tibet: "Tibetans Always 'Grateful' to 'Inland,'" Xinhua, 4 October 1992; "Report on Government Work Delivered by Gyaincain Norbu," Xizang Ribao, 8 June 1995, pp. 1 and 3, and 6 June 1994, pp. 1-3; Zhou Xiyin, "Lun Zangzu Renmin dui Zuguo de Zhoyue Gongxian" (The outstanding contribution of Tibetan people to China), Xizang Yanjiu (Tibetan Studies), 1990:2; Raidi on "frigid" plateau: "U.S. Senators Complete Visit to Tibet," Xinhua, 24 August 1993, in FBIS, 25 August 1993, p. 3.
56. On architecture: At least fifteen historic sites in the old section of Lhasa have been demolished in the past ten years. Most have been replaced by Chinese commercial and public buildings. "Demolition Derby," Tibet Press Watch, vol. 5, no. 4 (September 1993), pp. 5-6; "Urban Crisis on the Tibetan Plateau," Tibet Press Watch, vol. 6, no. 2 (May 1994), pp. 14-15. On "still-backward" Tibet: "Tibetans Always 'Grateful' to 'Inland,'" Xinhua, 4 October 1992; "Report on Government Work Delivered by Gyaincain Norbu," Xizang Ribao, 8 June 1995, pp. 1 and 3, and 6 June 1994, pp. 1-3; Zhou Xiyin, "Lun Zangzu Renmin dui Zuguo de Zhoyue Gongxian" (The outstanding contribution of Tibetan people to China), Xizang Yanjiu (Tibetan Studies), 1990:2; Raidi on "frigid" plateau: "U.S. Senators Complete Visit to Tibet," Xinhua, 24 August 1993, in FBIS, 25 August 1993, p. 3.
57. On architecture: At least fifteen historic sites in the old section of Lhasa have been demolished in the past ten years. Most have been replaced by Chinese commercial and public buildings. "Demolition Derby," Tibet Press Watch, vol. 5, no. 4 (September 1993), pp. 5-6; "Urban Crisis on the Tibetan Plateau," Tibet Press Watch, vol. 6, no. 2 (May 1994), pp. 14-15. On "still-backward" Tibet: "Tibetans Always 'Grateful' to 'Inland,'" Xinhua, 4 October 1992; "Report on Government Work Delivered by Gyaincain Norbu," Xizang Ribao, 8 June 1995, pp. 1 and 3, and 6 June 1994, pp. 1-3; Zhou Xiyin, "Lun Zangzu Renmin dui Zuguo de Zhoyue Gongxian" (The outstanding contribution of Tibetan people to China), Xizang Yanjiu (Tibetan Studies), 1990:2; Raidi on "frigid" plateau: "U.S. Senators Complete Visit to Tibet," Xinhua, 24 August 1993, in FBIS, 25 August 1993, p. 3.
58. On architecture: At least fifteen historic sites in the old section of Lhasa have been demolished in the past ten years. Most have been replaced by Chinese commercial and public buildings. "Demolition Derby," Tibet Press Watch, vol. 5, no. 4 (September 1993), pp. 5-6; "Urban Crisis on the Tibetan Plateau," Tibet Press Watch, vol. 6, no. 2 (May 1994), pp. 14-15. On "still-backward" Tibet: "Tibetans Always 'Grateful' to 'Inland,'" Xinhua, 4 October 1992; "Report on Government Work Delivered by Gyaincain Norbu," Xizang Ribao, 8 June 1995, pp. 1 and 3, and 6 June 1994, pp. 1-3; Zhou Xiyin, "Lun Zangzu Renmin dui Zuguo de Zhoyue Gongxian" (The outstanding contribution of Tibetan people to China), Xizang Yanjiu (Tibetan Studies), 1990:2; Raidi on "frigid" plateau: "U.S. Senators Complete Visit to Tibet," Xinhua, 24 August 1993, in FBIS, 25 August 1993, p. 3.
59. On architecture: At least fifteen historic sites in the old section of Lhasa have been demolished in the past ten years. Most have been replaced by Chinese commercial and public buildings. "Demolition Derby," Tibet Press Watch, vol. 5, no. 4 (September 1993), pp. 5-6; "Urban Crisis on the Tibetan Plateau," Tibet Press Watch, vol. 6, no. 2 (May 1994), pp. 14-15. On "still-backward" Tibet: "Tibetans Always 'Grateful' to 'Inland,'" Xinhua, 4 October 1992; "Report on Government Work Delivered by Gyaincain Norbu," Xizang Ribao, 8 June 1995, pp. 1 and 3, and 6 June 1994, pp. 1-3; Zhou Xiyin, "Lun Zangzu Renmin dui Zuguo de Zhoyue Gongxian" (The outstanding contribution of Tibetan people to China), Xizang Yanjiu (Tibetan Studies), 1990:2; Raidi on "frigid" plateau: "U.S. Senators Complete Visit to Tibet," Xinhua, 24 August 1993, in FBIS, 25 August 1993, p. 3.
60. Ni Banggui, "Fostering Correct Views on Nationalities," Xizang Ribao, 4 July 1994, p. 3, in FBIS, 18 July 1994, pp. 77-79.
61. Ni Banggui, "Fostering Correct Views on Nationalities," Xizang Ribao, 4 July 1994, p. 3, in FBIS, 18 July 1994, pp. 77-79.
62. Three sources state that there are 30,000, 37,000, or 40,000 minority cadres in Tibet, and 97 percent of minority cadres are said to be Tibetan. While the overall number of minority cadres changes from article to article (between 30-40,000), statistics on the percentages of cadres from minority nationalities always remain at about 70 percent (in two articles, 69.3 percent, in one, 67 percent, in another, "about 70 percent") of all cadres in Tibet. This implies that there are between 43,000 and 57,000 cadres. However, elsewhere official sources have also stated that there are about 100,000 cadres "of various nationalities in Tibet." This suggests that minority cadres comprise only 30-40 percent of the total. It is curious that the official percentages never change, even during periods of large influxes of cadres from other provinces (e.g., during martial law, 1989-1990). In fact, the large percentages of cadres who are temporary officers, engineers, and managers (working in Tibet for ten years or less) may not be counted in official statistics. Thus, the often-repeated figures on the percentages of Tibetan cadres in Tibet are all questionable. For statistics, see "China on Its Ownership and Human Rights in Tibet," Xinhua, 22 September 1992; "Ethnic Tibetans Constitute the Bulk of Tibetan Cadres," Zhongguo Xinwen She, 12 June 1993, in FBIS, 14 June 1993, pp. 26-27; "Tibetan Official Receives Australian Delegation," Xinhua, 10 July 1993, in FBIS, 12 July 1993, p. 21; "Tibet Chairman on Development, Ethnic Unity," Beijing TV, 25 June 1993, in FBIS, 29 June 1993; "Tibet Holds Meeting on Party Constitution," Tibet TV, 4 December 1992, in FBIS, 7 December 1992, p. 47; "Lhasa Celebrates Tenth Birthday of China's Constitution," Xinhua, 4 December 1992.
