National Reconciliation, Social Equity and Class Formation in Independent Namibia

Journal of Southern African Studies

Volumn 19, Issue 1, 1993, Pages 29-39

  Tapscott, Chris ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NAMIBIA   (Namibia)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

CLASS FORMATION; EQUITY; NATIONAL RECONCILIATION;

NAMIBIA;

EID: 0027798769     PISSN: 03057070     EISSN: 14653893     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/03057079308708345     Document Type: Article

References (35)

1. World Bank, Namibia Poverty A/feviation with Sustainable Growth (Washington, 1991), p. 3.
2. As Simon points out with respect to the repeal of laws governing residential segregation, only those in senior public positions could afford to buy housing at prevailing prices. In such a context, the ‘operation of a capitalist land and property market. replaced legislative fiat as the regulator of residential integration.’ (D. Simon, ‘Windhoek: Desegregation and Change in the Capital of South Africa's Erstwhile Colony‘, in A. Lemon (ed.), Homes Apart: South Africa's Segregated Cities (Cape Town, 1991), p. 187.)
3. Abrahams, for example, states that while 86% of black workers were earning incomes below a Household Subsistence Level of R261 per month in 1982, high school teachers and middle-level civil servants were earning salaries of Rl.OOO to R1.500 a month together with such perks as 100% housing loans, car purchase schemes, entertainment allowances and a range of other benefits. (K. Abrahams, ‘The “Waserauta” Phenomenon: Additional Notes on the Namibian Elite‘, The Namibian Review, 25, July/August 1982, pp. 23-24.)
4. The findings of the Thirion Commission of Enquiry, for example, revealed numerous cases of misappropriation of state funds. Werner, W., ‘Ethnicity and Reformism in Namibia‘, in G. Totemeyer, V. Kandetu, and W. Werner, Namibia in Perspective (Windhoek, 1987), p. 76.
5. Magubane cautions that the concept of elite should not be considered as a substitute for class, since the former ‘refers to groups exercising power at a particular time and the latter to an economic relationship. [I]n the present conditions in Africa‘, he maintains, ‘an elite as a group which is not the owner of the means of production is a transitory formation whose hold on the state is extremely tenuous, as the recent military coups have demonstrated.’ B. Magubane, ‘The Evolution of Class Structure in Africa‘, in P.C. Gutkind and I. Wallerstein (eds.), The Political Economy of Contemporary Africa (London, 1976), p. 194. However, to this must be added the observation that, given sufficient time, elites can and do reproduce themselves (coups notwithstanding) and are capable of developing into, or merging with, independent classes.
6. The 1979 White Paper on Defence for example, speakscof ‘the RSA's military responsibility in SWA where SWAPO is trying to intimidate and subjugate the population with terrorism with the help of its Soviet allies.’ (Republic of South Africa, White Paper on Defence and Armaments Supply 1979 (Pretoria, 1979), p. 2.)
7. SWAPO, ‘Political Programme‘, Lusaka, 1976, p. 6. See also Simon and Sidaway in this volume.
8. P. Strand, ‘SWAPO and Nation Building in Namibia, Transfer of Power in a Post Communist Era‘, Minor Field Study No. 8, University of Uppsala, 1991.
9. P. Katjavivi, A History of Resistance in Namibia (London 1988), p. 41.
10. See among others, A.D. Smith, The Ethnic Revival (London, 1981), E. Kedourie, Nationalism in Asia and Africa (London, 1971), H.J. Brenda, ‘Non-Western Intelligentsia as Political Elites‘, in H. Kautsky (ed.), Political Change in Underdeveloped Countries (New York, 1962).
11. C. Tapscott and B. Mulongeni, ‘An Evaluation of the Welfare and Future Prospects of Repatriated Namibians in Northern Namibia‘, Research Report No. 3, NISER, Windhoek, 1990.
12. UNICEF/NISER, ‘A Situation Analysis of Children and Women in Namibia‘, Windhoek, 1991, p. 118.
13. ILO, ‘Report of the ILO Employment Advisory and Training Policy Mission‘, Geneva, 1991, pp. 19, 22.
14. Ibid., pp. 28-31.
15. D. Simon, ‘Independent Namibia, One Year On‘, Conflict Studies 239, Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, March 1991, p. 9. Delays in the implementation of the Labour Act, in particular, have been a source of considerable dissatisfaction to those in the trade union movement. Illustrative of this has been the decision by the Rosh Pinah branch of the Mineworkers’ Union to boycott the Regional Government elections in protest against government inactivity. The Namibian, 7 October 1992.
16. ‘“DTA-gate#x201D;: How UN tackled dirty tricks‘, The Namibian, 30 July 1991. To this must be added the fact that votes were also likely to have been lost as a result of revelations concerning the detention of SWAPO members in exile. (D. Simon, ‘Independent Namibia, One Year On‘, p. 5.)
