Pigouvian taxation of energy for flow and stock externalities and strategic, noncompetitive energy pricing

Journal of Environmental Economics and Management

Volumn 26, Issue 1, 1994, Pages 1-18

  Wirl, Franz ^a  

^a VIENNA UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY   (Austria)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0028057084     PISSN: 00950696     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeem.1994.1001     Document Type: Article

References (22)

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