-
2
-
-
34247765945
-
Intelligent Writing: The Electronic Liberation of Text
-
who approaches the subject from the perspective of a profoundly philosophical student of media, see esp.
-
(1989)
Technology and Society
, vol.11
, pp. 387-400
-
-
Levinson1
-
3
-
-
45149140681
-
Electronic Text and the Evolution of Media
-
A somewhat similar point was made a few years ago by Alan Kay, who can probably be fairly described as the father of the laptop computer; see
-
(1990)
Journal of Social and Biological Systems
, vol.13
, Issue.2
, pp. 141-149
-
-
-
4
-
-
84911273323
-
-
“Computers are going to disappear as physical objects. They will disappear into the wiring of our houses and into the clothes that we wear.”
-
-
-
-
7
-
-
84911273322
-
-
No purpose will be served here by attempting a bibliography of this debate.
-
-
-
-
8
-
-
0004124145
-
-
However, indispensable sources include, MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts
-
(1978)
Brainstorms
-
-
Dennett1
-
19
-
-
84911273320
-
-
J.C.R. Licklider, “Man-Computer Symbiosis,” reprinted in Goldberg, 131–140; esp. 133–134.
-
-
-
-
22
-
-
0003489805
-
-
Also, this and several other classic papers by Bush and others are now available in
-
(1945)
The Atlantic Monthly
, pp. 245-246
-
-
-
24
-
-
84911273319
-
-
On enabling technologies, see Rheingold, Virtual Reality, 61.
-
-
-
-
28
-
-
8744270151
-
Design for an Intelligence-Amplifier
-
C.E. Shannon, J. McCarthy, Princeton University Press, Princeton, The contrast between the steam engine and the lever is explicitly drawn on p. 218.
-
(1956)
Automata Studies
, pp. 215-233
-
-
Ashby1
-
29
-
-
84911273318
-
-
Engelbart, “Augmenting Human Intellect,” 9–11. The potential for misunderstanding inherent in the concept of intelligence augmentation is illustrated by a recent rebuttal of the myth that the possession of a computer makes the owner inherently smarter, a myth mistakenly claimed to have one of its roots in Engelbart's augmentationism
-
-
-
-
30
-
-
0003956603
-
-
see, Peachpit Press, Berkeley, CA, In my innocence I had not encountered this particular myth before seeing it rebutted, but I suppose there is no limit to the range of superstitions that may spring up around a new technology. Engelbart, to make this point absolutely clear, is not even claiming that computer training makes a person inherently smarter; rather, through training the person is augmented by becoming part of a complex system that is smarter than the unaided person.
-
(1992)
Silicon Mirage: The Art and Science of Virtual Reality
, pp. 307-308
-
-
Aukstakalnis1
Blatner2
-
31
-
-
84911273317
-
-
Engelbart, in “Augmenting Human Intellect”, 21–23.
-
-
-
-
32
-
-
18344405033
-
-
The effect on our thinking of graphical representation of symbols has more recently been literally illustrated by Edward R. Tufte in his two remarkable works, Graphics Press, Cheshire, CT
-
(1983)
The Visual Display of Quantitative Information
-
-
-
34
-
-
84911273316
-
-
Engelbart, in “Augmenting Human Intellect”, 24.
-
-
-
-
35
-
-
0003813338
-
-
Engelbart cites, MIT and John Wiley & Sons, New York, For a delightful popular exercise in applied Whorfian linguistics, see
-
(1956)
Language, Thought, and Reality
-
-
Whorf1
-
37
-
-
84911273315
-
-
Engelbart, “Augmenting Human Intellect,” 9–11. The potential for misunderstanding inherent in the concept of intelligence augmentation is illustrated by a recent rebuttal of the myth that the possession of a computer makes the owner inherently smarter, a myth mistakenly claimed to have one of its roots in Engelbart's augmentationism
-
-
-
-
38
-
-
84911273314
-
-
Engelbart, in “Augmenting Human Intellect”, 21–23.
-
-
-
-
39
-
-
84911273313
-
-
Engelbart, in “Augmenting Human Intellect”, 24.
-
-
-
-
41
-
-
84911273312
-
-
For a discussion of Havelock's relevance to the personal computer revolution, see Heim, 46–57.
-
-
-
-
46
-
-
84911273310
-
-
Engelbart, “Augmenting Human Intellect,” 25.
-
-
-
-
47
-
-
84911273309
-
-
All of the above find even earlier intimations of hypertext in Vannevar Bush's pioneering paper “As We May Think”; see Note 9 above.
-
-
-
-
52
-
-
84911273308
-
-
Engelbart, “Augmenting Human Intellect,” p. 46. The concept of the computer as a medium has been articulated, e.g., by Alan Kay, who in this respect has been influenced by Marshall McLuhan; see Rheingold, Virtual Reality, p. 85.
