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1
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84919307693
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There are, however, a number of foreign precedents from which we can draw experience, namely Norway, Latin America, and the UK.
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6
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84919307690
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In the future, large generation companies in the UK will be required to report their availability policies for the upcoming year. It is unclear at this time whether this will be an effective deterrent to the strategic games.
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7
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84919307689
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For instance, home security companies charge for the ‘on call’ service. In some cases, they also charge a ‘per visit’ fee when the contingent demand for their service arises.
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10
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84919307688
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While the vertical integration and transmission constraints may create concerns that incumbent firms will be able to discourage new entry, it seems unlikely that large firms could engage in profitable predation to drive out firms that are already operating. Profitable predation requires that the predator increase output substantially to drive price below the prey's short-run average cost, but then reduce output once the prey is eliminated. Because short-run average cost is generally quite low once an electricity-generating facility is operating, this would require a significant depressing of price for a significant period of time. Furthermore, the predator would need to have sufficient capacity to expand output, capacity that it would not want to use (in this market) after the predatory behavior ends.
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13
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0001519094
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Supply function equilibria in oligopoly under uncertainty
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(1989)
Econometrica
, vol.57
, Issue.6
, pp. 1243-1277
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Klemperer1
Meyer2
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15
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0003088971
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Supply function equilibria and the danger of tacit collusion
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(1992)
Energy Economics
, vol.12
, Issue.2
, pp. 94-102
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Bolle1
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18
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84919307685
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Joskow, op cit, ref 2.
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19
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84919307684
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The example has identical linear demands in the two markets and zero marginal cost.
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21
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84919307682
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It is important to note that for the first 5 years after restructuring, the three California IOUs are required to supply their energy only through the spot market, and are therefore not eligible suppliers of PPCs. The concentration of suppliers for this transition period may be drastically different, although spot electricity combined with financial instruments remains available as a substitute for PPCs.
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24
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84919307681
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Newbery, op cit, ref 5.
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25
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84919307680
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Allez and Vila, op cit, ref 22.
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28
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84919307679
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Allez and Vila, op cit, ref 22.
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29
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84919307678
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Newbery, op cit, ref 5.
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31
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84919307677
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Another potentially contentious question is what penalties should be paid by suppliers who deviate from their bids. We do not address this question here.
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33
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0001686436
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Markets in real electric networks require reactive pricing
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(1993)
Energy Journal
, vol.14
, Issue.3
, pp. 171-200
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Hogan1
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