The 1995 Malaysian general election: Reaffirmation of Barisan Nasional dominance

Round Table

Volumn , Issue 343, 1997, Pages 389-409

  Singh, Hari ^a  

^a NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF SINGAPORE   (Singapore)

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EID: 0013441404     PISSN: 00358533     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/00358539708454374     Document Type: Article

References (95)

1. The BN is an enlarged version of the Alliance whose roots can be traced to 1953 and whose membership included the United Malays National Organization (UMNO), the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) and the Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC). In the early 1970s, the change in the coalition's nomenclature to Barisan Nasional coincided with its expansion of membership. Parties that contested the 1995 election under the BN's banner also included Parti Pesaka Bumiputera Barsatu Sarawak (PBB), Sarawak United People's Party (SUPP), Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia (Gerakan), People's Progressive Party (PPP), Parti Bansa Dayak Sarawak (PBDS), Sarawak National Party (SNAP), Angkatan Keadilan Rakyat (AKAR), Sabah Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), Parti Maju Sabah (SAPP), Parti Bersatu Rakyat Sabah (PBRS), and Parti Demokratik Sabah (PDS).
2. See James Chin, 'The 1995 Malaysian General Election', Asian Survey, Vol 36, No 4, April 1996, pp 393-409.
3. Edmund Terence Gomez, The 1995 Malaysian General Election: A Report and Commentary, Occasional Paper No. 93, Singapore, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1996.
4. James Chin, for instance, writes that the BN's victory 'appear to be based primarily on economics and the opposition's unsound strategy' (p 408). Very little, if any, effort was expended to demonstrate these aspects. Gomez, in a more informed analysis of the election, discusses a number of factors, including the Chinese vote, as an explanation for the BN's success.
5. In 1993 it was revealed that the central bank's speculation in the foreign exchange market had resulted in losses amounting to RM15-30 billion. Aliran, Vol 14, No 5, 1994, p 23. Bumiputra Malaysia Finance (BMF) lost another RM72 million in addition to the RM3.65 billion deficit it incurred in the 1980s as a result of illegal transactions. The latter also explains Bank Pertanian's losses amounting to RM405 million revealed in 1991. Rocket, Vol 25, No 3, 1992, p 5.
6. In 1993 it was revealed that the central bank's speculation in the foreign exchange market had resulted in losses amounting to RM15-30 billion. Aliran, Vol 14, No 5, 1994, p 23. Bumiputra Malaysia Finance (BMF) lost another RM72 million in addition to the RM3.65 billion deficit it incurred in the 1980s as a result of illegal transactions. The latter also explains Bank Pertanian's losses amounting to RM405 million revealed in 1991. Rocket, Vol 25, No 3, 1992, p 5.
7. The most notorious example would be the awarding of the RM3.4 billion North-South Highway project to United Engineers Malaysia (UEM) in 1988, a company with no experience in building roads. This practice became even more pronounced under 'privatization', good examples being the RM6.27 billion sewage contract awarded to Indah Consortium, the RM600 million Tenaga Nasional scandal involving the purchase of gas turbines, and the 'letter of exclusivity' awarded to UEM for the construction of the RM2.3 billion Johore-Singapore second causeway link. Refer to Rocket, Vol 26, No 3, 1993, pp 3-4 and Straits Times (hereafter ST), 31 July 1993, p 22.
8. The most notorious example would be the awarding of the RM3.4 billion North-South Highway project to United Engineers Malaysia (UEM) in 1988, a company with no experience in building roads. This practice became even more pronounced under 'privatization', good examples being the RM6.27 billion sewage contract awarded to Indah Consortium, the RM600 million Tenaga Nasional scandal involving the purchase of gas turbines, and the 'letter of exclusivity' awarded to UEM for the construction of the RM2.3 billion Johore-Singapore second causeway link. Refer to Rocket, Vol 26, No 3, 1993, pp 3-4 and Straits Times (hereafter ST), 31 July 1993, p 22.
