Developments in the law: Medical technology and the law

Harvard Law Review

Volumn 103, Issue 7, 1990, Pages 1519-1676

[No Author Info available]

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

AUTONOMY; DUE PROCESS;

ARTICLE; ARTIFICIAL FEEDING; BODY PARTS AND FLUIDS; CHILD ABUSE AMENDMENTS 1984; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; DEATH AND EUTHANASIA; FEMALE; GENETICS AND REPRODUCTION; GOVERNMENT REGULATION; HEALTH CARE AND PUBLIC HEALTH; HUMAN; HUMAN RIGHTS; INFERTILITY THERAPY; LEGAL APPROACH; LEGAL ASPECT; LEGAL RIGHTS; MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY; MEDICOLEGAL ASPECT; NEONATOLOGY; NEWBORN; ORGAN DONOR; ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION; PATIENT COMPLIANCE; PATIENT SELECTION; PREGNANCY; PRENATAL CARE; PRENATAL INJURIES; REHABILITATION ACT 1973; REMUNERATION; REQUIRED REQUEST; RESOURCE ALLOCATION; RISKS AND BENEFITS; SELECTION FOR TREATMENT; STANDARDS; STATE INTEREST; TRANSPLANT RECIPIENTS; TREATMENT WITHDRAWAL; UNIFORM ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT; UNITED STATES;

ARTIFICIAL FEEDING; AUTONOMY; BODY PARTS AND FLUIDS; CHILD ABUSE AMENDMENTS 1984; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; DEATH AND EUTHANASIA; DUE PROCESS; GENETICS AND REPRODUCTION; GOVERNMENT REGULATION; HEALTH CARE AND PUBLIC HEALTH; LEGAL APPROACH; LEGAL RIGHTS; ORGAN DONATION; PREGNANT WOMEN; PRENATAL INJURIES; REHABILITATION ACT 1973; REMUNERATION; REQUIRED REQUEST; RESOURCE ALLOCATION; RISKS AND BENEFITS; SELECTION FOR TREATMENT; STANDARDS; STATE INTEREST; TRANSPLANT RECIPIENTS; UNIFORM ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT; UNITED STATES;

CIVIL RIGHTS; FEMALE; HUMAN; INFANT, NEWBORN; LEGISLATION, MEDICAL; NEONATOLOGY; ORGAN PROCUREMENT; PATIENT ADVOCACY; PATIENT COMPLIANCE; PATIENT SELECTION; PERSONAL AUTONOMY; PREGNANCY; PRENATAL CARE; REPRODUCTIVE TECHNIQUES; TECHNOLOGY, MEDICAL; UNITED STATES; WITHHOLDING TREATMENT;

EID: 0025424487     PISSN: 0017811X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/1341282     Document Type: Article

References (349)

1. Medical innovations have taken an enormous variety of forms, including non-traditional procreation, fetal diagnosis and intervention, advanced surgical techniques, biotechnological and genetic research, and artificial life support.
2. See Annas, The Impact of Medical Technology on the Pregnant Woman's Right to Privacy, 13 AM. J.L. & MED. 213, 213 (1988).
3. See J. COLOMBOTOS & C. KIRCHNER, PHYSICIANS AND SOCIAL CHANGE 18 (1986).
4. See Springer, Law and Medicine: Reflecting on a Metaphysical Misalliance, in LAW AND ETHICS IN HEALTH CARE 1, 18-20 (J. McKinlay ed. 1982).
5. See Callahan, Meeting Needs and Rationing Care, 16 LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 261, 263 (1988); Cassell, Paying Physicians, 36 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 771, 773 (1986).
6. See Callahan, Meeting Needs and Rationing Care, 16 LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 261, 263 (1988); Cassell, Paying Physicians, 36 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 771, 773 (1986).
7. In the case of some of the most expensive procedures, only the wealthy may be able to obtain the greatest level of care available. See Cassell, supra note 5, at 776; infra p. 1632 (discussing the prohibitive cost of organ transplantation).
8. See OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, MEDICARE'S PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT SYSTEM: STRATEGIES FOR EVALUATING COST, QUALITY, AND MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY 98-102 (1985) (noting the potentially differential impact of a prepayment system on access to care by the poor and other disadvantaged groups); E. ROLPH & P. LINDSEY, MEDICARE'S PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT SYSTEM: HEALTH CARE COMMUNITY REACTION AND PERCEPTIONS 45-53 (1986) (same).
9. See OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, MEDICARE'S PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT SYSTEM: STRATEGIES FOR EVALUATING COST, QUALITY, AND MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY 98-102 (1985) (noting the potentially differential impact of a prepayment system on access to care by the poor and other disadvantaged groups); E. ROLPH & P. LINDSEY, MEDICARE'S PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT SYSTEM: HEALTH CARE COMMUNITY REACTION AND PERCEPTIONS 45-53 (1986) (same).
10. See Furrow, The Changing Role of the Law in Promoting Quality in Health Care: From Sanctioning Outlaws to Managing Outcomes, 26 Hous. L. REV. 147, 150-52 (1989). As a result of their increased involvement in health care funding, private employers and the government have drastically increased their role in determining health care policies. See Capron, Containing Health Care Costs: Ethical And Legal Implications Of Changes in the Methods of Paying Physicians, 36 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 708, 708 (1986); Dunlop, The Changing Health Care System, 38 LAB. L.J. 524, 525 (1987). This new emphasis on the economics of medicine may promote a shift away from the traditional doctrines of professionalism and beneficence that have governed the medical profession in the past. See Cassell, supra note 5, at 776.
11. See Furrow, The Changing Role of the Law in Promoting Quality in Health Care: From Sanctioning Outlaws to Managing Outcomes, 26 Hous. L. REV. 147, 150-52 (1989). As a result of their increased involvement in health care funding, private employers and the government have drastically increased their role in determining health care policies. See Capron, Containing Health Care Costs: Ethical And Legal Implications Of Changes in the Methods of Paying Physicians, 36 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 708, 708 (1986); Dunlop, The Changing Health Care System, 38 LAB. L.J. 524, 525 (1987). This new emphasis on the economics of medicine may promote a shift away from the traditional doctrines of professionalism and beneficence that have governed the medical profession in the past. See Cassell, supra note 5, at 776.
12. See Furrow, The Changing Role of the Law in Promoting Quality in Health Care: From Sanctioning Outlaws to Managing Outcomes, 26 Hous. L. REV. 147, 150-52 (1989). As a result of their increased involvement in health care funding, private employers and the government have drastically increased their role in determining health care policies. See Capron, Containing Health Care Costs: Ethical And Legal Implications Of Changes in the Methods of Paying Physicians, 36 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 708, 708 (1986); Dunlop, The Changing Health Care System, 38 LAB. L.J. 524, 525 (1987). This new emphasis on the economics of medicine may promote a shift away from the traditional doctrines of professionalism and beneficence that have governed the medical profession in the past. See Cassell, supra note 5, at 776.
13. See Areen, Bioethics and Law: The Second Stage: Balancing Intelligent Consent and Individual Autonomy, 31 ARIZ. L. REV. 447, 449 (1989).
14. See Callahan, supra note 5, at 264; Fox, Ethical and Existential Developments in Contemporaneous American Medicine: Their Implications For Culture and Society, in LAW AND ETHICS IN HEALTH CARE, supra note 4, at 333, 358; Springer, supra note 4, at 5; cf. Palmer, The Search for Caring and Justice: The Social Functions of Medicine and Law, CORNELL L. F., Oct. 1987, at 62, 64 (noting that definitions of "health" are societally generated and depend on the prevailing level of medical capability). Increased societal expectations have also contributed to the increase in medical malpractice suits in recent decades. See Schwartz, Societal Responsibility for Malpractice, in LAW AND ETHICS IN HEALTH CARE, supra note 4, at 201, 210.
15. See Callahan, supra note 5, at 264; Fox, Ethical and Existential Developments in Contemporaneous American Medicine: Their Implications For Culture and Society, in LAW AND ETHICS IN HEALTH CARE, supra note 4, at 333, 358; Springer, supra note 4, at 5; cf. Palmer, The Search for Caring and Justice: The Social Functions of Medicine and Law, CORNELL L. F., Oct. 1987, at 62, 64 (noting that definitions of "health" are societally generated and depend on the prevailing level of medical capability). Increased societal expectations have also contributed to the increase in medical malpractice suits in recent decades. See Schwartz, Societal Responsibility for Malpractice, in LAW AND ETHICS IN HEALTH CARE, supra note 4, at 201, 210.
16. See Callahan, supra note 5, at 264; Fox, Ethical and Existential Developments in Contemporaneous American Medicine: Their Implications For Culture and Society, in LAW AND ETHICS IN HEALTH CARE, supra note 4, at 333, 358; Springer, supra note 4, at 5; cf. Palmer, The Search for Caring and Justice: The Social Functions of Medicine and Law, CORNELL L. F., Oct. 1987, at 62, 64 (noting that definitions of "health" are societally generated and depend on the prevailing level of medical capability). Increased societal expectations have also contributed to the increase in medical malpractice suits in recent decades. See Schwartz, Societal Responsibility for Malpractice, in LAW AND ETHICS IN HEALTH CARE, supra note 4, at 201, 210.
17. The growing recognition of medical ethics as an important adjunct to professional medicine illustrates the need for multidisciplinary perspectives in medical decisionmaking, See Fox, supra note 10; cf. Cassell, supra note 5, at 771 (describing medicine as a "moral, or moral-technical, profession"). Medical professionals have therefore turned to ethicists, social workers, business-persons, attorneys, and laypersons to aid their decisionmaking. See Areen, supra note 9, at 451; Libov, Connecticut Q & A: Stuart F. Spicker, N.Y. Times, March 5, 1989, § 12, at 3, col. 1; McKuen, Colleges Turn Their Attention to Growing Field of Health Law, Chicago Tribune, Jan. 1, 1989, School Guide, at 7; cf. Marbella, Can Bedside Manner Be Taught? The Traditional Medical School Glacier Begins to Melt, L.A. Times, May 25, 1989, § 5, at 7, col. 1 (noting the recent diversification of the medical school curriculum and the inclusion of more courses in the humanities and non-technical fields). The state of medical technology will, however, continue to influence society's analysis of these issues. See, e.g., Annas, supra note 2, at 216-19 (describing medical technology's influence on Supreme Court decisions defining the state's role in regulating human reproduction).
18. The growing recognition of medical ethics as an important adjunct to professional medicine illustrates the need for multidisciplinary perspectives in medical decisionmaking, See Fox, supra note 10; cf. Cassell, supra note 5, at 771 (describing medicine as a "moral, or moral-technical, profession"). Medical professionals have therefore turned to ethicists, social workers, business-persons, attorneys, and laypersons to aid their decisionmaking. See Areen, supra note 9, at 451; Libov, Connecticut Q & A: Stuart F. Spicker, N.Y. Times, March 5, 1989, § 12, at 3, col. 1; McKuen, Colleges Turn Their Attention to Growing Field of Health Law, Chicago Tribune, Jan. 1, 1989, School Guide, at 7; cf. Marbella, Can Bedside Manner Be Taught? The Traditional Medical School Glacier Begins to Melt, L.A. Times, May 25, 1989, § 5, at 7, col. 1 (noting the recent diversification of the medical school curriculum and the inclusion of more courses in the humanities and non-technical fields). The state of medical technology will, however, continue to influence society's analysis of these issues. See, e.g., Annas, supra note 2, at 216-19 (describing medical technology's influence on Supreme Court decisions defining the state's role in regulating human reproduction).
19. The growing recognition of medical ethics as an important adjunct to professional medicine illustrates the need for multidisciplinary perspectives in medical decisionmaking, See Fox, supra note 10; cf. Cassell, supra note 5, at 771 (describing medicine as a "moral, or moral-technical, profession"). Medical professionals have therefore turned to ethicists, social workers, business-persons, attorneys, and laypersons to aid their decisionmaking. See Areen, supra note 9, at 451; Libov, Connecticut Q & A: Stuart F. Spicker, N.Y. Times, March 5, 1989, § 12, at 3, col. 1; McKuen, Colleges Turn Their Attention to Growing Field of Health Law, Chicago Tribune, Jan. 1, 1989, School Guide, at 7; cf. Marbella, Can Bedside Manner Be Taught? The Traditional Medical School Glacier Begins to Melt, L.A. Times, May 25, 1989, § 5, at 7, col. 1 (noting the recent diversification of the medical school curriculum and the inclusion of more courses in the humanities and non-technical fields). The state of medical technology will, however, continue to influence society's analysis of these issues. See, e.g., Annas, supra note 2, at 216-19 (describing medical technology's influence on Supreme Court decisions defining the state's role in regulating human reproduction).
20. See Baron, Medicine and Human Rights: Emerging Substantive Standards and Procedural Protections for Medical Decision Making Within the American Family, 17 FAM. L.Q. 1, 23 (1983).
21. See Cassell, supra note 5, at 773; supra note 8 and accompanying text; cf. Pellegrino & Thomasma, The Conflict Between Autonomy and Beneficence in Medical Ethics: Proposal For a Resolution, 3 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 23, 35-36 (1987) (offering as an argument against medical paternalism the view that medicine's first priority should be to restore the patient's autonomy).
22. See Annas, supra note 2, at 231; see also L. WINNER, AUTONOMOUS TECHNOLOGY 13-16 (1977) (describing the growing belief that technology has escaped societal control).
23. See Springer, supra note 4, at 10.
24. See Furrow, supra note 8, at 152. Legal rules also facilitate health care quality assessment by establishing substantive criteria against which to measure physician and treatment performance. See id. at 172.
25. The relationship between law and medicine has been historically fraught with tension, and courts have been criticized for excessive interference with the medical profession. See Baron, supra note 12, at 18.
26. Palmer, supra note 10, at 62.
27. This Note does not, therefore, discuss the right of a woman to choose to have an abortion, except insofar as abortion law and the debate surrounding it affect the medical decisions that follow the threshold decision to begin life.
28. See J. LASKER & S. BORG, IN SEARCH OF PARENTHOOD 11-14 (1987); B. ROTHMAN, RECREATING MOTHERHOOD 141-42 (1989).
29. See J. LASKER & S. BORG, IN SEARCH OF PARENTHOOD 11-14 (1987); B. ROTHMAN, RECREATING MOTHERHOOD 141-42 (1989).
30. See Crowe, 'Women Want It': In-Vitro Fertilization and Women's Motivations for Participation, 8 WOMEN'S STUD. INT'L F. 547, 548 (1985) (noting that the women in one study "perceived motherhood as an integral part of marriage" and observing that "[b]oth marriage and motherhood were part of their life plans"). Women may even perceive infertility as a loss of identity. See Corea, What the King Can Not See, in EMBRYOS, ETHICS, AND WOMEN'S RIGHTS 77, 79 (E. Baruch, A. D'Adamo & J. Seager eds. 1988). In addition to social constraints, a woman's choices may be further limited by marriage because men are often the dominant partners in marital reproductive decisions. See, e.g., J. LASKER & S. BORG, supra note 1, at 16 ("Men usually appear to be the driving force behind the preference for a biological child."); Lorber, In Vitro Fertilization and Gender Politics, in EMBRYOS, ETHICS, AND WOMEN'S RIGHTS, supra, at 117, 124 (citing studies showing that when the husband did not want a child but the wife did, the couple remained married, but when the husband wanted a child but the wife did not, the couple often obtained a divorce).
31. See Crowe, 'Women Want It': In-Vitro Fertilization and Women's Motivations for Participation, 8 WOMEN'S STUD. INT'L F. 547, 548 (1985) (noting that the women in one study "perceived motherhood as an integral part of marriage" and observing that "[b]oth marriage and motherhood were part of their life plans"). Women may even perceive infertility as a loss of identity. See Corea, What the King Can Not See, in EMBRYOS, ETHICS, AND WOMEN'S RIGHTS 77, 79 (E. Baruch, A. D'Adamo & J. Seager eds. 1988). In addition to social constraints, a woman's choices may be further limited by marriage because men are often the dominant partners in marital reproductive decisions. See, e.g., J. LASKER & S. BORG, supra note 1, at 16 ("Men usually appear to be the driving force behind the preference for a biological child."); Lorber, In Vitro Fertilization and Gender Politics, in EMBRYOS, ETHICS, AND WOMEN'S RIGHTS, supra, at 117, 124 (citing studies showing that when the husband did not want a child but the wife did, the couple remained married, but when the husband wanted a child but the wife did not, the couple often obtained a divorce).
32. See Crowe, 'Women Want It': In-Vitro Fertilization and Women's Motivations for Participation, 8 WOMEN'S STUD. INT'L F. 547, 548 (1985) (noting that the women in one study "perceived motherhood as an integral part of marriage" and observing that "[b]oth marriage and motherhood were part of their life plans"). Women may even perceive infertility as a loss of identity. See Corea, What the King Can Not See, in EMBRYOS, ETHICS, AND WOMEN'S RIGHTS 77, 79 (E. Baruch, A. D'Adamo & J. Seager eds. 1988). In addition to social constraints, a woman's choices may be further limited by marriage because men are often the dominant partners in marital reproductive decisions. See, e.g., J. LASKER & S. BORG, supra note 1, at 16 ("Men usually appear to be the driving force behind the preference for a biological child."); Lorber, In Vitro Fertilization and Gender Politics, in EMBRYOS, ETHICS, AND WOMEN'S RIGHTS, supra, at 117, 124 (citing studies showing that when the husband did not want a child but the wife did, the couple remained married, but when the husband wanted a child but the wife did not, the couple often obtained a divorce).
33. See Lorber, supra note 2, at 124-25.
34. See Andrews, Alternative Modes of Reproduction, in REPRODUCTIVE LAWS FOR THE 1990S at 391 (S. Cohen & N. Taub eds. 1989). Government statistics, available only for married couples, indicate that primary fertility (the inability to have a child) doubled between 1964 and 1982. See OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, INFERTILITY: MEDICAL AND SOCIAL CHOICES 50 (1988). In recent years, the demand for infertility services has also risen. See id. at 55. The number of couples suffering from secondary infertility (couples who are parents at least once but are unable to have another child), however, has decreased, making the overall rate of infertility fairly constant. See id. at 50. Infertility may be attributed to a number of factors, such as the delayed childbirth of professional women, their experience with medical mistakes such as the Dalkon Shield, and the exposure of both men and women to hazardous workplace conditions. See Hollinger, From Coitus to Commerce: Legal and Social Consequences of Noncoital Reproduction, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 845, 875-76 (1985).
35. See Andrews, Alternative Modes of Reproduction, in REPRODUCTIVE LAWS FOR THE 1990S at 391 (S. Cohen & N. Taub eds. 1989). Government statistics, available only for married couples, indicate that primary fertility (the inability to have a child) doubled between 1964 and 1982. See OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, INFERTILITY: MEDICAL AND SOCIAL CHOICES 50 (1988). In recent years, the demand for infertility services has also risen. See id. at 55. The number of couples suffering from secondary infertility (couples who are parents at least once but are unable to have another child), however, has decreased, making the overall rate of infertility fairly constant. See id. at 50. Infertility may be attributed to a number of factors, such as the delayed childbirth of professional women, their experience with medical mistakes such as the Dalkon Shield, and the exposure of both men and women to hazardous workplace conditions. See Hollinger, From Coitus to Commerce: Legal and Social Consequences of Noncoital Reproduction, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 845, 875-76 (1985).
36. See Andrews, Alternative Modes of Reproduction, in REPRODUCTIVE LAWS FOR THE 1990S at 391 (S. Cohen & N. Taub eds. 1989). Government statistics, available only for married couples, indicate that primary fertility (the inability to have a child) doubled between 1964 and 1982. See OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, INFERTILITY: MEDICAL AND SOCIAL CHOICES 50 (1988). In recent years, the demand for infertility services has also risen. See id. at 55. The number of couples suffering from secondary infertility (couples who are parents at least once but are unable to have another child), however, has decreased, making the overall rate of infertility fairly constant. See id. at 50. Infertility may be attributed to a number of factors, such as the delayed childbirth of professional women, their experience with medical mistakes such as the Dalkon Shield, and the exposure of both men and women to hazardous workplace conditions. See Hollinger, From Coitus to Commerce: Legal and Social Consequences of Noncoital Reproduction, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 845, 875-76 (1985).
37. See N. CHODOROW, THE REPRODUCTION OF MOTHERING 13-30 (1978); J. LASKER & S. BORG, supra note 1, at 12-13.
38. See Corea, supra note 2, at 78.
39. American couples spent over one billion dollars on infertility treatment in 1987. See A. BONNICKSEN, IN VITRO FERTILIZATION 25 (1989).
40. See, e.g., Gould, And What About Baby M's Ruined Life?, N.Y. Times, Mar. 26, 1987, at 27, col. 1 (noting that "[w]hile the feeling is understandable, it has elements of narcissism and ego that have more to do with the man's needs than the child's best interests").
41. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 15-10, at 1361 (2d ed. 1988).
42. In a draft chapter of a forthcoming book with the working title of Acquiring Children, Elizabeth Bartholet discusses the ways in which society has constructed the parenting options available to the infertile so as to favor biological reproduction and disfavor adoption. She argues for a concept of parenting centered on its relationship aspect. See E. BARTHOLET, ACQUIRING CHILDREN 126-38 (forthcoming 1990).
43. Other problems may discourage people from pursuing adoption, such as the difficulty of finding a child, anxiety about the type of child adopted, and fear of being found unsuitable parents by the adoption agencies. See R. SNOWDEN & G. MITCHELL, THE ARTIFICIAL FAMILY 28-31 (1981); see also NATIONAL COMM. FOR ADOPTION, ADOPTION FACTBOOK 157 (1989) [hereinafter ADOPTION FACTBOOK] (noting that many couples may eschew adoption as an alternative "due to long waits and restrictive criteria for prospective adoptive parents"). Nevertheless, none of these factors dissuades infertile couples as strongly as the desire for biological parenthood. See J. LASKER & S. BORG, supra note 1, at 15.
