From alliance to collective security: Rethinking the Gulf Cooperation Council

Middle East Policy

Volumn 4, Issue 3, 1996, Pages 39-49

  Mainuddin, Rolin G ^a   Aicher Jr , Joseph R ^a   Elliot, Jeffrey M ^a  

^a NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0012910159     PISSN: 10611924     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1475-4967.1996.tb00222.x     Document Type: Article

References (56)

1. The official name is the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf. Founded on May 25, 1991, the members are Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.
2. For example, see Peter W. Wilson and Douglas F. Graham, Saudi Arabia: The Coming Storm (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1994), pp. 56-60, 81-82.
3. For a theoretical distinction between an alliance and collective security, see Thomas R. Cusack and Richard J. Stoll, "Collective Security and State Survival in the Interstate System," International Studies Quarterly, vol. 38, March 1994, pp. 43-44. Also, see the classic work by Inis L. Claude, Jr., Power and International Relations (New York: Random House, 1962), pp. 144-149.
4. For a theoretical distinction between an alliance and collective security, see Thomas R. Cusack and Richard J. Stoll, "Collective Security and State Survival in the Interstate System," International Studies Quarterly, vol. 38, March 1994, pp. 43-44. Also, see the classic work by Inis L. Claude, Jr., Power and International Relations (New York: Random House, 1962), pp. 144-149.
5. Article IV of the GCC Charter. Nevertheless, security issues were of concern to the political leadership. See Charles A. Kupchan, The Persian Gulf and the West: The Dilemmas of Security (Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1987), pp. 148-149.
6. J. E. Peterson, "The GCC and Regional Security," in John A. Sandwick, ed., The Gulf Cooperation Council: Moderation and Stability in an Interdependent World (Boulder: Westview Press, 1987), pp. 172-173, 194-196.
7. Peterson, in Sandwick, (ed.), The Gulf Cooperation Council, p. 196.
8. For the remainder of this section, the authors are indebted to J. E. Peterson in borrowing from his work. See Peterson, in Sandwick, (ed.), The Gulf Cooperation Council, pp. 177-199. Also, see Erik R. Peterson, The Gulf Cooperation Council: Search for Unity in a Dynamic Region (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988), chapter 3.
9. For the remainder of this section, the authors are indebted to J. E. Peterson in borrowing from his work. See Peterson, in Sandwick, (ed.), The Gulf Cooperation Council, pp. 177-199. Also, see Erik R. Peterson, The Gulf Cooperation Council: Search for Unity in a Dynamic Region (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988), chapter 3.
10. Robin Wright, "Unexplored Realities of the Persian Gulf Crisis," The Middle East Journal, vol. 45, Winter 1991, p. 25.
11. Thomas McNaugher, Arms and Oil: U.S. Military Strategy and the Persian Gulf (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1985), pp. 139-143, cited in Kupchan, The Persian Gulf and the West, p. 71.
12. Thomas McNaugher, Arms and Oil: U.S. Military Strategy and the Persian Gulf (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1985), pp. 139-143, cited in Kupchan, The Persian Gulf and the West, p. 71.
13. This culture of military coup is aptly discussed in a textbook by James A. Bill and Robert Springborg, Politics in the Middle East, 4th ed. (New York: HarperCollins, 1994), pp. 180-218, 248-251.
14. Michael J. Mazarr, Don M. Snider and James A. Blackwell, Jr., Desert Storm: The Gulf War and What We Learned (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), pp. 135-136.
15. Geoffrey Kemp, "Regional Security, Arms Control, and the End of the Cold War," in Sheryl J. Brown and Kimber M. Schraub, (eds.), Resolving Third World Conflict: Challenges for a New Era (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1992), p. 123.