9. For instance, it was revealed in the British Parliament in 1994 that the national leadership received kickbacks in connection with the Pergau dam project which was contracted to British companies. ST, 26 February 1994, p 1. In 1993, the opposition produced statistical evidence regarding the corrupt accumulation of wealth by the Malacca Chief Minister. Rocket, Vol 26, No 4, 1993, p 12.
10. For instance, it was revealed in the British Parliament in 1994 that the national leadership received kickbacks in connection with the Pergau dam project which was contracted to British companies. ST, 26 February 1994, p 1. In 1993, the opposition produced statistical evidence regarding the corrupt accumulation of wealth by the Malacca Chief Minister. Rocket, Vol 26, No 4, 1993, p 12.
11. This is evident from the implication of the Minister of Energy, Telecommunications and Posts in the RM100 million Maika-Telekom Share scandal and the involvement of the Minister of International Trade and Industry in the bumiputera special shares allocation scandal in 1994. Aliran, Vol 12, No 5, 1992, p 3 and Vol 14, No 12, 1994, pp 3-5, 38-39; and ST, 14 October 1994, p 16.
12. This is evident from the implication of the Minister of Energy, Telecommunications and Posts in the RM100 million Maika-Telekom Share scandal and the involvement of the Minister of International Trade and Industry in the bumiputera special shares allocation scandal in 1994. Aliran, Vol 12, No 5, 1992, p 3 and Vol 14, No 12, 1994, pp 3-5, 38-39; and ST, 14 October 1994, p 16.
13. This is evident from the implication of the Minister of Energy, Telecommunications and Posts in the RM100 million Maika-Telekom Share scandal and the involvement of the Minister of International Trade and Industry in the bumiputera special shares allocation scandal in 1994. Aliran, Vol 12, No 5, 1992, p 3 and Vol 14, No 12, 1994, pp 3-5, 38-39; and ST, 14 October 1994, p 16.
14. The law was passed just before the government's acquisition of a huge tract of land on the Malaysian side of the second causeway link between Johore and Singapore to be built by UEM. For the implications of the Act, see Aliran, Vol 14, No 12, 1994, pp 15-16.
15. When the 'Volvo cars' scandal unravelled, the Prime Minister threatened arrests under the OSA of those who had 'leaked' official information. Aliran, Vol 12, No 8, 1992, p 2.
16. An excellent case-study in this regard would be the rôle played by the Anti-Corruption Agency and the Attorney General's office in investigating the wealth of the former Chief Minister of Malacca. For details, refer to Aliran, 15, Nos 11 and 12, 1995, p 36.
17. Corruption charges against Dr Jeffrey Kitingan, estranged brother of the former Chief Minister of Sabah, were dropped following his defection to the BN in 1994. Rocket, Vol 27, No 2, 1994, p 9.
18. The victim was detained, interrogated, and publicly portrayed as a person of loose morals who should be punished under Islamic laws. This resulted in public outcry. ST, 25 October 1994, p 1 and 27 October 1994, p 18.
19. The victim was detained, interrogated, and publicly portrayed as a person of loose morals who should be punished under Islamic laws. This resulted in public outcry. ST, 25 October 1994, p 1 and 27 October 1994, p 18.
20. Tension between the BN and the PBS dates back to 1985 when PBS, whose manifesto sought federal guarantees for constitutional safeguards for East Malaysian states as contained in the '20 points' of the Federation of Malaysia Agreement of 1963, won the state election. The breaking point came in 1990 when, on the eve of the elections, the PBS withdrew from the BN and joined the Gagasan Rakyat, a coalition of parties led by Tengku Razaleigh, Mahathir's arch rival. Following the state election of February 1994, the Sabah Governor, influenced by the centre, refused to swear in as Chief Minister Joseph Pairin Kitingan, who had camped outside the Governor's house, until 37 hours later. The federal government, using financial inducements, was able to secure mass-defections of PBS state assemblymen to the BN leading to the eventual downfall of the PBS government in April 1994.
21. UMNO Baru claimed succession to UMNO which was deregistered as a political party in 1988. See Hari Singh and Suresh Narayanan, 'Changing Dimensions in Malaysian Politics: The Johore Baru By-Election', Asian Survey, Vol 29, No 5, May 1989, pp 516-520.
