The Armed Branch of the State: Civil—Military Relations in Mexico

Journal of Latin American Studies

Volumn 27, Issue 2, 1995, Pages 423-448

  Serrano, Mónica ^a  

^a Centro de Estudios Internationales of El Colegio de Mexico ^*  (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS; MILITARY ROLE; POLITICAL CHANGE;

MEXICO;

EID: 0028869288     PISSN: 0022216X     EISSN: 1469767X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0022216X00010816     Document Type: Article

References (121)

1. Although the 1994 presidential elections have been characterised as clean and transparent, in the aftermath of the elections evidence pointing to numerous irregularities increased. Despite this, and doubts about the fairness of competition, to the extent that free and transparent elections did not oust the PRI (Partido Revolucionario Institucional) Mexico could be placed into Sartori's category of ‘fake dominant party system’.
2. See M. Serrano, ‘The end of hegemonic rule?’, in N. Harvey and M. Serrano (eds.), Party Politics in “An Uncommon Democracy”: Political Parties and Elections in Mexico (London, 1994), p. 22.
3. As Huntington states, not only does professionalisation require a minimum degree of constitutional consensus, but ‘objective civilian control’ requires the armed forces to ‘carry out the wishes of any civilian group which secures legitimate authority within the state’.
4. S.P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge, 1957), pp. 35–6, 84.
5. M. Howard, ‘The armed forces as a political problem’, in M. Howard (ed.), Soldiers and Governments: Nine Studies in Civil-Military Relations (London, 1957), p. 13 ;
6. A. Roberts, Nations in Arms: The Theory and Practice of Territorial defence (London, 1988); Huntington, The Soldier and the State, chapter 3;
7. A. Hernandez Chavez, ‘Origen y ocaso del ejercito porfiriano’, Historia Mexicana, vol. 39 (1989), pp. 265—8;
8. F. Escalante, Ciudadanos imaginarios (Mexico, 1992), pp. 161-207;
9. J. L. Pineyro, ‘The modernization of the Mexican armed forces’, in A. Varas (ed.), Democracy Under Siege: New Military Power in Latin America (New York, 1989), p. 127.
10. S. Sarkesian, Beyond the Battlefield: The New Military Professionalism (New York, 1981), p. 239; Huntington, The Soldier and the State, p. 58.
11. This is a subject clearly linked to the discussion of constitutionalism. As Sartori states, ‘constitutions are first, and above all, instruments of government which limit, restrain and allow for the control of the exercise of political power’. G. Sartori, Comparative Constitutional Engineering (London, 1994), p. 198. See also Howard, ‘The armed forces as a political problem’, p. 12.
12. S. Finer, The Man on Horseback (London, 1962). Huntington, The Soldier and the State.
13. A. Lowenthal, ‘Armies and politics in Latin America’, in Lowenthal.
14. F. J. Samuel, (eds.), Armies and Politics in Latin America (New York, 1986), p. 20.
15. W. S. Ackroyd,‘Descendants of the Revolution: civil-military relations in Mexico’, unpublished PhD diss., University of Arizona, 1988, p. 186.
16. A stable and democratic civil-military balance would necessarily involve the stabilisation of expectations of both civilians and soldiers. The literature on the military in Latin America has provided extensive evidence of the civilians’ proclivity to seek alliances within the armed forces. Although recent polls have indicated substantial changes in public opinion and attitudes towards the military (especially in Argentina) as well as wide anti-authoritarian electoral majorities, authoritarian practices and patterns of domination remain ingrained in these societies. Finer, The Man on Horseback, pp. 86-90;
17. R. Fagen and W. Cornelius, Political Power in Latin America: Seven Confrontations (Englewood Cliffs, 1972);
18. G. O’Donell, ‘Transitions, continuities and paradoxes’, in S. Mainwaring et al., Issues in Democratic Consolidation (Notre Dame, 1992), p. 21
19. L. Whitehead, ‘On reform of the state and regulation of the market’, World Development, vol. 21, no. 8 (August 1993).