-
-
-
-
53
-
-
84911273307
-
-
Engelbart's role as a pioneer of virtual reality has been chronicled in Rheingold, Virtual Reality; see Note 5 above.
-
-
-
-
55
-
-
4243916528
-
Methodological Suggestions from a Comparative Psychology of Knowledge Processes
-
is found in, P.A. Schilpp, The Philosophy of Karl R. Popper, Open Court, LaSalle, IL, References to Ashby are found in this paper, 421–423, and elsewhere in Campbell's writings. An acknowledgement that Campbell was first introduced to this paradigm by Ashby is found in
-
(1974)
Campbell's Evolutionary Epistemology
, pp. 412-463
-
-
Campbell1
-
56
-
-
84911273306
-
-
(1959)
Inquiry
, Issue.2
, pp. 152-182
-
-
-
57
-
-
0002197688
-
Methodological Suggestions from a Comparative Psychology of Knowledge Processes
-
For some reservations about the scope of this paradigm, see
-
(1959)
Inquiry
, Issue.2
, pp. 154
-
-
Campbell1
-
58
-
-
2342525056
-
Taking Evolution Seriously Critical Comments on DT Campbell's Evolutionary Epistemology
-
Finally, a comprehensive bibliography of evolutionary epistemology, compiled by Campbell and Gary A. Cziko, has been published in the
-
(1978)
Monist
, vol.61
, Issue.4
, pp. 611-621
-
-
Skagestad1
-
60
-
-
84911273305
-
-
Engelbart, “Augmenting Human Intellect,” 27, Fig. 2.
-
-
-
-
61
-
-
84911273304
-
-
Engelbart, “Augmenting Human Intellect,” 26, Fig. 2.
-
-
-
-
62
-
-
84911273303
-
-
Engelbart, “The Augmented Knowledge Workshop,” 190.
-
-
-
-
63
-
-
84911273302
-
-
J.C.R. Licklider, “Man-Computer Symbiosis,” reprinted in Goldberg, 131–140; esp. 133–134.
-
-
-
-
64
-
-
84911273301
-
-
Popper, Objective Knowledge, 238.
-
-
-
-
65
-
-
84911273300
-
-
Popper's World 3 also bears a certain resemblance to John William Miller's “Midworid”, i.e., the world of artifacts or “functioning objects,” which in Miller's view was indispensable to bridging the gulf between objectivity and subjectivity
-
-
-
-
66
-
-
33746161418
-
The Thought: A Logical Inquiry
-
P.F. Strawson, Oxford University Press, esp. p. 29
-
(1967)
Philosophical Logic
, pp. 17-38
-
-
Frege1
-
72
-
-
84911273297
-
-
Popper, Objective Knowledge, 238–239.
-
-
-
-
73
-
-
84911273296
-
-
Popper, Objective Knowledge, 225, n. 39.
-
-
-
-
74
-
-
84911273295
-
-
Popper, Objective Knowledge, 116. Peirce's definition, of which more below, also anticipates Roman Jakobson's insistence on translatability as an essential character of the linguistic sign, as has been argued by Jakob Liszka
-
-
-
-
76
-
-
84911273294
-
-
Popper, Objective Knowledge, 242.
-
-
-
-
77
-
-
84911273293
-
-
Popper, Objective Knowledge, 106.
-
-
-
-
78
-
-
84911273292
-
-
Popper, Objective Knowledge, 107.
-
-
-
-
79
-
-
84911273291
-
-
Popper, Objective Knowledge, 253. See the Peirce quotation cited in Note 68 below.
-
-
-
-
80
-
-
42349104948
-
Peirce and Pearson: Pragmatism vs. Instrumentalism
-
For Charles Peirce's reliance on this same distinction, see, R.S. Cohen, M.W. Wartofsky, Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, D. Reidel, Dordrecht
-
(1983)
Language, Logic, and Method
, vol.31
, pp. 263-282
-
-
Skagestad1
-
81
-
-
84911273290
-
-
Popper, Objective Knowledge, 107–108.
-
-
-
-
82
-
-
84911273289
-
-
the last page referenced has a pertinent reference to Hume, while p. 96 references Adam Ferguson, including his famous formulation: “the result of human action, but not the execution of any human design.” See also Popper's “On the Theory of the Objective Mind,” 159, with further references to Hayek and to Bühler.
-
-
-
-
83
-
-
84911273288
-
-
Popper, Objective Knowledge, 113; 117.