16. Yahya M. Sadowski, Scuds or Butter: The Political Economy of Arms Control in the Middle East (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1993), pp. 8-9, 70-71. For a discussion of the GCC members' budget squeeze during the 1990-91 Persian Gulf crisis, see Joseph W. Twinam, "The Gulf Cooperation Council since the Gulf War: The State of the States," Middle East Policy, vol. 1, no. 4, 1992, pp. 97-100. Also, the long-term U.S. military presence in the region will inevitably force the Gulf sheikhdoms to share the financial burden. See Stephen Zunes, "The U.S.-GCC Relationship: Its Rise and Potential Fall," Middle East Policy, vol. 2, no. 1, 1993, p. 105.
17. Yahya M. Sadowski, Scuds or Butter: The Political Economy of Arms Control in the Middle East (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1993), pp. 8-9, 70-71. For a discussion of the GCC members' budget squeeze during the 1990-91 Persian Gulf crisis, see Joseph W. Twinam, "The Gulf Cooperation Council since the Gulf War: The State of the States," Middle East Policy, vol. 1, no. 4, 1992, pp. 97-100. Also, the long-term U.S. military presence in the region will inevitably force the Gulf sheikhdoms to share the financial burden. See Stephen Zunes, "The U.S.-GCC Relationship: Its Rise and Potential Fall," Middle East Policy, vol. 2, no. 1, 1993, p. 105.
18. Yahya M. Sadowski, Scuds or Butter: The Political Economy of Arms Control in the Middle East (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1993), pp. 8-9, 70-71. For a discussion of the GCC members' budget squeeze during the 1990-91 Persian Gulf crisis, see Joseph W. Twinam, "The Gulf Cooperation Council since the Gulf War: The State of the States," Middle East Policy, vol. 1, no. 4, 1992, pp. 97-100. Also, the long-term U.S. military presence in the region will inevitably force the Gulf sheikhdoms to share the financial burden. See Stephen Zunes, "The U.S.-GCC Relationship: Its Rise and Potential Fall," Middle East Policy, vol. 2, no. 1, 1993, p. 105.
19. See Wilson and Graham, Saudi Arabia, p. 160.
20. Herman F. Eilts, "The Persian Gulf Crisis: Perspectives and Prospects, " The Middle East Journal, vol. 45, Winter 1991, p. 8.
21. Ralph Braibanti, "The Gulf Cooperation Council: A Comparative Note," in Sandwick, (ed.), The Gulf Cooperation Council, p. 214.
22. Peterson, in Sandwick, (ed.), The Gulf Cooperation Council, pp. 172-193.
23. Mazarr and others, Desert Storm, chapter 2, particularly pp. 21-22.
24. Ibid., pp. 23, 48, 62, 143, 165.
25. The other three cornerstones of the framework were: ending arms proliferation in the Middle East, Israel's acceptance of the land-for-peace principle and a new program for regional economic development.
26. In requesting deployment of U.S. troops during the 1990 Operation Desert Shield, King Fahd of Saudi Arabia secured religious sanctification from Abd al-Aziz bin Baz, that country's preeminent religious leader. See Eilts, p. 8.
27. From the GCC perspective, Iraq and Iran represent a "potential threat" and an "actual threat," respectively (emphasis original). See John D. Anthony, "Iran in GCC Dynamics," Middle East Policy, vol. 2, no. 3, 1993, p. 117.
28. The authors are grateful to Col. James Bartholomees of the U.S. Army War College for underscoring this point.
29. The impracticability of "dual containment" in the Middle East is argued by F. Gregory Gause III. See Gause, "The Illogic of Dual Containment," Foreign Affairs, vol. 73, March/April 1994, pp. 56-57. Also, see Louis J. Cantori, "Regional Solutions to Regional Security Problems: The Middle East and Somalia," Middle East Policy, vol. 3, no. 3, 1994, p. 28; George Lenczowski, "Iran: The Big Debate," Middle East Policy, vol. 3, no. 2, 1994, p. 54; and Edward G. Shirley, "The Iran Policy Trap," Foreign Policy, vol. 96, Fall 1994, p. 75. The Clinton administration's perspective on dual containment is argued by Anthony Lake, assistant to the president for National Security Affairs, "Confronting Backlash States," Foreign Affairs, vol. 73, March/April 1994, pp. 48-49. Also, see clarification by Martin Indyk, special assistant to the president, National Security Council, in "Symposium on Dual Containment: U.S. Policy toward Iran and Iraq," Middle East Policy, vol. 3, no. 1, 1994, pp. 1-7.