20. J. J. Linz, ‘An authoritarian regime: Spain’, in E. Ellardt and Rotkan (eds.), Mass Politics: Studies in Political Sociology (New York, 1970), pp. 265–8.
21. As Pion-Berlin states, although there is not a ‘measurable ceiling’ below which civilian supremacy could be guaranteed, civilian control represents a distribution of power. Not only can civilian supremacy be achieved within authoritarian regimes, but apparent distributions of power are not solely the result of the authoritarian or democratic nature of regimes, but also of civilian tactics. The use of ‘tutelaged’ civilian control in this article differs from Zaverucha's - where tutelage refers to the veto power retained by the military - and is closer to the idea of ‘guardian’. For an assessment of civilian tactics in Democratic Argentina
22. see D. Pion-Berlin, ‘Between Confrontation and Accommodation: Military and Government Policy in Democratic Argentina’ Journal of Latin American Studies, vol. 23 (1991), pp. 543–71.
23. For an analysis of different distributions of power between civilians and the military and their implications for democratic consolidation see J. Zaverucha, ‘The Degree of Military Political Autonomy during the Spanish, Argentine and Brazilian Transitions’, Journal of Latin American Studies, vol. 25 (1993), pp. 283–99.
24. In the light of its anti-agrarian and pro-landlord attitudes, Tobler questions the ‘popular’ character of the Mexican armed forces. With the single exception of Morelos, Tobler suggests that the armed forces were an additional factor obstructing agrarian reform.
25. See W. Tobler, ‘Las paradojas del ejercito revolucionario: su papel social en la reforma agraria mexicana 1920–1935 ’, Historia Mexicana, vol. 21, no. 1 (1971).
26. The signature of the Teleoyucan Treaties of 1914 led to the demobilisation of the Federal Army. This was undoubtedly a key military decision which reduced the chances of the army becoming the ‘supreme arbiter of national life’. Yet subsequently, ex-federal officials re-entered the armed forces.
27. A. Hernandez Chavez, ‘Origen y ocaso’; J. Garciadiego, ‘La politica militar del presidente Carranza’, in A. Hernandez and M. Mino (eds.), Cincuenta ahos de Historia de Mexico, vol. 2 (Mexico, D.F., 1991)
28. R. A. Camp, Generals in the Palacio: The Military in Modern Mexico (New York, 1992), p. 17.
29. P.G. Walker, ‘The modern Mexican military: political influence and institutional interests in the 1980’, unpubl. Master's diss., The American University, 1987, pp. 8–13.
30. According to Sanche 2, during the 1940s when civilian supremacy had already been achieved, the rhetoric of a unified, professional and apolitical army enabled civilian elites to discipline or even eliminate ‘politicised’ generals. A. Sanchez, ‘Los militares en la decada de los cincuenta’, Revista Mexicana de Sociologia, no. 3 (July-September 1988), p. 273
31. Ackroyd, ‘Descendants of the Revolution’, p. 85.
32. The impact and the lessons derived from dramatic events such as wars and revolutions on subsequent generations has been a subject of debate, especially since the First World War. In the case of Spain the stability of the 1950s has been explained more in terms of fears of war and violence, rather than as a consequence of the regime's performance. Similarly, low levels of participation and conformism present in Mexican politics were partially associated with the memories of revolutionary violence. Moreover, during the recent elections the aversion shown by Mexican society towards change has been partly explained as the result of a campaign equating change with violence. Clearly, in both cases it was possible to observe the depolitisation characteristic of ‘stabilised authoritarian regimes’.
33. See Y. Foong Khon, Analogies at War (Princeton, 1992), p. 33.
34. See Y. Foong Khon, Analogies at War (Princeton, 1992), p. 33 ; R. Carr and J. P. Fusi, Spain, Dictatorship to Democracy (London, 1993 reprint), pp. 135-6;
35. Linz, ‘An Authoritarian Regime’, p. 259
36. S. Loaeza, ‘El cambio politico en Mexico en el siglo XX. Analogias y orfgenes de la discontinuidad de 1988’, Memorias del simposio de Historiografia Mexicanista (Mexico, D.F., 1990), p. 533.