44. Other problems may discourage people from pursuing adoption, such as the difficulty of finding a child, anxiety about the type of child adopted, and fear of being found unsuitable parents by the adoption agencies. See R. SNOWDEN & G. MITCHELL, THE ARTIFICIAL FAMILY 28-31 (1981); see also NATIONAL COMM. FOR ADOPTION, ADOPTION FACTBOOK 157 (1989) [hereinafter ADOPTION FACTBOOK] (noting that many couples may eschew adoption as an alternative "due to long waits and restrictive criteria for prospective adoptive parents"). Nevertheless, none of these factors dissuades infertile couples as strongly as the desire for biological parenthood. See J. LASKER & S. BORG, supra note 1, at 15.
45. Katharine Bartlett has discussed how current concepts of parenthood lead judges to resolve parental disputes between biological parents so that social relationships are de-emphasized. See Bartlett, Re-Expressing Parenthood, 98 YALE L.J. 293 (1988). Elizabeth Bartholet has also detailed the institutional and informational bias against would-be adoptive parents and in favor of technological alternatives. See E. BARTHOLET, supra note 10, at 39-52.
46. See, e.g., Bartlett, supra note 12; infra pp. 1534-37.
47. The right of privacy encompasses a right to reproductive autonomy. Commentators and courts, however, often use the two terms and the phrase "right to procreate" interchangeably.
48. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
49. Id. at 541.
50. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
51. Id. at 485.
52. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
53. Id. at 453 (emphasis in original).
54. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
55. See id. at 687.
56. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
57. Id. at 153.
58. 109 N.J. 396, 537 A.2d 1227 (1988).
59. See id. at 448, 537 A.2d at 1253.
60. Id.
61. 106 Mich. App. 169, 307 N.W.2d 438 (1981).
62. See id. at 173-74, 307 N.W.2d at 441.
63. See id. At least one other court has heard a similar argument involving artificial insem-ination. See Goodwin v. Turner, 702 F. Supp. 1452 (W.D. Mo. 1988), appeal docketed, No. 89-1101 (8th Cir. Jan. 19, 1989); Robbins, Court To Decide Missouri Prisoner's Right To Father A Child, N.Y. Times, Feb. 20, 1990, at A19, col. 1. In Goodwin, an inmate sued his prison for refusing to let him artificially inseminate his wife. The court upheld the prison policy, finding the inmate's request "'inconsistent with imprisonment itself.'" Id. at 1454 (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 523 (1983)). Nevertheless, the court implied that it might have recognized that artificial insemination did implicate the right to privacy had the petitioner not been an inmate. See id. at 1454-55.
64. No. A12749/8g (N.Y. Fam. Ct. Jan. 22, 1990) (1990 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 30).
65. Id. (1990 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 30, *7).
66. See, e.g., In re Baby M, 109 N.J. 396, 448, 537 A.2d 1227, 1253 (1988) (noting that Griswold "strictly speaking . . . involves the right not to procreate").
67. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191-94 (1986) (relying on the historical treatment of sodomy to uphold a criminal sodomy statute as not violative of the right of privacy); cf. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33 (1973) (finding that *[i]t is not in the province of this Court to create substantive constitutional rights in the name of guaranteeing equal protection*).
68. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 109 S. Ct. 2333, 2341-44 (1989) (plurality opinion) (defending the notion that history and tradition should determine which relationships and activities should receive constitutional protection); see also L. TRIBE, supra note 9, § 15-10, at 1347-48 (arguing that current conservative voices on the Court are advancing positions that *cannot readily be distinguished from a frontal assault on the Supreme Court's half-century old privacy jurisprudence*).
69. Commentators are divided on whether the right of privacy encompasses the use of reproductive technologies. Campare L. TRIBE, supra note 9, § 15-10, at 1360-61 (questioning the outer limits of the right to privacy as it relates to reproductive technology) and Kimbrell, The Case Against the Commercialization of Childbearing, 24 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 1035, 1048-49 (1988) (arguing that the right to procreate does not protect commercial surrogacy arrangements) with Gostin, A Civil Liberties Analysis of Surrogacy Arrangements, 16 LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 7 (1988) (arguing that the right to privacy should encompass paid, revocable surrogacy contracts) and Robertson, Procreative Liberty and the Control of Conception, Pregnancy, and Childbirth, 69 VA. L. REV. 405, 414-36 (1983) (arguing that a fundamental right to procreation exists and extends to all modes of artificial procreation).
70. Commentators are divided on whether the right of privacy encompasses the use of reproductive technologies. Campare L. TRIBE, supra note 9, § 15-10, at 1360-61 (questioning the outer limits of the right to privacy as it relates to reproductive technology) and Kimbrell, The Case Against the Commercialization of Childbearing, 24 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 1035, 1048-49 (1988) (arguing that the right to procreate does not protect commercial surrogacy arrangements) with Gostin, A Civil Liberties Analysis of Surrogacy Arrangements, 16 LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 7 (1988) (arguing that the right to privacy should encompass paid, revocable surrogacy contracts) and Robertson, Procreative Liberty and the Control of Conception, Pregnancy, and Childbirth, 69 VA. L. REV. 405, 414-36 (1983) (arguing that a fundamental right to procreation exists and extends to all modes of artificial procreation).
71. Commentators are divided on whether the right of privacy encompasses the use of reproductive technologies. Campare L. TRIBE, supra note 9, § 15-10, at 1360-61 (questioning the outer limits of the right to privacy as it relates to reproductive technology) and Kimbrell, The Case Against the Commercialization of Childbearing, 24 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 1035, 1048-49 (1988) (arguing that the right to procreate does not protect commercial surrogacy arrangements) with Gostin, A Civil Liberties Analysis of Surrogacy Arrangements, 16 LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 7 (1988) (arguing that the right to privacy should encompass paid, revocable surrogacy contracts) and Robertson, Procreative Liberty and the Control of Conception, Pregnancy, and Childbirth, 69 VA. L. REV. 405, 414-36 (1983) (arguing that a fundamental right to procreation exists and extends to all modes of artificial procreation).
72. Commentators are divided on whether the right of privacy encompasses the use of reproductive technologies. Campare L. TRIBE, supra note 9, § 15-10, at 1360-61 (questioning the outer limits of the right to privacy as it relates to reproductive technology) and Kimbrell, The Case Against the Commercialization of Childbearing, 24 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 1035, 1048-49 (1988) (arguing that the right to procreate does not protect commercial surrogacy arrangements) with Gostin, A Civil Liberties Analysis of Surrogacy Arrangements, 16 LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 7 (1988) (arguing that the right to privacy should encompass paid, revocable surrogacy contracts) and Robertson, Procreative Liberty and the Control of Conception, Pregnancy, and Childbirth, 69 VA. L. REV. 405, 414-36 (1983) (arguing that a fundamental right to procreation exists and extends to all modes of artificial procreation).
73. See Baby M, 109 N.J. at 448, 537 A.2d at 1253.
74. See, e.g., Gursky v. Gursky, 39 Misc. 2d 1083, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406 (Sup. Ct. 1963) (finding a child born of artificial insemination illegitimate).
75. The Court's emphasis on methodology over result led to its controversial decisions in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), and Michael H. v. Gerald D., 109 S. Ct. 2333 (1989). In Hardwick, the Court upheld a sodomy statute despite its infringement of the right to intimate association, on the grounds that sodomy was not an intimate association traditionally accorded constitutional protection. See 478 U.S. at 191-94. Similarly, in Michael H., the Court focused on a specific relationship rather than on the underlying right to maintain familial ties in denying protection to the filial relationship of a daughter and father when the daughter was born while the mother was married to another man. The Court reasoned that their relationship fell outside of the traditional marital family. See 109 S. Ct. at 2341-44 (plurality opinion).
76. Parental rights find additional protection in related due process cases. See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 743, 753 (1982) (recognizing "[t]he fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and management of their child"); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 518 (1925) (noting that "the parental right to guide one's child intellectually and religiously is a most substantial part of the liberty and freedom of the parent"); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (protecting the parental right to educate a child in a language other than English); see also Hollinger, supra note 4, at 878 (observing that Supreme Court cases protecting parental rights "plac[e] more emphasis on the opportunity to rear a child, and on the vital social and cultural functions performed by childrearing, than on the process by which a child is acquired").
77. Ultimately, the right might be broadened to include adoptive parent-child relationships. The presumption that adults have a right to adopt and children have a right to have a home would necessitate an entirely new approach to adoption practices. See E. BARTHOLET, supra note 10, at 127-28; see also id. at 128-38 (discussing how adoption practices could change to accommodate the presumption).
78. See supra notes 10 and 12.
79. Bartlett, supra note 12, at 293.
80. The acronyms "AIH," for artificial insemination by husband, and the more common "AID," for artificial insemination by donor, are also used in the literature.
81. The first recorded use of AI in the United States occurred in 1866, performed on wives with their husbands' semen. See W. FINEGOLD, ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION 5 (1964).
82. See R. SNOWDEN, G. MITCHELL & E. SNOWDEN, ARTIFICIAL REPRODUCTION: A SOCIAL INVESTIGATION 8-15 (1983); Moghissi, The Technology of AID and Surrogacy, in NEW APPROACHES TO HUMAN REPRODUCTION 117, 122-27 (L. Whiteford & M. Poland eds. 1989).
83. See R. SNOWDEN, G. MITCHELL & E. SNOWDEN, ARTIFICIAL REPRODUCTION: A SOCIAL INVESTIGATION 8-15 (1983); Moghissi, The Technology of AID and Surrogacy, in NEW APPROACHES TO HUMAN REPRODUCTION 117, 122-27 (L. Whiteford & M. Poland eds. 1989).
84. See, e.g., Gursky v. Gursky, 39 Misc. 2d 1083, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406 (Sup. Ct. 1963) (finding an AI child illegitimate but nevertheless requiring the husband to meet his parental obligations because his consent to the procedure bound him by the principles of implied contract and promissory estoppel).
85. See, e.g., People v. Sorensen, 68 Cal. 2d 280, 437 P.2d 495, 66 Cal. Rptr. 7 (1968); People v. Thompson, 89 Cal. App. 3d 386, 152 Cal. Rptr. 478 (1979); K.S. v. G.S., 182 N.J. Super. 102, 440 A.2d 64 (1981); People v. Dennett, 15 Misc. 2d 260, 184 N.Y.S.2d 178 (Sup. Ct. 1958); In re Adoption of Anonymous, 74 Misc. 2d 99, 345 N.Y.S.2d 430 (Sur. Ct. 1973); Brooks v. Fair, 40 Ohio App. 3d 202, 532 N.E.2d 208 (1988).
86. See ALA. CODE § 26-17-21 (1988); ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.045 (1988); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2451(B) (1988); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 9-10-201 (1988); CAL. Civ. CODE § 7005 (Deering 1989); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-4-106 (1988); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-69f to 45-69n (West 1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.11 (West Supp. 1986); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 19-7-21 (1982), 43-34-42 (1984); IDAHO CODE §§ 39-5401 to -5407 (1985); ILL. REV. STAT. ch 40, para. 1451-1453 (1987); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-128 to -130 (1981); LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 188 (West Supp. 1989); MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 1-206(b) (1988); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 46, § 48 (West 1989); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.111(2) (West 1980); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.56 (West Supp. 1987); Mo. REV. STAT. § 210.824 (1988); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-106 (1985); NEV. REV. STAT, § 126.061 (1985); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-44 (West Supp. 1987); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-11-6 (1986); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 73 (McKinney 1977); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49A-1 (1984); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-18-03 to -04 (Supp. 1989); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3111.30-.38 (Baldwin 1989); OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 552 (1987); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 109.239, 109.243, 109-247, 677.355, 677.360, 677.365, 677.370 (1983); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-3-306 (1985); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 12.03(a) (Vernon 1986); VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-7.1 (1989); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.050 (1985); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 891.40 (West Supp. 1988); WYO. STAT. § 14-2-103 (1986); 1990 N.H. House Bill 1426-FN §§ 168-6:2 to :3 (to be codified at N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 168-6:2 to :3) (effective Jan. 1991). Many of the statutes are modeled after UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5, 9B U.L.A. 301 (1987). See generally Note, Artificial Insemination: Donor Rights in Situations Involving Unmarried Recipients, 26 J. FAM. L. 793, 795-98 (1988) (discussing the Uniform Parentage Act and other current statutory schemes). The remaining states do not address AI use. In these states, however, courts faced with disputes involving married users of AI will likely grant parents and children full rights and obligations, based on common law principles. See, e.g., Gursky v. Gursky, 39 Misc. 2d 1083, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
87. See ALA. CODE § 26-17-21 (1988); ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.045 (1988); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2451(B) (1988); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 9-10-201 (1988); CAL. Civ. CODE § 7005 (Deering 1989); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-4-106 (1988); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-69f to 45-69n (West 1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.11 (West Supp. 1986); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 19-7-21 (1982), 43-34-42 (1984); IDAHO CODE §§ 39-5401 to -5407 (1985); ILL. REV. STAT. ch 40, para. 1451-1453 (1987); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-128 to -130 (1981); LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 188 (West Supp. 1989); MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 1-206(b) (1988); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 46, § 48 (West 1989); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.111(2) (West 1980); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.56 (West Supp. 1987); Mo. REV. STAT. § 210.824 (1988); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-106 (1985); NEV. REV. STAT, § 126.061 (1985); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-44 (West Supp. 1987); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-11-6 (1986); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 73 (McKinney 1977); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49A-1 (1984); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-18-03 to -04 (Supp. 1989); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3111.30-.38 (Baldwin 1989); OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 552 (1987); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 109.239, 109.243, 109-247, 677.355, 677.360, 677.365, 677.370 (1983); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-3-306 (1985); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 12.03(a) (Vernon 1986); VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-7.1 (1989); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.050 (1985); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 891.40 (West Supp. 1988); WYO. STAT. § 14-2-103 (1986); 1990 N.H. House Bill 1426-FN §§ 168-6:2 to :3 (to be codified at N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 168-6:2 to :3) (effective Jan. 1991). Many of the statutes are modeled after UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5, 9B U.L.A. 301 (1987). See generally Note, Artificial Insemination: Donor Rights in Situations Involving Unmarried Recipients, 26 J. FAM. L. 793, 795-98 (1988) (discussing the Uniform Parentage Act and other current statutory schemes). The remaining states do not address AI use. In these states, however, courts faced with disputes involving married users of AI will likely grant parents and children full rights and obligations, based on common law principles. See, e.g., Gursky v. Gursky, 39 Misc. 2d 1083, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
88. See ALA. CODE § 26-17-21 (1988); ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.045 (1988); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2451(B) (1988); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 9-10-201 (1988); CAL. Civ. CODE § 7005 (Deering 1989); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-4-106 (1988); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-69f to 45-69n (West 1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.11 (West Supp. 1986); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 19-7-21 (1982), 43-34-42 (1984); IDAHO CODE §§ 39-5401 to -5407 (1985); ILL. REV. STAT. ch 40, para. 1451-1453 (1987); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-128 to -130 (1981); LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 188 (West Supp. 1989); MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 1-206(b) (1988); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 46, § 48 (West 1989); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.111(2) (West 1980); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.56 (West Supp. 1987); Mo. REV. STAT. § 210.824 (1988); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-106 (1985); NEV. REV. STAT, § 126.061 (1985); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-44 (West Supp. 1987); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-11-6 (1986); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 73 (McKinney 1977); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49A-1 (1984); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-18-03 to -04 (Supp. 1989); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3111.30-.38 (Baldwin 1989); OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 552 (1987); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 109.239, 109.243, 109-247, 677.355, 677.360, 677.365, 677.370 (1983); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-3-306 (1985); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 12.03(a) (Vernon 1986); VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-7.1 (1989); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.050 (1985); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 891.40 (West Supp. 1988); WYO. STAT. § 14-2-103 (1986); 1990 N.H. House Bill 1426-FN §§ 168-6:2 to :3 (to be codified at N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 168-6:2 to :3) (effective Jan. 1991). Many of the statutes are modeled after UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5, 9B U.L.A. 301 (1987). See generally Note, Artificial Insemination: Donor Rights in Situations Involving Unmarried Recipients, 26 J. FAM. L. 793, 795-98 (1988) (discussing the Uniform Parentage Act and other current statutory schemes). The remaining states do not address AI use. In these states, however, courts faced with disputes involving married users of AI will likely grant parents and children full rights and obligations, based on common law principles. See, e.g., Gursky v. Gursky, 39 Misc. 2d 1083, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
89. See ALA. CODE § 26-17-21 (1988); ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.045 (1988); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2451(B) (1988); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 9-10-201 (1988); CAL. Civ. CODE § 7005 (Deering 1989); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-4-106 (1988); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-69f to 45-69n (West 1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.11 (West Supp. 1986); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 19-7-21 (1982), 43-34-42 (1984); IDAHO CODE §§ 39-5401 to -5407 (1985); ILL. REV. STAT. ch 40, para. 1451-1453 (1987); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-128 to -130 (1981); LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 188 (West Supp. 1989); MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 1-206(b) (1988); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 46, § 48 (West 1989); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.111(2) (West 1980); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.56 (West Supp. 1987); Mo. REV. STAT. § 210.824 (1988); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-106 (1985); NEV. REV. STAT, § 126.061 (1985); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-44 (West Supp. 1987); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-11-6 (1986); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 73 (McKinney 1977); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49A-1 (1984); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-18-03 to -04 (Supp. 1989); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3111.30-.38 (Baldwin 1989); OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 552 (1987); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 109.239, 109.243, 109-247, 677.355, 677.360, 677.365, 677.370 (1983); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-3-306 (1985); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 12.03(a) (Vernon 1986); VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-7.1 (1989); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.050 (1985); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 891.40 (West Supp. 1988); WYO. STAT. § 14-2-103 (1986); 1990 N.H. House Bill 1426-FN §§ 168-6:2 to :3 (to be codified at N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 168-6:2 to :3) (effective Jan. 1991). Many of the statutes are modeled after UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5, 9B U.L.A. 301 (1987). See generally Note, Artificial Insemination: Donor Rights in Situations Involving Unmarried Recipients, 26 J. FAM. L. 793, 795-98 (1988) (discussing the Uniform Parentage Act and other current statutory schemes). The remaining states do not address AI use. In these states, however, courts faced with disputes involving married users of AI will likely grant parents and children full rights and obligations, based on common law principles. See, e.g., Gursky v. Gursky, 39 Misc. 2d 1083, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
90. See ALA. CODE § 26-17-21 (1988); ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.045 (1988); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2451(B) (1988); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 9-10-201 (1988); CAL. Civ. CODE § 7005 (Deering 1989); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-4-106 (1988); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-69f to 45-69n (West 1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.11 (West Supp. 1986); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 19-7-21 (1982), 43-34-42 (1984); IDAHO CODE §§ 39-5401 to -5407 (1985); ILL. REV. STAT. ch 40, para. 1451-1453 (1987); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-128 to -130 (1981); LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 188 (West Supp. 1989); MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 1-206(b) (1988); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 46, § 48 (West 1989); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.111(2) (West 1980); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.56 (West Supp. 1987); Mo. REV. STAT. § 210.824 (1988); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-106 (1985); NEV. REV. STAT, § 126.061 (1985); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-44 (West Supp. 1987); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-11-6 (1986); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 73 (McKinney 1977); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49A-1 (1984); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-18-03 to -04 (Supp. 1989); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3111.30-.38 (Baldwin 1989); OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 552 (1987); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 109.239, 109.243, 109-247, 677.355, 677.360, 677.365, 677.370 (1983); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-3-306 (1985); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 12.03(a) (Vernon 1986); VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-7.1 (1989); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.050 (1985); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 891.40 (West Supp. 1988); WYO. STAT. § 14-2-103 (1986); 1990 N.H. House Bill 1426-FN §§ 168-6:2 to :3 (to be codified at N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 168-6:2 to :3) (effective Jan. 1991). Many of the statutes are modeled after UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5, 9B U.L.A. 301 (1987). See generally Note, Artificial Insemination: Donor Rights in Situations Involving Unmarried Recipients, 26 J. FAM. L. 793, 795-98 (1988) (discussing the Uniform Parentage Act and other current statutory schemes). The remaining states do not address AI use. In these states, however, courts faced with disputes involving married users of AI will likely grant parents and children full rights and obligations, based on common law principles. See, e.g., Gursky v. Gursky, 39 Misc. 2d 1083, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
91. See ALA. CODE § 26-17-21 (1988); ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.045 (1988); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2451(B) (1988); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 9-10-201 (1988); CAL. Civ. CODE § 7005 (Deering 1989); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-4-106 (1988); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-69f to 45-69n (West 1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.11 (West Supp. 1986); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 19-7-21 (1982), 43-34-42 (1984); IDAHO CODE §§ 39-5401 to -5407 (1985); ILL. REV. STAT. ch 40, para. 1451-1453 (1987); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-128 to -130 (1981); LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 188 (West Supp. 1989); MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 1-206(b) (1988); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 46, § 48 (West 1989); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.111(2) (West 1980); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.56 (West Supp. 1987); Mo. REV. STAT. § 210.824 (1988); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-106 (1985); NEV. REV. STAT, § 126.061 (1985); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-44 (West Supp. 1987); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-11-6 (1986); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 73 (McKinney 1977); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49A-1 (1984); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-18-03 to -04 (Supp. 1989); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3111.30-.38 (Baldwin 1989); OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 552 (1987); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 109.239, 109.243, 109-247, 677.355, 677.360, 677.365, 677.370 (1983); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-3-306 (1985); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 12.03(a) (Vernon 1986); VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-7.1 (1989); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.050 (1985); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 891.40 (West Supp. 1988); WYO. STAT. § 14-2-103 (1986); 1990 N.H. House Bill 1426-FN §§ 168-6:2 to :3 (to be codified at N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 168-6:2 to :3) (effective Jan. 1991). Many of the statutes are modeled after UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5, 9B U.L.A. 301 (1987). See generally Note, Artificial Insemination: Donor Rights in Situations Involving Unmarried Recipients, 26 J. FAM. L. 793, 795-98 (1988) (discussing the Uniform Parentage Act and other current statutory schemes). The remaining states do not address AI use. In these states, however, courts faced with disputes involving married users of AI will likely grant parents and children full rights and obligations, based on common law principles. See, e.g., Gursky v. Gursky, 39 Misc. 2d 1083, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
92. See ALA. CODE § 26-17-21 (1988); ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.045 (1988); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2451(B) (1988); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 9-10-201 (1988); CAL. Civ. CODE § 7005 (Deering 1989); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-4-106 (1988); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-69f to 45-69n (West 1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.11 (West Supp. 1986); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 19-7-21 (1982), 43-34-42 (1984); IDAHO CODE §§ 39-5401 to -5407 (1985); ILL. REV. STAT. ch 40, para. 1451-1453 (1987); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-128 to -130 (1981); LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 188 (West Supp. 1989); MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 1-206(b) (1988); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 46, § 48 (West 1989); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.111(2) (West 1980); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.56 (West Supp. 1987); Mo. REV. STAT. § 210.824 (1988); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-106 (1985); NEV. REV. STAT, § 126.061 (1985); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-44 (West Supp. 1987); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-11-6 (1986); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 73 (McKinney 1977); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49A-1 (1984); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-18-03 to -04 (Supp. 1989); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3111.30-.38 (Baldwin 1989); OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 552 (1987); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 109.239, 109.243, 109-247, 677.355, 677.360, 677.365, 677.370 (1983); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-3-306 (1985); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 12.03(a) (Vernon 1986); VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-7.1 (1989); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.050 (1985); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 891.40 (West Supp. 1988); WYO. STAT. § 14-2-103 (1986); 1990 N.H. House Bill 1426-FN §§ 168-6:2 to :3 (to be codified at N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 168-6:2 to :3) (effective Jan. 1991). Many of the statutes are modeled after UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5, 9B U.L.A. 301 (1987). See generally Note, Artificial Insemination: Donor Rights in Situations Involving Unmarried Recipients, 26 J. FAM. L. 793, 795-98 (1988) (discussing the Uniform Parentage Act and other current statutory schemes). The remaining states do not address AI use. In these states, however, courts faced with disputes involving married users of AI will likely grant parents and children full rights and obligations, based on common law principles. See, e.g., Gursky v. Gursky, 39 Misc. 2d 1083, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