63. Three sources state that there are 30,000, 37,000, or 40,000 minority cadres in Tibet, and 97 percent of minority cadres are said to be Tibetan. While the overall number of minority cadres changes from article to article (between 30-40,000), statistics on the percentages of cadres from minority nationalities always remain at about 70 percent (in two articles, 69.3 percent, in one, 67 percent, in another, "about 70 percent") of all cadres in Tibet. This implies that there are between 43,000 and 57,000 cadres. However, elsewhere official sources have also stated that there are about 100,000 cadres "of various nationalities in Tibet." This suggests that minority cadres comprise only 30-40 percent of the total. It is curious that the official percentages never change, even during periods of large influxes of cadres from other provinces (e.g., during martial law, 1989-1990). In fact, the large percentages of cadres who are temporary officers, engineers, and managers (working in Tibet for ten years or less) may not be counted in official statistics. Thus, the often-repeated figures on the percentages of Tibetan cadres in Tibet are all questionable. For statistics, see "China on Its Ownership and Human Rights in Tibet," Xinhua, 22 September 1992; "Ethnic Tibetans Constitute the Bulk of Tibetan Cadres," Zhongguo Xinwen She, 12 June 1993, in FBIS, 14 June 1993, pp. 26-27; "Tibetan Official Receives Australian Delegation," Xinhua, 10 July 1993, in FBIS, 12 July 1993, p. 21; "Tibet Chairman on Development, Ethnic Unity," Beijing TV, 25 June 1993, in FBIS, 29 June 1993; "Tibet Holds Meeting on Party Constitution," Tibet TV, 4 December 1992, in FBIS, 7 December 1992, p. 47; "Lhasa Celebrates Tenth Birthday of China's Constitution," Xinhua, 4 December 1992.
64. Three sources state that there are 30,000, 37,000, or 40,000 minority cadres in Tibet, and 97 percent of minority cadres are said to be Tibetan. While the overall number of minority cadres changes from article to article (between 30-40,000), statistics on the percentages of cadres from minority nationalities always remain at about 70 percent (in two articles, 69.3 percent, in one, 67 percent, in another, "about 70 percent") of all cadres in Tibet. This implies that there are between 43,000 and 57,000 cadres. However, elsewhere official sources have also stated that there are about 100,000 cadres "of various nationalities in Tibet." This suggests that minority cadres comprise only 30-40 percent of the total. It is curious that the official percentages never change, even during periods of large influxes of cadres from other provinces (e.g., during martial law, 1989-1990). In fact, the large percentages of cadres who are temporary officers, engineers, and managers (working in Tibet for ten years or less) may not be counted in official statistics. Thus, the often-repeated figures on the percentages of Tibetan cadres in Tibet are all questionable. For statistics, see "China on Its Ownership and Human Rights in Tibet," Xinhua, 22 September 1992; "Ethnic Tibetans Constitute the Bulk of Tibetan Cadres," Zhongguo Xinwen She, 12 June 1993, in FBIS, 14 June 1993, pp. 26-27; "Tibetan Official Receives Australian Delegation," Xinhua, 10 July 1993, in FBIS, 12 July 1993, p. 21; "Tibet Chairman on Development, Ethnic Unity," Beijing TV, 25 June 1993, in FBIS, 29 June 1993; "Tibet Holds Meeting on Party Constitution," Tibet TV, 4 December 1992, in FBIS, 7 December 1992, p. 47; "Lhasa Celebrates Tenth Birthday of China's Constitution," Xinhua, 4 December 1992.
65. Three sources state that there are 30,000, 37,000, or 40,000 minority cadres in Tibet, and 97 percent of minority cadres are said to be Tibetan. While the overall number of minority cadres changes from article to article (between 30-40,000), statistics on the percentages of cadres from minority nationalities always remain at about 70 percent (in two articles, 69.3 percent, in one, 67 percent, in another, "about 70 percent") of all cadres in Tibet. This implies that there are between 43,000 and 57,000 cadres. However, elsewhere official sources have also stated that there are about 100,000 cadres "of various nationalities in Tibet." This suggests that minority cadres comprise only 30-40 percent of the total. It is curious that the official percentages never change, even during periods of large influxes of cadres from other provinces (e.g., during martial law, 1989-1990). In fact, the large percentages of cadres who are temporary officers, engineers, and managers (working in Tibet for ten years or less) may not be counted in official statistics. Thus, the often-repeated figures on the percentages of Tibetan cadres in Tibet are all questionable. For statistics, see "China on Its Ownership and Human Rights in Tibet," Xinhua, 22 September 1992; "Ethnic Tibetans Constitute the Bulk of Tibetan Cadres," Zhongguo Xinwen She, 12 June 1993, in FBIS, 14 June 1993, pp. 26-27; "Tibetan Official Receives Australian Delegation," Xinhua, 10 July 1993, in FBIS, 12 July 1993, p. 21; "Tibet Chairman on Development, Ethnic Unity," Beijing TV, 25 June 1993, in FBIS, 29 June 1993; "Tibet Holds Meeting on Party Constitution," Tibet TV, 4 December 1992, in FBIS, 7 December 1992, p. 47; "Lhasa Celebrates Tenth Birthday of China's Constitution," Xinhua, 4 December 1992.
66. Three sources state that there are 30,000, 37,000, or 40,000 minority cadres in Tibet, and 97 percent of minority cadres are said to be Tibetan. While the overall number of minority cadres changes from article to article (between 30-40,000), statistics on the percentages of cadres from minority nationalities always remain at about 70 percent (in two articles, 69.3 percent, in one, 67 percent, in another, "about 70 percent") of all cadres in Tibet. This implies that there are between 43,000 and 57,000 cadres. However, elsewhere official sources have also stated that there are about 100,000 cadres "of various nationalities in Tibet." This suggests that minority cadres comprise only 30-40 percent of the total. It is curious that the official percentages never change, even during periods of large influxes of cadres from other provinces (e.g., during martial law, 1989-1990). In fact, the large percentages of cadres who are temporary officers, engineers, and managers (working in Tibet for ten years or less) may not be counted in official statistics. Thus, the often-repeated figures on the percentages of Tibetan cadres in Tibet are all questionable. For statistics, see "China on Its Ownership and Human Rights in Tibet," Xinhua, 22 September 1992; "Ethnic Tibetans Constitute the Bulk of Tibetan Cadres," Zhongguo Xinwen She, 12 June 1993, in FBIS, 14 June 1993, pp. 26-27; "Tibetan Official Receives Australian Delegation," Xinhua, 10 July 1993, in FBIS, 12 July 1993, p. 21; "Tibet Chairman on Development, Ethnic Unity," Beijing TV, 25 June 1993, in FBIS, 29 June 1993; "Tibet Holds Meeting on Party Constitution," Tibet TV, 4 December 1992, in FBIS, 7 December 1992, p. 47; "Lhasa Celebrates Tenth Birthday of China's Constitution," Xinhua, 4 December 1992.