37. See for example Camp, Generals in the Palacio, and Ackroyd, ‘Descendants of the Revolution’, pp. 163 and 206.
38. Yet Huntington emphasised the value attached by professional officers to the ideals of the ‘good soldier’ over political or ideological ambitions. Huntington, The Soldier and the State p. 74.
39. See also A. Stepan, ‘The new professionalism of internal warfare and military role expansion’, in A. Stepan (ed.), Authoritarian Brazil: Origins, Policies and Future (New Haven, 1973), pp. 47–8.
40. ed>Despite this, the Dfaz regime did not succeed in its efforts to consolidate its monopoly over legitimate violence. Decentralisation of military power, a constant feature of 19th century Mexican politics, remained during the porfiriato. As Knight states, the Diaz regime was neither a dictatorship nor a police state. The regime depended on both a withering legitimacy and targeted coercion. Alan Knight, The Mexican Revolution, vol. 1 (Cambridge, 1986), pp. 17–18 and 35
41. A. Hernandez Chavez, ‘Origen y ocaso’, pp. 264, 280–4.
42. Ackroyd, ‘Descendants of the Revolution’, p. 71.
43. A. Hernandez Chavez, ‘Origen y ocaso’ and ‘Militares y negocios en la Revolucion Mexicana’, Historia Mexicana, vol. 34, no. 2 (1984);
44. J. Garciadiego, ‘La poh’tica militar’; and A. Matute, La Revolucion Mexicana (Mexico, D.F., 1993).
45. The Constitutional Army had eleven generals: A. Obregon, B. Hill, P. Gonzalez, C. Aguilar, C. Castro, F. Murgufa, F. Coss, J. B. Trevino, M. M. Dieguez, S. Alvarado and J. A. Castro. By the end of the constitutional period only two of these had survived, Obregon
46. A. Castro, and new names appeared including F. R. Serrano, A. R. Gomez, J. G. Escobar, F. Mazo, F. Topete and J. Amaro. Not only did the 1928 political pact demilitarise political competition, but it restricted the arena of competition to the new party, the PNR (Partido Nacional Revolucionario). The rules of political competition that derived from this pact were indisputably civilian: loyalty and discipline.
47. See A. Chavez, ‘Militares y negocios’; Tobler, ‘Las paradojas del ejercito’;
48. A. Matute, La Revolucion Mexicana. For a detailed analysis of the 1928 – 29 pact.
49. see A. Knight, ‘Mexico's Elite Settlement: conjuncture and consequences’, in J. Higley and R. Gunther (eds.), Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe (Cambridge, 1992).
50. Tobler, ‘Las paradojas del ejercito’, p. 44;
51. Zaverucha, ‘The degree of military political autonomy’, p. 289; and Excelsior, 4 March 1994.
52. Walker, ‘The Modern Mexican Military’, p. 15.
53. Camp, Generals in the Palacio, p. 195.
54. Ackroyd, ‘Descendants of the Revolution’, pp. 88–9, 110–24.
55. In addition, this measure sought to ‘protect’ the military institution from the inherently destabilising game of presidential succession. J. A. Lozoya, El ejercito mexicano (Mexico, D.F., 1970), p. 76
56. A. Hernandez Chavez, La mecdnica Cardenista: Historia de la Revolucidn Mexicana, 1934–1940, no. 16 (Mexico, D.F., 1979), p. 109.
57. L. J. Garrido, ‘Un partido sin militantes’, in S. Loaeza and R. Segovia (eds.), La vida politica mexicana en la crisis (Mexico, D.F., 1987), p. 65.
58. L. J. Garrido, El partido de la Revolution Institutional. La formacion del nuevo Estado en Mexico (1928-1945) (Mexico, D.F., 1982), pp. 303–4.