93. See ALA. CODE § 26-17-21 (1988); ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.045 (1988); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2451(B) (1988); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 9-10-201 (1988); CAL. Civ. CODE § 7005 (Deering 1989); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-4-106 (1988); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-69f to 45-69n (West 1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.11 (West Supp. 1986); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 19-7-21 (1982), 43-34-42 (1984); IDAHO CODE §§ 39-5401 to -5407 (1985); ILL. REV. STAT. ch 40, para. 1451-1453 (1987); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-128 to -130 (1981); LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 188 (West Supp. 1989); MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 1-206(b) (1988); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 46, § 48 (West 1989); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.111(2) (West 1980); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.56 (West Supp. 1987); Mo. REV. STAT. § 210.824 (1988); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-106 (1985); NEV. REV. STAT, § 126.061 (1985); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-44 (West Supp. 1987); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-11-6 (1986); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 73 (McKinney 1977); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49A-1 (1984); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-18-03 to -04 (Supp. 1989); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3111.30-.38 (Baldwin 1989); OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 552 (1987); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 109.239, 109.243, 109-247, 677.355, 677.360, 677.365, 677.370 (1983); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-3-306 (1985); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 12.03(a) (Vernon 1986); VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-7.1 (1989); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.050 (1985); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 891.40 (West Supp. 1988); WYO. STAT. § 14-2-103 (1986); 1990 N.H. House Bill 1426-FN §§ 168-6:2 to :3 (to be codified at N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 168-6:2 to :3) (effective Jan. 1991). Many of the statutes are modeled after UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5, 9B U.L.A. 301 (1987). See generally Note, Artificial Insemination: Donor Rights in Situations Involving Unmarried Recipients, 26 J. FAM. L. 793, 795-98 (1988) (discussing the Uniform Parentage Act and other current statutory schemes). The remaining states do not address AI use. In these states, however, courts faced with disputes involving married users of AI will likely grant parents and children full rights and obligations, based on common law principles. See, e.g., Gursky v. Gursky, 39 Misc. 2d 1083, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
94. See ALA. CODE § 26-17-21 (1988); ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.045 (1988); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2451(B) (1988); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 9-10-201 (1988); CAL. Civ. CODE § 7005 (Deering 1989); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-4-106 (1988); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-69f to 45-69n (West 1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.11 (West Supp. 1986); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 19-7-21 (1982), 43-34-42 (1984); IDAHO CODE §§ 39-5401 to -5407 (1985); ILL. REV. STAT. ch 40, para. 1451-1453 (1987); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-128 to -130 (1981); LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 188 (West Supp. 1989); MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 1-206(b) (1988); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 46, § 48 (West 1989); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.111(2) (West 1980); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.56 (West Supp. 1987); Mo. REV. STAT. § 210.824 (1988); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-106 (1985); NEV. REV. STAT, § 126.061 (1985); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-44 (West Supp. 1987); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-11-6 (1986); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 73 (McKinney 1977); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49A-1 (1984); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-18-03 to -04 (Supp. 1989); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3111.30-.38 (Baldwin 1989); OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 552 (1987); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 109.239, 109.243, 109-247, 677.355, 677.360, 677.365, 677.370 (1983); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-3-306 (1985); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 12.03(a) (Vernon 1986); VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-7.1 (1989); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.050 (1985); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 891.40 (West Supp. 1988); WYO. STAT. § 14-2-103 (1986); 1990 N.H. House Bill 1426-FN §§ 168-6:2 to :3 (to be codified at N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 168-6:2 to :3) (effective Jan. 1991). Many of the statutes are modeled after UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5, 9B U.L.A. 301 (1987). See generally Note, Artificial Insemination: Donor Rights in Situations Involving Unmarried Recipients, 26 J. FAM. L. 793, 795-98 (1988) (discussing the Uniform Parentage Act and other current statutory schemes). The remaining states do not address AI use. In these states, however, courts faced with disputes involving married users of AI will likely grant parents and children full rights and obligations, based on common law principles. See, e.g., Gursky v. Gursky, 39 Misc. 2d 1083, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
95. See ALA. CODE § 26-17-21 (1988); ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.045 (1988); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2451(B) (1988); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 9-10-201 (1988); CAL. Civ. CODE § 7005 (Deering 1989); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-4-106 (1988); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-69f to 45-69n (West 1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.11 (West Supp. 1986); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 19-7-21 (1982), 43-34-42 (1984); IDAHO CODE §§ 39-5401 to -5407 (1985); ILL. REV. STAT. ch 40, para. 1451-1453 (1987); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-128 to -130 (1981); LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 188 (West Supp. 1989); MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 1-206(b) (1988); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 46, § 48 (West 1989); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.111(2) (West 1980); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.56 (West Supp. 1987); Mo. REV. STAT. § 210.824 (1988); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-106 (1985); NEV. REV. STAT, § 126.061 (1985); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-44 (West Supp. 1987); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-11-6 (1986); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 73 (McKinney 1977); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49A-1 (1984); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-18-03 to -04 (Supp. 1989); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3111.30-.38 (Baldwin 1989); OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 552 (1987); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 109.239, 109.243, 109-247, 677.355, 677.360, 677.365, 677.370 (1983); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-3-306 (1985); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 12.03(a) (Vernon 1986); VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-7.1 (1989); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.050 (1985); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 891.40 (West Supp. 1988); WYO. STAT. § 14-2-103 (1986); 1990 N.H. House Bill 1426-FN §§ 168-6:2 to :3 (to be codified at N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 168-6:2 to :3) (effective Jan. 1991). Many of the statutes are modeled after UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5, 9B U.L.A. 301 (1987). See generally Note, Artificial Insemination: Donor Rights in Situations Involving Unmarried Recipients, 26 J. FAM. L. 793, 795-98 (1988) (discussing the Uniform Parentage Act and other current statutory schemes). The remaining states do not address AI use. In these states, however, courts faced with disputes involving married users of AI will likely grant parents and children full rights and obligations, based on common law principles. See, e.g., Gursky v. Gursky, 39 Misc. 2d 1083, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
96. See ALA. CODE § 26-17-21 (1988); ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.045 (1988); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2451(B) (1988); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 9-10-201 (1988); CAL. Civ. CODE § 7005 (Deering 1989); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-4-106 (1988); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-69f to 45-69n (West 1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.11 (West Supp. 1986); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 19-7-21 (1982), 43-34-42 (1984); IDAHO CODE §§ 39-5401 to -5407 (1985); ILL. REV. STAT. ch 40, para. 1451-1453 (1987); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-128 to -130 (1981); LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 188 (West Supp. 1989); MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 1-206(b) (1988); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 46, § 48 (West 1989); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.111(2) (West 1980); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.56 (West Supp. 1987); Mo. REV. STAT. § 210.824 (1988); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-106 (1985); NEV. REV. STAT, § 126.061 (1985); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-44 (West Supp. 1987); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-11-6 (1986); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 73 (McKinney 1977); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49A-1 (1984); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-18-03 to -04 (Supp. 1989); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3111.30-.38 (Baldwin 1989); OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 552 (1987); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 109.239, 109.243, 109-247, 677.355, 677.360, 677.365, 677.370 (1983); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-3-306 (1985); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 12.03(a) (Vernon 1986); VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-7.1 (1989); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.050 (1985); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 891.40 (West Supp. 1988); WYO. STAT. § 14-2-103 (1986); 1990 N.H. House Bill 1426-FN §§ 168-6:2 to :3 (to be codified at N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 168-6:2 to :3) (effective Jan. 1991). Many of the statutes are modeled after UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5, 9B U.L.A. 301 (1987). See generally Note, Artificial Insemination: Donor Rights in Situations Involving Unmarried Recipients, 26 J. FAM. L. 793, 795-98 (1988) (discussing the Uniform Parentage Act and other current statutory schemes). The remaining states do not address AI use. In these states, however, courts faced with disputes involving married users of AI will likely grant parents and children full rights and obligations, based on common law principles. See, e.g., Gursky v. Gursky, 39 Misc. 2d 1083, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
97. See ALA. CODE § 26-17-21 (1988); ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.045 (1988); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2451(B) (1988); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 9-10-201 (1988); CAL. Civ. CODE § 7005 (Deering 1989); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-4-106 (1988); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-69f to 45-69n (West 1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.11 (West Supp. 1986); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 19-7-21 (1982), 43-34-42 (1984); IDAHO CODE §§ 39-5401 to -5407 (1985); ILL. REV. STAT. ch 40, para. 1451-1453 (1987); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-128 to -130 (1981); LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 188 (West Supp. 1989); MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 1-206(b) (1988); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 46, § 48 (West 1989); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.111(2) (West 1980); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.56 (West Supp. 1987); Mo. REV. STAT. § 210.824 (1988); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-106 (1985); NEV. REV. STAT, § 126.061 (1985); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-44 (West Supp. 1987); N.M.
98. See ALA. CODE § 26-17-21 (1988); ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.045 (1988); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2451(B) (1988); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 9-10-201 (1988); CAL. Civ. CODE § 7005 (Deering 1989); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-4-106 (1988); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-69f to 45-69n (West 1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.11 (West Supp. 1986); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 19-7-21 (1982), 43-34-42 (1984); IDAHO CODE §§ 39-5401 to -5407 (1985); ILL. REV. STAT. ch 40, para. 1451-1453 (1987); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-128 to -130 (1981); LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 188 (West Supp. 1989); MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 1-206(b) (1988); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 46, § 48 (West 1989); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.111(2) (West 1980); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.56 (West Supp. 1987); Mo. REV. STAT. § 210.824 (1988); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-106 (1985); NEV. REV. STAT, § 126.061 (1985); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-44 (West Supp. 1987); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-11-6 (1986); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 73 (McKinney 1977); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49A-1 (1984); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-18-03 to -04 (Supp. 1989); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3111.30-.38 (Baldwin 1989); OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 552 (1987); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 109.239, 109.243, 109-247, 677.355, 677.360, 677.365, 677.370 (1983); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-3-306 (1985); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 12.03(a) (Vernon 1986); VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-7.1 (1989); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.050 (1985); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 891.40 (West Supp. 1988); WYO. STAT. § 14-2-103 (1986); 1990 N.H. House Bill 1426-FN §§ 168-6:2 to :3 (to be codified at N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 168-6:2 to :3) (effective Jan. 1991). Many of the statutes are modeled after UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5, 9B U.L.A. 301 (1987). See generally Note, Artificial Insemination: Donor Rights in Situations Involving Unmarried Recipients, 26 J. FAM. L. 793, 795-98 (1988) (discussing the Uniform Parentage Act and other current statutory schemes). The remaining states do not address AI use. In these states, however, courts faced with disputes involving married users of AI will likely grant parents and children full rights and obligations, based on common law principles. See, e.g., Gursky v. Gursky, 39 Misc. 2d 1083, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
99. See ALA. CODE § 26-17-21 (1988); ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.045 (1988); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2451(B) (1988); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 9-10-201 (1988); CAL. Civ. CODE § 7005 (Deering 1989); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-4-106 (1988); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-69f to 45-69n (West 1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.11 (West Supp. 1986); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 19-7-21 (1982), 43-34-42 (1984); IDAHO CODE §§ 39-5401 to -5407 (1985); ILL. REV. STAT. ch 40, para. 1451-1453 (1987); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-128 to -130 (1981); LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 188 (West Supp. 1989); MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 1-206(b) (1988); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 46, § 48 (West 1989); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.111(2) (West 1980); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.56 (West Supp. 1987); Mo. REV. STAT. § 210.824 (1988); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-106 (1985); NEV. REV. STAT, § 126.061 (1985); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-44 (West Supp. 1987); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-11-6 (1986); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 73 (McKinney 1977); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49A-1 (1984); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-18-03 to -04 (Supp. 1989); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3111.30-.38 (Baldwin 1989); OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 552 (1987); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 109.239, 109.243, 109-247, 677.355, 677.360, 677.365, 677.370 (1983); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-3-306 (1985); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 12.03(a) (Vernon 1986); VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-7.1 (1989); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.050 (1985); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 891.40 (West Supp. 1988); WYO. STAT. § 14-2-103 (1986); 1990 N.H. House Bill 1426-FN §§ 168-6:2 to :3 (to be codified at N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 168-6:2 to :3) (effective Jan. 1991). Many of the statutes are modeled after UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5, 9B U.L.A. 301 (1987). See generally Note, Artificial Insemination: Donor Rights in Situations Involving Unmarried Recipients, 26 J. FAM. L. 793, 795-98 (1988) (discussing the Uniform Parentage Act and other current statutory schemes). The remaining states do not address AI use. In these states, however, courts faced with disputes involving married users of AI will likely grant parents and children full rights and obligations, based on common law principles. See, e.g., Gursky v. Gursky, 39 Misc. 2d 1083, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
100. See ALA. CODE § 26-17-21 (1988); ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.045 (1988); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2451(B) (1988); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 9-10-201 (1988); CAL. Civ. CODE § 7005 (Deering 1989); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-4-106 (1988); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-69f to 45-69n (West 1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.11 (West Supp. 1986); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 19-7-21 (1982), 43-34-42 (1984); IDAHO CODE §§ 39-5401 to -5407 (1985); ILL. REV. STAT. ch 40, para. 1451-1453 (1987); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-128 to -130 (1981); LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 188 (West Supp. 1989); MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 1-206(b) (1988); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 46, § 48 (West 1989); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.111(2) (West 1980); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.56 (West Supp. 1987); Mo. REV. STAT. § 210.824 (1988); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-106 (1985); NEV. REV. STAT, § 126.061 (1985); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-44 (West Supp. 1987); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-11-6 (1986); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 73 (McKinney 1977); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49A-1 (1984); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-18-03 to -04 (Supp. 1989); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3111.30-.38 (Baldwin 1989); OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 552 (1987); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 109.239, 109.243, 109-247, 677.355, 677.360, 677.365, 677.370 (1983); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-3-306 (1985); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 12.03(a) (Vernon 1986); VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-7.1 (1989); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.050 (1985); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 891.40 (West Supp. 1988); WYO. STAT. § 14-2-103 (1986); 1990 N.H. House Bill 1426-FN §§ 168-6:2 to :3 (to be codified at N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 168-6:2 to :3) (effective Jan. 1991). Many of the statutes are modeled after UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5, 9B U.L.A. 301 (1987). See generally Note, Artificial Insemination: Donor Rights in Situations Involving Unmarried Recipients, 26 J. FAM. L. 793, 795-98 (1988) (discussing the Uniform Parentage Act and other current statutory schemes). The remaining states do not address AI use. In these states, however, courts faced with disputes involving married users of AI will likely grant parents and children full rights and obligations, based on common law principles. See, e.g., Gursky v. Gursky, 39 Misc. 2d 1083, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
101. See ALA. CODE § 26-17-21 (1988); ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.045 (1988); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2451(B) (1988); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 9-10-201 (1988); CAL. Civ. CODE § 7005 (Deering 1989); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-4-106 (1988); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-69f to 45-69n (West 1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.11 (West Supp. 1986); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 19-7-21 (1982), 43-34-42 (1984); IDAHO CODE §§ 39-5401 to -5407 (1985); ILL. REV. STAT. ch 40, para. 1451-1453 (1987); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-128 to -130 (1981); LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 188 (West Supp. 1989); MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 1-206(b) (1988); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 46, § 48 (West 1989); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.111(2) (West 1980); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.56 (West Supp. 1987); Mo. REV. STAT. § 210.824 (1988); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-106 (1985); NEV. REV. STAT, § 126.061 (1985); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-44 (West Supp. 1987); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-11-6 (1986); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 73 (McKinney 1977); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49A-1 (1984); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-18-03 to -04 (Supp. 1989); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3111.30-.38 (Baldwin 1989); OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 552 (1987); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 109.239, 109.243, 109-247, 677.355, 677.360, 677.365, 677.370 (1983); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-3-306 (1985); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 12.03(a) (Vernon 1986); VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-7.1 (1989); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.050 (1985); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 891.40 (West Supp. 1988); WYO. STAT. § 14-2-103 (1986); 1990 N.H. House Bill 1426-FN §§ 168-6:2 to :3 (to be codified at N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 168-6:2 to :3) (effective Jan. 1991). Many of the statutes are modeled after UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5, 9B U.L.A. 301 (1987). See generally Note, Artificial Insemination: Donor Rights in Situations Involving Unmarried Recipients, 26 J. FAM. L. 793, 795-98 (1988) (discussing the Uniform Parentage Act and other current statutory schemes). The remaining states do not address AI use. In these states, however, courts faced with disputes involving married users of AI will likely grant parents and children full rights and obligations, based on common law principles. See, e.g., Gursky v. Gursky, 39 Misc. 2d 1083, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
102. See ALA. CODE § 26-17-21 (1988); ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.045 (1988); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2451(B) (1988); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 9-10-201 (1988); CAL. Civ. CODE § 7005 (Deering 1989); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-4-106 (1988); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-69f to 45-69n (West 1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.11 (West Supp. 1986); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 19-7-21 (1982), 43-34-42 (1984); IDAHO CODE §§ 39-5401 to -5407 (1985); ILL. REV. STAT. ch 40, para. 1451-1453 (1987); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-128 to -130 (1981); LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 188 (West Supp. 1989); MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 1-206(b) (1988); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 46, § 48 (West 1989); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.111(2) (West 1980); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.56 (West Supp. 1987); Mo. REV. STAT. § 210.824 (1988); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-106 (1985); NEV. REV. STAT, § 126.061 (1985); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-44 (West Supp. 1987); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-11-6 (1986); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 73 (McKinney 1977); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49A-1 (1984); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-18-03 to -04 (Supp. 1989); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3111.30-.38 (Baldwin 1989); OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 552 (1987); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 109.239, 109.243, 109-247, 677.355, 677.360, 677.365, 677.370 (1983); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-3-306 (1985); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 12.03(a) (Vernon 1986); VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-7.1 (1989); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.050 (1985); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 891.40 (West Supp. 1988); WYO. STAT. § 14-2-103 (1986); 1990 N.H. House Bill 1426-FN §§ 168-6:2 to :3 (to be codified at N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 168-6:2 to :3) (effective Jan. 1991). Many of the statutes are modeled after UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5, 9B U.L.A. 301 (1987). See generally Note, Artificial Insemination: Donor Rights in Situations Involving Unmarried Recipients, 26 J. FAM. L. 793, 795-98 (1988) (discussing the Uniform Parentage Act and other current statutory schemes). The remaining states do not address AI use. In these states, however, courts faced with disputes involving married users of AI will likely grant parents and children full rights and obligations, based on common law principles. See, e.g., Gursky v. Gursky, 39 Misc. 2d 1083, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
103. See ALA. CODE § 26-17-21 (1988); ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.045 (1988); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2451(B) (1988); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 9-10-201 (1988); CAL. Civ. CODE § 7005 (Deering 1989); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-4-106 (1988); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-69f to 45-69n (West 1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.11 (West Supp. 1986); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 19-7-21 (1982), 43-34-42 (1984); IDAHO CODE §§ 39-5401 to -5407 (1985); ILL. REV. STAT. ch 40, para. 1451-1453 (1987); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-128 to -130 (1981); LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 188 (West Supp. 1989); MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 1-206(b) (1988); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 46, § 48 (West 1989); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.111(2) (West 1980); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.56 (West Supp. 1987); Mo. REV. STAT. § 210.824 (1988); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-106 (1985); NEV. REV. STAT, § 126.061 (1985); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-44 (West Supp. 1987); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-11-6 (1986); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 73 (McKinney 1977); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49A-1 (1984); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-18-03 to -04 (Supp. 1989); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3111.30-.38 (Baldwin 1989); OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 552 (1987); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 109.239, 109.243, 109-247, 677.355, 677.360, 677.365, 677.370 (1983); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-3-306 (1985); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 12.03(a) (Vernon 1986); VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-7.1 (1989); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.050 (1985); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 891.40 (West Supp. 1988); WYO. STAT. § 14-2-103 (1986); 1990 N.H. House Bill 1426-FN §§ 168-6:2 to :3 (to be codified at N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 168-6:2 to :3) (effective Jan. 1991). Many of the statutes are modeled after UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5, 9B U.L.A. 301 (1987). See generally Note, Artificial Insemination: Donor Rights in Situations Involving Unmarried Recipients, 26 J. FAM. L. 793, 795-98 (1988) (discussing the Uniform Parentage Act and other current statutory schemes). The remaining states do not address AI use. In these states, however, courts faced with disputes involving married users of AI will likely grant parents and children full rights and obligations, based on common law principles. See, e.g., Gursky v. Gursky, 39 Misc. 2d 1083, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
