Natural resource policy, unforgiving geographies, and persistent poverty in Alaska Native villages

Natural Resources Journal

Volumn 38, Issue 1, 1998, Pages 85-108

  Berardi, Gigi ^a  

^a WESTERN WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0013577743     PISSN: 00280739     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (105)

1. See RURAL SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETY TASK FORCE ON PERSISTENT RURAL POVERTY, PERSISTENT POVERTY IN RURAL AMERICA (1993). The task force was organized to outline new directions in theory that would provide complementary and cumulative explanations of persistent rural poverty. Its intent was to move beyond major existing theories such as the culture of poverty and embrace more robust theories such as rational underinvestment, dependency, moral exclusion, and global economic restructuring. The task force focused on rural rather than urban poverty since previous research had centered mostly on urban areas. Key terms - "persistent," "rural," and "poverty" - are defined and discussed on pp. 4-7 and 20-22 of the report. Briefly, "persistent" refers to the permanence of a substantial segment of the population with incomes below the poverty threshold despite ameliorative efforts, "rural" refers to nonmetropolitan or more sparsely populated areas, and families living in "poverty" are those whose cash income is below the official poverty threshold. In the 1990 U.S. Bureau of the Census data, 48 thresholds are used to determine poverty status; these are adjusted annually to reflect inflation.
2. Gigi Berardi, Native Alaskan Populations at Risk: Putting the Last First (1991) (paper presented to the Rural Sociological Society Meeting (on file with author).
3. See Lee Huskey, Regional Poverty, National Transfers: Transfer Programs and Poverty in Rural Alaska (1990) (paper presented to the WEA International Conference, on file with author);
4. ALASKA NATIVES COMM'N/JOINT FEDERAL-STATE COMM'N ON POLICIES AND PROGRAMS AFFECTING ALASKA NATIVES, ALASKA NATIVES COMMISSION FINAL REPORT, VOL. I-III (1994) [hereinafter ALASKA NATIVES COMM'N];
5. MATTHEW BERMAN & KAREN P. FOSTER, INST. OF SOC. AND ECON. RESEARCH, POVERTY AMONG ALASKA NATIVES, RESEARCH SUMMARY 31 (1986).
6. The term "Village Alaska" refers to remote villages, many of which are characterized by their small size, with populations of less than 500, and at least one-quarter of the households living below the poverty level; see LEE HUSKEY, INST. OF SOC. AND ECON. RESEARCH, THE ECONOMY OF VILLAGE ALASKA 2 (1992).
7. These villages are found principally in the Yukon-Kuskokwim Delta, southwest, and interior regions, as well as to a lesser extent the northwest, arctic, and Alaska Peninsula regions. More prosperous villages are found in areas where they receive direct income from oil or taxes on oil (as on the North Slope), fish (as in some coastal regions), timber (as in southeast and southcentral Alaska), or minerals (areas of the northwest region). L HUSKEY, THE ECONOMY OF VILLAGE ALASKA 1992 2 Id.
8. For more detailed information, see RURAL SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETY TASK FORCE ON PERSISTENT RURAL POVERTY, supra note 1, at 21;
9. STATE OF ALASKA DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY AND REGIONAL AFFAIRS, COMMUNITY INFORMATION SUMMARIES (1995) [hereinafter SUMMARIES].
10. Income transfers and related support include money and services the federal and state governments provide such as: welfare, pension, and other payment programs; jobs in post offices and other public agencies; and schools and other services which also are subsidized. In 1989, transfers accounted for nearly 60 percent of per capita personal income in western coastal Alaska. See HUSKEY, supra note 4, at 9.
11. See HUSKEY, supra note 4, at 9-12; GORDON S. HARRISON, THE YEARS OF BIG SPENDING IN ALASKA: HOW GOOD IS THE RECORD? (Inst. of Soc. & Econ. Research, Occasional Papers No. 20, 1989).
12. See SUMMARIES, supra note 4.
13. See O. SCOTT GOLDSMITH & TERESA HULL, TRACKING THE STRUCTURE OF THE ALASKA ECONOMY: THE 1994 ISER MAP ECONOMIC DATABASE (Inst. of Soc. & Econ. Research Working Paper 94.1, 1994);
14. MATTHEW BERMAN ET AL., INST. OF SOC. & ECON. RESEARCH, NATURAL RESOURCE DEPLETION AND SOCIAL INCOME ACCOUNTING: SUSTAINABLE INCOME IN PETROLEUM-DEPENDENT ECONOMIES (1992).
15. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNTTED STATES: 1990, 110TH EDITION (1990).
16. Before the Prudhoe Bay oil fields were discovered, Alaska was a state of modest means. Military and other federal government spending and extractive industries (fishing, mining, logging, and some oil production in Cook Inlet) provided most of state income. The economic impact of the discovery of oil in Alaska was dramatically different than elsewhere, primarily because the state government owned the field and thus could collect royalties as well as taxes, large amounts of oil could be produced (close to two million barrels a day), and soon after oil began flowing, the world price tripled. Thomas A. Morehouse, Alaska's Political Economy: Myths and Realities 2 (1993) (paper presented to the Western Regional Science Association Annual Meetings, Wailea, Maui, Hawaii) (on file with the Nat. Resources J.).
17. Thomas A. Morehouse, Western Regional Science Association Annual Meetings, 1993) ( 2 ( Id.; see also BERMAN ET AL., supra note 8, at 13-19.
18. See ROBERT CHAMBERS, RURAL DEVELOPMENT: PUTTING THE LAST FIRST 131-38 (1983);
19. JOSEPH JORGENSEN, OIL AGE ESKIMOS 11-19 (1990).
20. See William Freudenburg, Addictive Economies: Extractive Industries and Vulnerable Localities in a Changing World Economy 9 (1991) (paper presented to the Rural Sociological Society Annual Meeting, Columbus) (on file with the Nat. Resources J.).
21. See JORGENSEN, supra note 12; for a related discussion of the political assault on subsistence harvest preferences by organized urban interests, see ALASKA NATIVES COMM'N, supra note 3, Vol. III, at 14-42.
22. See DAVID D. MILLS & ANNE S. FIRMAN, FISH AND WILDLIFE USE IN YAKUTAT ALASKA: CONTEMPORARY PATTERNS AND CHANGES 215-227 (Div.of Subsistence, Alaska Dep't of Fish & Game, Technical Paper No. 131 (1986)).
23. It was not until 1959 that the Tlingit and Haida received a judgment in the 1935 action. As reported by Berger, "the U.S. Court of Claims explicitly declared that the Treaty of Cession, 1867, did not extinguish aboriginal title." Seven years later the tribe was awarded a cash settlement of 7.5 million dollars in compensation, with no return of Native lands. See THOMAS R. BERGER, VILLAGE JOURNEY: THE REPORT OF THE ALASKA NATIVE REVIEW COMM'N 22 (1985). Berger was head of the Alaska Native Review Commission. The commission was appointed by the Inuit Circumpolar Conference, an organization of Eskimos from Alaska, Canada, and Greenland, to review ANCSA.
24. See, e.g., ALASKA DEP'T OF EDUC., THE ALASKA NATIVE CLAIMS SETTLEMENT ACT: SELECTED STUDENT READINGS 6 (1986).
25. Id. at 7.
26. There was tremendous pressure on Native groups as well to settle land claims, given the expected economic importance of the "super giant" Prudhoe Bay oil field. Its estimated 12 billion recoverable barrels of oil characterized it as an extremely rare geological find. See Morehouse, supra note 10, at 5.
27. See the following for identification and discussion of issues, events, and participants in the formulation of ANCSA: Morehouse, supra note 10; Victor Fisher, Alaska Native Land Claims Bibliography (paper presented to the Seventh Libraries Colloquy, Centre d'Etude Arctiques, Paris 1979); BERGER, supra note 16;
28. THOMAS A. MOREHOUSE, THE ALASKA NATIVE CLAIMS SETTLEMENT ACT, 1991, AND TRIBAL GOVERNMENT 20-21 (Inst. of Soc. & Econ. Research Occasional Paper No. 19, 1988) [hereinafter MOREHOUSE, ANCSA];
29. MARY C. BERRY, THE ALASKA PIPELINE, THE POLITICS OF OIL AND NATIVE LAND CLAIMS (1975);
30. FREDERICK SEAGAYUK BIGJIM & JAMES ITO-ADLER, LETTERS TO HOWARD: AN INTERPRETATION OF THE ALASKA NATIVE LAND CLAIMS (1974).
