The politics of participation in the gulf cooperation council states: The Omani Consultative Council

Middle East Journal

Volumn 50, Issue 4, 1996, Pages 559-571

  Al Haj, Abdullah Juma ^a  

^a UNITED ARAB EMIRATES UNIVERSITY   (United Arab Emirates)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 0012992587     PISSN: 00263141     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (52)

1. For a discussion about "sultanistic regimes" see Juan J. Linz, "Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes," in Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby, eds., Handbook of Political Science, vol. 3 (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1975), pp. 259-63. Linz describes the sultanistic regimes as those "based on personal rulership with loyalty to the ruler based not only on tradition, or on him embodying an ideology, or on a unique personal mission, or on charismatic qualities, but also on a mixture of fear and rewards to his collaberators. The ruler exercises his power without restraint at his own discretion and above all unencumbered by rules or by any commitment to an ideology or value system. The binding norms and relations of bureaucratic administration are constantly subverted by personal arbitrary decisions of the ruler, which he does not feel constrained to justify in ideological terms. In many respects the organization of power and of the staff of the ruler is similar to traditional patrimonialism as described by Weber" (p. 259).
2. The Ibadhis, named for 'Abdallah bin-Ibadh, trace their history to the seventh century. They recognize only Abu Bakr al-Siddiq and 'Umar ibn al-Khattab as legitimate Caliphs. Historical sources mention that the Ibadhis migrated from Iraq to Oman in the eighth century to escape persecution by the Ummayyads during the early years of the Ummayyad caliphate. The Ibadhis elected their first Imam in 749 A.D. The Ibadhi ideal is to restore Islam to its purest form, as it was at the time of the Prophet Muhammad. Ibadhism is a minority form of Islam practiced only in Oman and some North African states such as Tunisia. It is marked by the strict adherence of its followers to its teachings.
3. "Preamble to Sultanistic Decree No. 84/81," The Official Gazette of Oman (Muscat: Ministry of Information), no. 228, 1 November 1981, p. 1.
4. Sultanate of Oman, Ministry of Information, Oman 1994 (Muscat: Ministry of Information, 1994), p. 34.
5. "Preamble to Sultanistic Decree No. 84/81," p. 1.
6. Ian Skeet, Oman Before 1970, The End of an Era (London and Boston: Faber and Faber, 1985), pp. 163-72.
7. Ian Skeet, Oman: Politics and Development (London: Macmillan, 1992), p. 120.
8. "Sultanistic Decree No. 86/81 covering the by-laws of the SCC," The Official Gazette of Oman (Muscat: Ministry of Information), no. 228, 1 November 1981.
9. Hadi Hasan Hammudi, Al-Fikr al-Siyasi al-'Umani (Omani Political Thought) (London: Riyadh Al-Rayyis Books, 1993), p. 300.
10. US Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1993 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1994), p. 1266.
11. Sultanate of Oman, Ministry of Information, "The Sultanistic Decree Establishing the OCC," Article 2, Paragraph A, p. 1 , cited in Ministry of Information, Oman 1994, pp. 35-40.
12. Sultanate of Oman, Ministry of Information, "The Sultanistic Decree Establishing the OCC," Article 2, Paragraph A, p. 1 , cited in Ministry of Information, Oman 1994, pp. 35-40.
13. Al-Bayan (Dubai), 21 November 1994; and Al-Khalij (Sharjah), 21 November 1994.
14. Al-Bayan (Dubai), 21 November 1994; and Al-Khalij (Sharjah), 21 November 1994.
15. "The Sultanistic Decree Establishing the OCC," Article 9, pp. 2-3.
16. Ibid., Articles 9 and 10, pp. 2-3.
17. Hammudi, Al-Fikr al-Siyasi al-'Umani, p. 300.
18. Muhammad Rumaihi, Beyond Oil, translated to English by James Dickins (London: Al-Saqi Books, 1986), pp. 21-22.
19. Harry J. Benda, "Non-Western Intelligentsia as Political Elites," in David E. Novack and Robert Lekachman, eds., Development and Society: The Dynamics of Economic Change (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1964). Benda states: "these new intellectuals are a recent phenomenon for they are the greater party, the product of western education during the past few decades. But though western-trained and therefore in several respects kin of their western counterparts, they also differ from the western intellectuals in some very significant respects. In the first place it is not literacy per se but westernization that stamps the non-westerner as the new intellectual. To the traditional tasks of manipulating the tools of communication have now been added the tasks of what Toynbee has aptly called the 'human transformer'" p. 409.
20. "The Sultanistic Decree Establishing the OCC," Article 9, pp. 2-3.
21. Ibid., Article 11, p. 3.
22. The Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report: Oman and Yemen (London: The Economist, 1994), pp. 8-11.
23. Oman (Muscat), 28 March 1994.