104. See ALA. CODE § 26-17-21 (1988); ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.045 (1988); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2451(B) (1988); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 9-10-201 (1988); CAL. Civ. CODE § 7005 (Deering 1989); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-4-106 (1988); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-69f to 45-69n (West 1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.11 (West Supp. 1986); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 19-7-21 (1982), 43-34-42 (1984); IDAHO CODE §§ 39-5401 to -5407 (1985); ILL. REV. STAT. ch 40, para. 1451-1453 (1987); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-128 to -130 (1981); LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 188 (West Supp. 1989); MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 1-206(b) (1988); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 46, § 48 (West 1989); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.111(2) (West 1980); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.56 (West Supp. 1987); Mo. REV. STAT. § 210.824 (1988); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-106 (1985); NEV. REV. STAT, § 126.061 (1985); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-44 (West Supp. 1987); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-11-6 (1986); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 73 (McKinney 1977); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49A-1 (1984); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-18-03 to -04 (Supp. 1989); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3111.30-.38 (Baldwin 1989); OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 552 (1987); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 109.239, 109.243, 109-247, 677.355, 677.360, 677.365, 677.370 (1983); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-3-306 (1985); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 12.03(a) (Vernon 1986); VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-7.1 (1989); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.050 (1985); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 891.40 (West Supp. 1988); WYO. STAT. § 14-2-103 (1986); 1990 N.H. House Bill 1426-FN §§ 168-6:2 to :3 (to be codified at N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 168-6:2 to :3) (effective Jan. 1991). Many of the statutes are modeled after UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5, 9B U.L.A. 301 (1987). See generally Note, Artificial Insemination: Donor Rights in Situations Involving Unmarried Recipients, 26 J. FAM. L. 793, 795-98 (1988) (discussing the Uniform Parentage Act and other current statutory schemes). The remaining states do not address AI use. In these states, however, courts faced with disputes involving married users of AI will likely grant parents and children full rights and obligations, based on common law principles. See, e.g., Gursky v. Gursky, 39 Misc. 2d 1083, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
105. See ALA. CODE § 26-17-21 (1988); ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.045 (1988); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2451(B) (1988); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 9-10-201 (1988); CAL. Civ. CODE § 7005 (Deering 1989); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-4-106 (1988); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-69f to 45-69n (West 1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.11 (West Supp. 1986); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 19-7-21 (1982), 43-34-42 (1984); IDAHO CODE §§ 39-5401 to -5407 (1985); ILL. REV. STAT. ch 40, para. 1451-1453 (1987); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-128 to -130 (1981); LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 188 (West Supp. 1989); MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 1-206(b) (1988); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 46, § 48 (West 1989); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.111(2) (West 1980); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.56 (West Supp. 1987); Mo. REV. STAT. § 210.824 (1988); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-106 (1985); NEV. REV. STAT, § 126.061 (1985); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-44 (West Supp. 1987); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-11-6 (1986); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 73 (McKinney 1977); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49A-1 (1984); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-18-03 to -04 (Supp. 1989); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3111.30-.38 (Baldwin 1989); OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 552 (1987); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 109.239, 109.243, 109-247, 677.355, 677.360, 677.365, 677.370 (1983); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-3-306 (1985); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 12.03(a) (Vernon 1986); VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-7.1 (1989); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.050 (1985); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 891.40 (West Supp. 1988); WYO. STAT. § 14-2-103 (1986); 1990 N.H. House Bill 1426-FN §§ 168-6:2 to :3 (to be codified at N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 168-6:2 to :3) (effective Jan. 1991). Many of the statutes are modeled after UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5, 9B U.L.A. 301 (1987). See generally Note, Artificial Insemination: Donor Rights in Situations Involving Unmarried Recipients, 26 J. FAM. L. 793, 795-98 (1988) (discussing the Uniform Parentage Act and other current statutory schemes). The remaining states do not address AI use. In these states, however, courts faced with disputes involving married users of AI will likely grant parents and children full rights and obligations, based on common law principles. See, e.g., Gursky v. Gursky, 39 Misc. 2d 1083, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
106. See ALA. CODE § 26-17-21 (1988); ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.045 (1988); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2451(B) (1988); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 9-10-201 (1988); CAL. Civ. CODE § 7005 (Deering 1989); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-4-106 (1988); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-69f to 45-69n (West 1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.11 (West Supp. 1986); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 19-7-21 (1982), 43-34-42 (1984); IDAHO CODE §§ 39-5401 to -5407 (1985); ILL. REV. STAT. ch 40, para. 1451-1453 (1987); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-128 to -130 (1981); LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 188 (West Supp. 1989); MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 1-206(b) (1988); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 46, § 48 (West 1989); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.111(2) (West 1980); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.56 (West Supp. 1987); Mo. REV. STAT. § 210.824 (1988); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-106 (1985); NEV. REV. STAT, § 126.061 (1985); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-44 (West Supp. 1987); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-11-6 (1986); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 73 (McKinney 1977); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49A-1 (1984); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-18-03 to -04 (Supp. 1989); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3111.30-.38 (Baldwin 1989); OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 552 (1987); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 109.239, 109.243, 109-247, 677.355, 677.360, 677.365, 677.370 (1983); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-3-306 (1985); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 12.03(a) (Vernon 1986); VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-7.1 (1989); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.050 (1985); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 891.40 (West Supp. 1988); WYO. STAT. § 14-2-103 (1986); 1990 N.H. House Bill 1426-FN §§ 168-6:2 to :3 (to be codified at N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 168-6:2 to :3) (effective Jan. 1991). Many of the statutes are modeled after UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5, 9B U.L.A. 301 (1987). See generally Note, Artificial Insemination: Donor Rights in Situations Involving Unmarried Recipients, 26 J. FAM. L. 793, 795-98 (1988) (discussing the Uniform Parentage Act and other current statutory schemes). The remaining states do not address AI use. In these states, however, courts faced with disputes involving married users of AI will likely grant parents and children full rights and obligations, based on common law principles. See, e.g., Gursky v. Gursky, 39 Misc. 2d 1083, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
107. See ALA. CODE § 26-17-21 (1988); ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.045 (1988); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2451(B) (1988); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 9-10-201 (1988); CAL. Civ. CODE § 7005 (Deering 1989); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-4-106 (1988); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-69f to 45-69n (West 1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.11 (West Supp. 1986); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 19-7-21 (1982), 43-34-42 (1984); IDAHO CODE §§ 39-5401 to -5407 (1985); ILL. REV. STAT. ch 40, para. 1451-1453 (1987); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-128 to -130 (1981); LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 188 (West Supp. 1989); MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 1-206(b) (1988); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 46, § 48 (West 1989); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.111(2) (West 1980); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.56 (West Supp. 1987); Mo. REV. STAT. § 210.824 (1988); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-106 (1985); NEV. REV. STAT, § 126.061 (1985); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-44 (West Supp. 1987); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-11-6 (1986); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 73 (McKinney 1977); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49A-1 (1984); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-18-03 to -04 (Supp. 1989); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3111.30-.38 (Baldwin 1989); OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 552 (1987); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 109.239, 109.243, 109-247, 677.355, 677.360, 677.365, 677.370 (1983); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-3-306 (1985); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 12.03(a) (Vernon 1986); VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-7.1 (1989); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.050 (1985); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 891.40 (West Supp. 1988); WYO. STAT. § 14-2-103 (1986); 1990 N.H. House Bill 1426-FN §§ 168-6:2 to :3 (to be codified at N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 168-6:2 to :3) (effective Jan. 1991). Many of the statutes are modeled after UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5, 9B U.L.A. 301 (1987). See generally Note, Artificial Insemination: Donor Rights in Situations Involving Unmarried Recipients, 26 J. FAM. L. 793, 795-98 (1988) (discussing the Uniform Parentage Act and other current statutory schemes). The remaining states do not address AI use. In these states, however, courts faced with disputes involving married users of AI will likely grant parents and children full rights and obligations, based on common law principles. See, e.g., Gursky v. Gursky, 39 Misc. 2d 1083, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
108. See ALA. CODE § 26-17-21 (1988); ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.045 (1988); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2451(B) (1988); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 9-10-201 (1988); CAL. Civ. CODE § 7005 (Deering 1989); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-4-106 (1988); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-69f to 45-69n (West 1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.11 (West Supp. 1986); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 19-7-21 (1982), 43-34-42 (1984); IDAHO CODE §§ 39-5401 to -5407 (1985); ILL. REV. STAT. ch 40, para. 1451-1453 (1987); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-128 to -130 (1981); LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 188 (West Supp. 1989); MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 1-206(b) (1988); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 46, § 48 (West 1989); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.111(2) (West 1980); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.56 (West Supp. 1987); Mo. REV. STAT. § 210.824 (1988); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-106 (1985); NEV. REV. STAT, § 126.061 (1985); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-44 (West Supp. 1987); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-11-6 (1986); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 73 (McKinney 1977); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49A-1 (1984); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-18-03 to -04 (Supp. 1989); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3111.30-.38 (Baldwin 1989); OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 552 (1987); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 109.239, 109.243, 109-247, 677.355, 677.360, 677.365, 677.370 (1983); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-3-306 (1985); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 12.03(a) (Vernon 1986); VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-7.1 (1989); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.050 (1985); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 891.40 (West Supp. 1988); WYO. STAT. § 14-2-103 (1986); 1990 N.H. House Bill 1426-FN §§ 168-6:2 to :3 (to be codified at N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 168-6:2 to :3) (effective Jan. 1991). Many of the statutes are modeled after UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5, 9B U.L.A. 301 (1987). See generally Note, Artificial Insemination: Donor Rights in Situations Involving Unmarried Recipients, 26 J. FAM. L. 793, 795-98 (1988) (discussing the Uniform Parentage Act and other current statutory schemes). The remaining states do not address AI use. In these states, however, courts faced with disputes involving married users of AI will likely grant parents and children full rights and obligations, based on common law principles. See, e.g., Gursky v. Gursky, 39 Misc. 2d 1083, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
109. See ALA. CODE § 26-17-21 (1988); ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.045 (1988); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2451(B) (1988); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 9-10-201 (1988); CAL. Civ. CODE § 7005 (Deering 1989); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-4-106 (1988); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-69f to 45-69n (West 1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.11 (West Supp. 1986); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 19-7-21 (1982), 43-34-42 (1984); IDAHO CODE §§ 39-5401 to -5407 (1985); ILL. REV. STAT. ch 40, para. 1451-1453 (1987); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-128 to -130 (1981); LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 188 (West Supp. 1989); MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 1-206(b) (1988); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 46, § 48 (West 1989); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.111(2) (West 1980); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.56 (West Supp. 1987); Mo. REV. STAT. § 210.824 (1988); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-106 (1985); NEV. REV. STAT, § 126.061 (1985); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-44 (West Supp. 1987); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-11-6 (1986); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 73 (McKinney 1977); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49A-1 (1984); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-18-03 to -04 (Supp. 1989); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3111.30-.38 (Baldwin 1989); OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 552 (1987); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 109.239, 109.243, 109-247, 677.355, 677.360, 677.365, 677.370 (1983); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-3-306 (1985); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 12.03(a) (Vernon 1986); VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-7.1 (1989); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.050 (1985); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 891.40 (West Supp. 1988); WYO. STAT. § 14-2-103 (1986); 1990 N.H. House Bill 1426-FN §§ 168-6:2 to :3 (to be codified at N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 168-6:2 to :3) (effective Jan. 1991). Many of the statutes are modeled after UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5, 9B U.L.A. 301 (1987). See generally Note, Artificial Insemination: Donor Rights in Situations Involving Unmarried Recipients, 26 J. FAM. L. 793, 795-98 (1988) (discussing the Uniform Parentage Act and other current statutory schemes). The remaining states do not address AI use. In these states, however, courts faced with disputes involving married users of AI will likely grant parents and children full rights and obligations, based on common law principles. See, e.g., Gursky v. Gursky, 39 Misc. 2d 1083, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
110. See ALA. CODE § 26-17-21 (1988); ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.045 (1988); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2451(B) (1988); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 9-10-201 (1988); CAL. Civ. CODE § 7005 (Deering 1989); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-4-106 (1988); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-69f to 45-69n (West 1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.11 (West Supp. 1986); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 19-7-21 (1982), 43-34-42 (1984); IDAHO CODE §§ 39-5401 to -5407 (1985); ILL. REV. STAT. ch 40, para. 1451-1453 (1987); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-128 to -130 (1981); LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 188 (West Supp. 1989); MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 1-206(b) (1988); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 46, § 48 (West 1989); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.111(2) (West 1980); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.56 (West Supp. 1987); Mo. REV. STAT. § 210.824 (1988); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-106 (1985); NEV. REV. STAT, § 126.061 (1985); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-44 (West Supp. 1987); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-11-6 (1986); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 73 (McKinney 1977); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49A-1 (1984); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-18-03 to -04 (Supp. 1989); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3111.30-.38 (Baldwin 1989); OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 552 (1987); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 109.239, 109.243, 109-247, 677.355, 677.360, 677.365, 677.370 (1983); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-3-306 (1985); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 12.03(a) (Vernon 1986); VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-7.1 (1989); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.050 (1985); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 891.40 (West Supp. 1988); WYO. STAT. § 14-2-103 (1986); 1990 N.H. House Bill 1426-FN §§ 168-6:2 to :3 (to be codified at N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 168-6:2 to :3) (effective Jan. 1991). Many of the statutes are modeled after UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5, 9B U.L.A. 301 (1987). See generally Note, Artificial Insemination: Donor Rights in Situations Involving Unmarried Recipients, 26 J. FAM. L. 793, 795-98 (1988) (discussing the Uniform Parentage Act and other current statutory schemes). The remaining states do not address AI use. In these states, however, courts faced with disputes involving married users of AI will likely grant parents and children full rights and obligations, based on common law principles. See, e.g., Gursky v. Gursky, 39 Misc. 2d 1083, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
111. See ALA. CODE § 26-17-21 (1988); ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.045 (1988); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2451(B) (1988); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 9-10-201 (1988); CAL. Civ. CODE § 7005 (Deering 1989); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-4-106 (1988); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-69f to 45-69n (West 1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.11 (West Supp. 1986); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 19-7-21 (1982), 43-34-42 (1984); IDAHO CODE §§ 39-5401 to -5407 (1985); ILL. REV. STAT. ch 40, para. 1451-1453 (1987); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-128 to -130 (1981); LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 188 (West Supp. 1989); MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 1-206(b) (1988); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 46, § 48 (West 1989); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.111(2) (West 1980); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.56 (West Supp. 1987); Mo. REV. STAT. § 210.824 (1988); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-106 (1985); NEV. REV. STAT, § 126.061 (1985); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-44 (West Supp. 1987); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-11-6 (1986); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 73 (McKinney 1977); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49A-1 (1984); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-18-03 to -04 (Supp. 1989); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3111.30-.38 (Baldwin 1989); OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 552 (1987); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 109.239, 109.243, 109-247, 677.355, 677.360, 677.365, 677.370 (1983); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-3-306 (1985); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 12.03(a) (Vernon 1986); VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-7.1 (1989); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.050 (1985); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 891.40 (West Supp. 1988); WYO. STAT. § 14-2-103 (1986); 1990 N.H. House Bill 1426-FN §§ 168-6:2 to :3 (to be codified at N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 168-6:2 to :3) (effective Jan. 1991). Many of the statutes are modeled after UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5, 9B U.L.A. 301 (1987). See generally Note, Artificial Insemination: Donor Rights in Situations Involving Unmarried Recipients, 26 J. FAM. L. 793, 795-98 (1988) (discussing the Uniform Parentage Act and other current statutory schemes). The remaining states do not address AI use. In these states, however, courts faced with disputes involving married users of AI will likely grant parents and children full rights and obligations, based on common law principles. See, e.g., Gursky v. Gursky, 39 Misc. 2d 1083, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
112. See ALA. CODE § 26-17-21 (1988); ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.045 (1988); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2451(B) (1988); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 9-10-201 (1988); CAL. Civ. CODE § 7005 (Deering 1989); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-4-106 (1988); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-69f to 45-69n (West 1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.11 (West Supp. 1986); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 19-7-21 (1982), 43-34-42 (1984); IDAHO CODE §§ 39-5401 to -5407 (1985); ILL. REV. STAT. ch 40, para. 1451-1453 (1987); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-128 to -130 (1981); LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 188 (West Supp. 1989); MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 1-206(b) (1988); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 46, § 48 (West 1989); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.111(2) (West 1980); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.56 (West Supp. 1987); Mo. REV. STAT. § 210.824 (1988); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-106 (1985); NEV. REV. STAT, § 126.061 (1985); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-44 (West Supp. 1987); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-11-6 (1986); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 73 (McKinney 1977); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49A-1 (1984); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-18-03 to -04 (Supp. 1989); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3111.30-.38 (Baldwin 1989); OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 552 (1987); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 109.239, 109.243, 109-247, 677.355, 677.360, 677.365, 677.370 (1983); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-3-306 (1985); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 12.03(a) (Vernon 1986); VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-7.1 (1989); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.050 (1985); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 891.40 (West Supp. 1988); WYO. STAT. § 14-2-103 (1986); 1990 N.H. House Bill 1426-FN §§ 168-6:2 to :3 (to be codified at N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 168-6:2 to :3) (effective Jan. 1991). Many of the statutes are modeled after UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5, 9B U.L.A. 301 (1987). See generally Note, Artificial Insemination: Donor Rights in Situations Involving Unmarried Recipients, 26 J. FAM. L. 793, 795-98 (1988) (discussing the Uniform Parentage Act and other current statutory schemes). The remaining states do not address AI use. In these states, however, courts faced with disputes involving married users of AI will likely grant parents and children full rights and obligations, based on common law principles. See, e.g., Gursky v. Gursky, 39 Misc. 2d 1083, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
113. See ALA. CODE § 26-17-21 (1988); ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.045 (1988); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2451(B) (1988); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 9-10-201 (1988); CAL. Civ. CODE § 7005 (Deering 1989); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-4-106 (1988); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-69f to 45-69n (West 1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.11 (West Supp. 1986); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 19-7-21 (1982), 43-34-42 (1984); IDAHO CODE §§ 39-5401 to -5407 (1985); ILL. REV. STAT. ch 40, para. 1451-1453 (1987); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-128 to -130 (1981); LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 188 (West Supp. 1989); MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 1-206(b) (1988); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 46, § 48 (West 1989); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.111(2) (West 1980); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.56 (West Supp. 1987); Mo. REV. STAT. § 210.824 (1988); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-106 (1985); NEV. REV. STAT, § 126.061 (1985); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-44 (West Supp. 1987); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-11-6 (1986); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 73 (McKinney 1977); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49A-1 (1984); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-18-03 to -04 (Supp. 1989); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3111.30-.38 (Baldwin 1989); OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 552 (1987); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 109.239, 109.243, 109-247, 677.355, 677.360, 677.365, 677.370 (1983); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-3-306 (1985); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 12.03(a) (Vernon 1986); VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-7.1 (1989); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.050 (1985); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 891.40 (West Supp. 1988); WYO. STAT. § 14-2-103 (1986); 1990 N.H. House Bill 1426-FN §§ 168-6:2 to :3 (to be codified at N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 168-6:2 to :3) (effective Jan. 1991). Many of the statutes are modeled after UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5, 9B U.L.A. 301 (1987). See generally Note, Artificial Insemination: Donor Rights in Situations Involving Unmarried Recipients, 26 J. FAM. L. 793, 795-98 (1988) (discussing the Uniform Parentage Act and other current statutory schemes). The remaining states do not address AI use. In these states, however, courts faced with disputes involving married users of AI will likely grant parents and children full rights and obligations, based on common law principles. See, e.g., Gursky v. Gursky, 39 Misc. 2d 1083, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