31. See also DAN O'NEILL, THE FIRECRACKER BOYS (1994), for a description of a Cold War-era attempt to use nuclear bombs to excavate a harbor in northwest Alaska, which subsequently prompted the growth of Alaska Native leadership and activism on land rights.
32. Some saw the Act as social engineering. See STEWART FRENCH, ARCTIC INST. OF NORTH AMERICA ,ALASKA NATIVE CLAIMS SETTLEMENT ACT 3, 16 (1972): . . . while admittedly a compromise and far from perfect, [ANCSA] nevertheless marks a great moral and ethical advance over the white man's dealings with the native inhabitants of the Lower 48 . . . the Act will provide an unparalleled case study on a large scale of the adaptability to a radically changed economic, social, and political environment of several markedly different ethnic groups, which have dealt effectively for centuries with a harsh physical environment and a totally different level of social and economic problems. The mechanism for the use, development, and control over the lands, resources, and money by the Native people of Alaska - only a few generations removed from aboriginal existence - is that relatively modern business creation, the corporation. As shareholders, the Native people are entitled to a voice in management and a share in the lands, assets, and income . . . . Id. at 3, 16. Economic benefits anticipated included development of natural resources, capital improvements (for example, housing, transportation, and services), employment opportunities, and establishment of small business enterprises. Broader social benefits included raised educational levels and greater Native political influence. Id. at 4-5.
33. See BERGER, supra note 16, at 45. As BERGER stated, "ANCSA is an attempt to recreate Main Street on the tundra." Id. at 45-46. ANCSA does this by promoting capital expenditures. Rather than strengthening the existing subsistence economy, it encourages extraction of natural resources and the anticipated economic development following.
34. See MOREHOUSE, ANCSA, supra note 20, at 1-2.
35. This is clear in some of the provisions of ANCSA. For example, the 70 percent revenue sharing among corporations underscores the role that Congress saw for the corporations, not merely to make profits but to provide a degree of equity among Alaska Natives. ELY, GUESS & RUDD, RURAL ALASKA COMMUNITY ACTION PROGRAM, SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS OF THE ALASKA NATIVE CLAIMS SETTLEMENT ACT 151-53 (1972) [hereinafter ELY].
36. Before 1968 there was no mention of corporations; the first bills introduced in 1967 resolved claims through "tribes, bands, villages, communities, associations or other identifiable groups of Eskimos, Indians, and Aleuts," ROBERT D. ARNOLD, ALASKA NATIVE LAND CLAIMS, 153 (1978). In 1968, in U.S. Senate Interior Committee meetings, business corporations were proposed as the means of carrying out the settlement, in large part due to opposition to the power of the federal government, as shown through the BIA's bureaucratic and inept handling of its responsibilities on reservations. Senator Henry Jackson, one of the main architects of ANCSA, and other major figures in Congress rejected tribal governments as the "vehicle" for implementing ANCSA. ANCSA, in terms of policy, specifically avoided the creation of "permanently racially defined institutions," namely, tribal institutions. This was a departure from the prior practice of creating reservations and the special obligation of the federal government to provide health and social services to other Native Americans. Opposition to extending the Indian reservation system to Alaska was widespread. Even AFN attorney, Barry Jackson, urged the corporation structure as the main implementation vehicle. The theme of the 1971 AFN convention, the last held before the passage of ANCSA, was, "In the white man's society, we need white man's tools."