59. Sanchez, ‘Los militares en la decada de Ios cincuenta’ and Ackroyd, ‘Descendants of the Revolution’, p. 85.
60. Walker, ‘The Modern Mexican Military’, pp. 8–13.
61. See, for example, E. Lieuwen, Mexican Militarism: The Political Rise and Fall of the Revolutionary army (Alburquerque, 1968) and Lozoya, El ejercito mexicano.
62. See for example D. Ronfeldt (ed.), The Modern Mexican Military (San Diego, 1984);
63. See for example D. Ronfeldt (ed.), The Modern Mexican Military (San Diego, 1984); A. Sanchez, ‘Los militares en la decada de los cincuenta’; and Camp, Generals in the Palacio.
64. Excelsior, 5 November 1992. Ronfeldt has emphasised these residual roles which have been more common in tasks associated with the maintenance of public order. It is important to note that participation in politics could either be the result of civilian strategies or of military demands. While military participation in legislative politics had tended to decrease over the past years, after Chiapas military candidates reentered the PRI lists. D. Ronfeldt, ‘The Mexican army and political order since 1940’, in Ronfeldt (ed.), The Modern Mexican Military.
65. See also S. Finer's contribution in V. Bogdanor (ed.), The Blackwell Encyclopaedia of Political Science (Oxford, 1987), p. 101.
66. Walker, ‘The Modern Mexican Military’, p. 4
67. Hernandez Chavez, ‘Orfgen y ocaso’, pp. 258–9.
68. The Joint Defence Commission was established in 1942. Under this scheme the Avila Camacho administration created and coordinated the Military Pacific Region under the command of General Cardenas, and the US government established three radar stations in Mexican territory and operated by Mexican soldiers.
69. C. W. Reynolds and S. Wager, ‘Integration econamica de Mexico y Estados Unidos. Implicaciones para la seguridad de ambos paises’, in S. Aguayo and B. M. Bagley (eds.), En busca de la seguridadperdida, Aproximaciones a la seguridad nacional mexicana (Mexico, D.F., 1990), p. 217.
70. R. Wesson (ed.), The Latin American military institution (New York, 1986)
71. R. Wesson (ed.), The Latin American military institution (New York, 1986) and J. L. Pineyro, Ejercitoy sociedad en Mexico. Pasadoy presente (Mexico, D.F., 1985), pp. 148–9.
72. On 25 August 1990 President Salinas offered to send troops as part of a multilateral force under the command of the United Nations (UN). This decision was reversed on 3 January 1991 as a result of pressure from the military and accompanied by declarations reaffirming Mexico's commitment to ‘peaceful solution of controversies’. Excelsior, 25 August 1994 and 3 January 1991. Mexico's participation in UN peacekeeping efforts has so far been restricted to the presence of 39 civilian police in El Salvador. Similarly, although in private high officials of the PGR have recognised the strategic importance of US cooperation in the war against the drugs, in multilateral fora Mexico remains opposed to multilateral forces. See the declarations of the General Prosecutor E. Alvarez del Castillo to the UN in Excelsior, 21 February 1990; and Mexico's opposition to proposals for a multilateral inter-American force discussed with the Organisation of American States, Excelsior, 8 February 1992.
73. According to J.A. Cope, a US security expert, in 1989 President Bush ordered the revision of the security agreement with Mexico to strengthen. relations between the armed forces of the two countries. In 1990 the US government made an open attempt to reactivate the Joint Defence Commission. Although these moves apparently received the support of civilian authorities in Mexico, and led to the creation of a special office in San Diego and to a number of meetings between higher officials from both countries, the Mexican military have not been particularly enthusiastic. El Financiero, 17 March 1994.
74. In the case of Spain, integration to the European Union played a stabilising role in civil-military relations. See J. Story and B. Pollack, ‘Spain's transition: domestic and external linkages’, in G. Pridham (ed.), Encouraging Democracy: The International Context of Regime Transition in Southern Europe (Leicester, 1991).
75. El Financiero, 2 April On democratisation and integration. El Financiero, 2 April 1994. On democratisation and integration.
76. see L. Whitehead, ‘Democracy by Convergence in Southern Europe: a comparative politics perspective’, in Pridham (ed.), Encouraging Democracy. On NAFTA's political implications.