24. Ibid.
25. Al-Khalij, 17 March 1995.
26. Oman, 29 August 1994.
27. Al-Omania News Agency (Muscat), 28 August 1994.
28. Oman, 29 August 1994.
29. Al-Hayat (London), 30 August 1994.
30. Al-Khalij, 30 August 1994.
31. Al-Khalij, 19 August 1994.
32. In August 1994, while this author was collecting his data, several businessmen, intellectuals and government officials told him in private discussions that the detainees represented a highly sophisticated secret Islamic organization which was attempting to overthrow the regime. They had weapons and communication devices and were linked to foreign entities.
33. Author's interview with an Omani citizen who prefers to remain anonymous, Muscat, August 1994.
34. Those names included 'Abdallah Tahir, Salim al-Ghazali, Hamid al-Ghazali, 'Abdallah al-Ghilani, 'Umar Qatan, Khalid 'Abd al-Rahman, Muhammad al-'Uraymi, Khalid al-Hashmi, and Musalam Qatan.
35. Ahmad Shalabi, "'Uman fi al-Tarikh" (Oman in History), in Sultanate of Oman, Ministry of National Heritage and Culture, Seminar of the Omani Studies, vol. 1, (Muscat: 1980), pp. 36-38.
36. Sadok Belaid, "Roles of Religious Institutions in Support of the State," in Adeed Dawisha and I. William Zartman, eds., Beyond Coercion, The Durability of the Arab State (London: Croom Helm, 1988), p. 152.
37. John L. Esposito, "Islamic Movements, Democratization and U.S. Foreign Policy," in Phebe Marr and William Lewis, eds., Riding the Tiger: The Middle East Challenge After the Cold War (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993), pp. 188-94.
38. Al-Khalij, 6 November 1995.
39. Saudi Arabia introduced a majlis al-shura in 1993.
40. For a description of the political participation experiences in the GCC states, see J.E. Peterson, The Arab Gulf States: Steps Toward Political Participation (New York and London: Praeger, 1988).
41. Al-Khalij, 21 November 1994; and Al-Bayan, 21 November 1994.
42. Al-Khalij, 21 November 1994; and Al-Bayan, 21 November 1994.
43. Foreign Report (published by the Economist), no. 2328, 17 November 1994, p. 7.
44. Author's interviews in Muscat, 10 January 1994, 6 March 1994, 28 August 1994, and 20 January 1995.
45. The speech of Sultan Qabus in the opening ceremony of the OCC, cited in Hammudi, Al-Fikr al-Siyasi al-'Umani, pp. 478-81.
46. Fuad I. Khuri, Tribes and State in Bahrain (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1980). He writes, "Religious law regulates interpersonal relationships universally without prescribing the forms of government or state that carry out these regulations. 'Legitimacy' is derived from the application of divine scriptures, not from popular vote, which gives government any form of government, tribally based or otherwise, a de facto 'legitimacy' without resort to public delegation or any other system of representation. Islam neither forbids nor requires the faithful to participate in decision making through universal suffrage" p. 216.
47. Abdullah Juma al-Haj, "The Formation of the Political Elite of the United Arab Emirates," unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Reading (United Kingdom), 1989, p. 289.
48. See as an example, "Sultan Qaboos' speech in the Opening Ceremony of the SCC in 1981," in Sultanate of Oman, Ministry of Information, The Eminent Pronouncement: Speeches and Addresses of H.H. Sultan Qaboos, 1970-1990 (Muscat: 1990), pp. 175-78.
49. These observations are based on the author's following of the developments of the OCC since its establishment. Most of the Omani and U.A.E. media, especially newspapers, cover the OCC's activities and survey Omani public opinion about the Council. See, for instance, Al-Bayan, 25 May 1992, 8 July 1992, 18 November 1994, 31 December 1994, and 12 January 1995; and Oman, 1 August 1994. In addition to these sources, the author has repeatedly asked interviewees their opinions concerning the functions and success of the OCC. As was indicated above, all responses were positive.
50. These observations are based on the author's following of the developments of the OCC since its establishment. Most of the Omani and U.A.E. media, especially newspapers, cover the OCC's activities and survey Omani public opinion about the Council. See, for instance, Al-Bayan, 25 May 1992, 8 July 1992, 18 November 1994, 31 December 1994, and 12 January 1995; and Oman, 1 August 1994. In addition to these sources, the author has repeatedly asked interviewees their opinions concerning the functions and success of the OCC. As was indicated above, all responses were positive.
51. A press release by Shaykh 'Abdallah bin-'Ali al-Qutbi, Chairman of the OCC, as cited in Al-Bayan, 18 November 1994. Two members of the OCC were asked to be part of the eight committees which comprise the Development Council, which is responsible for the economic and social planning for Oman.
52. The Omani television broadcasts some of the OCC sessions. Some of those sessions show heated debates among OCC members on important questions addressed to Cabinet ministers.