37. ROBERT D. ARNOLD, ALASKA NATIVE LAND CLAIMS, 153 1978 Id.
38. There is no doubt that the enactment of ANCSA, although now celebrated as a holiday in certain Native organizations such as the AFN, was a bittersweet victory. An editorial in the Tundra Times at the time stated: 962 million [dollars] - a payment for lands lost. These are almost astronomical figures, but at the end of the voting, they were met with almost a dead silence by some 600 native delegates to the AFN convention . . . . The delegates must have sensed that as they voted, they were also voting to relinquish some 300 million acres of land forever - lands they and their ancestors were accustomed to using . . . . 'For several times today, I didn't know whether to laugh or cry,' said a woman delegate . . . . The atmosphere at the convention hall seemed to be prefaced with a special kind of sadness - a strange ending to a great fight for justice." See Howard Rock, Congress Passes Alaska Native Land Claims Bill: 'I Didn't Know Whether To Laugh Or Cry,' in ALASKA NATIVE CLAIMS SETTLEMENT ACT: A SCRAPBOOK HISTORY 61 (1991). In particular, most Natives were not familiar with corporations as a form of organization, nor with the kinds of laws usually governing it. Compounding problems, many villagers, particularly older persons in northern and western Alaska, could not understand the language or meaning of provisions of the Act. See BERGER, supra note 16.
39. An authorized Thirteenth Regional Corporation, for Natives residing outside of Alaska, formed in 1976 after contested elections and lawsuits.
40. The twelve regional corporations, organized soon after ANCSA was passed, actually began to function in 1975. A total of about 75,000 shareholders eventually enrolled in groups ranging from 1,100 (Ahtna Corporation) to about 16,000 (Sealaska Corporation). Regional corporations received 440 million dollars out of the 962.5 million dollar cash settlement; village corporations and individuals received the rest. STEVEN COLT, INST. OF SOC. & ECON. RESEARCH, FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE OF NATIVE REGIONAL CORPORATIONS 2, 6, 8, 21 (1991).
41. Some of the most pertinent provisions of ANCSA include the following: U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, ANCSA 1985 STUDY (1984); Fisher, supra note 20; ELY supra note 24. Section 2 specifies the goals and intents of Congress: to settle land claims without litigation, with maximum participation by Natives in decisions, without establishing permanent racially defined institutions and at the same time without diminishing obligations of the United States or Alaska to protect and promote the rights and welfare of Natives. ALASKA DEP'T OF EDUC., supra note 17, at 30-33. Section 4 extinguishes Natives' claims to any traditional land rights beyond that given in the settlement. Section 5 contains provisions for enrollment of Natives, including the controversial provision that "New Natives," born after December 18, 1971, are not eligible to receive corporation stock. As early as 1991, over half of Alaska Natives were not shareholders. Section 7 provides for the creation of regional corporations and Section 8 for the creation of village corporations, with eligible Natives each holding 100 shares. No stock could be sold, pledged, seized for debt, or otherwise alienated (with a few exceptions, such as to pay child support). At the end of 20 years all this stock was to be canceled and unrestricted stock issued in exchange. Section 9 provides that 70 percent of net revenues from the sale by regional corporations of natural resources conveyed as part of the settlement must be shared among all regional corporations in proportion to the enrolled population of each.
42. Perceived legal, political, and economic problems with ANCSA resulted in strong demands, led by the AFN and Native leaders, for changes to the law, especially before the 1991 deadline when protection of stock from alienation and lands from taxation was to expire. See Thomas A. Morehouse, in Native Claims and Political Development 21-22, WESTERN REGIONAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION ANNUAL MEETING (1987) (paper on file with the author and the Inst. of Soc. & Econ. Research, Anchorage, Alaska).
43. For example, in 1976, amendments extended the deadline for enrollment of Natives and contained provisions for the mergers of Native corporations, timelines for the submission of reports of the Joint Federal-State Land Use Planning Commission, and land exchanges. Amendments passed in 1987 made significant changes to provisions of the original law that were to go into effect in 1991 (causing it to be referred to as the "1991 law or 1991 amendments"). The amendments passed in 1987 extend indefinitely the restrictions on stock alienation, unless corporate shareholders remove the restrictions by majority vote. The amendments also extend the tax exemptions and other protection on all ANCSA lands that remain undeveloped, unleased, and unsold. In general terms, land cannot be taxed; taken by trespassers who otherwise might acquire rights to the land (through trespassers' or squatters' rights); taken by creditors to pay a debt owed by the corporation; or lost if the corporation files bankruptcy or is involuntarily dissolved. In addition, the amendments call for the issuance of additional stock to "new Natives" (those born after the enactment of ANCSA in 1971), elders, and others who missed the previous official enrollments of eligible shareholders in the ANCSA corporations. Protection of subsistence hunting and fishing opportunities was one of the most important motivations for these amendments. The amendments help keep Native corporations and lands under Native control, but they may also diminish the value of corporate stock by restricting its sale and providing for the issuing of additional shares. See ALASKA FEDERATION OF NATIVES, 1991: MAKING IT WORK 3, 14, 37 (1988).
