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4
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-
85033314323
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-
note
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As explained in following sections, mahrieh in practice is similar to a prenuptial agreement. However, since the latter phrase has a broader meaning than mahrieh does, it is not an appropriate English translation of mahrieh.
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-
-
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5
-
-
85033290928
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-
Paris: Librarie Géne;rale de Droit et Jourisprudence
-
In the sample of 511 couples used in this study, fewer than 1% married without a mahrieh. B. Saroukhani (Le choix du conjoint en Iran et en Occident [Choice of spouse in Iran and the West] [Paris: Librarie Géne;rale de Droit et Jourisprudence, 1968]) and G. Tavassoli ("Evolution of Bride-Price in Tehran," in Tenth International Seminar on Family Research [Tehran: Institute for Social Studies and Research, 1966]) have also shown similar results.
-
(1968)
Le Choix du Conjoint en Iran et en Occident [Choice of Spouse in Iran and the West]
-
-
Saroukhani, B.1
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6
-
-
85033291341
-
Evolution of Bride-Price in Tehran
-
Tehran: Institute for Social Studies and Research
-
In the sample of 511 couples used in this study, fewer than 1% married without a mahrieh. B. Saroukhani (Le choix du conjoint en Iran et en Occident [Choice of spouse in Iran and the West] [Paris: Librarie Géne;rale de Droit et Jourisprudence, 1968]) and G. Tavassoli ("Evolution of Bride-Price in Tehran," in Tenth International Seminar on Family Research [Tehran: Institute for Social Studies and Research, 1966]) have also shown similar results.
-
(1966)
Tenth International Seminar on Family Research
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-
Tavassoli, G.1
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7
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-
85033301269
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-
Iran's Civil Law Code no. 1087
-
Iran's Civil Law Code no. 1087.
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-
-
-
8
-
-
0000818384
-
An Economic Analysis of Marital Instability
-
December
-
G. S. Becker, E. M. Landes, and R. T. Michael, "An Economic Analysis of Marital Instability," Journal of Political Economy 85, no. 6 (December 1977): 1141-87.
-
(1977)
Journal of Political Economy
, vol.85
, Issue.6
, pp. 1141-1187
-
-
Becker, G.S.1
Landes, E.M.2
Michael, R.T.3
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9
-
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0000620362
-
Marriage and Divorce: Informal Constraints and Private Contracting
-
June
-
In an empirical analysis of U.S. data, H. E. Peters ("Marriage and Divorce: Informal Constraints and Private Contracting," American Economic Review 76 [June 1986]: 437-54) has shown that a person's decision to divorce his or her spouse depends on the expected lifetime utility after divorce as compared to that of remaining married. If we accept this result, then mahrieh as a penalty that a husband must pay in case of unilateral divorce will increase his cost of divorce and hence reduce its attractiveness.
-
(1986)
American Economic Review
, vol.76
, pp. 437-454
-
-
Peters, H.E.1
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10
-
-
84920378489
-
Bride-Wealth and Dowry Revisited: The Position of Women in Sub-Saharan Africa and North India
-
August/October
-
Stanley J. Tambiah ("Bride-Wealth and Dowry Revisited: The Position of Women in Sub-Saharan Africa and North India," Current Anthropology 30 [August/October 1989]: 413-27, esp. 427) reports that in the Swazi tribe among the southern Bantu (in Africa) the status difference between the man's family and the woman's family affects the value of the bride-price. Swazi aristocrats extract a larger bride-price for a daughter who marries into a lower-status family and pay a smaller bride-price when a son marries a woman of lower family status.
-
(1989)
Current Anthropology
, vol.30
, pp. 413-427
-
-
Tambiah, S.J.1
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11
-
-
85033314841
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-
note
-
A man wishing to marry into a family of higher socioeconomic status might offer a mahrieh of larger value as compensation to the woman who is marrying into a family of lower status. See also n. 9.
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-
-
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12
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85033318895
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-
note
-
Concern for status and concern for the financial security of a woman in case of an unwanted divorce are not separately identifiable given these data. Mahrieh is viewed as insurance against divorce. Thus, we expect a family of higher status and wealth to demand a larger amount of mahrieh insurance for a marrying daughter. This lack of identification was pointed out by a referee of this journal.
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-
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13
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0004227324
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-
New York: McGraw-Hill
-
For an explanation of the Chow test, see P. N. Gujarati, Basic Econometrics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1988), pp. 443-46.
-
(1988)
Basic Econometrics
, pp. 443-446
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-
Gujarati, P.N.1
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15
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0021575979
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Bridegroom-Price in Urban India: Class, Caste, and 'Dowry Evil' among Christians in Madras
-
L. Caplan ("Bridegroom-Price in Urban India: Class, Caste, and 'Dowry Evil' among Christians in Madras," Man 19 [1984]: 216-33, esp. 221) reports that in south Asia education raises the transaction value of women in marriage.
-
(1984)
Man
, vol.19
, pp. 216-233
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-
Caplan, L.1
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16
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0022818830
-
Rural Punjabi Social Organization and Marriage Timing Strategies in Pakistan
-
November
-
Thomas E. Fricke and Syed H. Sabiha, "Rural Punjabi Social Organization and Marriage Timing Strategies in Pakistan," Demography 23, no. 4 (November 1986): 489-508.
-
(1986)
Demography
, vol.23
, Issue.4
, pp. 489-508
-
-
Fricke, T.E.1
Sabiha, S.H.2
|