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Volumn 45, Issue 2, 1997, Pages 281-293

An economic analysis of the prenuptial agreement (Mahrieh) in contemporary Iran

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EID: 0012960031     PISSN: 00130079     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/452274     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (9)

References (17)
  • 4
    • 85033314323 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • As explained in following sections, mahrieh in practice is similar to a prenuptial agreement. However, since the latter phrase has a broader meaning than mahrieh does, it is not an appropriate English translation of mahrieh.
  • 5
    • 85033290928 scopus 로고
    • Paris: Librarie Géne;rale de Droit et Jourisprudence
    • In the sample of 511 couples used in this study, fewer than 1% married without a mahrieh. B. Saroukhani (Le choix du conjoint en Iran et en Occident [Choice of spouse in Iran and the West] [Paris: Librarie Géne;rale de Droit et Jourisprudence, 1968]) and G. Tavassoli ("Evolution of Bride-Price in Tehran," in Tenth International Seminar on Family Research [Tehran: Institute for Social Studies and Research, 1966]) have also shown similar results.
    • (1968) Le Choix du Conjoint en Iran et en Occident [Choice of Spouse in Iran and the West]
    • Saroukhani, B.1
  • 6
    • 85033291341 scopus 로고
    • Evolution of Bride-Price in Tehran
    • Tehran: Institute for Social Studies and Research
    • In the sample of 511 couples used in this study, fewer than 1% married without a mahrieh. B. Saroukhani (Le choix du conjoint en Iran et en Occident [Choice of spouse in Iran and the West] [Paris: Librarie Géne;rale de Droit et Jourisprudence, 1968]) and G. Tavassoli ("Evolution of Bride-Price in Tehran," in Tenth International Seminar on Family Research [Tehran: Institute for Social Studies and Research, 1966]) have also shown similar results.
    • (1966) Tenth International Seminar on Family Research
    • Tavassoli, G.1
  • 7
    • 85033301269 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Iran's Civil Law Code no. 1087
    • Iran's Civil Law Code no. 1087.
  • 8
    • 0000818384 scopus 로고
    • An Economic Analysis of Marital Instability
    • December
    • G. S. Becker, E. M. Landes, and R. T. Michael, "An Economic Analysis of Marital Instability," Journal of Political Economy 85, no. 6 (December 1977): 1141-87.
    • (1977) Journal of Political Economy , vol.85 , Issue.6 , pp. 1141-1187
    • Becker, G.S.1    Landes, E.M.2    Michael, R.T.3
  • 9
    • 0000620362 scopus 로고
    • Marriage and Divorce: Informal Constraints and Private Contracting
    • June
    • In an empirical analysis of U.S. data, H. E. Peters ("Marriage and Divorce: Informal Constraints and Private Contracting," American Economic Review 76 [June 1986]: 437-54) has shown that a person's decision to divorce his or her spouse depends on the expected lifetime utility after divorce as compared to that of remaining married. If we accept this result, then mahrieh as a penalty that a husband must pay in case of unilateral divorce will increase his cost of divorce and hence reduce its attractiveness.
    • (1986) American Economic Review , vol.76 , pp. 437-454
    • Peters, H.E.1
  • 10
    • 84920378489 scopus 로고
    • Bride-Wealth and Dowry Revisited: The Position of Women in Sub-Saharan Africa and North India
    • August/October
    • Stanley J. Tambiah ("Bride-Wealth and Dowry Revisited: The Position of Women in Sub-Saharan Africa and North India," Current Anthropology 30 [August/October 1989]: 413-27, esp. 427) reports that in the Swazi tribe among the southern Bantu (in Africa) the status difference between the man's family and the woman's family affects the value of the bride-price. Swazi aristocrats extract a larger bride-price for a daughter who marries into a lower-status family and pay a smaller bride-price when a son marries a woman of lower family status.
    • (1989) Current Anthropology , vol.30 , pp. 413-427
    • Tambiah, S.J.1
  • 11
    • 85033314841 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • A man wishing to marry into a family of higher socioeconomic status might offer a mahrieh of larger value as compensation to the woman who is marrying into a family of lower status. See also n. 9.
  • 12
    • 85033318895 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Concern for status and concern for the financial security of a woman in case of an unwanted divorce are not separately identifiable given these data. Mahrieh is viewed as insurance against divorce. Thus, we expect a family of higher status and wealth to demand a larger amount of mahrieh insurance for a marrying daughter. This lack of identification was pointed out by a referee of this journal.
  • 13
    • 0004227324 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • New York: McGraw-Hill
    • For an explanation of the Chow test, see P. N. Gujarati, Basic Econometrics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1988), pp. 443-46.
    • (1988) Basic Econometrics , pp. 443-446
    • Gujarati, P.N.1
  • 15
    • 0021575979 scopus 로고
    • Bridegroom-Price in Urban India: Class, Caste, and 'Dowry Evil' among Christians in Madras
    • L. Caplan ("Bridegroom-Price in Urban India: Class, Caste, and 'Dowry Evil' among Christians in Madras," Man 19 [1984]: 216-33, esp. 221) reports that in south Asia education raises the transaction value of women in marriage.
    • (1984) Man , vol.19 , pp. 216-233
    • Caplan, L.1
  • 16
    • 0022818830 scopus 로고
    • Rural Punjabi Social Organization and Marriage Timing Strategies in Pakistan
    • November
    • Thomas E. Fricke and Syed H. Sabiha, "Rural Punjabi Social Organization and Marriage Timing Strategies in Pakistan," Demography 23, no. 4 (November 1986): 489-508.
    • (1986) Demography , vol.23 , Issue.4 , pp. 489-508
    • Fricke, T.E.1    Sabiha, S.H.2


* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.