44. See Monica E. Thomas, Conflict and Controversy: Land Ownership In Alaska, 5 LAND USE POL. 121, at 126 (1988).
45. As a former Chief Counsel of the U.S. Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs observed, "the Act is the most generous settlement ever granted by a government to a relatively powerless minority." See FRENCH, supra note 21, at 16.
46. See ARNOLD, supra note 25, at 147-48. This perception in turn affected attitudes toward Alaska Natives in following years. As Berger noted: There can be no doubt that the amount of ANCSA's cash compensation caught the public's eye. Millie Buck, speaking at Gulkana, remarked that constant reiteration of the generosity of the settlement had left White people with the idea that an Indian who was driving a new car had not worked for it but had simply bought it from a share of the settlement . . . . Lena Dewey, at Nenana, said, 'You have a lot of the White community against anything that's Native because of the land claims, because they thought we got so much.' See BERGER, supra note 16, at 27-28. A change in public opinion about the generosity of the Act likely would require the public becoming better informed about the settlement terms and the overall consequences and beneficiaries.
47. See ALASKA DEP'T OF EDUC, supra note 17, at 32.
48. See BERGER, supra note 16, at 24, 27.
49. See Steve Colt, ANCSA and Rural Alaska: An Economic Reality Check (1993) (paper presented to Commonwealth North, Anchorage) (on file with author).
50. See MOREHOUSE, ANCSA, supra note 30, at 20-21.
51. See Gigi Berardi, Rural Sanitation and Participatory Research in Alaska (1997) (paper presented to the Association of American Geographers Annual Meeting, Fort Worth) (on file with author).
52. See BERGER, supra note 16, at 34.
53. See ALASKA FEDERATION OF NATIVES (AFN), THE AFN REPORT ON THE STATUS OF ALASKA NATIVES: A CALL FOR ACTION 36 (1989).
54. See Gunnar Knapp & Lee Huskey, Effects of Transfers on Remote Regional Economies: The Transfer Economy in Rural Alaska, GROWTH AND CHANGE 25-39 (Spring 1988). Huskey estimates that village residents in the Norton Sound, Interior River, and Lower Kuskokwim areas would have had to pay over 20 percent of their average per capita income in 1989 for the same level of local government, school, and electric power services if these costs had not been subsidized. See HUSKEY, supra note 4, at 11.
55. For more discussion of fiscal problems at the state level and their effects on the village transfer economy, see BERMAN ET AL., supra note 8.
56. See HUSKEY, supra note 5, at 9.
57. See ALASKA NATIVES COMM'N, supra note 3, Vol. III.
58. For example, studies in the village of Yakutat on the Gulf of Alaska coast illustrate the importance of sharing subsistence resources in Native and rural communities. In 1984, moose were harvested by 22 percent but used by 70 percent of households, dungeness crab was harvested by 40 percent but used by 98 percent of households, and shrimp were harvested by 18 percent but used by 86 percent of households. See MILLS & FIRMAN, supra note 15, at 89.
59. See BERGER, supra note 16; JOSEPH JORGENSEN, MINERALS MANAGEMENT SERVICE, SOCIAL INDICATORS STUDY OF ALASKAN COASTAL VILLAGES, PART IV (1993);