30. The impracticability of "dual containment" in the Middle East is argued by F. Gregory Gause III. See Gause, "The Illogic of Dual Containment," Foreign Affairs, vol. 73, March/April 1994, pp. 56-57. Also, see Louis J. Cantori, "Regional Solutions to Regional Security Problems: The Middle East and Somalia," Middle East Policy, vol. 3, no. 3, 1994, p. 28; George Lenczowski, "Iran: The Big Debate," Middle East Policy, vol. 3, no. 2, 1994, p. 54; and Edward G. Shirley, "The Iran Policy Trap," Foreign Policy, vol. 96, Fall 1994, p. 75. The Clinton administration's perspective on dual containment is argued by Anthony Lake, assistant to the president for National Security Affairs, "Confronting Backlash States," Foreign Affairs, vol. 73, March/April 1994, pp. 48-49. Also, see clarification by Martin Indyk, special assistant to the president, National Security Council, in "Symposium on Dual Containment: U.S. Policy toward Iran and Iraq," Middle East Policy, vol. 3, no. 1, 1994, pp. 1-7.
31. The impracticability of "dual containment" in the Middle East is argued by F. Gregory Gause III. See Gause, "The Illogic of Dual Containment," Foreign Affairs, vol. 73, March/April 1994, pp. 56-57. Also, see Louis J. Cantori, "Regional Solutions to Regional Security Problems: The Middle East and Somalia," Middle East Policy, vol. 3, no. 3, 1994, p. 28; George Lenczowski, "Iran: The Big Debate," Middle East Policy, vol. 3, no. 2, 1994, p. 54; and Edward G. Shirley, "The Iran Policy Trap," Foreign Policy, vol. 96, Fall 1994, p. 75. The Clinton administration's perspective on dual containment is argued by Anthony Lake, assistant to the president for National Security Affairs, "Confronting Backlash States," Foreign Affairs, vol. 73, March/April 1994, pp. 48-49. Also, see clarification by Martin Indyk, special assistant to the president, National Security Council, in "Symposium on Dual Containment: U.S. Policy toward Iran and Iraq," Middle East Policy, vol. 3, no. 1, 1994, pp. 1-7.
32. The impracticability of "dual containment" in the Middle East is argued by F. Gregory Gause III. See Gause, "The Illogic of Dual Containment," Foreign Affairs, vol. 73, March/April 1994, pp. 56-57. Also, see Louis J. Cantori, "Regional Solutions to Regional Security Problems: The Middle East and Somalia," Middle East Policy, vol. 3, no. 3, 1994, p. 28; George Lenczowski, "Iran: The Big Debate," Middle East Policy, vol. 3, no. 2, 1994, p. 54; and Edward G. Shirley, "The Iran Policy Trap," Foreign Policy, vol. 96, Fall 1994, p. 75. The Clinton administration's perspective on dual containment is argued by Anthony Lake, assistant to the president for National Security Affairs, "Confronting Backlash States," Foreign Affairs, vol. 73, March/April 1994, pp. 48-49. Also, see clarification by Martin Indyk, special assistant to the president, National Security Council, in "Symposium on Dual Containment: U.S. Policy toward Iran and Iraq," Middle East Policy, vol. 3, no. 1, 1994, pp. 1-7.
33. The impracticability of "dual containment" in the Middle East is argued by F. Gregory Gause III. See Gause, "The Illogic of Dual Containment," Foreign Affairs, vol. 73, March/April 1994, pp. 56-57. Also, see Louis J. Cantori, "Regional Solutions to Regional Security Problems: The Middle East and Somalia," Middle East Policy, vol. 3, no. 3, 1994, p. 28; George Lenczowski, "Iran: The Big Debate," Middle East Policy, vol. 3, no. 2, 1994, p. 54; and Edward G. Shirley, "The Iran Policy Trap," Foreign Policy, vol. 96, Fall 1994, p. 75. The Clinton administration's perspective on dual containment is argued by Anthony Lake, assistant to the president for National Security Affairs, "Confronting Backlash States," Foreign Affairs, vol. 73, March/April 1994, pp. 48-49. Also, see clarification by Martin Indyk, special assistant to the president, National Security Council, in "Symposium on Dual Containment: U.S. Policy toward Iran and Iraq," Middle East Policy, vol. 3, no. 1, 1994, pp. 1-7.
