Rationalizable Trade

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 31, Issue 2, 2000, Pages 311-323

  Morris, Stephen ^a   Skiadas, Costis ^b  

^a YALE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0012925932     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/game.1999.0744     Document Type: Article

References (15)

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3. Bernheim, D. (1984). "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior," Econometrica 52, 1007-1028.
4. Bhattacharya, S., and Lipman, B. (1995). "Ex Ante versus Interim Rationality and the Existence of Bubbles," Econ. Theory 6, 469-494.
5. Dekel, E., and Fudenberg, D. (1990). "Rational Behavior with Payoff Uncertainty," J. Econ. Theory 52, 243-267.
6. Dekel, E., and Gul, F. (1997). "Rationality and Common Knowledge in Game Theory," in Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Seventh World Congress of the Econometric Society, Vol. 1. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press.
7. DeMarzo, P., and Skiadas, C. (1998). "Aggregation, Determinacy, and Informational Efficiency for a Class of Economies with Asymmetric Information," J. Econ. Theory 80, 123-152.
8. DeMarzo, P., and Skiadas, C. (1999). "On the Uniqueness of Rational Expectations Equilibria," Econ. Theory 13, 1-24.
9. Geanakoplos, J. (1994). "Common Knowledge," in Handbook of Game Theory Vol. 2, Chap. 40. (R. Aumann and S. Hart, Eds.), Amsterdam/New York: Elsevier Science.
10. Milgrom, P., and Roberts, J. (1990). "Rationalizability, Learning and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities," Econometrica 58, 1255-1278.
11. Morris, S. (1992). "Acceptance Games and Protocols," CARESS working paper 92-22, University of Pennsylvania.
12. Morris, S. (1994). "Trade with Heterogeneous Prior Beliefs and Asymmetric Information," Econometrica 62, 1327-1347.
13. Nalebuff, B. (1989). "Puzzles: The Other Person's Envelope Is Always Greener," J. Econ. Perspect. 3, 171-181.
14. Pearce, D. (1984). "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection," Econometrica 52, 1029-1050.
15. Sebenius, J., and Geanakoplos, J. (1983). "Don't Bet On It: Contingent Agreements with Asymmetric Information," J. Am. Stat. Assoc. 78, 424-426.