17. This was the position held by Hidipo Hamutenya, Minister of Information and Broadcasting, in a presentation to a Workshop on ‘Decolonisation and the Transition to a New Namibia‘, held at Midgaard Farm, Okahandja, 8-10 May 1992.
18. Republic of Namibia, Constitution, Windhoek, 1990.
19. Department of Economic Affairs, Manpower Survey 1988, Windhoek, 1988, p. 13. 0 Public Service Commission, unpublished Staff Records, Windhoek, 1990.
20. view of the fact that the black elite is predominantly to be found in the public sector, the capitalist class (the captains of industry and commerce) are still strongly identified with the white population.
21. These included Otto Herrigel as Minister of Finance (since resigned), Gert Hanekom as Minister of Agriculture, Water and Rural Development, Dr Zedekia Ngavirue as Secretary General of the National Planning Commission, Vekuui Rukoro (President of the Namibian National Front), as Deputy Minister of Justice, and Klaus Dierks (S WAPO) as Deputy Minister of Transport.
22. This is expressed in numerous letters to local newspapers, epitomised as follows: ‘Our country has gone through a long struggle. The People have struggled together, workers and students have really sacrificed; our PLAN combatants have given up their education and lives to serve (for no salary) the motherland - but it seems our ministers have forgotten. Our education system has to continue to support racists and autocrats who now pretend to have changed so as to retain their jobs, all for the sake of reconciliation. Is reconciliation the reason for these high salaries?’ (The Namibian, 11 May 1990.)
23. What about the people who were at the battlefront during the liberation of our country, and who are not educated? What are we going to do? Many of us are illiterate people who only know how to fight. Now we are being threatened by intellectuals who were lucky to be sent abroad by SWAPO to study for the benefit of the Namibian nation. Many of them are now proud and arrogant because they have been given jobs and are driving luxurious cars.’ (Amandjange, letter to The Namibian, 23 July 1990.)
24. Tapscott and Mulongeni, ‘An Evaluation of the Welfare‘, p. 10.
25. F. Adams, W. Werner, and P. Vale, “The Land Issue in Namibia: An Enquiry‘, Research Report No. 1, NISER, Windhoek 1990, pp. 81-82.
26. Republic of Namibia, National Conference on Land Reform and the Land Question, Office of the Prime Minister, Windhoek, 1991; S. Brown, ‘Land Reform in Namibia: Rhetoric, Reform or Revolution‘, Southern Africa Report, 7, 2, (November 1991).
27. New Era, 7 May 1992; The Namibian, 3 June 1992.
28. This view is consistently reinforced by SWAPO officials, as in pronouncements by the Festus Naholo, SWAPO deputy head, that ‘SWAPO and the NUNW (trade union) are one, and both fought for the liberation of Namibia. SWAPO will make sure that workers rights are achieved.’ (Namibian Worker, June 1991.)
29. The presidential guard who fired on and wounded a white motorist who failed to react to his instructions, for example, was prosecuted despite popular convictions that the actions of the motorist had been provocative and his injury, at least in part, self inflicted. (The Namibian, April l990.The Sunday Star, 6 May 1990.) Similarly, the lenient sentences meted out to several whites accused of treason, met with wide disapproval among much of the black population. (The Namibian, 20 September 1991.)
30. The disaffiliation, which was intended to signal NANSO's intellectual independence from SWAPO, sparked a fierce debate within student circles, and in a split in the organisation. (The Namibian, 9 and 24 September 1991.)
31. Namibian Worker, June 1991.
32. Most notable in that respect, was the appointment of the militant mine workers leader, Ben Ulenga, to the post of deputy minister of Wildlife, Conservation and Tourism.
33. The NUNW, in particular, embarked upon a series of seminars, workshops and training programmes in 1992 both to redefine their role and to train the new leadership.
34. An editorial in a state sponsored newspaper reports: ‘The capacity and ability of the local trade union movement to organise workers is becoming a debatable subject. Ever since the advent of independence two years ago, this nation has been treated to a level of apathy among workers every May Day, with insignificant attendance and poor union activity. Compared to workers, activities during colonial times, the present is simple pathetic. During those sad times, workers came out in thousands, celebrated with colour and militancy.’ (New Era, 7 May 1992.)
35. Republic of Namibia, Draft Transitional Development Plan, 199112-1993194, Windhoek, 1991; D. Simon, ‘The Ties that Bind: Decolonisation and Neo-Colonialism in Southern Africa‘, in C. Dixon and M.J. Heffernan (eds.), Colonialism and Development in the Contemporary World (London, 1991).