77. see V. Bulmer-Thomas et al., ‘Who will benefit?’ in Bulmer-Thomas et al, Mexico and the North American Free Trade Agreement: Who Will Benefit? (Basingstoke, 1994).
78. Although prerogatives can be ‘constitutionally sanctioned’, in a consolidated democratic regime this is not the case as no independent roles of the military are constitutionally sanctioned. The exercise of prerogatives, by enabling the military institution to exercise control over the political agenda, to set the boundaries of political competition and even to establish alliances with civilians to protect and advance common interests, represents an important source of power. A. Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics (Princeton, 1988), p. 106.
79. Even in pacted transitions the underlying context to the military's exit or withdrawal from power can significantly influence prospects for stable civil-military relations. Certainly, the prestige of the armed forces is likely to affect its unity, morale and capacity to broaden military dejure and de facto prerogatives. The stronger the prestige of the armed forces, the greater the need of calibrated civilian strategies and social pressure to force the military to cooperate ‘on certain acts and omissions’, and in such a way to avoid an authoritarian relapse.
80. See F. Hagopian, ‘Democracy by Undemocratic Means?’, Comparative Political Studies, vol. 22, no. 2 (July 1990); O’Donnell, ‘Transitions, Continuities and Paradoxes’, p. 23;
81. Pion-Berlin, ‘Between Confrontation and Accommodation’; and Whitehead, ‘On Reform of the State’.
82. For an interesting comparative analysis of the variables included in Stepan's study of military prerogatives in the context of democratic transition, see Zaverucha, ‘The degree of military political autonomy’. On the evolution of military prerogatives and ‘reserved domains of policy ’ in Argentine and Brazilian nuclear policies.
83. see M. Serrano, ‘Brazil and Argentina’, in R.S. Litwak and M. Reiss (eds.), Nuclear Proliferation after the Cold War (Washington, 1994). In ‘Between Confrontation and Accommodation’, Pion-Berlin examines President Alfonstn's failure to take full advantage of the opportunities offered by transition through military collapse and to establish a solid framework for civilian supremacy.
84. Tobler's article ‘Las paradojas del ejercito revolucionario’ offers a vivid account of the tasks assigned to the police especially in the period between 1920 and 1935.
85. Distortion in promotion patterns was particularly clear during the Aleman government following the repression of the Henriquista movement. The annual average in this period accelerated to 76 promotions to general rank, and 66 to colonel. Although Camp states that promotions again accelerated under President Echeverria (1970–6), this trend could be explained in terms of the expansion of the armed forces and not solely as the result of politicisation following the 1968 repression. Camp, Generals in the Palacio, pp. 177–8. While military procurements during this period included 37 airplanes, the expansion of the armed forces brought the total of troops from 60,000 in 1973 to 90,000 in 1977.
86. Pineyro, Ejercitoy sociedaden Mexico:pasadoypresente (Mexico, D.F., 1985), pp. 88, 123.
87. See O. Pellicer de Brody, ‘La seguridad nacional en Mexico’, Cuadernos Politicos, no. 27 (January-March 1981) and Pineyro, Ejercitoy Sociedad en Mexico, pp. 121–2, 135.
88. Charges of corruption reached the highest level in June 1988. Although the US government stated that no evidence confirmed the charges, on 2 June 1988 a drug dealer J. Figueroa involved the Secretary of Defence, J. Arevalo Gardoqui in drug allegations. Two days later Arevalo published an open letter addressed to President de la Madrid denying the charges. Although in1990the new Secretary of Defence, Riviello Bazan, again denied charges of close links between the Mexican military and drug traffickers, by1993the senator and member of the Navy J. A, Vega Camacho admitted that there were ‘isolated’ cases of members of the armed forces who had been corrupted. Excelsior, 2, 3 and 4 June 1988;
89. Excelsior, 2, 3 and 4 June 1988; Excelsior, 29 July 1990; and El Financiero, 30 June 1993.
90. See Excelsior, 12 and 13 April 1989; and 8 and 14 November 1991.
91. In Tamaulipas a number of rural defence units have been set up. In May 1994 peasants were ‘officially’ armed to assist the armed forces’ anti-narcotics campaigns. La Jornada 29 May 1994.