22. For details, refer to Gomez, op cit, pp 11-13, 18-20.
23. The popular vote in this article is based on parliamentary results rather than on an average of votes for parliament and the state assemblies. This is so because elections for the Sabah and Sarawak state legislatures were not held in 1995.
24. Refer to Star, 27 April 1995, p 17.
25. J. S. Furnivall defines the plural society as 'comprising two or more elements or orders which live side by side, yet without mingling, in one political unit'. Netherlands India: A Study of Plural Economy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1939, p 446. This is an apt description of ethnic politics in Malaysia at the time of its independence. The ethnic breakdown in 1957 was 49.8 per cent Malay, 37.2 per cent Chinese and 11.1 per cent Indians. Saw Swee-Hock, The Population of Peninsula Malaysia, Singapore, Singapore University Press, 1988, p 65.
26. J. S. Furnivall defines the plural society as 'comprising two or more elements or orders which live side by side, yet without mingling, in one political unit'. Netherlands India: A Study of Plural Economy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1939, p 446. This is an apt description of ethnic politics in Malaysia at the time of its independence. The ethnic breakdown in 1957 was 49.8 per cent Malay, 37.2 per cent Chinese and 11.1 per cent Indians. Saw Swee-Hock, The Population of Peninsula Malaysia, Singapore, Singapore University Press, 1988, p 65.
27. Lucian W. Pye, Asian Power and Politics: The Cultural Dimensions of Authority, Cambridge, MA, Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1985, pp 148-155.
28. On consociationalism, refer to Arend Lijphart, 'Consociational Democracy', World Politics, Vol 21, No 2, January 1969, pp 207-225.
29. It was not unusual for BN leaders to allude to the race riots of May 1969 in which an estimated 2000 people lost their lives. See, for instance, ST, 21 May 1994, 18 and 25 April 1995, p 27.
30. It was not unusual for BN leaders to allude to the race riots of May 1969 in which an estimated 2000 people lost their lives. See, for instance, ST, 21 May 1994, 18 and 25 April 1995, p 27.
31. ST, 22 March 1995, p 15.
32. The Malays could, if they had wanted to, rule on their own given that the greater number of the parliamentary seats were Malay majority seats. Also see Diane K. Mauzy, Barisan Nasional: Coalition Government in Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur, Marican & Sons, 1983, p 143.
33. The original members of Gagasan were S46, DAP, PBS, Indian Progressive Front, Parti Rakyat, Malaysian Solidarity Party, Hamim, and Kongres India Muslim Malaysia.
34. This was the media's 'analysis' in the immediate post-election period. ST, 27 April 1995, p 2.
35. As the Prime Minister stated, 'every voice will be heard and the interest of every community will be taken into account'. ST, 26 March 1995, p 20.
36. Refer to Gordon P. Means, '"Special Rights" as a Strategy for Development', Comparative Politics, Vol 5, No 1, October 1972, pp 29-62.
37. Equity ownership in the corporate sector in 1990 was 44.9 per cent Chinese, 1 per cent Indians and 20.3 per cent Bumiputera. The Second Outline Perspective Plan 1991-2000, Kuala Lumpur, National Printing Department, 1991, p 12.
38. Aliran, Vol 14, No 11, 1994, pp 3-5 and ST, 30 March 1995, p 1.
39. Aliran, Vol 14, No 11, 1994, pp 3-5 and ST, 30 March 1995, p 1.
40. Kelantan's average growth rate was 6 per cent compared with the national average of 8 per cent. ST, 14 July 1994, p 17. The BN issued a supplementary manifesto for Kelantan which promised RM1 billion in developmental aid and a university for the state if it won. ST, 8 April 1995, p 20 and 22 April 1995, p 23.
41. Kelantan's average growth rate was 6 per cent compared with the national average of 8 per cent. ST, 14 July 1994, p 17. The BN issued a supplementary manifesto for Kelantan which promised RM1 billion in developmental aid and a university for the state if it won. ST, 8 April 1995, p 20 and 22 April 1995, p 23.