67. Three sources state that there are 30,000, 37,000, or 40,000 minority cadres in Tibet, and 97 percent of minority cadres are said to be Tibetan. While the overall number of minority cadres changes from article to article (between 30-40,000), statistics on the percentages of cadres from minority nationalities always remain at about 70 percent (in two articles, 69.3 percent, in one, 67 percent, in another, "about 70 percent") of all cadres in Tibet. This implies that there are between 43,000 and 57,000 cadres. However, elsewhere official sources have also stated that there are about 100,000 cadres "of various nationalities in Tibet." This suggests that minority cadres comprise only 30-40 percent of the total. It is curious that the official percentages never change, even during periods of large influxes of cadres from other provinces (e.g., during martial law, 1989-1990). In fact, the large percentages of cadres who are temporary officers, engineers, and managers (working in Tibet for ten years or less) may not be counted in official statistics. Thus, the often-repeated figures on the percentages of Tibetan cadres in Tibet are all questionable. For statistics, see "China on Its Ownership and Human Rights in Tibet," Xinhua, 22 September 1992; "Ethnic Tibetans Constitute the Bulk of Tibetan Cadres," Zhongguo Xinwen She, 12 June 1993, in FBIS, 14 June 1993, pp. 26-27; "Tibetan Official Receives Australian Delegation," Xinhua, 10 July 1993, in FBIS, 12 July 1993, p. 21; "Tibet Chairman on Development, Ethnic Unity," Beijing TV, 25 June 1993, in FBIS, 29 June 1993; "Tibet Holds Meeting on Party Constitution," Tibet TV, 4 December 1992, in FBIS, 7 December 1992, p. 47; "Lhasa Celebrates Tenth Birthday of China's Constitution," Xinhua, 4 December 1992.
68. Three sources state that there are 30,000, 37,000, or 40,000 minority cadres in Tibet, and 97 percent of minority cadres are said to be Tibetan. While the overall number of minority cadres changes from article to article (between 30-40,000), statistics on the percentages of cadres from minority nationalities always remain at about 70 percent (in two articles, 69.3 percent, in one, 67 percent, in another, "about 70 percent") of all cadres in Tibet. This implies that there are between 43,000 and 57,000 cadres. However, elsewhere official sources have also stated that there are about 100,000 cadres "of various nationalities in Tibet." This suggests that minority cadres comprise only 30-40 percent of the total. It is curious that the official percentages never change, even during periods of large influxes of cadres from other provinces (e.g., during martial law, 1989-1990). In fact, the large percentages of cadres who are temporary officers, engineers, and managers (working in Tibet for ten years or less) may not be counted in official statistics. Thus, the often-repeated figures on the percentages of Tibetan cadres in Tibet are all questionable. For statistics, see "China on Its Ownership and Human Rights in Tibet," Xinhua, 22 September 1992; "Ethnic Tibetans Constitute the Bulk of Tibetan Cadres," Zhongguo Xinwen She, 12 June 1993, in FBIS, 14 June 1993, pp. 26-27; "Tibetan Official Receives Australian Delegation," Xinhua, 10 July 1993, in FBIS, 12 July 1993, p. 21; "Tibet Chairman on Development, Ethnic Unity," Beijing TV, 25 June 1993, in FBIS, 29 June 1993; "Tibet Holds Meeting on Party Constitution," Tibet TV, 4 December 1992, in FBIS, 7 December 1992, p. 47; "Lhasa Celebrates Tenth Birthday of China's Constitution," Xinhua, 4 December 1992.
69. Three sources state that there are 30,000, 37,000, or 40,000 minority cadres in Tibet, and 97 percent of minority cadres are said to be Tibetan. While the overall number of minority cadres changes from article to article (between 30-40,000), statistics on the percentages of cadres from minority nationalities always remain at about 70 percent (in two articles, 69.3 percent, in one, 67 percent, in another, "about 70 percent") of all cadres in Tibet. This implies that there are between 43,000 and 57,000 cadres. However, elsewhere official sources have also stated that there are about 100,000 cadres "of various nationalities in Tibet." This suggests that minority cadres comprise only 30-40 percent of the total. It is curious that the official percentages never change, even during periods of large influxes of cadres from other provinces (e.g., during martial law, 1989-1990). In fact, the large percentages of cadres who are temporary officers, engineers, and managers (working in Tibet for ten years or less) may not be counted in official statistics. Thus, the often-repeated figures on the percentages of Tibetan cadres in Tibet are all questionable. For statistics, see "China on Its Ownership and Human Rights in Tibet," Xinhua, 22 September 1992; "Ethnic Tibetans Constitute the Bulk of Tibetan Cadres," Zhongguo Xinwen She, 12 June 1993, in FBIS, 14 June 1993, pp. 26-27; "Tibetan Official Receives Australian Delegation," Xinhua, 10 July 1993, in FBIS, 12 July 1993, p. 21; "Tibet Chairman on Development, Ethnic Unity," Beijing TV, 25 June 1993, in FBIS, 29 June 1993; "Tibet Holds Meeting on Party Constitution," Tibet TV, 4 December 1992, in FBIS, 7 December 1992, p. 47; "Lhasa Celebrates Tenth Birthday of China's Constitution," Xinhua, 4 December 1992.
