Architecting Noncooperative Networks

IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications

Volumn 13, Issue 7, 1995, Pages 1241-1251

  Korilis, Yannis A ^a   Lazar, Aurel A ^a   Orda, Ariel ^a,b  

^a Department of Electrical Engineering and the Center for Telecommunications Research Columbia University ^*  (United States)

^b TECHNION ISRAEL INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (Israel)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

CHANNEL CAPACITY; ELECTRIC NETWORK ANALYSIS; ELECTRIC NETWORK TOPOLOGY; GAME THEORY; LARGE SCALE SYSTEMS; TELECOMMUNICATION LINKS;

NASH EQUILIBRIA; NONCOOPERATIVE NETWORKS; PROVISIONING PHASE; RUN TIME PHASE;

TELECOMMUNICATION NETWORKS;

EID: 0029373265     PISSN: 07338716     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1109/49.414643     Document Type: Article

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