42. Kelantan's average growth rate was 6 per cent compared with the national average of 8 per cent. ST, 14 July 1994, p 17. The BN issued a supplementary manifesto for Kelantan which promised RM1 billion in developmental aid and a university for the state if it won. ST, 8 April 1995, p 20 and 22 April 1995, p 23.
43. ST, 12 December 1994, p 33 and 10 April 1995, p 1.
44. ST, 12 December 1994, p 33 and 10 April 1995, p 1.
45. Michael Vatikiotis, 'The Mahathir Paradox', Far Eastern Economic Review (here-after cited as FEER), 20 August 1992, p 17.
46. Guenther Roth, 'Personal Rulership, Patrimonialism, and Empire-Building in the New States', World Politics, Vol 20, No 2, 1968, pp 194-206 and Syed Farid Alatas, The Post-Colonial State: Dual Functions in the Public Sphere, Working Paper 121, Singapore, Department of Sociology, National University of Singapore, 1994, pp 24-30.
47. Guenther Roth, 'Personal Rulership, Patrimonialism, and Empire-Building in the New States', World Politics, Vol 20, No 2, 1968, pp 194-206 and Syed Farid Alatas, The Post-Colonial State: Dual Functions in the Public Sphere, Working Paper 121, Singapore, Department of Sociology, National University of Singapore, 1994, pp 24-30.
48. James C. Scott has argued along similar lines. See 'Patron-Client Politics and Political Change in Southeast Asia', American Political Science Review, Vol 66, No 1, March 1972, pp 101-113. See also Clark D. Neher, 'Political Corruption in a Thai Province', Journal of Developing Areas, Vol 11, No 4, July 1977, p 483.
49. James C. Scott has argued along similar lines. See 'Patron-Client Politics and Political Change in Southeast Asia', American Political Science Review, Vol 66, No 1, March 1972, pp 101-113. See also Clark D. Neher, 'Political Corruption in a Thai Province', Journal of Developing Areas, Vol 11, No 4, July 1977, p 483.
50. Edmund Terence Gomez, Money Politics in the Barisan Nasional, Kuala Lumpur, Forum, 1991, p 13.
51. James V. Jesudason, 'Statist Democracy and the Limits to Civil Society in Malaysia', Journal of Commonwealth & Comparative Politics, Vol 33, No 3, November 1995, pp 335-356.
52. See, for example, ST, 7 December 1994, p 19.
53. Refer to Hari Singh, 'UMNO Leaders and Malay Rulers: The Erosion of a Special Relationship', Pacific Affairs, Vol 68, No 2, Summer 1995, pp 187-205.
54. Karl von Vorys had come to a similar conclusion with regard to elections under the Alliance. See Democracy without Consensus: Communalism and Political Stability in Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur, Oxford University Press, 1976, pp 423-438.
55. For an elaboration of these strategies, see T. J. Pempel (ed), Uncommon Democracies: The One Party Dominant Regimes, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1990.
56. In exchange for citizenship status, the Chinese and Indian immigrant communities acknowledged Malay political dominance by agreeing, on the eve of independence, to political and economic concessions for the Malay community, including 'weightage' to the rural Malay heartland in the delineation of constituencies. As a result, the electorate was disproportionately represented with most rural seats comprising half the electorate compared to that of urban constituencies, although subject to the proviso that 'there shall not be more than a difference of 15 per cent in the numbers of electors of any one constituency to the electoral quota'. An amendment to the constitution in 1962 removed this restriction. For details, refer to K. J. Ratnam and R. S. Milne, The Malayan Parliamentary Election of 1964, Singapore, University of Malaya Press, 1967, p 65 and Aliran, Vol 12, No 12, 1992, pp 12-15.