92. Pineyro, Ejercito y Sociedad, pp. 107, 123. Camp, Generals in the Palacio, The Military Balance (1988–1989) (1989–1990) (1994—1995) and Latin American Weekly Keport, 5 November 1992.
93. Constitutional and institutional mechanisms designed to coordinate and reconcile military and civilian beliefs and views are often the result of power struggles. R. Blake, ‘Great Britain’, in Howard (ed.), Soldiers and Governments, pp. 40, 48. According to Stepan, National Security Councils can contribute to ensuring that the military's function as advisor and potential implementor of defence policy is incorporated into the routine mechanisms of democratic control. Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics, p. 141
94. From August 1992 La Jornada had been reporting the existence of a peasant guerrilla. This information was subsequently corroborated by the Latin American Weekly Report, 13 August 1993. For charges of incompetence and lack of preparation, see the various declarations made by experts in The Washington Post, 19 January 1994, and La Jornada 20 January 1994 and 10 June 1994.
95. ‘recommendations’. Defence of human rights became a more salient issue at the end of the 1980s due to the combination of pressures from below and increased international surveillance over Mexican authoritarian practices. Under the Salinas administration a National Commission for Human Rights (CNDH) was created, but its powers were limited to issuing Charges of human rights abuses involving members of the armed forces precede the Chiapas rebellion. In 1989 an incident involving shootings against three peasants led the Secretary of Defence to state that the armed forces ‘were not against the people A year later the head of the Navy, M. Scheleske, declared that the protection of human rights was a distinctive feature of modern states. In January 1992 the press reported that the General Prosecutor of Military Justice had implemented a number of recommendations made by the CNDH. Defence of human rights became a more salient issue at the end of the 1980s due to the combination of pressures from below and increased international surveillance over Mexican authoritarian practices. Under the Salinas administration a National Commission for Human Rights (CNDH) was created, but its powers were limited to issuing Charges of human rights abuses involving members of the armed forces precede the Chiapas rebellion. In 1989 an incident involving shootings against three peasants led the Secretary of Defence to state that the armed forces ‘were not against the people A year later the head of the Navy, M. Scheleske, declared that the protection of human rights was a distinctive feature of modern states. In January 1992 the press reported that the General Prosecutor of Military Justice had implemented a number of recommendations made by the CNDH.
96. The armed forces in 1994 secured two seats in the Senate, General A. Vallarta for Nayarit, and J.A. Valdivia for Baja California, while Generals Luis Garfias and Jesus Esquinaca entered the lower chamber. El Financiero, 19 September 1994.
97. Ackroyd, ‘Descendants of the Revolution’, p. 163.
98. Knight, ‘Mexico's Elite Settlement’, pp. 134-6;
99. S. Kaufman and J. F. H. Purcell, ‘State and Society in Mexico: Must a stable polity be institutionalised?’, World Politics, vol. 32, no. 2 (1980);
100. G. Sartori, Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis (Cambridge, 1976), p.235.
101. More recently, the pressures opened by political liberalisation led the government to offer military security to the presidential candidates of opposition parties. Despite the casualties suffered by the PRD (Partido de la Revolucion Democratica) during the Salinas administration, and the assassination of the PRI candidate in March 1994, the PRD candidate, C. Cardenas, not only rejected, but also criticised such use of members of the armed forces. Camp, Generals in the Palacio, pp. 79–80.
102. See Cardenas's declarations in La Jornada, 10 June 1994.
103. The performance of the PAN (Partido Accion Nacional) candidate in the 1994 presidential election led some members of the armed forces to express publicly their admiration. For decades, the hegemonic party system made possible the cooptation and inclusion of military within the civil bureaucracy. Most importantly, ordered and stable participation in public administration was to a large extent facilitated by a regime controlled by a single party. Although the number of military participating in politics started to decrease in 1940, according to Ackroyd in 1983 nearly 5,000 soldiers were employed by the civilian bureaucracy. Ackroyd, ‘Descendants of the Revolution’, p. 200; Wesson, The Latin American Military, pp. 51-2; El Financiero, 4 September 1994.
