Survey of the peace economics literature: Recent key contributions and a comprehensive coverage up to 1992 (Part II)

Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy

Volumn 5, Issue 4, 1999, Pages 1-53

  Isard, Walter ^a   Anderton, Charles H ^b  

^a Department of Obstetrics Gynecology   (United States)

^b Department of Biology   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0013154559     PISSN: 10792457     EISSN: 15548597     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2202/1554-8597.1027     Document Type: Article

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