114. See ALA. CODE § 26-17-21 (1988); ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.045 (1988); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2451(B) (1988); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 9-10-201 (1988); CAL. Civ. CODE § 7005 (Deering 1989); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-4-106 (1988); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-69f to 45-69n (West 1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.11 (West Supp. 1986); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 19-7-21 (1982), 43-34-42 (1984); IDAHO CODE §§ 39-5401 to -5407 (1985); ILL. REV. STAT. ch 40, para. 1451-1453 (1987); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-128 to -130 (1981); LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 188 (West Supp. 1989); MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 1-206(b) (1988); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 46, § 48 (West 1989); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.111(2) (West 1980); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.56 (West Supp. 1987); Mo. REV. STAT. § 210.824 (1988); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-106 (1985); NEV. REV. STAT, § 126.061 (1985); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-44 (West Supp. 1987); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-11-6 (1986); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 73 (McKinney 1977); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49A-1 (1984); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-18-03 to -04 (Supp. 1989); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3111.30-.38 (Baldwin 1989); OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 552 (1987); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 109.239, 109.243, 109-247, 677.355, 677.360, 677.365, 677.370 (1983); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-3-306 (1985); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 12.03(a) (Vernon 1986); VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-7.1 (1989); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.050 (1985); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 891.40 (West Supp. 1988); WYO. STAT. § 14-2-103 (1986); 1990 N.H. House Bill 1426-FN §§ 168-6:2 to :3 (to be codified at N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 168-6:2 to :3) (effective Jan. 1991). Many of the statutes are modeled after UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5, 9B U.L.A. 301 (1987). See generally Note, Artificial Insemination: Donor Rights in Situations Involving Unmarried Recipients, 26 J. FAM. L. 793, 795-98 (1988) (discussing the Uniform Parentage Act and other current statutory schemes). The remaining states do not address AI use. In these states, however, courts faced with disputes involving married users of AI will likely grant parents and children full rights and obligations, based on common law principles. See, e.g., Gursky v. Gursky, 39 Misc. 2d 1083, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
115. See ALA. CODE § 26-17-21 (1988); ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.045 (1988); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2451(B) (1988); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 9-10-201 (1988); CAL. Civ. CODE § 7005 (Deering 1989); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-4-106 (1988); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-69f to 45-69n (West 1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.11 (West Supp. 1986); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 19-7-21 (1982), 43-34-42 (1984); IDAHO CODE §§ 39-5401 to -5407 (1985); ILL. REV. STAT. ch 40, para. 1451-1453 (1987); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-128 to -130 (1981); LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 188 (West Supp. 1989); MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 1-206(b) (1988); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 46, § 48 (West 1989); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.111(2) (West 1980); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.56 (West Supp. 1987); Mo. REV. STAT. § 210.824 (1988); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-106 (1985); NEV. REV. STAT, § 126.061 (1985); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-44 (West Supp. 1987); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-11-6 (1986); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 73 (McKinney 1977); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49A-1 (1984); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-18-03 to -04 (Supp. 1989); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3111.30-.38 (Baldwin 1989); OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 552 (1987); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 109.239, 109.243, 109-247, 677.355, 677.360, 677.365, 677.370 (1983); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-3-306 (1985); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 12.03(a) (Vernon 1986); VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-7.1 (1989); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.050 (1985); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 891.40 (West Supp. 1988); WYO. STAT. § 14-2-103 (1986); 1990 N.H. House Bill 1426-FN §§ 168-6:2 to :3 (to be codified at N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 168-6:2 to :3) (effective Jan. 1991). Many of the statutes are modeled after UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5, 9B U.L.A. 301 (1987). See generally Note, Artificial Insemination: Donor Rights in Situations Involving Unmarried Recipients, 26 J. FAM. L. 793, 795-98 (1988) (discussing the Uniform Parentage Act and other current statutory schemes). The remaining states do not address AI use. In these states, however, courts faced with disputes involving married users of AI will likely grant parents and children full rights and obligations, based on common law principles. See, e.g., Gursky v. Gursky, 39 Misc. 2d 1083, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
116. See ALA. CODE § 26-17-21 (1988); ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.045 (1988); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2451(B) (1988); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 9-10-201 (1988); CAL. Civ. CODE § 7005 (Deering 1989); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-4-106 (1988); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-69f to 45-69n (West 1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.11 (West Supp. 1986); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 19-7-21 (1982), 43-34-42 (1984); IDAHO CODE §§ 39-5401 to -5407 (1985); ILL. REV. STAT. ch 40, para. 1451-1453 (1987); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-128 to -130 (1981); LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 188 (West Supp. 1989); MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 1-206(b) (1988); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 46, § 48 (West 1989); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.111(2) (West 1980); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.56 (West Supp. 1987); Mo. REV. STAT. § 210.824 (1988); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-106 (1985); NEV. REV. STAT, § 126.061 (1985); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-44 (West Supp. 1987); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-11-6 (1986); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 73 (McKinney 1977); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49A-1 (1984); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-18-03 to -04 (Supp. 1989); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3111.30-.38 (Baldwin 1989); OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 552 (1987); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 109.239, 109.243, 109-247, 677.355, 677.360, 677.365, 677.370 (1983); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-3-306 (1985); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 12.03(a) (Vernon 1986); VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-7.1 (1989); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.050 (1985); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 891.40 (West Supp. 1988); WYO. STAT. § 14-2-103 (1986); 1990 N.H. House Bill 1426-FN §§ 168-6:2 to :3 (to be codified at N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 168-6:2 to :3) (effective Jan. 1991). Many of the statutes are modeled after UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5, 9B U.L.A. 301 (1987). See generally Note, Artificial Insemination: Donor Rights in Situations Involving Unmarried Recipients, 26 J. FAM. L. 793, 795-98 (1988) (discussing the Uniform Parentage Act and other current statutory schemes). The remaining states do not address AI use. In these states, however, courts faced with disputes involving married users of AI will likely grant parents and children full rights and obligations, based on common law principles. See, e.g., Gursky v. Gursky, 39 Misc. 2d 1083, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
117. See ALA. CODE § 26-17-21 (1988); ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.045 (1988); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2451(B) (1988); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 9-10-201 (1988); CAL. Civ. CODE § 7005 (Deering 1989); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-4-106 (1988); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-69f to 45-69n (West 1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.11 (West Supp. 1986); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 19-7-21 (1982), 43-34-42 (1984); IDAHO CODE §§ 39-5401 to -5407 (1985); ILL. REV. STAT. ch 40, para. 1451-1453 (1987); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-128 to -130 (1981); LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 188 (West Supp. 1989); MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 1-206(b) (1988); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 46, § 48 (West 1989); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.111(2) (West 1980); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.56 (West Supp. 1987); Mo. REV. STAT. § 210.824 (1988); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-106 (1985); NEV. REV. STAT, § 126.061 (1985); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-44 (West Supp. 1987); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-11-6 (1986); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 73 (McKinney 1977); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49A-1 (1984); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-18-03 to -04 (Supp. 1989); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3111.30-.38 (Baldwin 1989); OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 552 (1987); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 109.239, 109.243, 109-247, 677.355, 677.360, 677.365, 677.370 (1983); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-3-306 (1985); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 12.03(a) (Vernon 1986); VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-7.1 (1989); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.050 (1985); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 891.40 (West Supp. 1988); WYO. STAT. § 14-2-103 (1986); 1990 N.H. House Bill 1426-FN §§ 168-6:2 to :3 (to be codified at N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 168-6:2 to :3) (effective Jan. 1991). Many of the statutes are modeled after UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5, 9B U.L.A. 301 (1987). See generally Note, Artificial Insemination: Donor Rights in Situations Involving Unmarried Recipients, 26 J. FAM. L. 793, 795-98 (1988) (discussing the Uniform Parentage Act and other current statutory schemes). The remaining states do not address AI use. In these states, however, courts faced with disputes involving married users of AI will likely grant parents and children full rights and obligations, based on common law principles. See, e.g., Gursky v. Gursky, 39 Misc. 2d 1083, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
118. See ALA. CODE § 26-17-21 (1988); ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.045 (1988); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2451(B) (1988); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 9-10-201 (1988); CAL. Civ. CODE § 7005 (Deering 1989); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-4-106 (1988); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-69f to 45-69n (West 1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.11 (West Supp. 1986); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 19-7-21 (1982), 43-34-42 (1984); IDAHO CODE §§ 39-5401 to -5407 (1985); ILL. REV. STAT. ch 40, para. 1451-1453 (1987); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-128 to -130 (1981); LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 188 (West Supp. 1989); MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 1-206(b) (1988); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 46, § 48 (West 1989); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.111(2) (West 1980); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.56 (West Supp. 1987); Mo. REV. STAT. § 210.824 (1988); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-106 (1985); NEV. REV. STAT, § 126.061 (1985); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-44 (West Supp. 1987); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-11-6 (1986); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 73 (McKinney 1977); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49A-1 (1984); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-18-03 to -04 (Supp. 1989); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3111.30-.38 (Baldwin 1989); OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 552 (1987); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 109.239, 109.243, 109-247, 677.355, 677.360, 677.365, 677.370 (1983); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-3-306 (1985); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 12.03(a) (Vernon 1986); VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-7.1 (1989); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.050 (1985); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 891.40 (West Supp. 1988); WYO. STAT. § 14-2-103 (1986); 1990 N.H. House Bill 1426-FN §§ 168-6:2 to :3 (to be codified at N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 168-6:2 to :3) (effective Jan. 1991). Many of the statutes are modeled after UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5, 9B U.L.A. 301 (1987). See generally Note, Artificial Insemination: Donor Rights in Situations Involving Unmarried Recipients, 26 J. FAM. L. 793, 795-98 (1988) (discussing the Uniform Parentage Act and other current statutory schemes). The remaining states do not address AI use. In these states, however, courts faced with disputes involving married users of AI will likely grant parents and children full rights and obligations, based on common law principles. See, e.g., Gursky v. Gursky, 39 Misc. 2d 1083, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
119. See ALA. CODE § 26-17-21 (1988); ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.045 (1988); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2451(B) (1988); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 9-10-201 (1988); CAL. Civ. CODE § 7005 (Deering 1989); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-4-106 (1988); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-69f to 45-69n (West 1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.11 (West Supp. 1986); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 19-7-21 (1982), 43-34-42 (1984); IDAHO CODE §§ 39-5401 to -5407 (1985); ILL. REV. STAT. ch 40, para. 1451-1453 (1987); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-128 to -130 (1981); LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 188 (West Supp. 1989); MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 1-206(b) (1988); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 46, § 48 (West 1989); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.111(2) (West 1980); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.56 (West Supp. 1987); Mo. REV. STAT. § 210.824 (1988); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-106 (1985); NEV. REV. STAT, § 126.061 (1985); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-44 (West Supp. 1987); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-11-6 (1986); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 73 (McKinney 1977); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49A-1 (1984); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-18-03 to -04 (Supp. 1989); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3111.30-.38 (Baldwin 1989); OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 552 (1987); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 109.239, 109.243, 109-247, 677.355, 677.360, 677.365, 677.370 (1983); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-3-306 (1985); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 12.03(a) (Vernon 1986); VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-7.1 (1989); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.050 (1985); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 891.40 (West Supp. 1988); WYO. STAT. § 14-2-103 (1986); 1990 N.H. House Bill 1426-FN §§ 168-6:2 to :3 (to be codified at N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 168-6:2 to :3) (effective Jan. 1991). Many of the statutes are modeled after UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5, 9B U.L.A. 301 (1987). See generally Note, Artificial Insemination: Donor Rights in Situations Involving Unmarried Recipients, 26 J. FAM. L. 793, 795-98 (1988) (discussing the Uniform Parentage Act and other current statutory schemes). The remaining states do not address AI use. In these states, however, courts faced with disputes involving married users of AI will likely grant parents and children full rights and obligations, based on common law principles. See, e.g., Gursky v. Gursky, 39 Misc. 2d 1083, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
120. See ALA. CODE § 26-17-21 (1988); ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.045 (1988); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2451(B) (1988); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 9-10-201 (1988); CAL. Civ. CODE § 7005 (Deering 1989); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-4-106 (1988); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-69f to 45-69n (West 1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.11 (West Supp. 1986); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 19-7-21 (1982), 43-34-42 (1984); IDAHO CODE §§ 39-5401 to -5407 (1985); ILL. REV. STAT. ch 40, para. 1451-1453 (1987); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-128 to -130 (1981); LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 188 (West Supp. 1989); MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 1-206(b) (1988); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 46, § 48 (West 1989); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.111(2) (West 1980); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.56 (West Supp. 1987); Mo. REV. STAT. § 210.824 (1988); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-106 (1985); NEV. REV. STAT, § 126.061 (1985); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-44 (West Supp. 1987); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-11-6 (1986); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 73 (McKinney 1977); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49A-1 (1984); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-18-03 to -04 (Supp. 1989); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3111.30-.38 (Baldwin 1989); OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 552 (1987); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 109.239, 109.243, 109-247, 677.355, 677.360, 677.365, 677.370 (1983); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-3-306 (1985); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 12.03(a) (Vernon 1986); VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-7.1 (1989); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.050 (1985); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 891.40 (West Supp. 1988); WYO. STAT. § 14-2-103 (1986); 1990 N.H. House Bill 1426-FN §§ 168-6:2 to :3 (to be codified at N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 168-6:2 to :3) (effective Jan. 1991). Many of the statutes are modeled after UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5, 9B U.L.A. 301 (1987). See generally Note, Artificial Insemination: Donor Rights in Situations Involving Unmarried Recipients, 26 J. FAM. L. 793, 795-98 (1988) (discussing the Uniform Parentage Act and other current statutory schemes). The remaining states do not address AI use. In these states, however, courts faced with disputes involving married users of AI will likely grant parents and children full rights and obligations, based on common law principles. See, e.g., Gursky v. Gursky, 39 Misc. 2d 1083, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
121. See ALA. CODE § 26-17-21 (1988); ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.045 (1988); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2451(B) (1988); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 9-10-201 (1988); CAL. Civ. CODE § 7005 (Deering 1989); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-4-106 (1988); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-69f to 45-69n (West 1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.11 (West Supp. 1986); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 19-7-21 (1982), 43-34-42 (1984); IDAHO CODE §§ 39-5401 to -5407 (1985); ILL. REV. STAT. ch 40, para. 1451-1453 (1987); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-128 to -130 (1981); LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 188 (West Supp. 1989); MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 1-206(b) (1988); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 46, § 48 (West 1989); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.111(2) (West 1980); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.56 (West Supp. 1987); Mo. REV. STAT. § 210.824 (1988); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-106 (1985); NEV. REV. STAT, § 126.061 (1985); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-44 (West Supp. 1987); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-11-6 (1986); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 73 (McKinney 1977); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49A-1 (1984); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-18-03 to -04 (Supp. 1989); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3111.30-.38 (Baldwin 1989); OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 552 (1987); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 109.239, 109.243, 109-247, 677.355, 677.360, 677.365, 677.370 (1983); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-3-306 (1985); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 12.03(a) (Vernon 1986); VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-7.1 (1989); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.050 (1985); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 891.40 (West Supp. 1988); WYO. STAT. § 14-2-103 (1986); 1990 N.H. House Bill 1426-FN §§ 168-6:2 to :3 (to be codified at N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 168-6:2 to :3) (effective Jan. 1991). Many of the statutes are modeled after UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5, 9B U.L.A. 301 (1987). See generally Note, Artificial Insemination: Donor Rights in Situations Involving Unmarried Recipients, 26 J. FAM. L. 793, 795-98 (1988) (discussing the Uniform Parentage Act and other current statutory schemes). The remaining states do not address AI use. In these states, however, courts faced with disputes involving married users of AI will likely grant parents and children full rights and obligations, based on common law principles. See, e.g., Gursky v. Gursky, 39 Misc. 2d 1083, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
122. See ALA. CODE § 26-17-21 (1988); ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.045 (1988); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2451(B) (1988); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 9-10-201 (1988); CAL. Civ. CODE § 7005 (Deering 1989); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-4-106 (1988); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-69f to 45-69n (West 1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.11 (West Supp. 1986); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 19-7-21 (1982), 43-34-42 (1984); IDAHO CODE §§ 39-5401 to -5407 (1985); ILL. REV. STAT. ch 40, para. 1451-1453 (1987); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-128 to -130 (1981); LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 188 (West Supp. 1989); MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 1-206(b) (1988); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 46, § 48 (West 1989); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.111(2) (West 1980); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.56 (West Supp. 1987); Mo. REV. STAT. § 210.824 (1988); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-106 (1985); NEV. REV. STAT, § 126.061 (1985); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-44 (West Supp. 1987); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-11-6 (1986); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 73 (McKinney 1977); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49A-1 (1984); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-18-03 to -04 (Supp. 1989); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3111.30-.38 (Baldwin 1989); OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 552 (1987); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 109.239, 109.243, 109-247, 677.355, 677.360, 677.365, 677.370 (1983); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-3-306 (1985); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 12.03(a) (Vernon 1986); VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-7.1 (1989); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.050 (1985); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 891.40 (West Supp. 1988); WYO. STAT. § 14-2-103 (1986); 1990 N.H. House Bill 1426-FN §§ 168-6:2 to :3 (to be codified at N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 168-6:2 to :3) (effective Jan. 1991). Many of the statutes are modeled after UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5, 9B U.L.A. 301 (1987). See generally Note, Artificial Insemination: Donor Rights in Situations Involving Unmarried Recipients, 26 J. FAM. L. 793, 795-98 (1988) (discussing the Uniform Parentage Act and other current statutory schemes). The remaining states do not address AI use. In these states, however, courts faced with disputes involving married users of AI will likely grant parents and children full rights and obligations, based on common law principles. See, e.g., Gursky v. Gursky, 39 Misc. 2d 1083, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
123. These states are Alabama, California, Colorado, Illinois, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Texas, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. See statutes cited supra note 49.
124. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-44(b) (West Supp. 1987); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-11-6(B) (1986); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.050(2) (1985); 1990 N.H. House Bill 1426-FN § 168B:3(1)(c)(1) (to be codified at N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-8:3 (1)(c)(1) (effective Jan. 1991).
125. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-44(b) (West Supp. 1987); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-11-6(B) (1986); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.050(2) (1985); 1990 N.H. House Bill 1426-FN § 168B:3(1)(c)(1) (to be codified at N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-8:3 (1)(c)(1) (effective Jan. 1991).
126. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-44(b) (West Supp. 1987); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-11-6(B) (1986); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.050(2) (1985); 1990 N.H. House Bill 1426-FN § 168B:3(1)(c)(1) (to be codified at N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-8:3 (1)(c)(1) (effective Jan. 1991).
127. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-44(b) (West Supp. 1987); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-11-6(B) (1986); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.050(2) (1985); 1990 N.H. House Bill 1426-FN § 168B:3(1)(c)(1) (to be codified at N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-8:3 (1)(c)(1) (effective Jan. 1991).
128. These states are Arkansas, California, Colorado, Illinois, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, Ohio, Oregon, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. See statutes cited supra note 49.
129. See 1990 N.H. House Bill 1426-FN § 168-B:3(1)(e) (to be codified at N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:3(1)(e)) (effective Jan. 1991).
130. See, e.g., C.M. v. C.C., 152 N.J. Super. 160, 167-68, 377 A.2d 821,
131. C.M., 152 N.J. Super, at 166, 377 A.2d at 824.
132. Charlow, Awarding Custody: The Best Interests of the Child and Other Fictions, 5 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 267, 269, 273-74 (1987 ). Sociologists have found that the primary factors contributing to a child's healthy development are the quality and continuity of parental relationships that a child forms, rather than the influences of traditional lifestyles or of a parent of either gender. See, e.g., M. RUTTER, MATERNAL DEPRIVATION REASSESSED 120-21 (1981); see also Blechman, Are Children with One Parent at Psychological Risk? A Methodological Review, 44 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 179 (1982) (finding no evidence to support the assertion that children in single-parent households were damaged and that any existing damage seemed attributable to poverty or the loss of a parent through divorce or death).
133. Charlow, Awarding Custody: The Best Interests of the Child and Other Fictions, 5 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 267, 269, 273-74 (1987 ). Sociologists have found that the primary factors contributing to a child's healthy development are the quality and continuity of parental relationships that a child forms, rather than the influences of traditional lifestyles or of a parent of either gender. See, e.g., M. RUTTER, MATERNAL DEPRIVATION REASSESSED 120-21 (1981); see also Blechman, Are Children with One Parent at Psychological Risk? A Methodological Review, 44 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 179 (1982) (finding no evidence to support the assertion that children in single-parent households were damaged and that any existing damage seemed attributable to poverty or the loss of a parent through divorce or death).
134. Charlow, Awarding Custody: The Best Interests of the Child and Other Fictions, 5 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 267, 269, 273-74 (1987 ). Sociologists have found that the primary factors contributing to a child's healthy development are the quality and continuity of parental relationships that a child forms, rather than the influences of traditional lifestyles or of a parent of either gender. See, e.g., M. RUTTER, MATERNAL DEPRIVATION REASSESSED 120-21 (1981); see also Blechman, Are Children with One Parent at Psychological Risk? A Methodological Review, 44 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 179 (1982) (finding no evidence to support the assertion that children in single-parent households were damaged and that any existing damage seemed attributable to poverty or the loss of a parent through divorce or death).
135. 179 Cal. App. 3d 386, 224 Cal. Rptr. 530 (1986).
136. See id. at 392, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 534.
137. Under California law, married and unmarried women could obtain statutory protection from a donor's parental claims only by becoming artificially inseminated under a physician's supervision. Additional statutes, however, protected married couples, but not unmarried women, from donors' claims. The court held that the distinction did not constitute an equal protection violation, finding that married and unmarried women were not similarly situated for the purposes of equal protection analysis because the state had a "long-recognized social policy of preserving the integrity of the marriage." Id. at 395, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 536.
138. An unmarried woman and her lover might use AI for the same infertility-related reasons that married couples do. Lovers are different from friendly donors; if disputes arise, an inquiry into intent and expectations is appropriate. See infra pp. 1536-37.
