Transaction costs and tradeable permits

Journal of Environmental Economics and Management

Volumn 29, Issue 2, 1995, Pages 133-148

  Stavins, Robert N ^a,b  

^a HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0028870240     PISSN: 00950696     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeem.1995.1036     Document Type: Article

References (45)

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