57. In exchange for citizenship status, the Chinese and Indian immigrant communities acknowledged Malay political dominance by agreeing, on the eve of independence, to political and economic concessions for the Malay community, including 'weightage' to the rural Malay heartland in the delineation of constituencies. As a result, the electorate was disproportionately represented with most rural seats comprising half the electorate compared to that of urban constituencies, although subject to the proviso that 'there shall not be more than a difference of 15 per cent in the numbers of electors of any one constituency to the electoral quota'. An amendment to the constitution in 1962 removed this restriction. For details, refer to K. J. Ratnam and R. S. Milne, The Malayan Parliamentary Election of 1964, Singapore, University of Malaya Press, 1967, p 65 and Aliran, Vol 12, No 12, 1992, pp 12-15.
58. The voter representation ratio between the parliamentary seat with the biggest electorate (Shah Alam: 85 202) and one with the smallest (Julau: 16 198) is 5:1. On the other hand, the Jerlun-Langkawi constituency in Kedah, a Barisan strong-hold with a total electorate of 46 489 in 1990, was split into two, Jerlun (43 877) and Langkawi (21 719) for the 1995 election.
59. Aliran, Vol 12, No 12, 1992, pp 14-16.
60. On the illegal transfer of voters to other constituencies, refer to ST, 21 February 1994, p 19. The Elections Act, 1985 raised the deposits for parliamentary candidates from RM1500 to RM5000 and RM750 to RM3000 for state assembly candidature. Maximum expenditure permitted by candidates was also raised to RM50 000 and RM30 000 respectively. Refer to S. Sothi Rachagan, Law and the Electoral Process in Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur. University of Malaya Press, 1993, pp 46-47, 154.
61. On the illegal transfer of voters to other constituencies, refer to ST, 21 February 1994, p 19. The Elections Act, 1985 raised the deposits for parliamentary candidates from RM1500 to RM5000 and RM750 to RM3000 for state assembly candidature. Maximum expenditure permitted by candidates was also raised to RM50 000 and RM30 000 respectively. Refer to S. Sothi Rachagan, Law and the Electoral Process in Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur. University of Malaya Press, 1993, pp 46-47, 154.
62. ST, 7 September 1994, p 17.
63. See Aliran, Vol 10, No 11, 1990, pp 16-19 and Vol 15, No 1, 1995, pp 3, 10.
64. See Aliran, Vol 10, No 11, 1990, pp 16-19 and Vol 15, No 1, 1995, pp 3, 10.
65. As James Scott has remarked, this helps to 'dramatize the largesse as an act of personal patronage'. Op cit, p 95 fn 21.
66. For instance, the influential Dong Jiao Zong (Chinese Education Movement), which had backed the DAP in 1986 and 1990. decided to remain neutral in 1995. ST, 20 December 1994, p 19.
67. For instance, the influential Dong Jiao Zong (Chinese Education Movement), which had backed the DAP in 1986 and 1990. decided to remain neutral in 1995. ST, 20 December 1994, p 19.
68. In fact, Malay leaders who officiated Chinese functions began their speeches in Chinese. In January 1995, the Deputy Prime Minister sent Lunar New Year cards to Malaysian Chinese with the message 'We Are One Family, One People' written in Mandarin. 57, 13 January 1995, p 23.
69. ST, 7 November 1994, p 3.
70. Edmund Terence Gomez, General Election, pp 34, 39-45.
71. Members of APU included S46, PAS, Hamim and Berjasa. 54 This included the much publicized 'fact finding mission' to Kelantan in 1992 to assess whether the Chinese were discriminated against as a result of the PAS administration's policies. Rocket, Vol 5, No 2, 1992, pp 4-5, 18.
72. The DAP, in championing non-Muslim interests, was especially critical of S46 which, in principle, supported the passage of the Shahriah Criminal Code Bill, 1993 to implement hudud which prescribes, among others, punishment like amputation and stoning. This led to a reevaluation of the DAP's ties with S46 in the Gagasan. Refer to The Sunday Times, 23 November 1993, p 22 and ST, 29 November 1993, p 17. Non-Muslims, comprising about 5 per cent of the state's population, strongly objected to hudud despite assurances that Islamic laws were not applicable to them. ST, 26 July 1994, p 17.