-
-
-
-
85
-
-
84911273287
-
-
Popper, Objective Knowledge, 116. Peirce's definition, of which more below, also anticipates Roman Jakobson's insistence on translatability as an essential character of the linguistic sign, as has been argued by Jakob Liszka
-
-
-
-
86
-
-
84911273286
-
-
Agassi does suggest that Collingwood imposed needless restrictions on the use of the method because he, unlike Popper, sought certainty. This seems to me a mistake. Collingwood held that, in cases where the agent's solution is the only evidence of his problem, we cannot rediscover the problem unless the solution was successful. Whether or not we accept this view does not appear to me to have anything to do with whether or not we are looking for certainty—where there is no evidence, there surely can be no knowledge, certain or conjectural.
-
-
-
-
88
-
-
84911273285
-
-
Popper, Objective Knowledge, 115. See the Peirce quotation cited in Note 68 below.
-
-
-
-
89
-
-
84911273284
-
-
For further discussion of this issue, see Peter Skagestad, Making Sense of History, esp. Ch.5.
-
-
-
-
92
-
-
84911273283
-
Re-Enactment: A Study in R.G. Collingwood's Philosophy of History
-
An Emendation of R.G. Collingwood's Doctrine of Absolute Presuppositions, For an exceptionally detailed discussion of the reenactment doctrine, see Heikki Saari's dissertation, Some interesting parallels between Collingwood and Peirce are discussed in
-
(1984)
Acta Academiae Aboensis, Ser. A
, vol.63
, Issue.2
-
-
Ketner1
-
94
-
-
84911273281
-
-
Popper, Objective Knowledge, 120. See the Peirce quotation cited in Note 68 below.
-
-
-
-
99
-
-
0003561435
-
-
Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN, emphasis in the original. The Peircean ancestrage of the discipline is noted by Eco, 15–16
-
(1979)
A Theory of Semiotics
, pp. 9
-
-
Eco1
-
100
-
-
0004226744
-
-
Charles Hartshorne, Paul Weiss, The Belknap Press of the Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts
-
(1935)
Collected Papers
, vol.1-6
-
-
Peirce1
-
101
-
-
0004226744
-
-
A. Burks, The Belknap Press of the Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, On Peirce's semiotic, see, C. Sills G.H. Jensen The Philosophy of Discourse 1958 Heinemann Portsmouth, New Hampshire 53 69, for Peirce's philosophy more generally, see my
-
(1935)
Collected Papers
, vol.7-8
-
-
Peirce1
-
105
-
-
84911273278
-
-
Eugene Freeman and Henryk Skolimowski, “The Search for Objectivity in Peirce and Popper,” in Schilpp, 464–519. As has been pointed out by Ilkka Niiniluoto, however, Freeman misses the mark by claiming that Peirce's fallibilism, unlike Popper's, is qualified by a theory of ‘manifest’ truth; Peirce's ideal-limit theory is in fact nothing of the kind
-
-
-
-
106
-
-
0346860779
-
Notes on Popper as Follower of Whewell and Peirce
-
see, esp. 316–317
-
(1978)
Ajatus
, vol.37
, pp. 272-327
-
-
Niiniluoto1
-
107
-
-
84911269908
-
Notes on Popper as Follower of Whewell and Peirce
-
On Peirce's theory of truth, see
-
(1987)
Ajatus
, vol.37
, pp. 316-317
-
-
Niiniluoto1
-
109
-
-
84911273277
-
-
Niiniluoto, p. 320. The influences on Popper, other than the repeatedly acknowledged influences of Kant and Bühler, are harder to trace, as is somewhat testily noted by Niiniluoto, 274, n. 4. As Freeman and Skolimowski remark, 509, Popper was not familiar with Peirce's thought until 1952, by which time his own philosophical outlook was largely formed. Niiniluoto observes, 276, n. 8, that Popper does not mention Whewell until 1954, and then lumps him together with his opponent J.S. Mill as an inductivist. As Niiniluoto also notes, 274, n. 5, Whewell's ‘anticipations’ of Popper seem to have been first observed by Imre Lakatos in 1970
-
-
-
-
112
-
-
84911273276
-
-
Popper, Objective Knowledge, 122. See the Peirce quotation cited in Note 68 below.
-
-
-
-
113
-
-
84911273275
-
-
Popper, Objective Knowledge, 253. See the Peirce quotation cited in Note 68 below.
-
-
-
-
114
-
-
84911273274
-
-
Popper, Objective Knowledge, 114.
-
-
-
-
115
-
-
84911273273
-
-
Popper, Objective Knowledge, 113; 117.
-
-
-
-
116
-
-
84911273272
-
-
Peiree, Collected Papers, Vol. 5, paras. 286.