70. Three sources state that there are 30,000, 37,000, or 40,000 minority cadres in Tibet, and 97 percent of minority cadres are said to be Tibetan. While the overall number of minority cadres changes from article to article (between 30-40,000), statistics on the percentages of cadres from minority nationalities always remain at about 70 percent (in two articles, 69.3 percent, in one, 67 percent, in another, "about 70 percent") of all cadres in Tibet. This implies that there are between 43,000 and 57,000 cadres. However, elsewhere official sources have also stated that there are about 100,000 cadres "of various nationalities in Tibet." This suggests that minority cadres comprise only 30-40 percent of the total. It is curious that the official percentages never change, even during periods of large influxes of cadres from other provinces (e.g., during martial law, 1989-1990). In fact, the large percentages of cadres who are temporary officers, engineers, and managers (working in Tibet for ten years or less) may not be counted in official statistics. Thus, the often-repeated figures on the percentages of Tibetan cadres in Tibet are all questionable. For statistics, see "China on Its Ownership and Human Rights in Tibet," Xinhua, 22 September 1992; "Ethnic Tibetans Constitute the Bulk of Tibetan Cadres," Zhongguo Xinwen She, 12 June 1993, in FBIS, 14 June 1993, pp. 26-27; "Tibetan Official Receives Australian Delegation," Xinhua, 10 July 1993, in FBIS, 12 July 1993, p. 21; "Tibet Chairman on Development, Ethnic Unity," Beijing TV, 25 June 1993, in FBIS, 29 June 1993; "Tibet Holds Meeting on Party Constitution," Tibet TV, 4 December 1992, in FBIS, 7 December 1992, p. 47; "Lhasa Celebrates Tenth Birthday of China's Constitution," Xinhua, 4 December 1992.
71. Three sources state that there are 30,000, 37,000, or 40,000 minority cadres in Tibet, and 97 percent of minority cadres are said to be Tibetan. While the overall number of minority cadres changes from article to article (between 30-40,000), statistics on the percentages of cadres from minority nationalities always remain at about 70 percent (in two articles, 69.3 percent, in one, 67 percent, in another, "about 70 percent") of all cadres in Tibet. This implies that there are between 43,000 and 57,000 cadres. However, elsewhere official sources have also stated that there are about 100,000 cadres "of various nationalities in Tibet." This suggests that minority cadres comprise only 30-40 percent of the total. It is curious that the official percentages never change, even during periods of large influxes of cadres from other provinces (e.g., during martial law, 1989-1990). In fact, the large percentages of cadres who are temporary officers, engineers, and managers (working in Tibet for ten years or less) may not be counted in official statistics. Thus, the often-repeated figures on the percentages of Tibetan cadres in Tibet are all questionable. For statistics, see "China on Its Ownership and Human Rights in Tibet," Xinhua, 22 September 1992; "Ethnic Tibetans Constitute the Bulk of Tibetan Cadres," Zhongguo Xinwen She, 12 June 1993, in FBIS, 14 June 1993, pp. 26-27; "Tibetan Official Receives Australian Delegation," Xinhua, 10 July 1993, in FBIS, 12 July 1993, p. 21; "Tibet Chairman on Development, Ethnic Unity," Beijing TV, 25 June 1993, in FBIS, 29 June 1993; "Tibet Holds Meeting on Party Constitution," Tibet TV, 4 December 1992, in FBIS, 7 December 1992, p. 47; "Lhasa Celebrates Tenth Birthday of China's Constitution," Xinhua, 4 December 1992.
72. The number of Tibetan "cadres" in the Tibetan Military District was reported at six hundred in June of 1994, and the number of Tibetan "officers" was reported at one thousand in May of 1995. A secret report allegedly smuggled out of Tibet has claimed that one of every four soldiers (of any rank) in Tibet was Tibetan in 1992. The validity of these reports is impossible to confirm. There appear to be no official figures on the ethnic composition of all troops in Tibet. Moreover, while exiles have reported a large increase in troops on border patrols, the total troop force in Tibet commanded by the Han-dominated officer corps is a government secret. One official source claims that 56,000 soldiers were imported from elsewhere to suppress dissent during martial law, and the number of troops in Tibet since then has been estimated at anywhere between 40,000 and 250,000. See "PLA Promotes Ethnic Tibetan Officers," Xinhua, 6 May 1995; Qin, Lhasa: Riots, pp. 92-94; Jasper Becher, "'Secret' Report says 'Far Fewer Troops' in Tibet," SCMP, 8 June 1992, p. 9; Bill Austen, "China Flexes Military Muscle in Lhasa Suburbs," Kyodo, 2 May 1993; "Tibetan Officers Play a Major Role in Local PLA Troops," Xinhua, 1 March 1993; "PLA Trains Tibetan Cadres," Peking Home Service, 28 March 1989, in BBC, 14 April 1989; "Sixty-Six Percent of PLA Officers in Tibet are Tibetans," Xinhua, 26 March 1989, in BBC, 30 March 1989; "Emphasize the Employment of Minority Cadres [in the Tibet Military District]," Xizang Ribao, 23 June 1994, p. 1.
73. The number of Tibetan "cadres" in the Tibetan Military District was reported at six hundred in June of 1994, and the number of Tibetan "officers" was reported at one thousand in May of 1995. A secret report allegedly smuggled out of Tibet has claimed that one of every four soldiers (of any rank) in Tibet was Tibetan in 1992. The validity of these reports is impossible to confirm. There appear to be no official figures on the ethnic composition of all troops in Tibet. Moreover, while exiles have reported a large increase in troops on border patrols, the total troop force in Tibet commanded by the Han-dominated officer corps is a government secret. One official source claims that 56,000 soldiers were imported from elsewhere to suppress dissent during martial law, and the number of troops in Tibet since then has been estimated at anywhere between 40,000 and 250,000. See "PLA Promotes Ethnic Tibetan Officers," Xinhua, 6 May 1995; Qin, Lhasa: Riots, pp. 92-94; Jasper Becher, "'Secret' Report says 'Far Fewer Troops' in Tibet," SCMP, 8 June 1992, p. 9; Bill Austen, "China Flexes Military Muscle in Lhasa Suburbs," Kyodo, 2 May 1993; "Tibetan Officers Play a Major Role in Local PLA Troops," Xinhua, 1 March 1993; "PLA Trains Tibetan Cadres," Peking Home Service, 28 March 1989, in BBC, 14 April 1989; "Sixty-Six Percent of PLA Officers in Tibet are Tibetans," Xinhua, 26 March 1989, in BBC, 30 March 1989; "Emphasize the Employment of Minority Cadres [in the Tibet Military District]," Xizang Ribao, 23 June 1994, p. 1.