73. The DAP, in championing non-Muslim interests, was especially critical of S46 which, in principle, supported the passage of the Shahriah Criminal Code Bill, 1993 to implement hudud which prescribes, among others, punishment like amputation and stoning. This led to a reevaluation of the DAP's ties with S46 in the Gagasan. Refer to The Sunday Times, 23 November 1993, p 22 and ST, 29 November 1993, p 17. Non-Muslims, comprising about 5 per cent of the state's population, strongly objected to hudud despite assurances that Islamic laws were not applicable to them. ST, 26 July 1994, p 17.
74. The DAP, in championing non-Muslim interests, was especially critical of S46 which, in principle, supported the passage of the Shahriah Criminal Code Bill, 1993 to implement hudud which prescribes, among others, punishment like amputation and stoning. This led to a reevaluation of the DAP's ties with S46 in the Gagasan. Refer to The Sunday Times, 23 November 1993, p 22 and ST, 29 November 1993, p 17. Non-Muslims, comprising about 5 per cent of the state's population, strongly objected to hudud despite assurances that Islamic laws were not applicable to them. ST, 26 July 1994, p 17.
75. In 1993, the Kelantan Islamic Council banned traditional performances like Makyong, Menora and Wayang Kulit, and also sought the social segregation of males and females. ST, 30 January 1993, p 14.
76. Just a month before the elections, S46 indicated its willingness to hold talks with UMNO Baru 'to strengthen Malay unity'. ST, 16 March 1995, p 17. Subsequently, S46 disbanded en bloc and joined UMNO Baru in October 1996.
77. For details, refer to Kua Kia Soong, Inside the DAP 1990-95, Kuala Lumpur, 1996.
78. In its campaign strategy, the DAP had implied that the incumbent Chief Minister was a puppet of the Malays given that Gerakan had less seats than UMNO Baru.
79. ST, 29 July 1994, p 19 and 13 March 1995, p 19.
80. ST, 29 July 1994, p 19 and 13 March 1995, p 19.
81. ST, 14 April 1995, p 25. Penang enjoyed the highest growth rate, averaging about 12.4 per cent between 1990 and 1994. ST, 1 April 1995, p 32. See also Murray Hiebert, 'Sure Thing', FEER, 20 April 1995, p 15.
82. ST, 14 April 1995, p 25. Penang enjoyed the highest growth rate, averaging about 12.4 per cent between 1990 and 1994. ST, 1 April 1995, p 32. See also Murray Hiebert, 'Sure Thing', FEER, 20 April 1995, p 15.
83. ST, 14 April 1995, p 25. Penang enjoyed the highest growth rate, averaging about 12.4 per cent between 1990 and 1994. ST, 1 April 1995, p 32. See also Murray Hiebert, 'Sure Thing', FEER, 20 April 1995, p 15.
84. Edmund Terence Gomez, General Election, pp 40-41.
85. Political Parties: Their Organisation and Activity in the Modern State, translated by Barbara and Robert North, London, Methuen, 1959, p 312.
86. See Clifford Geertz, 'The Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in the New States', in Clifford Geertz (ed), Old Societies and New States: The Quest for Modernity in Asia and Africa, New York, Free Press, 1963, pp 105-157 and Cynthia Enloe, Ethnic Conflict and Political Development, Boston, Little, Brown, 1973, pp 15-34.
87. This echoes the Marxist perspective. However, see David Brown, The State and Ethnic. Politics in Southeast Asia, London, Routledge, 1994, pp 206-215.
88. See Hari Singh, 'Political Change in Malaysia: The Role of Semangat 46', Asian Survey, Vol 31, No 8, 1991, pp 712-728.
89. ST, 3 November 1993, p 2 and 5 November 1993, p 22.
90. ST, 3 November 1993, p 2 and 5 November 1993, p 22.
91. ST, 4 November 1994, p 18 and 19 November 1994, p 1.
92. ST, 4 November 1994, p 18 and 19 November 1994, p 1.
93. T. B. Bottomore, Elites and Society, London, Penguin Books, 1966, pp 48-68.
94. See also 'Winning Big', Asiaweek, 5 May 1995, p 21.
95. 'Cleaning the Cabinet', Asiaweek, 19 May 1995, p 33.