Computer system reliability and nuclear war

Communications of the ACM

Volumn 30, Issue 2, 1987, Pages 112-131

  Borning, Alan ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

MILITARY ENGINEERING - COMPUTER APPLICATIONS;

NUCLEAR WAR; NUCLEAR WEAPONS;

COMPUTER SYSTEMS, DIGITAL;

EID: 0023287803     PISSN: 00010782     EISSN: 15577317     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1145/12527.12528     Document Type: Article

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