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Energy Policy
Volumn 21, Issue 4, 1993, Pages 348-354
Competition in the UK market for electricity generating capacity. A game theory analysis
Author keywords

Competition; Electricity; UK
Indexed keywords

COMPETITION; ELECTRIC GENERATORS; ELECTRIC POWER GENERATION; ELECTRICITY; ENERGY POLICY; GAME THEORY; LAWS AND LEGISLATION; RELIABILITY;
EID: 0027786606     PISSN: 03014215     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/0301-4215(93)90275-K     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (13)
References (8)
  • 1
    • 84916026764 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • In fact the capacity payment is equivalent to [VOLL - Max {SMP, BP}] × LOLP, where SMP is the system marginal price, BP is the bid price of a genset at the day ahead stage. The energy payment to a generator is the Max{SMP, BP}]. Detils of the regulatory structure can be found in HMSO Cm 322, 188, Privatizing Electricity: The Governoment's Proposals for the Privatization of the Electricity Supply Industry in England and Wales, 1988.
  • 5
    • 84916026762 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • A Nash equilibrium characterizes a solution to a game in which netiher player can by unilateral action improve his position.
  • 6
    • 84916026761 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • We note that we have characterizes a solution to a game in which Nash equilibria appeared at positions away from the monopoly line, but only with higher forced power cut rates for plants leading to less reliable systems and therefore the means to sustain substantial capacity credits with higher declarations of plant.
  • 7
    • 84916026760 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • This paper was submitted for publication in November 1991. It has benn pointed out to us by a reference that there have been many significant developments since, including Offer's Pool Price Inquiry and license modifications, and that the paper would be improved by a discussion of the relevance of the work to these events. M.J. Exelby is now employed within the electricity industry and unfortunately it would be improper for him to be associated with comment on developments since sybmission of the paper. Extension of the game theory methodology is described in N.J.D. Lucas and P. Taylor, ‘Characterising generator behaviour: bidding strategies in the pool - a game theory analysis’, Energy Policy, forthcomming.
  • 8
    • 84916026759 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • We note that Richard Greena and David Newberry have come to somewhat similar conclusions using a different analysis and on the basis of the simple declarations of prices by generators, ignoring the capacity credits. These authors do not consider the ivestment implications. Richard Green and David Newberry, Competition in the British Electricity Spot market, DAE Working paper No 9108, 14 March 1991, Department of Applied Economics, University of Cambridge (cited with the permission of the authors).

* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.