139. See supra note 56. Furthermore, studies show that the greatest detriment to a child's emotional health is parental conflict. See Charlow, supra note 56, at 280. As a result, courts disserve unmarried users of AI and their children if they force them into unintended familial structures that may ultimately prove hostile.
140. But see Bartlett, supra note 12, at 307 (noting that contracts releasing parents from parental rights and support obligations are generally held unenforceable as contrary to public policy).
141. The Colorado Supreme Court has taken this approach. See In re R.C., 775 P.2d 27 (Colo. 1989) (en bane). In that case, a donor appealed a lower court decision based on a statute denying donors parental rights. Though agreeing that the statute protected unmarried women, the court found it "ambiguous with respect to the rights and duties of known donors and unmarried recipients." Jd. at 34. It remanded the case for examination of the parties' pre-conception intent to determine their relative rights. See id.
142. See Bartlett, supra note 12.
143. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 652 (1972) (finding that a statute attaching a presumption of unfitness to an unwed father violated his due process rights).
144. See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 262 (1983) (refusing to protect an unwed father's parental rights to his daughter because he had "never established any custodial, personal, or financial relationship" with her); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 394 (1979) (striking down a statute as "discriminat[ing] against unwed fathers even when their identity is known and they have manifested a significant paternal interest in the child"); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 256 (1978) (denying an unwed father's attempt to block the adoption of his child primarily because the father had "never shouldered any significant responsibility with respect to the daily supervision, education, protection, or care of the child"). The biological tie takes on significance only when the father "grasps [the] opportunity [for parenthood] and accepts some measure of responsibility for the child's future." Lehr, 463 U.S. at 262; see also Michael H. v. Gerald D., 109 S. Ct. 2333, 2345 (1989) (citing these cases approvingly to deny constitutional protection to an unwed father's parental rights because the mother was married and the child had maintained filial relationships with both the father and the mother's husband).
145. See Note, supra note 49, at 804.
146. At least one court has held that statutory denial of parental rights to a donor who could prove his intent to play a paternal role would be inconsistent with Supreme Court cases dealing with the rights of unwed fathers. See McIntyre v. Crouch, 98 Or. App. 462, 780 P.2d 239 (1989), review denied, 308 Or. 593, 784 P.2d 1100 (1990), cert, denied, 1990 U.S. LEXIS 2132 (U.S. Apr. 23, 1990) (No. 89-1424).
147. See, e.g., S. ELIAS & G. ANNAS, REPRODUCTIVE GENETICS AND THE LAW 232-34 (1987) (arguing that an AI child's interest in a donor might merit mandatory access to "medical and genetic" information and even access to secondary "identity" information upon demonstration of a "need to know").
148. See, e.g., Annas, Fathers Anonymous: Beyond the Best Interests of the Sperm Donor, 14 FAM. L.Q. 1, 10-12 (1980).
149. See Development in the Law, Surrogate Parenthood Contracts After Baby M, 24 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 1053, 1106-08 (1988 ). Sperm banks are apparently already facing lawsuits. One woman has sued a sperm bank for allegedly mixing up the sperm her husband had deposited before his death with that of another donor's. The plaintiff, a white woman, alleged that the sperm bank gave her sperm from a black donor and that her daughter is now the "target of 'racial teasing and embarrassment.'" Sullivan, Mother Accuses Sperm Bank of a Mixup, N.Y. Times, Mar. 9, 1990, at B1, col. 2.
150. See Development in the Law, Surrogate Parenthood Contracts After Baby M, 24 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 1053, 1106-08 (1988 ). Sperm banks are apparently already facing lawsuits. One woman has sued a sperm bank for allegedly mixing up the sperm her husband had deposited before his death with that of another donor's. The plaintiff, a white woman, alleged that the sperm bank gave her sperm from a black donor and that her daughter is now the "target of 'racial teasing and embarrassment.'" Sullivan, Mother Accuses Sperm Bank of a Mixup, N.Y. Times, Mar. 9, 1990, at B1, col. 2.
151. See, e.g., J. LASKER & S. BORG, supra note 1, at 50; P. SINGER & D. WELLS, MAKING BABIES at vii-ix (1985); Reed, Scientists Praise British Birth as Triumph, N.Y. Times, July 27, 1978, at A16, col. 2.
152. See, e.g., J. LASKER & S. BORG, supra note 1, at 50; P. SINGER & D. WELLS, MAKING BABIES at vii-ix (1985); Reed, Scientists Praise British Birth as Triumph, N.Y. Times, July 27, 1978, at A16, col. 2.
153. To facilitate egg retrieval, women are given fertility hormones to induce "superovulation." See A. BONNICKSEN, supra note 7, at 147-51. Eggs are removed surgically through a process called laparoscopy or, increasingly, through a less risky nonsurgical technique known as aspiration. See id. at 148-49.
154. See id. at 147-51. See generally C. GROBSTEIN, FROM CHANCE TO PURPOSE: AN APPRAISAL OF EXTERNAL HUMAN FERTILIZATION (1981) (describing the technique and raising many ethical concerns). Ovum transfer, also called in vivo fertilization or surrogate embryo transfer (SET), is the newest form of infertility treatment. An embryo is fertilized inside the donor woman's body, either through natural means or with AI. Within five days of conception, the embryo is "flushed out" and implanted in another woman. Ovum transfer is used by women unable to conceive but desiring a gestational relationship with a child or by women able to conceive but unable to carry a fetus to term. See Andrews, supra note 4, at 391-92. Because ovum transfer requires third-party participation, it raises virtually all the issues surrounding both in vitro fertilization and surrogate motherhood, especially the potential for commercialization. See S. ELIAS & G. ANNAS, supra note 69, at 230.
155. See A. BONNICKSEN, supra note 7, at 25. For a brief history of in vitro fertilization, see P. SINGER & D. WELLS, cited above in note 72, at 3-7.
156. See A. BONNICKSEN, supra note 7, at 25-27.
157. See, e.g., Neuffer, New Birth Technology Leaves Legal Void, Boston Globe, Jan. 30, 1990, at 1, col. 1.
158. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 81-26(7) (1987); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:121-:133 (West Supp. 1990); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3213(e) (1987); 1990 N.H. House Bill 1426-FN §§ 168-B:13 to :15 (to be codified at N.H. REV. STAT. ANN §§ 168-B:13 to :15) (effective Jan. 1991).
159. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 81-26(7) (1987); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:121-:133 (West Supp. 1990); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3213(e) (1987); 1990 N.H. House Bill 1426-FN §§ 168-B:13 to :15 (to be codified at N.H. REV. STAT. ANN §§ 168-B:13 to :15) (effective Jan. 1991).
160. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 81-26(7) (1987); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:121-:133 (West Supp. 1990); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3213(e) (1987); 1990 N.H. House Bill 1426-FN §§ 168-B:13 to :15 (to be codified at N.H. REV. STAT. ANN §§ 168-B:13 to :15) (effective Jan. 1991).
161. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 81-26(7) (1987); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:121-:133 (West Supp. 1990); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3213(e) (1987); 1990 N.H. House Bill 1426-FN §§ 168-B:13 to :15 (to be codified at N.H. REV. STAT. ANN §§ 168-B:13 to :15) (effective Jan. 1991).
162. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3213(e) (1987).
163. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 81-26(7) (1987). This statute repealed an older statute with much more limiting provisions. The change was a response to litigation challenging the old statute on the ground that it unconstitutionally prohibited the use of IVF. See Smith v. Hartigan, 556 F. Supp. 157 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
164. See 1990 N.H. House Bill 1426-FN § 168-B:13 (to be codified at N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:13) (effective Jan. 1991).
165. See id. § 168-B:15.
166. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:128 (West Supp. 1990).
167. See id. §§ 9:127, 9:132.
168. See id. § 9:122.
169. See id. §§ 9:121, :123-:125, :129-:131, :133. The legal status of embryos before implantation is discussed at pp. 1542-46 below.
170. See Baron, Fetal Research: The Question in the States, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Apr. 1985, at 12 (providing an overview of state regulation of fetal research).
171. See Note, Reproductive Technology and the Procreation Rights of the Unmarried, 98 HARV. L. REV. 669, 672-73 (1985). However, because most states have IVF clinics, this prohibition does not apparently extend to IVF treatment. For an overview of worldwide attitudes toward IVF, see Walters, Ethics and New Reproductive Technologies: An International Review of Committee Statements, HASTINGS CENTER REP., June 1987, at 3.
172. See Note, Reproductive Technology and the Procreation Rights of the Unmarried, 98 HARV. L. REV. 669, 672-73 (1985). However, because most states have IVF clinics, this prohibition does not apparently extend to IVF treatment. For an overview of worldwide attitudes toward IVF, see Walters, Ethics and New Reproductive Technologies: An International Review of Committee Statements, HASTINGS CENTER REP., June 1987, at 3.
173. The average couple can expect to pay from $ 2000 to $ 5000 per IVF cycle. See Andrews, supra note 4, at 393.
174. The misrepresentation takes several forms. Some clinics present the best statistics available, even though the particular facility has met with little success. See B. ROTHMAN, supra note 1, at 148. Others mislead by reporting the numbers of pregnancies rather than births. They ignore miscarriages and often count even "chemical pregnancies" - in which women test positive for pregnancy but miscarry in time for a normal period - in their "pregnancy" rates. See id. Still others mislead by dividing the number of babies by the number of women, without properly accounting for multiple births to a single woman. See id. In addition, clinics bombard would-be patients with images of success: waiting rooms display collages of baby photos; clinic brochures are studded with photos of happy children. See A. BONNICKSEN, supra note 7, at 26. At least one couple has sued, alleging willful misrepresentation for the citation of misleading success rates. See York v. Jones, 717 F. Supp. 421, 423 n.2 (E.D. Va. 1989) (finding that the couple had not proved the elements of willful misrepresentation under Virginia law).
175. In the words of one IVF patient: "'I entered the program with a rosy glow of expectation. It was a rude awakening to meet other women who were going through for their fourth or fifth attempt.'" Corea, Unnatural Selection, PROGRESSIVE, Jan. 1986, at 22, 24.
176. See id. at 23 (citing a Medical Tribune survey).
177. See Saltus, Study Finds 12% Success for In Vitro Fertilization, Boston Globe, Jan. 15, 1990, at 16, col. 2. Even this number is generous; it represents birth rate from the point of laparoscopy. Calculated from the moment a woman is given superovulation drugs, the average success rate is about 10%. See id.
178. See, e.g., Crowe, supra note 2, at 551; Klein, Introduction, in INFERTILITY: WOMEN SPEAK OUT ABOUT THEIR EXPERIENCES OF REPRODUCTIVE MEDICINE é(R. Klein ed. 1989) [hereinafter WOMEN SPEAK OUT].
179. In addition to the basic cycle, women may have to undergo other related procedures as part of their individual treatment. For example, ultrasound is needed to determine whether eggs have developed enough to be removed. Ultrasound is effective only if a woman's bladder is uncomfortably full. See G. COREA, THE MOTHER MACHINE 175 (1985). Tests may be taken to determine whether or not the fallopian tubes are blocked. For an account of the severe pain involved with the use of one such test, a hysterosalpinogram, see Stens, Give Me Children, or Else I Die, in WOMEN SPEAK OUT, cited above in note 94, at 11, 14-15.
180. In addition to the basic cycle, women may have to undergo other related procedures as part of their individual treatment. For example, ultrasound is needed to determine whether eggs have developed enough to be removed. Ultrasound is effective only if a woman's bladder is uncomfortably full. See G. COREA, THE MOTHER MACHINE 175 (1985). Tests may be taken to determine whether or not the fallopian tubes are blocked. For an account of the severe pain involved with the use of one such test, a hysterosalpinogram, see Stens, Give Me Children, or Else I Die, in WOMEN SPEAK OUT, cited above in note 94, at 11, 14-15.
181. See, e.g., A. BONNICKSEN, supra note 7, at 62; G. COREA, supra note 95, at 180.
182. See A. BONNICKSEN, supra note 7, at 59-64. Women's "feelings of low self-worth, anger, guilt, and frustration that have their roots in the infertility experience can be magnified by the IVF experience." Id. at 63.
183. Women report pressure from their employers to quit work. See Crowe, supra note 2, at 551; see also Humm, Motherhood Has a History: Amenorrhoea and Autobiography, in WOMEN SPEAK OUT, supra note 94, at 35, 38 (describing the physical and emotional difficulty of maintaining full-time employment during IVF treatment).
184. Reproductive medicine is often experimental, and practices are not always questioned until a sufficient number of women "guinea pigs" have suffered damage from the new technology. See, e.g., Klein, supra note 94, at 4. The litany of drugs and birth control devices that have proved harmful to women includes DES, the IUD, and the birth control pill. See Corea, supra note 2, at 82-85. Already, many IVF patients report serious side effects from "superovulation" drugs. These side effects include swelling, nausea, diarrhea, stomachaches, and weight gain. Women also risk overstimulation and burst ovaries; beyond certain levels, overstimulation may even subject a woman to the risk of death. See Solomon, Sometimes Perganol Kills, in WOMEN SPEAK OUT, supra note 94, at 47, 47-50.
185. The most publicized of these cases are those dealing with the legal status of unimplanted, frozen embryos. See infra pp. 1542-46, The remaining cases constitute a somewhat haphazard collection. See, e.g., Del Zio v. Presbyterian Hosp., No. 74 Civ. 3588 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 1978) (upholding a jury award of $50,000 to a woman for emotional distress suffered when her doctor destroyed the contents of her IVF petri dish); Kinzie v. Physician's Liab. Ins. Co., 750 P.2d 1140 (Okla. Ct. App. 1987) (considering whether an insurance company was required to cover the costs of IVF treatment).
186. These interests include concerns about malpractice liability, professional reputation, and in many cases, a genuine commitment to providing safe, efficient medical care to patients. See Hollinger, supra note 4, at 931.
187. See A. BONNICKSEN, supra note 7, at 27-30; G. COREA, supra note 95, at 116-20; J. LASKER & S. BORG, supra note 1, at 191. Some clinics do provide counseling and other patient services. Cf. A. BONNICKSEN, supra note 7, at 82-90 (discussing self-regulation and quality control by clinics).
188. See G. COREA, supra note 95, at 318-22; Hollinger, supra note 4, at 932.
189. New Hampshire recently passed legislation requiring such counseling. See 1990 N.H. House Bill 1426-FN § 168-B:13 (to be codified at N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:13) (effective Jan. 1991).
190. In response to government pressure, clinics have already acknowledged the inaccuracy of their success rate reports. See Saltus, Fertility Clinics Plan To Disclose Results, Boston Globe, Nov. 20, 1989, at 25, col. 2.
191. See, e.g., American Fertility Soc'y, Minimal Standards of Programs of In Vitro Fertilization, 41 FERTILITY & STERILITY 13 (1984) (outlining some minimal guidelines to which IVF clinics should adhere). Louisiana has specifically adopted the American Fertility Society's standards. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:128 (West Supp. 1990).
192. See, e.g., American Fertility Soc'y, Minimal Standards of Programs of In Vitro Fertilization, 41 FERTILITY & STERILITY 13 (1984) (outlining some minimal guidelines to which IVF clinics should adhere). Louisiana has specifically adopted the American Fertility Society's standards. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:128 (West Supp. 1990).
193. See E. BARTHOLET, supra note 10, at 59 (detailing the type of information such counseling should provide on both IVF and adoption).
194. Some commentators would prefer to see IVF use completely halted. See, e.g., Mies, "Why Do We Need All This?" A Call Against Genetic Engineering and Reproductive Technology, 8 WOMEN'S STUD. INT'L F. 553 (1985) (questioning the worth of the new reproductive technol-ogies and asserting their inability to change exploitative relations toward women). A moratorium on use, however, might place too great a burden on the infertile. See J. LASKER & S. BORG, supra note 1, at 190.
195. Courts and scholars refer to these entities in various ways, recognizing that the selected label reflects the status one wishes to accord them. See, e.g., York v. Jones, 717 F. Supp. 421 (E.D. Va. 1989) (using the label "prezygote"); Davis v. Davis, 15 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 2097 (Tenn. Ch. App. 1989) (considering and rejecting "preembryo"); 1990 N.H. House Bill 1426-FN §§ 168-6:13 to :15 (to be codified at N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 168-6:13 to :15) (effective Jan. 1991) (using the term "preembryo") L. TRIBE, supra note 9, § 15-10, at 1348 (arguing that "it demeans the value and dignity of all human life, fetal or adult, to refer to a fetus . . . as 'the products of conception'"); American Fertility Soc'y, Ethical Statement on In Vitro Fertilization, 41 FERTILITY & STERILITY 12 (1984) (using the term "concepti").
196. Courts and scholars refer to these entities in various ways, recognizing that the selected label reflects the status one wishes to accord them. See, e.g., York v. Jones, 717 F. Supp. 421 (E.D. Va. 1989) (using the label "prezygote"); Davis v. Davis, 15 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 2097 (Tenn. Ch. App. 1989) (considering and rejecting "preembryo"); 1990 N.H. House Bill 1426-FN §§ 168-6:13 to :15 (to be codified at N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 168-6:13 to :15) (effective Jan. 1991) (using the term "preembryo") L. TRIBE, supra note 9, § 15-10, at 1348 (arguing that "it demeans the value and dignity of all human life, fetal or adult, to refer to a fetus . . . as 'the products of conception'"); American Fertility Soc'y, Ethical Statement on In Vitro Fertilization, 41 FERTILITY & STERILITY 12 (1984) (using the term "concepti").
197. Courts and scholars refer to these entities in various ways, recognizing that the selected label reflects the status one wishes to accord them. See, e.g., York v. Jones, 717 F. Supp. 421 (E.D. Va. 1989) (using the label "prezygote"); Davis v. Davis, 15 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 2097 (Tenn. Ch. App. 1989) (considering and rejecting "preembryo"); 1990 N.H. House Bill 1426-FN §§ 168-6:13 to :15 (to be codified at N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 168-6:13 to :15) (effective Jan. 1991) (using the term "preembryo") L. TRIBE, supra note 9, § 15-10, at 1348 (arguing that "it demeans the value and dignity of all human life, fetal or adult, to refer to a fetus . . . as 'the products of conception'"); American Fertility Soc'y, Ethical Statement on In Vitro Fertilization, 41 FERTILITY & STERILITY 12 (1984) (using the term "concepti").
198. Courts and scholars refer to these entities in various ways, recognizing that the selected label reflects the status one wishes to accord them. See, e.g., York v. Jones, 717 F. Supp. 421 (E.D. Va. 1989) (using the label "prezygote"); Davis v. Davis, 15 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 2097 (Tenn. Ch. App. 1989) (considering and rejecting "preembryo"); 1990 N.H. House Bill 1426-FN §§ 168-6:13 to :15 (to be codified at N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 168-6:13 to :15) (effective Jan. 1991) (using the term "preembryo") L. TRIBE, supra note 9, § 15-10, at 1348 (arguing that "it demeans the value and dignity of all human life, fetal or adult, to refer to a fetus . . . as 'the products of conception'"); American Fertility Soc'y, Ethical Statement on In Vitro Fertilization, 41 FERTILITY & STERILITY 12 (1984) (using the term "concepti").
199. To minimize the number of times a woman must undergo laparoscopy, physicians retrieve as many eggs as possible in each cycle. No more than three or four embryos are usually implanted at one time; remaining embryos may be preserved for later implantation without repeating the surgical portion of the cycle. See A. BONNICKSEN, supra note 7, at 30-31.
200. 15 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 2097 (Tenn. Ch. App. 1989).
201. See id. at 2098.
202. See id. at 2103.
203. This conclusion was due apparently to the testimony of one of several experts, testimony that "stands unrebutted in the record." Id. at 2102. The court cursorily considered and rejected the proposition that the embryos might be considered property. See id. at 2103.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 2104.
206. See, e.g., Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 109 S. Ct. 3040, 3050 (1989) (declining to rule on the constitutionality of a Missouri statute whose preamble stated that life begins at conception).
207. See id. at 3057 (upholding a statute that established fetal viability as the point at which the state's interest in fetal life would be safeguarded); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (establishing the trimester framework for determining when a state's interest in protecting fetal life can override a woman's right to an abortion).
208. See, e.g., Simon v. United States, 438 F. Supp. 759 (S.D. Fla. 1977) (permitting an action for wrongful death for prenatal injuries only if the fetus died after its live birth); Commonwealth v. Cass, 392 Mass. 799, 804, 467 N.E.2d 1324, 1328 (1984) (allowing tort recovery by a fetus, but only after the point of viability); Wallace v. Wallace, 120 N.H. 675, 421 A.2d 134 (1980) (finding that an action for an automotive death could not be brought on behalf of an aborted nonviable fetus).
209. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-5-106(b) (1980). For a discussion of other state infanticide statutes, see p. 1560 below. Despite debate over the coherence and durability of viability as a trigger for state regulation, viability remains currently the pervasive legislative approach.
210. But see American Fertility Soc'y, supra note 109, at 12 ("It is understood that the gametes and concepti are the property of the donors.").
211. See York v. Jones, 717 F. Supp. 421 (E.D. Va. 1989). In York, a couple sought the transfer of their prezygote from one IVF clinic to another over the first clinic's objection. See id. at 422. The court ruled for the couple on the first clinic's motion to dismiss, finding in part that the preservation agreement between the couple and that clinic, which referred to the that the preservation agreement between the couple and that clinic, which referred to the prezygotes as "property" throughout, had created a bailor-bailee relationship. See id. at 425. However, because of the nature of the dispute before the court and especially because both potential parents were united in their position, the court did not need to justify the propriety of this classification.
212. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
213. See L. TRIBE, supra note 9, § 15-10, at 1352, 1359; cf. Somerville, Reflections on Canadian Abortion Law: Evacuation and Destruction - Two Separate Issues, 31 TORONTO L.J. 1, 12 (1981) (arguing that although a woman might have the right to an abortion, she should not have the additional right to demand that the fetus be killed).
214. See L. TRIBE, supra note 9, § 15-10, at 1352, 1359; cf. Somerville, Reflections on Canadian Abortion Law: Evacuation and Destruction - Two Separate Issues, 31 TORONTO L.J. 1, 12 (1981) (arguing that although a woman might have the right to an abortion, she should not have the additional right to demand that the fetus be killed).
215. See L. TRIBE, supra note 9, § 15-10, at 1359.
216. See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 69-75 (1976) (finding that a mother's interest in the outcome of her pregnancy outweighs the interest of the father).
217. But cf. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:131 (West Supp. 1990) (requiring that disputes between parties to IVF regarding the prezygote be resolved not by reference to the parties' rights, but according to the "best interest of the in vitro fertilized ovum").
218. Missouri, for example, has codified its belief that life begins at conception. See MO. REV. STAT. § 1.205.1(1) (1986).
219. See Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 109 S. Ct. 3040, 3057 (1989) (plurality opinion) (stating that the state may select viability or even some earlier stage as the point at which its interest may be safeguarded).
220. Louisiana has already passed such a statute prohibiting the destruction of prezygotes and requiring that prezygotes whose intended parents renounce their parental rights be made available for "adoptive implantation." See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:129-:130 (West Supp. 1990).
221. See A. BONNICKSEN, supra note 7, at 30-36.
222. Even the mere availability of the techniques pressures individuals into using them and further minimizes the appeal of adoption. For example, once enrolled in an IVF program, some women find it extremely difficult to quit, feeling "compelled to attempt all possible avenues to motherhood before they could accept a child-free life." See Crowe, supra note 2, at 551. Some of the strongest pressure to "keep trying to have a baby" may actually come from physicians. See J. LASKER & S. BORG, supra note 1, at 17.
223. These options are supported by the American Fertility Society. Examination for medical research purposes would be permitted only on prezygotes through 14 days of development. See American Fertility Soc'y, supra note 109, at 12.
224. But see LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:129 (West Supp. 1990) (prohibiting the destruction of prezygotes).
225. Recent estimates place the cost of surrogate motherhood at $25,000, with about $10,000 going to the surrogate, $10,000 to lawyers or other facilitators, and $5000 to such miscellaneous expenses as medical costs. See Andrews, supra note 4, at 393.
226. A variation on ovum transfer, sometimes called "complete surrogacy," permits both the husband and wife to maintain a genetic relationship with the child. In this case, the wife is impregnated, and the fertilized embryo is flushed out and implanted in a surrogate. See supra note 74. Thus, the surrogate has only a gestational relationship with the child.
227. See Peterson, Surrogates Often Improvise Birth Pacts, N.Y. Times, Feb. 25, 1987, at B2, col. 1. By comparison, roughly 350,000 children had been born through AI by 1987. See J. LASKER & S. BORG, supra note 1, at 33. Over 60,000 children were adopted in 1986. See ADOPTION FACTBOOK, supra note 11, at 60.
228. See Peterson, Surrogates Often Improvise Birth Pacts, N.Y. Times, Feb. 25, 1987, at B2, col. 1. By comparison, roughly 350,000 children had been born through AI by 1987. See J. LASKER & S. BORG, supra note 1, at 33. Over 60,000 children were adopted in 1986. See ADOPTION FACTBOOK, supra note 11, at 60.
229. See Garrison, Surrogate Parenting: What Should Legislatures Do?, 22 FAM. L.Q. 149, 158 & n.38 (1988).
230. See, e.g., Sherwyn & Handel v. California State Dep't of Social Servs., 173 Cal. App. 3d 52, 218 Cal. Rptr. 778 (1985) (challenging the constitutionality of an AI statute and adoption policies threatening surrogate arrangements); In re R.K.S., 10 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 1383 (D.C. Super. Ct. 1984) (ordering the District of Columbia corporate counsel to investigate and report on a surrogate mother arrangement before allowing adoption); Miroff v. Surrogate Mother, 13 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 1260 (Ind. Super. Ct. 1986) (declaring the surrogate contract underlying an adoption contrary to public policy); Syrkowski v. Appleyard, 420 Mich. 367, 362 N.W.2d 211 (1985) (per curiam) (holding that jurisdiction exists to allow a biological father to assert his parenthood to a child born to a surrogate mother); Yates v. Keane, 14 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 1160 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1987) (refusing to enforce a surrogacy agreement).
231. See, e.g., Sherwyn & Handel v. California State Dep't of Social Servs., 173 Cal. App. 3d 52, 218 Cal. Rptr. 778 (1985) (challenging the constitutionality of an AI statute and adoption policies threatening surrogate arrangements); In re R.K.S., 10 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 1383 (D.C. Super. Ct. 1984) (ordering the District of Columbia corporate counsel to investigate and report on a surrogate mother arrangement before allowing adoption); Miroff v. Surrogate Mother, 13 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 1260 (Ind. Super. Ct. 1986) (declaring the surrogate contract underlying an adoption contrary to public policy); Syrkowski v. Appleyard, 420 Mich. 367, 362 N.W.2d 211 (1985) (per curiam) (holding that jurisdiction exists to allow a biological father to assert his parenthood to a child born to a surrogate mother); Yates v. Keane, 14 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 1160 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1987) (refusing to enforce a surrogacy agreement).
232. See, e.g., Sherwyn & Handel v. California State Dep't of Social Servs., 173 Cal. App. 3d 52, 218 Cal. Rptr. 778 (1985) (challenging the constitutionality of an AI statute and adoption policies threatening surrogate arrangements); In re R.K.S., 10 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 1383 (D.C. Super. Ct. 1984) (ordering the District of Columbia corporate counsel to investigate and report on a surrogate mother arrangement before allowing adoption); Miroff v. Surrogate Mother, 13 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 1260 (Ind. Super. Ct. 1986) (declaring the surrogate contract underlying an adoption contrary to public policy); Syrkowski v. Appleyard, 420 Mich. 367, 362 N.W.2d 211 (1985) (per curiam) (holding that jurisdiction exists to allow a biological father to assert his parenthood to a child born to a surrogate mother); Yates v. Keane, 14 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 1160 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1987) (refusing to enforce a surrogacy agreement).
233. 217 N.J. Super. 313, 525 A.2d 1128 (1987), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 109 N.J. 396, 537 A.2d 1227 (1988).
234. See, e.g., Rosenblatt, Baby M. - Emotions for Sale, TIME, Apr. 6, 1987, at 88; Okun, Ruling Hailed by Opponents of Surrogacy, N.Y. Times, Feb. 4, 1988, at 87, col. 1.
235. See, e.g., Rosenblatt, Baby M. - Emotions for Sale, TIME, Apr. 6, 1987, at 88; Okun, Ruling Hailed by Opponents of Surrogacy, N.Y. Times, Feb. 4, 1988, at 87, col. 1.
236. See, e.g., ON THE PROBLEM OF SURROGATE PARENTHOOD: ANALYZING THE BABY M CASE (H. Richardson ed. 1987) (providing essays on a variety of surrogacy-related issues); Annas, Baby M: Babies (and Justice) for Sale, HASTINGS CENTER REP., June 1987, at 13. For a general discussion of surrogacy, see M. FIELD, SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD (1988); C. SHALEV, BIRTH POWER: THE CASE FOR SURROGACY (1989); and K. STEVENS, SURROGATE MOTHER: ONE WOMAN'S STORY (1985).
237. See, e.g., ON THE PROBLEM OF SURROGATE PARENTHOOD: ANALYZING THE BABY M CASE (H. Richardson ed. 1987) (providing essays on a variety of surrogacy-related issues); Annas, Baby M: Babies (and Justice) for Sale, HASTINGS CENTER REP., June 1987, at 13. For a general discussion of surrogacy, see M. FIELD, SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD (1988); C. SHALEV, BIRTH POWER: THE CASE FOR SURROGACY (1989); and K. STEVENS, SURROGATE MOTHER: ONE WOMAN'S STORY (1985).
238. See, e.g., ON THE PROBLEM OF SURROGATE PARENTHOOD: ANALYZING THE BABY M CASE (H. Richardson ed. 1987) (providing essays on a variety of surrogacy-related issues); Annas, Baby M: Babies (and Justice) for Sale, HASTINGS CENTER REP., June 1987, at 13. For a general discussion of surrogacy, see M. FIELD, SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD (1988); C. SHALEV, BIRTH POWER: THE CASE FOR SURROGACY (1989); and K. STEVENS, SURROGATE MOTHER: ONE WOMAN'S STORY (1985).
239. See, e.g., ON THE PROBLEM OF SURROGATE PARENTHOOD: ANALYZING THE BABY M CASE (H. Richardson ed. 1987) (providing essays on a variety of surrogacy-related issues); Annas, Baby M: Babies (and Justice) for Sale, HASTINGS CENTER REP., June 1987, at 13. For a general discussion of surrogacy, see M. FIELD, SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD (1988); C. SHALEV, BIRTH POWER: THE CASE FOR SURROGACY (1989); and K. STEVENS, SURROGATE MOTHER: ONE WOMAN'S STORY (1985).
240. See, e.g., ON THE PROBLEM OF SURROGATE PARENTHOOD: ANALYZING THE BABY M CASE (H. Richardson ed. 1987) (providing essays on a variety of surrogacy-related issues); Annas, Baby M: Babies (and Justice) for Sale, HASTINGS CENTER REP., June 1987, at 13. For a general discussion of surrogacy, see M. FIELD, SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD (1988); C. SHALEV, BIRTH POWER: THE CASE FOR SURROGACY (1989); and K. STEVENS, SURROGATE MOTHER: ONE WOMAN'S STORY (1985).
241. See, e.g., Section of Family Law Adoption Comm. & Ad Hoc Surrogacy Comm., Am. Bar Ass'n, Draft ABA Model Surrogacy Act, 22 FAM. L.Q. 123 (1988).
242. See statutes cited infra notes 156-161.
243. See Baby M, 217 N.J. Super, at 335-50, 525 A.2d at 1138-46.
244. See id. at 388, 525 A.2d at 1164-66.
245. See id. at 389-400, 525 A.2d at 1166-72.
246. See In re Baby M, 109 N.J. 396, 537 A.2d 1227 (1988).
247. See id. at 423, 537 A.2d at 1240.
248. See id. at 435-36, 537 A.2d at 1246-47.
249. See Winston, 470 U.S. at 761; Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 771; Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 38-39.
250. See Major, supra note 142, at 21-27; see also Childress, When Is It Morally Justifiable To Discontinue Medical Nutrition and Hydration?, in BY No EXTRAORDINARY MEANS, supra note 107, at 67, 72-73 (suggesting that patients not receiving food and water die more comfortably than those provided sustenance).
251. Cf. Washington v. Harper, 110 S. Ct. 1028, 1036 (1990) (noting that a prisoner retains "a significant liberty interest" under the due process clause "in avoiding the unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs"). Arguably, the Anglo-American tradition of discouraging suicide and attempted suicide, see Comment, The Punishment of Suicide - A Need for Change, 14 VILL. L. REV. 463, 464-68 (1969); infra note 173, negates the more general tradition of protecting bodily integrity and autonomy, for a liberty interest cannot be fundamental when there exists "a societal tradition of enacting laws denying the interest." Michael H. v. Gerald D., 109 S. Ct. 2333, 2341 n.2 (1989) (plurality opinion) (emphasis deleted). The societal legal proscription against suicide, however, is not "longstanding and still extant." Id. at 2345 n.6. Even though suicide was a crime at early common law, it has never been punished in the United States. See Comment, supra, at 465. Although attempted suicide has occasionally been punished, see id. at 466-67, "the prevailing view has long been otherwise." W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW § 7.8(a), at 649 (2d ed. 1986). Currently no state by statute criminalizes attempts to commit suicide, see Note, Criminal Liability for Assisting Suicide, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 348, 350 (1986), and the last reported prosecution was in 1961, see LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT, supra note 1, at 37 n.73 (citing State v. Willis, 255 N.C. 473, 121 S.E.2d 854 (1961)). In addition, there is a longstanding, albeit not often discussed, practice by physicians of terminating medical care for patients when treatment merely serves to prolong the dying process. See In re Storar (Eichner), 52 N.Y.2d 363, 385-86 & n.3, 420 N.E.2d 64, 75-76 & n.3, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, 277-78 & n.3 (Jones, J., dissenting in part), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981); Fried, Terminating Life Support: Out of the Closetl, 295 NEW ENG. J. MED. 390, 390 (1976). This tradition is more specific than the general societal tradition against suicide and therefore prevails even under Justice Scalia's due process analysis. See Michael H., 109 S. Ct. at 2344 n.6.
252. Cf. Washington v. Harper, 110 S. Ct. 1028, 1036 (1990) (noting that a prisoner retains "a significant liberty interest" under the due process clause "in avoiding the unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs"). Arguably, the Anglo-American tradition of discouraging suicide and attempted suicide, see Comment, The Punishment of Suicide - A Need for Change, 14 VILL. L. REV. 463, 464-68 (1969); infra note 173, negates the more general tradition of protecting bodily integrity and autonomy, for a liberty interest cannot be fundamental when there exists "a societal tradition of enacting laws denying the interest." Michael H. v. Gerald D., 109 S. Ct. 2333, 2341 n.2 (1989) (plurality opinion) (emphasis deleted). The societal legal proscription against suicide, however, is not "longstanding and still extant." Id. at 2345 n.6. Even though suicide was a crime at early common law, it has never been punished in the United States. See Comment, supra, at 465. Although attempted suicide has occasionally been punished, see id. at 466-67, "the prevailing view has long been otherwise." W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW § 7.8(a), at 649 (2d ed. 1986). Currently no state by statute criminalizes attempts to commit suicide, see Note, Criminal Liability for Assisting Suicide, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 348, 350 (1986), and the last reported prosecution was in 1961, see LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT, supra note 1, at 37 n.73 (citing State v. Willis, 255 N.C. 473, 121 S.E.2d 854 (1961)). In addition, there is a longstanding, albeit not often discussed, practice by physicians of terminating medical care for patients when treatment merely serves to prolong the dying process. See In re Storar (Eichner), 52 N.Y.2d 363, 385-86 & n.3, 420 N.E.2d 64, 75-76 & n.3, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, 277-78 & n.3 (Jones, J., dissenting in part), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981); Fried, Terminating Life Support: Out of the Closetl, 295 NEW ENG. J. MED. 390, 390 (1976). This tradition is more specific than the general societal tradition against suicide and therefore prevails even under Justice Scalia's due process analysis. See Michael H., 109 S. Ct. at 2344 n.6.
253. Cf. Washington v. Harper, 110 S. Ct. 1028, 1036 (1990) (noting that a prisoner retains "a significant liberty interest" under the due process clause "in avoiding the unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs"). Arguably, the Anglo-American tradition of discouraging suicide and attempted suicide, see Comment, The Punishment of Suicide - A Need for Change, 14 VILL. L. REV. 463, 464-68 (1969); infra note 173, negates the more general tradition of protecting bodily integrity and autonomy, for a liberty interest cannot be fundamental when there exists "a societal tradition of enacting laws denying the interest." Michael H. v. Gerald D., 109 S. Ct. 2333, 2341 n.2 (1989) (plurality opinion) (emphasis deleted). The societal legal proscription against suicide, however, is not "longstanding and still extant." Id. at 2345 n.6. Even though suicide was a crime at early common law, it has never been punished in the United States. See Comment, supra, at 465. Although attempted suicide has occasionally been punished, see id. at 466-67, "the prevailing view has long been otherwise." W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW § 7.8(a), at 649 (2d ed. 1986). Currently no state by statute criminalizes attempts to commit suicide, see Note, Criminal Liability for Assisting Suicide, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 348, 350 (1986), and the last reported prosecution was in 1961, see LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT, supra note 1, at 37 n.73 (citing State v. Willis, 255 N.C. 473, 121 S.E.2d 854 (1961)). In addition, there is a longstanding, albeit not often discussed, practice by physicians of terminating medical care for patients when treatment merely serves to prolong the dying process. See In re Storar (Eichner), 52 N.Y.2d 363, 385-86 & n.3, 420 N.E.2d 64, 75-76 & n.3, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, 277-78 & n.3 (Jones, J., dissenting in part), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981); Fried, Terminating Life Support: Out of the Closetl, 295 NEW ENG. J. MED. 390, 390 (1976). This tradition is more specific than the general societal tradition against suicide and therefore prevails even under Justice Scalia's due process analysis. See Michael H., 109 S. Ct. at 2344 n.6.
254. Cf. Washington v. Harper, 110 S. Ct. 1028, 1036 (1990) (noting that a prisoner retains "a significant liberty interest" under the due process clause "in avoiding the unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs"). Arguably, the Anglo-American tradition of discouraging suicide and attempted suicide, see Comment, The Punishment of Suicide - A Need for Change, 14 VILL. L. REV. 463, 464-68 (1969); infra note 173, negates the more general tradition of protecting bodily integrity and autonomy, for a liberty interest cannot be fundamental when there exists "a societal tradition of enacting laws denying the interest." Michael H. v. Gerald D., 109 S. Ct. 2333, 2341 n.2 (1989) (plurality opinion) (emphasis deleted). The societal legal proscription against suicide, however, is not "longstanding and still extant." Id. at 2345 n.6. Even though suicide was a crime at early common law, it has never been punished in the United States. See Comment, supra, at 465. Although attempted suicide has occasionally been punished, see id. at 466-67, "the prevailing view has long been otherwise." W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW § 7.8(a), at 649 (2d ed. 1986). Currently no state by statute criminalizes attempts to commit suicide, see Note, Criminal Liability for Assisting Suicide, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 348, 350 (1986), and the last reported prosecution was in 1961, see LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT, supra note 1, at 37 n.73 (citing State v. Willis, 255 N.C. 473, 121 S.E.2d 854 (1961)). In addition, there is a longstanding, albeit not often discussed, practice by physicians of terminating medical care for patients when treatment merely serves to prolong the dying process. See In re Storar (Eichner), 52 N.Y.2d 363, 385-86 & n.3, 420 N.E.2d 64, 75-76 & n.3, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, 277-78 & n.3 (Jones, J., dissenting in part), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981); Fried, Terminating Life Support: Out of the Closetl, 295 NEW ENG. J. MED. 390, 390 (1976). This tradition is more specific than the general societal tradition against suicide and therefore prevails even under Justice Scalia's due process analysis. See Michael H., 109 S. Ct. at 2344 n.6.
255. See Garvey, Freedom and Choice in Constitutional Law, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1756, 1756 (1981); Rhoden, supra note 53, at 388; Shultz, From Informed Consent to Patient Choice: A New Protected Interest, 95 YALE L.J. 219, 277 (1985). That substantive due process provides rights of choice and not guarantees of certain outcomes is evident in the abortion context. Compare Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (upholding a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy under certain circumstances) with Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (finding no constitutional obligation on the states to provide the funds needed to obtain an abortion).
256. See Garvey, Freedom and Choice in Constitutional Law, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1756, 1756 (1981); Rhoden, supra note 53, at 388; Shultz, From Informed Consent to Patient Choice: A New Protected Interest, 95 YALE L.J. 219, 277 (1985). That substantive due process provides rights of choice and not guarantees of certain outcomes is evident in the abortion context. Compare Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (upholding a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy under certain circumstances) with Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (finding no constitutional obligation on the states to provide the funds needed to obtain an abortion).
257. See In re Conservatorship of Drabick, 200 Cal. App. 3d 185, 208, 245 Cal. Rptr. 840, 854, cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 399 (1988). Judicial treatment of statutes denying guardians the authority to consent to the sterilization of their incompetent wards illustrates the problems with ascribing autonomy-based rights to those incapable of exercising any autonomy. Although such statutes have been struck down as interfering with the fundamental right of incompetent women choose to be sterilized, see, e.g., In re Conservatorship of Valerie N., 40 Cal. 3d 143, 707 P.2d 760, 219 Cal. Rptr. 387 (1985), involuntary sterilization simultaneously infringes upon the constitutional right to have offspring, see Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 536 (1942). Because an incompetent ward is incapable of choosing between the two options, use of due process language masks a value judgment by the court that sterilization would be the proper choice for the ward to make, if she were competent. Cf. Kamisar, Speaking Out: Karen Ann Quinlan and the "Right To Die," 29 LAW QUADRANGLE NOTES 2, 3 (1985) ("The Quinlan case . . . badly smudged, if it did not erase, the distinction between the right to choose one's own death and the right to choose someone else's.").
258. Garvey, supra note 154, at 1759; see also Rhoden, supra note 53, at 386.
259. See LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT, supra note 1, at 135; L. TRIBE, supra note 46, § 15-11, at 1369.
