Behind the Market Stage Where Real Societies Exist – Part I: The Role of Public and Private Order Institutions

The Journal of Development Studies

Volumn 30, Issue 3, 1994, Pages 533-577

  Platteau, Jean Phiilippe ^a  

^a NONE   (Belgium)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

CULTURAL CONTEXT; INSTITUTIONAL ROLE; MARKET SYSTEM; MORALITY; SOCIAL CONDITIONS;

EID: 0028322648     PISSN: 00220388     EISSN: 17439140     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/00220389408422328     Document Type: Article

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