On the Identification of Covert Storage Channels in Secure Systems

IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering

Volumn 16, Issue 6, 1990, Pages 569-580

  Tsai, Chii Ren ^a   Gligor, Virgil D ^b   Chandersekaran, C Sekar ^c  

^a VDG Inc ^*  (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND   (United States)

^c IBM   (United States)

Author keywords

Covert channels; information flow; nondiscretionary security; source code; top level specifications

Indexed keywords

PROBABILITY;

COVERT STORAGE CHANNELS; INFORMATION FLOW; NONDISCRETIONARY SECURITY; SECURE SYSTEMS; SECURE XENIX KERNEL; SOURCE CODE;

DATA PROCESSING;

EID: 0025438147     PISSN: 00985589     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1109/32.55086     Document Type: Article

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