34. The impracticability of "dual containment" in the Middle East is argued by F. Gregory Gause III. See Gause, "The Illogic of Dual Containment," Foreign Affairs, vol. 73, March/April 1994, pp. 56-57. Also, see Louis J. Cantori, "Regional Solutions to Regional Security Problems: The Middle East and Somalia," Middle East Policy, vol. 3, no. 3, 1994, p. 28; George Lenczowski, "Iran: The Big Debate," Middle East Policy, vol. 3, no. 2, 1994, p. 54; and Edward G. Shirley, "The Iran Policy Trap," Foreign Policy, vol. 96, Fall 1994, p. 75. The Clinton administration's perspective on dual containment is argued by Anthony Lake, assistant to the president for National Security Affairs, "Confronting Backlash States," Foreign Affairs, vol. 73, March/April 1994, pp. 48-49. Also, see clarification by Martin Indyk, special assistant to the president, National Security Council, in "Symposium on Dual Containment: U.S. Policy toward Iran and Iraq," Middle East Policy, vol. 3, no. 1, 1994, pp. 1-7.
35. Zunes, PP. 106, 112.
36. Here the authors propose a broader framework than Louis Cantori's Pan-Arab focus. See Cantori, p. 30.
37. Like Robin Wright, we view an anti-Iraqi "regional alliance" involving Iran and Israel as unrealistic (emphasis original). See Wright, p. 24.
38. Thomas R. Mattair and Stephen Brannon, "U.N. Sanctions against Iraq: Issues Influencing Continuation or Removal," Middle East Policy, vol. 3, no. 1, 1994, p. 29. In addressing the fear of a reasserted Iraq, Mattair and Brannon discuss the pros and cons of lifting U.N. sanctions against Iraq.
39. Eric Rouleau, "America's Unyielding Policy toward Iraq," Foreign Affairs, vol. 74, January/February 1995, pp. 71-72.
40. Wright, p. 29.
41. For a discussion of the importance of over-coming mutual misperceptions in improving relationships in another context, see Bill, "The United States and Iran: Mutual Mythologies," Middle East Policy, vol. 2, no. 3, 1993, pp. 105-106.
42. R. K. Ramazani, "Iran's Foreign Policy: Both North and South," The Middle East Journal, vol. 46, Summer 1992, pp. 393-394.
43. Lenczowski, pp. 61-62. For a cautious optimism, see Anthony, pp. 119-120.
44. Cantori, p. 29.
45. Ramazani, pp. 394, 401-403.
46. For interesting perspectives on proponents and opponents of improved GCC-Iran relations, see Anthony, pp. 108-118.
47. Israel would like to break out of the perpetual state of tension with its Arab neighbors. See Israel Shahak, "The Israeli Myth of Omniscience: Nuclear Deterrence and Intelligence," American-Arab Affairs, vol. 36, Spring 1991, pp. 95-96.
48. Whereas Algeria and Yemen boycotted the talks, Bahrain, Kuwait, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Tunisia sent observers.
49. The other eight countries were: Algeria, Bahrain, Lebanon, Morocco, Qatar, Tunisia, the UAE and Yemen.
50. American arms and aircraft manufacturers were "routinely exempted" from such a policy.
51. Those events followed the September 1978 Camp David accords and the May 1979 Camp David Treaty between Egypt and Israel, which were the first dramatic breakthroughs in Arab-Israeli relations.