60. KEVIN WARING ASSOCIATES, MINERALS MANAGEMENT SERVICE, HOPE BASIN SOCIOECONOMIC BASELINE STUDY, VOL. 1-3, (1992);
61. STEPHEN BRAUND & ASSOCIATES, MINERALS MANAGEMENT SERVICE, NORTH SLOPE SUBSISTENCE STUDY: BARROW 1988 (1989);
62. STEPHEN BRAUND & ASSOCIATES, MINERALS MANAGEMENT SERVICE, NORTH SLOPE SUBSISTENCE STUDY: WAINWRIGHT 1988 (1989);
63. PETER G. CRAIG, MINERALS MANAGEMENT SERVICE, SUBSISTENCE FISHERIES AT COASTAL VILLAGES IN THE ALASKAN ARCTIC (1987).
64. Alaskans' Per Capita Harvests of Wild Food, 21 ALASKA FISH & GAME, Nov.-Dec. 1989, at 14-15.
65. ALASKA FISH & GAME, 1989 21 14-15. Id.
66. JORGENSEN, supra note 12, at 78.
67. See BERGER, supra note 16, at 48-55, 67-68.
68. HUSKEY, supra note 4, at 13-14.
69. See JORGENSEN, supra note 12, in particular at 110, 179, 182.
70. As one village leader explained: We take whatever technology works and shape it to our own purposes and uses . . . . Apparently that bothers people who want us to remain pristine, or to admit our contradictions of wanting technology and controlling and preserving the natural resources for our own use . . . . Why not? We've always accepted and reshaped technology that works for our own purposes. JORGENSEN, supra note 12, at 69.
71. Government restrictions on the uses of many subsistence resources since 1971 have led to conflicts over the harvesting of resources. One of the most disputed issues is the regulation of hunting and fishing, in many cases pitting Natives against urban residents who sport hunt and fish, and against management bodies, in particular, the Alaska Department of Fish and Game and the policy-making Alaska Boards of Fisheries and Game.
72. See ARNOLD, supra note 25, at 293.
73. See ARNOLD, supra note 25, at 263-264. For example, Arnold reports that there was awareness of the potential for conflict with essential subsistence uses from developments such as timber cutting, oil drilling and production, or building tourist facilities.
74. See Tim Bristol, Gaining Influence, (Fall) NATIVE AMERICAS 14-21 (1996).
75. Bristol gives an overview of Native corporation economic development and resulting tensions. See also Dirk Miller, Disappearing Forest: Hoonah and Chichagof Island Logged for Quick Cash, THE JUNEAU EMPIRE, July 9, 1995, at A1.
76. See BERGER, supra note 16, at 40-41. See also Bristol, supra note 58, at 21.
77. As stated by a prominent Native corporate leader: The irony strikes me that in the 'Lower 48,' Indian reservations exist with the land largely protected, but in many instances with little economic enterprise. For Alaska Natives, the land is totally at risk and economic enterprises now account for most Native organization and activity. See ALASKA DEP'T OF EDUC., supra note 17, at 23. See also Colt, supra note 37, for a discussion of corporate economic success.
78. See BERGER, supra note 16.
79. Id. at 155-172.
80. See COLT, supra note 28, at 20.
81. For example, see ARNOLD, supra note 25, at 282, for the goals of the regional Calista corporation.
82. For example, Nelson N. Angapak, Sr., the AFN's Special Assistant for Land, Anchorage, Angapak states, "the two major changes needed to ANCSA are to delete the section on repealing aboriginal hunting and fishing rights and rewrite a section on Native self-governance." Interview with Nelson N. Angapak, Sr., AFN Special Asst. for Land, in Anchorage, Alaska (August 21, 1996).
83. See ALASKA DEP'T OF EDUC., supra note 17, at 37.
84. See the discussion on federal and state subsistence policies, and in particular, subsistence statutes and The Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act, in ALASKA NATIVES COMMISSION, supra note 3, Vol. III, at 12-39.
85. For an overview of issues concerning state management, see Alaska Department of Fish and Game Division of Subsistence, Subsistence Management in Alaska: 1991 Update (1991);
86. Alaska Dep't of Fish & Game, A Brief History: Why Alaska Has a Subsistence Law, 21 ALASKA FISH & GAME, Nov.-Dec. 1989, at 11 [hereinafter Alaska Dep't of Fish & Game].
87. ALASKA FISH & GAME, 1989 11 Id. Alaska Dep't of Fish & Game.
88. See ALASKA NATIVES COMMISSION, supra note 3, Vol. III, at 45-91;
89. see also David Hulen, Court Ruling Upholds Authority of Tribes, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Nov. 21, 1996, at A1, col. 1. The most significant recent action was the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals' decision in November 1996 affirming that ANCSA did not undermine at least some tribal government powers to tax and govern land, including Native corporation lands. The court also affirmed for the first time the existence in Alaska of "Indian Country," a legal classification that applies to reservations of self-governing tribes in the Lower 48 states. Alaska ex rel. Yukon Flats School District v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Govt., 101 F.3d 1286 (9th Cir. 1996). Sovereignty advocates saw the decision as opening the way toward tribal government land and resource management authority.