260. The Supreme Court has long held that incompetent persons retain their constitutional rights, even though others may have to vindicate them. See, e.g., Thompson v. Oklahoma, 108 S. Ct. 2687, 2693 n.23 (1988) (plurality opinion); Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
261. See L. TRIBE, supra note 46, § 18-1, at 1688-89.
262. See Rasmussen v. Fleming, 154 Ariz. 207, 215 n.9, 741 P.2d 674, 682 n.9 (1987) (en banc); In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114, 121, 660 P.2d 738, 742 (1983) (en banc). Most courts, however, have applied the due process analysis without discussing the state action requirement, thus either ignoring it or simply presuming state action. See, e.g., Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., 398 Mass. 417, 497 N.E.2d 626 (1986); In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
263. See Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 350 (1974).
264. Id. at 351.
265. See Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982).
266. See id. at 1008 (holding that "medical judgments made by private parties according to professional standards that are not established by the State" do not implicate state action); Walker v. Pierce, 560 F.2d 609, 613 (4th Cir. 1977) (holding that a medical decision by a physician in a hospital receiving federal funds does not implicate state action), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1075 (1978); see also West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 52 n.10 (1988) ("Where the issue is whether a private party is engaged in activity that constitutes state action, it may be relevant that the challenged activity turned on judgments controlled by professional standards, where those standards are not established by the State." (emphasis in original)). Several recent cases have refused to find state action in a physician's refusal to terminate treatment. See, e.g., Ross v. Hilltop Rehabilitation Hosp., 676 F. Supp. 1528, 1535-37 (D. Colo. 1987); Bouvia v. Glenchur, 195 Cal. App. 3d 1075, 1086-89, 241 Cal. Rptr. 239, 246-47 (1987). When a patient in a public hospital is treated against his wishes in accordance with hospital policy, state action is clearly implicated. However, many doctors practicing in hospitals have the status of independent contractors, see A. SOUTHWICK, THE LAW OF HOSPITAL AND HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION 544 (2d ed. 1988), over whom the state exerts little control. The determination of state action in such circumstances may ultimately rest upon whether the court believes that the public nature of the hospital influences medical care decisions of physicians in that institution. See West, 487 U.S. at 56 n.15 (finding state action in the treatment decisions of a physician under contract to provide medical services in a state prison because "the nonmedical functions of prison life inevitably influence the nature, timing, and forms of medical care provided").
267. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).
268. See, e.g., Gray v. Romeo, 697 F. Supp. 580, 588 (D.R.I. 1988); In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 348-49, 486 A.2d 1209, 1223 (1985). These four interests were first enunciated in Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 741, 370 N.E.2d 417, 425 (1977).
269. Some courts have argued that the state interest in the preservation of life actually implicates two analytically separate concerns: an interest in preserving the life of the patient and an interest in preserving societal respect for the sanctity of life in general. See Rasmussen v. Fleming, 154 Ariz. 207, 216, 741 P.2d 674, 683 (1987) (en banc); Conroy, 98 N.J. at 349, 486 A.2d at 1223.
270. See, e.g., Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., 398 Mass. 417, 433-34, 497 N.E.2d 626, 635 (1986); Conroy, 98 N.J. at 349, 486 A.2d at 1223-24.
271. See, e.g., In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 41, 355 A.2d 647, 664, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976); In re Guardianship of Grant, 109 Wash. 2d 545, 556, 747 P.2d 445, 451 (1987) (en banc), modified on other grounds, 757 P.2d 534 (Wash. 1988).
272. See, e.g., Brophy, 398 Mass. at 433-34 & n.28, 497 N.E.2d at 635 & n.28; Grant, 109 Wash. 2d at 556, 747 P.2d at 451.
273. See, e.g., In re Peter, 108 N.J. 365, 380, 529 A.2d 419, 427 (1987) ("[Wk find it difficult to conceive of a case in which the state could have an interest strong enough to subordinate a patient's right to choose not to be artificially sustained in a persistent vegetative state."). But see Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408 (Mo. 1988) (en banc) (holding that the state's interest in life outweighed a vegetative patient's right to terminate artificial sustenance), cert. granted sub nom. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 109 S. Ct. 3240 (1989). Although the Cruzan court framed the state interest in life as "unqualified," see id. at 422, it is unlikely that the court meant to prohibit termination of treatment in all cases. See infra note 233.
274. See supra note 153.
275. Aiding and abetting suicide remains a crime in many American jurisdictions. See W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note 153, § 7.8(c), at 650-52. Moreover, persons are often hospitalized involuntarily for psychiatric reasons after attempting suicide. See 1 M. PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW § 2.06, at 65 (1989). Finally, bystanders are authorized to use force if necessary to prevent the success of a suicide attempt. See N. CANTOR, supra note 12, at 46.
276. See, e.g., In re President & Directors of Georgetown College, 331 F.2d 1000, 1008-09 (D.C. Cir.) (Wright, J., in chambers), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964).
277. See A. MEISEL, supra note 26, § 4.14, at 102.
278. See, e.g., Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160, 162-63 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (noting that the competent patient had a "basic wish to live"), aff'd, 379 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980); Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 743 n.11, 370 N.E.2d 417, 426 n.11 (1977).
279. See N. CANTOR, supra note 12, at 47.
280. See, e.g., Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 743 n.11, 370 N.E.2d at 426 n.11; In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 350-51, 486 A.2d 1209, 1224 (1985).
281. See, e.g., Gray v. Romeo, 697 F. Supp. 580, 589 (D.R.I. 1988); Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., 398 Mass. 417, 439, 497 N.E.2d 626, 638 (1986).
282. Rubenfeld, supra note 141, at 795 n.214.
283. Cf. Conroy, 98 N.J. at 350, 486 A.2d at 1224 (questioning whether the interest in preventing suicide is a "distinct state interest worthy of independent consideration").
284. See, e.g., Jefferson v. Griffin-Spaulding County Hosp., 247 Ga. 86, 274 S.E.2d 457 (1981) (ordering a pregnant woman to undergo a cesarean section over her religious objections); see also supra pp. 1567-69 (discussing forced cesareans).
285. See, e.g., In re President & Directors of Georgetown College, 531 F.2d 1000, 1008 (D.C. Cir.) (Wright, J., in chambers), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964).
286. See, e.g., In re Farrell, 108 N.J. 335, 352-53, 529 A.2d 404, 412-13 (1987); Fosmire v. Nicoleau, 75 N.Y. 2d 218, 229-31, 551 N.E. 2d 77, 83-84, 551 N.Y.S.2d 876, 882-83 (1990).
287. See, e.g., Gray v. Romeo, 697 F. Supp. 580, 589 (D.R.I. 1988); Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 743, 370
288. See Blake, State Interests in Terminating Medical Treatment, HASTINGS CENTER REP., May-June 1989, at 5, 9-11; cf. J BERLANT, PROFESSION AND MONOPOLY 64-68, 97-120 (1975) (arguing that standards of medical ethics advance physicians' interests by furthering the profession's monopoly).
289. See Blake, State Interests in Terminating Medical Treatment, HASTINGS CENTER REP., May-June 1989, at 5, 9-11; cf. J BERLANT, PROFESSION AND MONOPOLY 64-68, 97-120 (1975) (arguing that standards of medical ethics advance physicians' interests by furthering the profession's monopoly).
290. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
291. See, e.g., In re Boyd, 403 A.2d 744 (D.C. 1979) (Christian Scientist); Wons v. Public Health Trust, 500 So. 2d 679 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (Jehovah's Witness); In re Milton, 29 Ohio St. 3d 20, 505 N.E.2d 255 (1987) (believer in faith healing).
292. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963).
293. See, e.g., In re Estate of Brooks, 32 Ill. 2d 362, 373, 205 N.E.2d 435, 442 (1965); Milton, 29 Ohio St. 3d at 23-26, 505 N.E.2d at 258-60.
294. See, e.g., In re Jamaica Hosp., 128 Misc. 2d 1006, 491 N.V.S.2d 898 (Sup. Ct. 1985).
295. See, e.g., In re Winthrop Univ. Hosp., 128 Misc. 2d 804, 490 N.Y.S.2d 996 (Sup. Ct. 1985). But see cases cited supra note 184 (rejecting this state interest).
296. See In re Osborne, 294 A.2d 372, 375 (D.C. 1972); Wons v. Public Health Trust, 500 So. 2d 679, 688 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
297. See St. Mary's Hosp. v. Ramsey, 465 So. 2d 666 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) ($50 per week support to a minor child living with the patient's former wife).
298. See supra text accompanying notes 183 to 184.
299. See, e.g., In re Brown, 478 So. 2d 1033 (Miss. 1985) (declining to order a blood transfusion over religious objections when the patient was to be a witness in a pending criminal prosecution).
300. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 259 (1982); see also L. TRIBE, supra note 46, § 14-13, at 1268-69 (discussing the state's interest in overseeing autonomous adults in a manner that restricts religious freedom).
301. See, e.g., In re President & Directors of Georgetown College, 331 F.2d 100 (D.C. Cir.) (Wright, J., in chambers), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964); In re Estate of Dorone, 517 Pa. 3, 9, 534 A.2d 452, 455 (1987).
302. See Developments in the Law - Civil Commitment of the Menially Ill, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1190, 1218 n.95 (1974).
303. See Jehovah's Witnesses v. King County Hosp., 390 U.S. 598 (1968), aff'g per curiam 278 F. Supp. 488 (W.D. Wash. 1967).
304. See, e.g., In re Sampson, 65 Misc. 2d 658, 317 N.Y.S.2d 641 (Fam. Ct. 1970), aff'd, 37 A.D.2d 668, 323 N.Y.S.2d 253 (1971), aff'd per curiam, 29 N.Y.2d 900, 278 N.E.2d 918, 328 N.Y.S.2d 686 (1972); In re Jensen, 54 Or. App. 1, 633 P.2d 1302, review denied, 291 Or. 662, 639 P.2d 1280 (1981).
305. Although most legislative activity has occurred at the state level, federal legislation was introduced in the Senate in 1989. See Patient Self-Determination Act of 1989, S. 1766, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG. REC. 813,566 (daily ed. Oct. 17, 1989).
306. MINN. STAT. § 144.651(12) (1988).
307. See McConnell v. Beverly Enterprises-Connecticut, Inc., 209 Conn. 692, 553 A.2d 596 (1989); Hazelton v. Powhatan Nursing Home, Inc., 6 Va. Cir. 414 (1986). Other courts have used state guardianship or conservatorship statutes to implement an incompetent patient's constitutional or common law right to refuse treatment. See, e.g., In re Conservatorship of Drabick, 200 Cal. App. 3d 185, 200-04, 206-10, 245 Cal. Rptr. 840, 849-51, 853-56, cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 399 (1988); In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114, 120, 128-32, 660 P.2d 738, 742, 746-48 ('983) (en banc).
308. See A. MEISEL, supra note 26, § 10.5, at 320-21.
309. See id. at 321.
310. Even in states lacking such a statute, courts accord weight to indications of patient intent contained in such documents. See, e.g., Saunders v. State, 129 Misc. 2d 45, 53-54, 492 N.Y.S.2d 510, 516-17 (Sup. Ct. 1985).
311. See Zinberg, supra note 122, at 454-55. For examples, see CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7185-7195 (West Supp. 1990); and FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.01-.15 (West 1986).
312. See Zinberg, supra note 122, at 454-55. For examples, see CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7185-7195 (West Supp. 1990); and FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.01-.15 (West 1986).
313. See Zinberg, supra note 122, at 456. For examples, see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-322 (1985); and VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2986 (1988).
314. See Zinberg, supra note 122, at 456. For examples, see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-322 (1985); and VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2986 (1988).
315. See Zinberg, supra note 122, at 455. For examples, see CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 2430-2444 West Supp. 1990); and ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1101/2, para. 804-1 to -12 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1989).
316. See Zinberg, supra note 122, at 455. For examples, see CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 2430-2444 West Supp. 1990); and ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1101/2, para. 804-1 to -12 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1989).
317. See Zinberg, supra note 122, at 455-56. For examples, see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 2502 (1983); and TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4590h-1 (Vernon Supp. 1990).
318. See Zinberg, supra note 122, at 455-56. For examples, see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 2502 (1983); and TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4590h-1 (Vernon Supp. 1990).
319. See Zinberg, supra note 122, at 456. For examples, see COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-14-501 (1987); and ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18A, § 5-501 (West Supp. 1989).
320. See Zinberg, supra note 122, at 456. For examples, see COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-14-501 (1987); and ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18A, § 5-501 (West Supp. 1989).
321. See A. MEISEL, supra note 26, § 11.12, at 366 & n.50. The definition of terminal varies by statute. Death must be "imminent" under 16 statutes and must occur within a "short time" under nine. Fourteen others do not specify any period of time. See Zinberg, supra note 122, at 461 n.60.
322. Twenty statutes specifically forbid termination of artificial nutrition and hydration pursuant to a directive, see Zinberg, supra note 122, at 458-59 & n.45, while four statutes specifically allow termination of feeding not required for comfort, see id. at 459 n.45.
323. See W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON, D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 32, at 190-91 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON]. The doctrine has been accepted in all but three American jurisdictions. See Zinberg, supra note 122, at 447 n.2.
324. See Physician's Responsibility, supra note 70, at 957.
325. Common law battery is the intentional, unauthorized touching of another person. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 215, § 9, at 39.
326. See R. FADEN & T. BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY AND THEORY OF INFORMED CONSENT 27 (1986); 1 F. HARPER, F. JAMES & O. GRAY, THE LAW OF TORTS § 3.10, at 301 n.20 (2d ed. 1986). Medical professionals are also required to provide the information necessary to make consent meaningful. See 1 MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS, supra note 10, at 20.
327. See R. FADEN & T. BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY AND THEORY OF INFORMED CONSENT 27 (1986); 1 F. HARPER, F. JAMES & O. GRAY, THE LAW OF TORTS § 3.10, at 301 n.20 (2d ed. 1986). Medical professionals are also required to provide the information necessary to make consent meaningful. See 1 MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS, supra note 10, at 20.
328. See R. FADEN & T. BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY AND THEORY OF INFORMED CONSENT 27 (1986); 1 F. HARPER, F. JAMES & O. GRAY, THE LAW OF TORTS § 3.10, at 301 n.20 (2d ed. 1986). Medical professionals are also required to provide the information necessary to make consent meaningful. See 1 MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS, supra note 10, at 20.
329. In such cases, the battery is considered a technical one, and the patient may recover only minal damages. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 907 & comment a (1979); PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 215, § 9, at 40.
330. See, e.g., Estate of Leach v. Shapiro, 13 Ohio App. 3d 393, 469 N.E.2d 1047 (1984) (holding that such a suit states a cause of action); see also Young v. Oakland Gen. Hosp., 175 Mich. App. 132, 437 N.W.2d 321 (1989) (accepting the battery action in theory, though finding it inapplicable on the facts); Margolick, Patient's Lawsuit Says Saving Life Ruined It, N.Y. Times, Mar. 18, 1990, § 1, at 1, col. 1 (reporting the first suit by a living patient for battery). But see, e.g., McVey v. Englewood Hosp. Ass'n, 216 N.J. Super. 502, 506-07, 524 A.2d 450, 452 (1987) (rejecting a battery action when the patient's daughters requested termination of life supports before their appointment as guardians and finding no duty on the part of physicians to determine an incompetent patient's orally expressed wishes). See generally Oddi, The Tort of Interference with the Right To Die: The Wrongful Living Cause of Action, 75 GEO. L.J. 625 (1986).
331. See, e.g., Estate of Leach v. Shapiro, 13 Ohio App. 3d 393, 469 N.E.2d 1047 (1984) (holding that such a suit states a cause of action); see also Young v. Oakland Gen. Hosp., 175 Mich. App. 132, 437 N.W.2d 321 (1989) (accepting the battery action in theory, though finding it inapplicable on the facts); Margolick, Patient's Lawsuit Says Saving Life Ruined It, N.Y. Times, Mar. 18, 1990, § 1, at 1, col. 1 (reporting the first suit by a living patient for battery). But see, e.g., McVey v. Englewood Hosp. Ass'n, 216 N.J. Super. 502, 506-07, 524 A.2d 450, 452 (1987) (rejecting a battery action when the patient's daughters requested termination of life supports before their appointment as guardians and finding no duty on the part of physicians to determine an incompetent patient's orally expressed wishes). See generally Oddi, The Tort of Interference with the Right To Die: The Wrongful Living Cause of Action, 75 GEO. L.J. 625 (1986).
332. See P. APPELBAUM, C. LIDZ & A. MEISEL, INFORMED CONSENT: LEGAL THEORY AND CLINICAL PRACTICE 117-19 (1987); PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 215, § 32, at 190.
333. See P. APPELBAUM, C. LIDZ & A. MEISEL, supra note 221, at 41-49 (discussing the various standards under which physician disclosures are evaluated). Because only physical injuries are compensable under negligence law, see PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 215, § 30, at 165, patients may find it difficult to vindicate their rights in the absence of such injuries or when the benefits of treatment outweigh the injuries.
334. See P. APPELBAUM, C. LIDZ & A. MEISEL, supra note 221, at 118; Shultz, supra note 154, at 226. But see ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-562(b) (1982) (abolishing the cause of action for medical battery).
335. Patients may recover for any physical or economic injury resulting from the unconsented touching. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 905(3) (1979); Shultz, supra note 154, at 224 n.24. Moreover, the patient or his survivors may seek recovery for any revulsion or humiliation suffered. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 905 comments d & e (1979); PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 215, § 9, at 40. Punitive damages might also be available. See id. at 40-41.
336. Patients may recover for any physical or economic injury resulting from the unconsented touching. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 905(3) (1979); Shultz, supra note 154, at 224 n.24. Moreover, the patient or his survivors may seek recovery for any revulsion or humiliation suffered. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 905 comments d & e (1979); PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 215, § 9, at 40. Punitive damages might also be available. See id. at 40-41.
337. Because battery doctrine developed in a context entirely different from that of lifesaving medical treatment, see 1 F. HARPER, F. JAMES & O. GRAY, supra note 218, § 3.1, at 266-67, courts should avoid formalistic application in this context without careful analysis.
338. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 215, § 18, at 114-15.
339. See id. § 9, at 40.
340. See R. FADEN & T. BEAUCHAMP, supra note 218, at 36.
341. The four exceptions are public health emergencies requiring mass health programs, medical emergencies in which the delay necessary to obtain consent would place the patient in significant danger of harm and there is no evidence that the patient would refuse the treatment, cases of "therapeutic privilege" in which the physician reasonably believes that the information if conveyed would seriously threaten the patient's mental or physical well-being, and "waiver" cases in which the patient has indicated that he does not wish to be informed. See P. APPELBAUM, C. LIDZ & A. MEISEL, supra note 221, at 66-79; R. FADEN & T. BEAUCHAMP, supra note 218, at 35-39.
342. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 215, § 18, at 116.
343. See, e.g., In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 348-55, 486 A.2d 1209, 1223-26 (1985); In re Storar (Eichner), 52 N.Y.2d 363, 377 & n.6, 420 N.E.2d 64, 71 & n.6, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, 273 & n.6, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981); see also supra pp. 1666-69 (discussing the four state interests).
344. See Meisel, The "Exceptions" to the Informed Consent Doctrine: Striking a Balance Between Competing Values in Medical Decisionmaking, 1979 WIS. L. REV. 413, 433-34.
345. See Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408 (Mo. 1988) (en banc), cert. granted sub nom. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 109 S. Ct. 3240 (1989); In re Westchester County Medical Center (O'Connor), 72 N.Y.2d 517, 531 N.E.2d 607, 534 N.Y.S.2d 886 (1988); Storar, 52 N.Y.2d at 380-82, 420 N.E.2d at 72-74, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 274-76. e polemical language in Cruzan has led some commentators to interpret the decision as significantly broader than suggested here. See, e.g., Greenhouse, Does Right to Privacy Include Right To Die? Court To Decide, N.Y. Times, July 25, 1989, at A1, col. 3 (quoting Professor Nancy Rhoden as calling the Cruzan decision "totally anomalous"). In fact, Cruzan does not seem significantly different from the O'Connor/Storar approach. Cruzan accepted in principle the right to refuse medical treatment, noting that the right was "a necessary corollary" of informed consent doctrine. See 760 S.W.2d at 417. Moreover, much of the polemical language in the opinion is internally inconsistent with either the court's actual holding or other language in the opinion. For example, although the court stated that "it is definitionally impossible for a person to make an informed decision - either to consent or to refuse - under hypothetical circumstances [because] neither the benefits nor the risks of treatment can be properly weighed or fully appreciated," id., the court approved of just such a decision in cases in which the formalities required by Missouri's living will statute are followed, see id. at 425. Furthermore, although the court characterized the state's interest in life as "unqualified," id. at 422, this description seems at odds with the court's balancing of that interest against the patient's interests, see id., and the court's implication that in some cases - when there is a living will or when there is clear and convincing evidence of the patient's intent - the patient's interest outweighs that of the state, see id. at 425. This suggests that with appropriate, albeit rigorous, safeguards, the Missouri court might permit termination of medical treatment even for incompetent patients. Furthermore, the court's requirement that refusal of treatment itself be informed, see id. at 417, produces nonsensical results. For example, a doctor confronted with a competent patient who refuses to discuss treatment options would be prohibited from providing lifesaving treatment under informed consent doctrine, yet obligated to provide such treatment under Cruzan's novel informed refusal requirement.
346. See Dresser, supra note 54, at 397 n.135.
347. See O'Connor, 72 N.Y.2d at 530-31, 531 N.E.2d at 613, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 892; cf. L. TRIBE, supra note 46, § 16-31, at 1598 n.26 (suggesting that those near death be considered handicapped and thus entitled to greater judicial solicitude).
348. See L. TRIBE, supra note 46, § 16-31, at 1599.
349. See, e.g., Rasmussen v. Fleming, 154 Ariz. 207, 224, 741 P.2d 674, 691 (1987) (en banc); Storar, 52 N.Y.2d at 378-79, 420 N.E.2d at 72, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 274. The due process clause may require a clear and convincing evidence standard. In Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979), the Supreme Court required clear and convincing evidence before a person could be involuntarily committed for his own welfare and protection or for the protection of others. See id. at 425-27, 431-33. Because the decision to allow a person to die threatens interests more substantial than those threatened by involuntary committal, a heightened standard of review seems appropriate. See id. at 424 (suggesting that such a standard is appropriate when "[t]he interests at stake . . . are deemed to be more substantial than mere loss of money" and when "particularly important individual interests" are involved).