104. Rumours of President Aleman's re-election led Henriquez to come back to the electoral arena, but as a candidate of the Revolutionary family. Not only was the head of Aleman's Estado Mayor one of the main promoters of re-election, but apparently fears of exclusion in subsequent promotions provided a powerful incentive for members of the armed forces to join the Henriquista movement. The regime's response was expected: repression followed by the politicisation of promotions. Many ex-Henriquistas soon returned to the public pay-roll. Although Pineyro states that this event strengthened the subordination of the military, it is important to emphasise that while ‘subjective civilian supremacy’ was reinforced, this was achieved at the cost of objective control.
105. O. Pellicer, ‘La oposicion en Mexico: el caso del henriquismo’, in Las crisis del sistema politico mexicano 1928 - 1977 (Mexico, D.F., 1977);
106. O. Pellicer and J. L. Reyna, Historia de la Revolucion Mexicana. Periodo 1956 – 1960, ‘El afianzamiento de la estabilidad politica’ (Mexico, D.F., 1978);
107. B. Boils, Los militaresy la politica en Mexico 1914-1974 (Mexico, D.F., 1975), p. 79;
108. Pineyro, Ejercitoy Sociedaden Mexico, p. 75.
109. see M. A. Centeno, Democracy within Reason: Technocratic Revolution in Mexico (Pennsylvania, 1994).
110. See also Camp, Generals in the Palacio and A. Stepan, The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil (Princeton, 1971).
111. L. Whitehead, ‘The peculiarities of “Transition” a la Mexicana’, in Harvey and Serrano (eds.), Party Politics in “An Uncommon Democracy”.
112. The combination of international and national pressures forced the Mexican government first to declare the ceasefire in Chiapas in January 1994 and, subsequently, obliged the armed forces to address charges of indiscriminate bombing. In January 1994 the European Parliament demanded that the Mexican government respect human rights in Chiapas. Similarly declarations by high US officials, including Secretary of State Warren Christopher, proliferated, and pressure by International Human Rights organisations increased. Financial Times, 6 January 1994, La Jornada, 8 January 1994, Reforma, 21 January 1994, El Financiero, 10 February 1994.
113. In 1976, two months before the reform was submitted to the courts, Suarez obtained from members of the officialdom their commitment to neutrality. Zaverucha also highlights the weak role played by political parties in Argentina's legislative assembly, as well as in the Constitutional process in Brazil.
114. F.J.M. Maravall and J. Santamaria, ‘Political change in Spain and the prospects for democracy’, in G. O’Donnell et al. (eds.), Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Prospectsfor Democracy (Baltimore, 1986), pp. 73, 83.
115. See also Carr and Fusi, Spain, pp. 220-22;
116. Zaverucha, ‘The degree of military political autonomy’, pp. 291–3. The proposal for the military's neutrality was put forward by Demetrio Sodi, an ex-PRI member.
117. See La Jornada, 20 July 1994.
118. Although Cardenas's declarations referred to ‘both armies’ as crucial actors in the democratisation process, the reaction of members of the armed forces, including the chief commander of the military zone in Chiapas, obliged him to offer explanations in which he denied accusations of having equated both armies.
119. See La Jornada, 15 January 6 February 1994 and 9 July 1994.
120. While it is true that the armed forces were forced to repel the Zapatistas’ attack on their headquarters itself, Salinas's failure to declare a state of emergency and to secure Congressional approval, meant that his decision to resort to full use of force in Chiapas may have been unconstitutional. El Financiero, 24 February 1994. For a general analysis of Salinas's disregard for institutions
121. see the interesting article by R. Hernandez, ‘Inestabilidad politica y presidencialismo en Mexico’, Mexican Studies/Estudios Mexicanos, vol. 10, no. 1 (1994).