90. See Carey Goldberg, Tiny Tribe in Remote Arctic Is Jolting Alaska, N. Y. TIMES, May 9, 1997, at A1. However, the State of Alaska successfully appealed the decision to the U.S. Supreme Court, which reversed the Ninth Circuit. Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Govt., 118 S. Ct. 948 (1998).
91. See MOREHOUSE, ANSCA, supra note 20, at 4.
92. Id. at 2. Morehouse discusses the unsuccessful attempt by leaders of the Native tribal government movement in Alaska to use the 1991 amendments to establish governments representing the values and interests of the minority Native culture. Congress chose not to act on the political claims of Alaska Natives, declaring that no provision of the 1991 ANCSA amendments would confer any sovereign governmental authority over lands (including management of fish and wildlife resources) or persons in Alaska to Native organizations.
93. See also ALASKA NATIVES COMM'N, VOL. III, supra note 3, at 66.
94. See BERGER, supra note 16, at 113-116.
95. See BIGJIM & ITO-ADLER, supra note 20, at 91.
96. Id.
97. See ARNOLD, supra note 25, at 275.
98. See Morehouse, supra note 30.
99. Id.
100. For example, since 1976, with an initial cash capitalization of $458 million, the regional corporations have produced aggregate shareholder wealth of $874 million (compounded to 1988 dollars), equaling 85 percent of the $1,033 million that could have been generated by a financial trust invested at a nominal average risk-free rate of seven percent. If the figures are adjusted down for the high performance of one corporation and for the effects of a series of questionable federal tax subsidies, wealth measured in 1988 is about 24 percent of the trust fund alternative. See COLT, supra note 63, at 1; see also ALASKA DEP'T OF EDUC., supra note 17, at 21. Although Colt argues that the corporations would have been better off financially if they had taken the cash settlement and invested in mutual funds, others see the benefits that the corporations have brought. NANA Regional Corporation, for example, employs more than a fifth of its 5,000 shareholders in mining, the oil industry, and tourism. See COLT, supra note 63; Alaska: From Fur-trading to Portfolios, THE ECONOMIST, May 25, 1996, at 31.
101. The corporations have engaged in a variety of business activities, mostly direct investments in Alaska. Some were novel. CIRI (the regional corporation for the Cook Inlet area) secured the right to acquire surplus federal property in lieu of some of its land entitlement - $500 in property for every acre of entitlement relinquished, putting $120 million into CIRI's capital endowment. This is about three times the amount of cash originally conveyed to the corporation. Also, for several years the regional corporations had the right to sell net operating losses to other entities with positive tax liabilities, amounting to a major recapitalization of the corporate capital base. See COLT, supra note 63, at 4.
102. For example, some types of transfers (such as Aid to Families with Dependent Children) link the amount of the transfer to the participant's other income. If villagers move to take jobs elsewhere, their transfers are reduced. The negative effect of transfer income on mobility is also exacerbated by the low cost of public goods in the villages that provide an incentive for residents to remain in the villages. See HUSKEY, supra note 4, at 12. It has been estimated that transfers in western Alaska have increased population by as much as three times that which the area could otherwise support. See Knapp & Huskey, supra note 42. Yet from a Native perspective, the growth of the villages may be vital to the preservation of Alaska Native culture; see ALASKA NATIVES COMM'N, supra note 3, Vol. I.
103. The transfer economy also increases dependency on decision-making bodies outside the villages that are responsible for state and federal laws, regulations, and programs directly affecting village welfare. See HUSKEY, supra note 4, at 12.
104. CHAMBERS, supra note 12, at 145.
105. See Morehouse, supra note 30, at 21. "We don't want to become better white men or beat them at their own game. We just want a chance to develop our traditional values into a satisfying way of life that we can understand. AN ACT is forcing us into new ways of organizing ourselves . . . . AN ACT could split the Native peoples even more, set region against region, village against village . . . . AN ACT is based on competition; the Native way is based on cooperation." BIGJIM & ITO-ADLER, supra note 20, at 82-83.