74. The number of Tibetan "cadres" in the Tibetan Military District was reported at six hundred in June of 1994, and the number of Tibetan "officers" was reported at one thousand in May of 1995. A secret report allegedly smuggled out of Tibet has claimed that one of every four soldiers (of any rank) in Tibet was Tibetan in 1992. The validity of these reports is impossible to confirm. There appear to be no official figures on the ethnic composition of all troops in Tibet. Moreover, while exiles have reported a large increase in troops on border patrols, the total troop force in Tibet commanded by the Han-dominated officer corps is a government secret. One official source claims that 56,000 soldiers were imported from elsewhere to suppress dissent during martial law, and the number of troops in Tibet since then has been estimated at anywhere between 40,000 and 250,000. See "PLA Promotes Ethnic Tibetan Officers," Xinhua, 6 May 1995; Qin, Lhasa: Riots, pp. 92-94; Jasper Becher, "'Secret' Report says 'Far Fewer Troops' in Tibet," SCMP, 8 June 1992, p. 9; Bill Austen, "China Flexes Military Muscle in Lhasa Suburbs," Kyodo, 2 May 1993; "Tibetan Officers Play a Major Role in Local PLA Troops," Xinhua, 1 March 1993; "PLA Trains Tibetan Cadres," Peking Home Service, 28 March 1989, in BBC, 14 April 1989; "Sixty-Six Percent of PLA Officers in Tibet are Tibetans," Xinhua, 26 March 1989, in BBC, 30 March 1989; "Emphasize the Employment of Minority Cadres [in the Tibet Military District]," Xizang Ribao, 23 June 1994, p. 1.
75. The number of Tibetan "cadres" in the Tibetan Military District was reported at six hundred in June of 1994, and the number of Tibetan "officers" was reported at one thousand in May of 1995. A secret report allegedly smuggled out of Tibet has claimed that one of every four soldiers (of any rank) in Tibet was Tibetan in 1992. The validity of these reports is impossible to confirm. There appear to be no official figures on the ethnic composition of all troops in Tibet. Moreover, while exiles have reported a large increase in troops on border patrols, the total troop force in Tibet commanded by the Han-dominated officer corps is a government secret. One official source claims that 56,000 soldiers were imported from elsewhere to suppress dissent during martial law, and the number of troops in Tibet since then has been estimated at anywhere between 40,000 and 250,000. See "PLA Promotes Ethnic Tibetan Officers," Xinhua, 6 May 1995; Qin, Lhasa: Riots, pp. 92-94; Jasper Becher, "'Secret' Report says 'Far Fewer Troops' in Tibet," SCMP, 8 June 1992, p. 9; Bill Austen, "China Flexes Military Muscle in Lhasa Suburbs," Kyodo, 2 May 1993; "Tibetan Officers Play a Major Role in Local PLA Troops," Xinhua, 1 March 1993; "PLA Trains Tibetan Cadres," Peking Home Service, 28 March 1989, in BBC, 14 April 1989; "Sixty-Six Percent of PLA Officers in Tibet are Tibetans," Xinhua, 26 March 1989, in BBC, 30 March 1989; "Emphasize the Employment of Minority Cadres [in the Tibet Military District]," Xizang Ribao, 23 June 1994, p. 1.
76. The number of Tibetan "cadres" in the Tibetan Military District was reported at six hundred in June of 1994, and the number of Tibetan "officers" was reported at one thousand in May of 1995. A secret report allegedly smuggled out of Tibet has claimed that one of every four soldiers (of any rank) in Tibet was Tibetan in 1992. The validity of these reports is impossible to confirm. There appear to be no official figures on the ethnic composition of all troops in Tibet. Moreover, while exiles have reported a large increase in troops on border patrols, the total troop force in Tibet commanded by the Han-dominated officer corps is a government secret. One official source claims that 56,000 soldiers were imported from elsewhere to suppress dissent during martial law, and the number of troops in Tibet since then has been estimated at anywhere between 40,000 and 250,000. See "PLA Promotes Ethnic Tibetan Officers," Xinhua, 6 May 1995; Qin, Lhasa: Riots, pp. 92-94; Jasper Becher, "'Secret' Report says 'Far Fewer Troops' in Tibet," SCMP, 8 June 1992, p. 9; Bill Austen, "China Flexes Military Muscle in Lhasa Suburbs," Kyodo, 2 May 1993; "Tibetan Officers Play a Major Role in Local PLA Troops," Xinhua, 1 March 1993; "PLA Trains Tibetan Cadres," Peking Home Service, 28 March 1989, in BBC, 14 April 1989; "Sixty-Six Percent of PLA Officers in Tibet are Tibetans," Xinhua, 26 March 1989, in BBC, 30 March 1989; "Emphasize the Employment of Minority Cadres [in the Tibet Military District]," Xizang Ribao, 23 June 1994, p. 1.
77. The number of Tibetan "cadres" in the Tibetan Military District was reported at six hundred in June of 1994, and the number of Tibetan "officers" was reported at one thousand in May of 1995. A secret report allegedly smuggled out of Tibet has claimed that one of every four soldiers (of any rank) in Tibet was Tibetan in 1992. The validity of these reports is impossible to confirm. There appear to be no official figures on the ethnic composition of all troops in Tibet. Moreover, while exiles have reported a large increase in troops on border patrols, the total troop force in Tibet commanded by the Han-dominated officer corps is a government secret. One official source claims that 56,000 soldiers were imported from elsewhere to suppress dissent during martial law, and the number of troops in Tibet since then has been estimated at anywhere between 40,000 and 250,000. See "PLA Promotes Ethnic Tibetan Officers," Xinhua, 6 May 1995; Qin, Lhasa: Riots, pp. 92-94; Jasper Becher, "'Secret' Report says 'Far Fewer Troops' in Tibet," SCMP, 8 June 1992, p. 9; Bill Austen, "China Flexes Military Muscle in Lhasa Suburbs," Kyodo, 2 May 1993; "Tibetan Officers Play a Major Role in Local PLA Troops," Xinhua, 1 March 1993; "PLA Trains Tibetan Cadres," Peking Home Service, 28 March 1989, in BBC, 14 April 1989; "Sixty-Six Percent of PLA Officers in Tibet are Tibetans," Xinhua, 26 March 1989, in BBC, 30 March 1989; "Emphasize the Employment of Minority Cadres [in the Tibet Military District]," Xizang Ribao, 23 June 1994, p. 1.