52. Syria is unlikely to be more accommodating without recovering the Golan Heights from Israel. Nevertheless, a Syrian-Israeli peace is not impossible in the near future. See Alon BenMeir, "The Israeli-Syrian Battle for Equitable Peace," Middle East Policy, vol. 3, no. 1, 1994, p. 78; M. Zuhair Diab, "Have Syria and Israel Opted for Peace?" Middle East Policy, vol. 3, no. 2, 1994, pp. 77, 83-84; and Muhammad Muslih, "Dateline Damascus: Asad Is Ready," Foreign Policy, vol. 96, Fall 1994, pp. 150-151. Also, see "Damascus Making a Big Concession in Talks on Golan," The New York Times, May 25, 1995, p. A1, and "Peres Inches toward Ceding Golan for Peace with Syria," The New York Times, May 26, 1995, p. A2.
53. Syria is unlikely to be more accommodating without recovering the Golan Heights from Israel. Nevertheless, a Syrian-Israeli peace is not impossible in the near future. See Alon BenMeir, "The Israeli-Syrian Battle for Equitable Peace," Middle East Policy, vol. 3, no. 1, 1994, p. 78; M. Zuhair Diab, "Have Syria and Israel Opted for Peace?" Middle East Policy, vol. 3, no. 2, 1994, pp. 77, 83-84; and Muhammad Muslih, "Dateline Damascus: Asad Is Ready," Foreign Policy, vol. 96, Fall 1994, pp. 150-151. Also, see "Damascus Making a Big Concession in Talks on Golan," The New York Times, May 25, 1995, p. A1, and "Peres Inches toward Ceding Golan for Peace with Syria," The New York Times, May 26, 1995, p. A2.
54. Syria is unlikely to be more accommodating without recovering the Golan Heights from Israel. Nevertheless, a Syrian-Israeli peace is not impossible in the near future. See Alon BenMeir, "The Israeli-Syrian Battle for Equitable Peace," Middle East Policy, vol. 3, no. 1, 1994, p. 78; M. Zuhair Diab, "Have Syria and Israel Opted for Peace?" Middle East Policy, vol. 3, no. 2, 1994, pp. 77, 83-84; and Muhammad Muslih, "Dateline Damascus: Asad Is Ready," Foreign Policy, vol. 96, Fall 1994, pp. 150-151. Also, see "Damascus Making a Big Concession in Talks on Golan," The New York Times, May 25, 1995, p. A1, and "Peres Inches toward Ceding Golan for Peace with Syria," The New York Times, May 26, 1995, p. A2.
55. Syria is unlikely to be more accommodating without recovering the Golan Heights from Israel. Nevertheless, a Syrian-Israeli peace is not impossible in the near future. See Alon BenMeir, "The Israeli-Syrian Battle for Equitable Peace," Middle East Policy, vol. 3, no. 1, 1994, p. 78; M. Zuhair Diab, "Have Syria and Israel Opted for Peace?" Middle East Policy, vol. 3, no. 2, 1994, pp. 77, 83-84; and Muhammad Muslih, "Dateline Damascus: Asad Is Ready," Foreign Policy, vol. 96, Fall 1994, pp. 150-151. Also, see "Damascus Making a Big Concession in Talks on Golan," The New York Times, May 25, 1995, p. A1, and "Peres Inches toward Ceding Golan for Peace with Syria," The New York Times, May 26, 1995, p. A2.
56. Syria is unlikely to be more accommodating without recovering the Golan Heights from Israel. Nevertheless, a Syrian-Israeli peace is not impossible in the near future. See Alon BenMeir, "The Israeli-Syrian Battle for Equitable Peace," Middle East Policy, vol. 3, no. 1, 1994, p. 78; M. Zuhair Diab, "Have Syria and Israel Opted for Peace?" Middle East Policy, vol. 3, no. 2, 1994, pp. 77, 83-84; and Muhammad Muslih, "Dateline Damascus: Asad Is Ready," Foreign Policy, vol. 96, Fall 1994, pp. 150-151. Also, see "Damascus Making a Big Concession in Talks on Golan," The New York Times, May 25, 1995, p. A1, and "Peres Inches toward Ceding Golan for Peace with Syria," The New York Times, May 26, 1995, p. A2.