Probabilistic Coalition Formation in Distributed Knowledge Environments

IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man and Cybernetics

Volumn 25, Issue 2, 1995, Pages 277-286

  Pasquale, Joseph C ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF AIZU   (Japan)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

FUNCTIONS; INFORMATION MANAGEMENT; KNOWLEDGE BASED SYSTEMS; MATHEMATICAL MODELS; PROBABILITY; SYSTEM STABILITY;

DISTRIBUTED KNOWLEDGE ENVIRONMENTS; INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION; POTENTIAL SYNERGY; PROBABILISTIC COALITION FORMATION;

PERFORMANCE;

EID: 0029247220     PISSN: 00189472     EISSN: 21682909     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1109/21.364836     Document Type: Article

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