78. The number of Tibetan "cadres" in the Tibetan Military District was reported at six hundred in June of 1994, and the number of Tibetan "officers" was reported at one thousand in May of 1995. A secret report allegedly smuggled out of Tibet has claimed that one of every four soldiers (of any rank) in Tibet was Tibetan in 1992. The validity of these reports is impossible to confirm. There appear to be no official figures on the ethnic composition of all troops in Tibet. Moreover, while exiles have reported a large increase in troops on border patrols, the total troop force in Tibet commanded by the Han-dominated officer corps is a government secret. One official source claims that 56,000 soldiers were imported from elsewhere to suppress dissent during martial law, and the number of troops in Tibet since then has been estimated at anywhere between 40,000 and 250,000. See "PLA Promotes Ethnic Tibetan Officers," Xinhua, 6 May 1995; Qin, Lhasa: Riots, pp. 92-94; Jasper Becher, "'Secret' Report says 'Far Fewer Troops' in Tibet," SCMP, 8 June 1992, p. 9; Bill Austen, "China Flexes Military Muscle in Lhasa Suburbs," Kyodo, 2 May 1993; "Tibetan Officers Play a Major Role in Local PLA Troops," Xinhua, 1 March 1993; "PLA Trains Tibetan Cadres," Peking Home Service, 28 March 1989, in BBC, 14 April 1989; "Sixty-Six Percent of PLA Officers in Tibet are Tibetans," Xinhua, 26 March 1989, in BBC, 30 March 1989; "Emphasize the Employment of Minority Cadres [in the Tibet Military District]," Xizang Ribao, 23 June 1994, p. 1.
79. The number of Tibetan "cadres" in the Tibetan Military District was reported at six hundred in June of 1994, and the number of Tibetan "officers" was reported at one thousand in May of 1995. A secret report allegedly smuggled out of Tibet has claimed that one of every four soldiers (of any rank) in Tibet was Tibetan in 1992. The validity of these reports is impossible to confirm. There appear to be no official figures on the ethnic composition of all troops in Tibet. Moreover, while exiles have reported a large increase in troops on border patrols, the total troop force in Tibet commanded by the Han-dominated officer corps is a government secret. One official source claims that 56,000 soldiers were imported from elsewhere to suppress dissent during martial law, and the number of troops in Tibet since then has been estimated at anywhere between 40,000 and 250,000. See "PLA Promotes Ethnic Tibetan Officers," Xinhua, 6 May 1995; Qin, Lhasa: Riots, pp. 92-94; Jasper Becher, "'Secret' Report says 'Far Fewer Troops' in Tibet," SCMP, 8 June 1992, p. 9; Bill Austen, "China Flexes Military Muscle in Lhasa Suburbs," Kyodo, 2 May 1993; "Tibetan Officers Play a Major Role in Local PLA Troops," Xinhua, 1 March 1993; "PLA Trains Tibetan Cadres," Peking Home Service, 28 March 1989, in BBC, 14 April 1989; "Sixty-Six Percent of PLA Officers in Tibet are Tibetans," Xinhua, 26 March 1989, in BBC, 30 March 1989; "Emphasize the Employment of Minority Cadres [in the Tibet Military District]," Xizang Ribao, 23 June 1994, p. 1.
80. The number of Tibetan "cadres" in the Tibetan Military District was reported at six hundred in June of 1994, and the number of Tibetan "officers" was reported at one thousand in May of 1995. A secret report allegedly smuggled out of Tibet has claimed that one of every four soldiers (of any rank) in Tibet was Tibetan in 1992. The validity of these reports is impossible to confirm. There appear to be no official figures on the ethnic composition of all troops in Tibet. Moreover, while exiles have reported a large increase in troops on border patrols, the total troop force in Tibet commanded by the Han-dominated officer corps is a government secret. One official source claims that 56,000 soldiers were imported from elsewhere to suppress dissent during martial law, and the number of troops in Tibet since then has been estimated at anywhere between 40,000 and 250,000. See "PLA Promotes Ethnic Tibetan Officers," Xinhua, 6 May 1995; Qin, Lhasa: Riots, pp. 92-94; Jasper Becher, "'Secret' Report says 'Far Fewer Troops' in Tibet," SCMP, 8 June 1992, p. 9; Bill Austen, "China Flexes Military Muscle in Lhasa Suburbs," Kyodo, 2 May 1993; "Tibetan Officers Play a Major Role in Local PLA Troops," Xinhua, 1 March 1993; "PLA Trains Tibetan Cadres," Peking Home Service, 28 March 1989, in BBC, 14 April 1989; "Sixty-Six Percent of PLA Officers in Tibet are Tibetans," Xinhua, 26 March 1989, in BBC, 30 March 1989; "Emphasize the Employment of Minority Cadres [in the Tibet Military District]," Xizang Ribao, 23 June 1994, p. 1.
81. The number of Tibetan "cadres" in the Tibetan Military District
82. In recent years, military and security leaders have included Hu Yongzhu (political commissar of the Tibet Military District), Zhou Wenbi (commander of the Tibet Military District), Wang Shunhe (deputy commander of the Tibet Military District and its Logistics Department director), Gong Xunzhong (Tibet Military District deputy political commissar), Zhang Guoying (political commissar of the air force), Major General Zhang Zhu (political commissar of the People's Armed Police Corps and leader of the armed police during martial law in 1989), Tang Huasheng (commander of the Regional People's Armed Police Corps), and Yang Youcai (chief procurator of the T.A.R.). None are Tibetan. Yin Xingwen, prison warden of Tibet's only officially acknowledged prison, is Han Chinese.
83. The two Tibetan names cited above are taken from Chinese language sources, and the author has been unable to identify the transliterated Tibetan spelling of the names.
84. For two high-level speeches on party, rather than government, loyalty, see "Gyaincain Norbu on Building Up Armed Police," Tibet TV, 29 July 1992, in FBIS, 31 July 1992, pp. 58-60; "Gyaincain Norbu Address," Tibet TV, 22 February 1992, in FBIS, 24 February 1992.
85. For two high-level speeches on party, rather than government, loyalty, see "Gyaincain Norbu on Building Up Armed Police," Tibet TV, 29 July 1992, in FBIS, 31 July 1992, pp. 58-60; "Gyaincain Norbu Address," Tibet TV, 22 February 1992, in FBIS, 24 February 1992.
86. For two high-level speeches on party, rather than government, loyalty, see "Gyaincain Norbu on Building Up Armed Police," Tibet TV, 29 July 1992, in FBIS, 31 July 1992, pp. 58-60; "Gyaincain Norbu Address," Tibet TV, 22 February 1992, in FBIS, 24 February 1992.
87. For two high-level speeches on party, rather than government, loyalty, see "Gyaincain Norbu on Building Up Armed Police," Tibet TV, 29 July 1992, in FBIS, 31 July 1992, pp. 58-60; "Gyaincain Norbu Address," Tibet TV, 22 February 1992, in FBIS, 24 February 1992.
88. On weak Marxist viewpoints, see Deng Zhujia, "The First Tibetan Symposium on the Theory of Leading Bodies' Ideological and Work Style Building," Xizang Ribao, 4 July 1994, p. 3, in FBIS, 19 July 1994, p. 50. Chen's negative views on rural cadres and grassroots organizations are contained in Chen, "Basic Party Line."
89. On weak Marxist viewpoints, see Deng Zhujia, "The First Tibetan Symposium on the Theory of Leading Bodies' Ideological and Work Style Building," Xizang Ribao, 4 July 1994, p. 3, in FBIS, 19 July 1994, p. 50. Chen's negative views on rural cadres and grassroots organizations are contained in Chen, "Basic Party Line."
90. On weak Marxist viewpoints, see Deng Zhujia, "The First Tibetan Symposium on the Theory of Leading Bodies' Ideological and Work Style Building," Xizang Ribao, 4 July 1994, p. 3, in FBIS, 19 July 1994, p. 50. Chen's negative views on rural cadres and grassroots organizations are contained in Chen, "Basic Party Line."
91. Batang, the hometown of Gyaincain Norbu, is just outside the Tibetan Autonomous Region. "Tibet's Chairman on Dalai Lama's 'Lies' in the UK," Xinhua, 1 June 1993, in FBIS, 2 June 1993, p. 16.
92. Batang, the hometown of Gyaincain Norbu, is just outside the Tibetan Autonomous Region. "Tibet's Chairman on Dalai Lama's 'Lies' in the UK," Xinhua, 1 June 1993, in FBIS, 2 June 1993, p. 16.
93. On the training of Tibet-bound cadres in Sichuan, see "Raidi Tells Chongqing Students of Continuing Separatist Activities," Xizang Ribao, 14 November 1993, p. 1, in BBC, 29 November 1993. On the difficulties of recruitment of younger Tibetans, according to official and opposition sources, see "Tibet Propaganda Chief Writes on Deng's Theory," Xinhua, 12 November 1993, in FBIS, 7 December 1993, p. 44; Barbara Schwepcke, "Dalai Lama Discusses Relations with the Chinese," Sueddeutscht Zeitung, 12-13 June 1993, in FBIS, 15 June 1993, pp. 20-21. On the Tibetan language ability of new recruits, see Tseten Wangchuk Sharlho, "China's Reforms," p. 52.
94. On the training of Tibet-bound cadres in Sichuan, see "Raidi Tells Chongqing Students of Continuing Separatist Activities," Xizang Ribao, 14 November 1993, p. 1, in BBC, 29 November 1993. On the difficulties of recruitment of younger Tibetans, according to official and opposition sources, see "Tibet Propaganda Chief Writes on Deng's Theory," Xinhua, 12 November 1993, in FBIS, 7 December 1993, p. 44; Barbara Schwepcke, "Dalai Lama Discusses Relations with the Chinese," Sueddeutscht Zeitung, 12-13 June 1993, in FBIS, 15 June 1993, pp. 20-21. On the Tibetan language ability of new recruits, see Tseten Wangchuk Sharlho, "China's Reforms," p. 52.
95. On the training of Tibet-bound cadres in Sichuan, see "Raidi Tells Chongqing Students of Continuing Separatist Activities," Xizang Ribao, 14 November 1993, p. 1, in BBC, 29 November 1993. On the difficulties of recruitment of younger Tibetans, according to official and opposition sources, see "Tibet Propaganda Chief Writes on Deng's Theory," Xinhua, 12 November 1993, in FBIS, 7 December 1993, p. 44; Barbara Schwepcke, "Dalai Lama Discusses Relations with the Chinese," Sueddeutscht Zeitung, 12-13 June 1993, in FBIS, 15 June 1993, pp. 20-21. On the Tibetan language ability of new recruits, see Tseten Wangchuk Sharlho, "China's Reforms," p. 52.
96. On the training of Tibet-bound cadres in Sichuan, see "Raidi Tells Chongqing Students of Continuing Separatist Activities," Xizang Ribao, 14 November 1993, p. 1, in BBC, 29 November 1993. On the difficulties of recruitment of younger Tibetans, according to official and opposition sources, see "Tibet Propaganda Chief Writes on Deng's Theory," Xinhua, 12 November 1993, in FBIS, 7 December 1993, p. 44; Barbara Schwepcke, "Dalai Lama Discusses Relations with the Chinese," Sueddeutscht Zeitung, 12-13 June 1993, in FBIS, 15 June 1993, pp. 20-21. On the Tibetan language ability of new recruits, see Tseten Wangchuk Sharlho, "China's Reforms," p. 52.
97. On the training of Tibet-bound cadres in Sichuan, see "Raidi Tells Chongqing Students of Continuing Separatist Activities," Xizang Ribao, 14 November 1993, p. 1, in BBC, 29 November 1993. On the difficulties of recruitment of younger Tibetans, according to official and opposition sources, see "Tibet Propaganda Chief Writes on Deng's Theory," Xinhua, 12 November 1993, in FBIS, 7 December 1993, p. 44; Barbara Schwepcke, "Dalai Lama Discusses Relations with the Chinese," Sueddeutscht Zeitung, 12-13 June 1993, in FBIS, 15 June 1993, pp. 20-21. On the Tibetan language ability of new recruits, see Tseten Wangchuk Sharlho, "China's Reforms," p. 52.
98. On the training of Tibet-bound cadres in Sichuan, see "Raidi Tells Chongqing Students of Continuing Separatist Activities," Xizang Ribao, 14 November 1993, p. 1, in BBC, 29 November 1993. On the difficulties of recruitment of younger Tibetans, according to official and opposition sources, see "Tibet Propaganda Chief Writes on Deng's Theory," Xinhua, 12 November 1993, in FBIS, 7 December 1993, p. 44; Barbara Schwepcke, "Dalai Lama Discusses Relations with the Chinese," Sueddeutscht Zeitung, 12-13 June 1993, in FBIS, 15 June 1993, pp. 20-21. On the Tibetan language ability of new recruits, see Tseten Wangchuk Sharlho, "China's Reforms," p. 52.
99. On the training of Tibet-bound cadres in Sichuan, see "Raidi Tells Chongqing Students of Continuing Separatist Activities," Xizang Ribao, 14 November 1993, p. 1, in BBC, 29 November 1993. On the difficulties of recruitment of younger Tibetans, according to official and opposition sources, see "Tibet Propaganda Chief Writes on Deng's Theory," Xinhua, 12 November 1993, in FBIS, 7 December 1993, p. 44; Barbara Schwepcke, "Dalai Lama Discusses Relations with the Chinese," Sueddeutscht Zeitung, 12-13 June 1993, in FBIS, 15 June 1993, pp. 20-21. On the Tibetan language ability of new recruits, see Tseten Wangchuk Sharlho, "China's Reforms," p. 52.
100. "Text of Speech by Raidi," Xizang Ribao, 24 May 1994, pp. 1, 3.
101. The seventeenth Karmapa was said to have been privately approved by the Dalai Lama beforehand. Monks at the Tashilhunpo Lamasery, which is responsible for the selection of the Panchen Lama, have traditionally not accepted the Dalai Lama's authority, but their insistence on his participation in the selection process is a strong sign of their dissatisfaction with Beijing's interference. The Dalai Lama participated in the selection process and it was he who first announced the reincarnation of the Panchen Lama on May 14, 1995. This led to the arrest of the chair of the selection committee, and subsequent riots and arrests in Shigatse. At the time of this writing, the whereabouts of the six-year-old eleventh Panchen Lama are unknown.
102. On new religious instructions, see "Report on Government Work," pp. 1, 3; Testimony of Louisa Coan; "Tibet to Restrict the Number of Buddhist Monks, Nuns," HK AFP, 2 December 1993, in FBIS, 2 December 1993, p. 53; Daniela Deane, "Chinese Army, Police Overshadow Tibetan Monks," Washington Post, 3 July 1991; "New Restrictions on Religion Reported," Tibet Press Watch, vol. 4, no. 3 (July 1992), p. 19.
103. On new religious instructions, see "Report on Government Work," pp. 1, 3; Testimony of Louisa Coan; "Tibet to Restrict the Number of Buddhist Monks, Nuns," HK AFP, 2 December 1993, in FBIS, 2 December 1993, p. 53; Daniela Deane, "Chinese Army, Police Overshadow Tibetan Monks," Washington Post, 3 July 1991; "New Restrictions on Religion Reported," Tibet Press Watch, vol. 4, no. 3 (July 1992), p. 19.
104. On new religious instructions, see "Report on Government Work," pp. 1, 3; Testimony of Louisa Coan; "Tibet to Restrict the Number of Buddhist Monks, Nuns," HK AFP, 2 December 1993, in FBIS, 2 December 1993, p. 53; Daniela Deane, "Chinese Army, Police Overshadow Tibetan Monks," Washington Post, 3 July 1991; "New Restrictions on Religion Reported," Tibet Press Watch, vol. 4, no. 3 (July 1992), p. 19.
105. On new religious instructions, see "Report on Government Work," pp. 1, 3; Testimony of Louisa Coan; "Tibet to Restrict the Number of Buddhist Monks, Nuns," HK AFP, 2 December 1993, in FBIS, 2 December 1993, p. 53; Daniela Deane, "Chinese Army, Police Overshadow Tibetan Monks," Washington Post, 3 July 1991; "New Restrictions on Religion Reported," Tibet Press Watch, vol. 4, no. 3 (July 1992), p. 19.
106. On new religious instructions, see "Report on Government Work," pp. 1, 3; Testimony of Louisa Coan; "Tibet to Restrict the Number of Buddhist Monks, Nuns," HK AFP, 2 December 1993, in FBIS, 2 December 1993, p. 53; Daniela Deane, "Chinese Army, Police Overshadow Tibetan Monks," Washington Post, 3 July 1991; "New Restrictions on Religion Reported," Tibet Press Watch, vol. 4, no. 3 (July 1992), p. 19.
107. For Chen Kaiyuan's admonitions, see Chen, "Basic Party Line."
108. Chen quotations ("At this time . . ."; "In organizational building . . .") in Chen, "Basic Party Line," pp. 7-8, and "Chen Kaiyuan Speaks," Tibet TV, 12 June 1992, in FBIS, 16 June 1992, pp. 59-60.
109. Chen quotations ("At this time . . ."; "In organizational building . . .") in Chen, "Basic Party Line," pp. 7-8, and "Chen Kaiyuan Speaks," Tibet TV, 12 June 1992, in FBIS, 16 June 1992, pp. 59-60.
110. Chen quotations ("At this time . . ."; "In organizational building . . .") in Chen, "Basic Party Line," pp. 7-8, and "Chen Kaiyuan Speaks," Tibet TV, 12 June 1992, in FBIS, 16 June 1992, pp. 59-60.
111. Internal Chinese government documents reported in the Hong Kong press have cited hundreds of "incidents" of "unrest" in rural areas, with "reports of peasant uprisings in nearly a dozen provinces." See Carl Goldstein and Lincoln Kaye, "Get off Our Backs: Peasant Unrest in China," Far Eastern Economic Review, 15 July 1993, pp. 68-70.
112. The possibly deteriorating situation in Xinjiang is described in Lillian Craig Harris, "Xinjiang, Central Asia and the Implications for China's Policy in the Islamic World," China Quarterly, no. 133 (March 1993), p. 117. Areas for Xinjiang, Tibet, Qinghai, and the PRC as a whole are 1.6, 1.2, .72, and 9.56 million square kilometres respectively, Zhongguo Renmin Gongheguo Dutuji (Atlas of the PRC) (Beijing: Map Publishing House, 1984).
113. The possibly deteriorating situation in Xinjiang is described in Lillian Craig Harris, "Xinjiang, Central Asia and the Implications for China's Policy in the Islamic World," China Quarterly, no. 133 (March 1993), p. 117. Areas for Xinjiang, Tibet, Qinghai, and the PRC as a whole are 1.6, 1.2, .72, and 9.56 million square kilometres respectively, Zhongguo Renmin Gongheguo Dutuji (Atlas of the PRC) (Beijing: Map Publishing House, 1984).
114. "Communiqué Details Lhasa Protest in May," HK AFP, in FBIS, 6 August 1993, p. 8; Geoffrey Crothall, "Police Disperse 25 May 'Large Demonstration,'" SCWP, 26 May 1993, p. 1, in FBIS, 26 May 1993, p. 18.
115. "Communiqué Details Lhasa Protest in May," HK AFP, in FBIS, 6 August 1993, p. 8; Geoffrey Crothall, "Police Disperse 25 May 'Large Demonstration,'" SCWP, 26 May 1993, p. 1, in FBIS, 26 May 1993, p. 18.
116. "Communiqué Details Lhasa Protest in May," HK AFP, in FBIS, 6 August 1993, p. 8; Geoffrey Crothall, "Police Disperse 25 May 'Large Demonstration,'" SCWP, 26 May 1993, p. 1, in FBIS, 26 May 1993, p. 18.
117. "Communiqué Details Lhasa Protest in May," HK AFP, in FBIS, 6 August 1993, p. 8; Geoffrey Crothall, "Police Disperse 25 May 'Large Demonstration,'" SCWP, 26 May 1993, p. 1, in FBIS, 26 May 1993, p. 18.
118. See, for example, "Large Scale Anti-Chinese Protests in Tibet," Tibet Press Watch, vol. 5, no. 3 (July 1993), p. 2.