-
-
-
-
117
-
-
84911274754
-
Charles S. Peirce: Semiotician in Mathematics and the History of Science
-
Peirce's profound and lifelong interest in notation is documented, e.g., Kenneth L. Ketner, JosephM. Ransdell, Institute for Studies in Pragmaticism, Lubbock, Texas
-
(1979)
Studies in Peirce 's Semiotic
, pp. 31-39
-
-
Eisele1
-
118
-
-
84911273271
-
-
Peirce, vol. 2, paras. 276–292.
-
-
-
-
120
-
-
84911273270
-
-
Arabic numerals were introduced to the Christian world through Fibonacci's Liber Abaci, the definitive second edition of which appeared in 1228
-
-
-
-
122
-
-
0009578682
-
-
Allyn and Bacon, Boston, and Engelbart, “Augmenting Human Intellect,” 35. Howard DeLong has drawn my attention to the superior ease of use of Leibnitz's notation for the calculus over Newton's as an analogous example.
-
(1985)
The History of Mathematics
, pp. 268-274
-
-
Burton1
-
123
-
-
84911273268
-
-
Popper, Objective Knowledge, 135. Whorf's view, I should add, was that our European tendency to objectify leads us to posit make-believe entities whenever we use cardinal numbers, whereas the Hopi would not use cardinal numbers except for things already ascertained to exist. Thus we can think of days and years as things, which we count and measure, whereas the Hopi simply think of day as a condition; to the Hopi, then, you do not stay ten days', you stay ‘until the eleventh day’. See Benjamin Lee Whorf, Language, Thought, and Reality, 57–64; 139–140.
-
-
-
-
124
-
-
84911273267
-
-
Popper, 187–188.
-
-
-
-
125
-
-
84911273266
-
-
For further discussion of this issue, see Peter Skagestad, Making Sense of History, esp. Ch.5.
-
-
-
-
126
-
-
84911273265
-
-
E.g., Popper, 96.
-
-
-
-
127
-
-
84911273264
-
-
Eugene Freeman and Henryk Skolimowski, “The Search for Objectivity in Peirce and Popper,” in Schilpp, 464–519. As has been pointed out by Ilkka Niiniluoto, however, Freeman misses the mark by claiming that Peirce's fallibilism, unlike Popper's, is qualified by a theory of ‘manifest’ truth; Peirce's ideal-limit theory is in fact nothing of the kind
-
-
-
-
129
-
-
84911273263
-
-
Niiniluoto, p. 320. The influences on Popper, other than the repeatedly acknowledged influences of Kant and Bühler, are harder to trace, as is somewhat testily noted by Niiniluoto, 274, n. 4. As Freeman and Skolimowski remark, 509, Popper was not familiar with Peirce's thought until 1952, by which time his own philosophical outlook was largely formed. Niiniluoto observes, 276, n. 8, that Popper does not mention Whewell until 1954, and then lumps him together with his opponent J.S. Mill as an inductivist. As Niiniluoto also notes, 274, n. 5, Whewell's ‘anticipations’ of Popper seem to have been first observed by Imre Lakatos in 1970
-
-
-
-
130
-
-
84911273262
-
-
Peiree, Collected Papers, Vol. 5, paras. 247–249.
-
-
-
-
131
-
-
84911273261
-
-
Freeman and Skolimowski, 477 Peirce, Vol. 3, para. 363. See Perice, Vol. 4, paras. 530; 571.
-
-
-
-
132
-
-
0041131304
-
C.S. Peirce's “First Real Discovery” and its Contemporary Relevance
-
For a related discussion, see, Monist Library of Philosophy, LaSalle, Illinois
-
(1983)
The Relevance of Charles Peirce
, pp. 107-118
-
-
Freeman1
-
133
-
-
84911273260
-
-
Peiree, Collected Papers, Vol. 5, paras. 251.
-
-
-
-
134
-
-
84911273259
-
-
Peiree, Collected Papers, Vol. 5, paras. 338.
-
-
-
-
135
-
-
84911273258
-
-
Gardner exaggerates, however, when he postulates the need for “a gigantic effort of practice and study to master Peirce's intricate technique to the point of usefulness…” 58. Kenneth L. Keiner has brilliantly shown that at least Peirce's graphical notation for propositional logic is not significantly more intricate or difficult to learn than the algebraic notation normally used in introductory logic courses
-
-
-
-
138
-
-
84911273257
-
-
Gardner, 116, Note 2, observes that the first known diagram of electrical switching circuits for Boolean operators is found in a letter from Peirce to his former student Marquand written in 1886, and rediscovered only in the 1970s
-
-
-
-
142
-
-
84911273256
-
-
Peiree, Collected Papers, Vol. 5, paras. 283.
-
-
-
-
143
-
-
84911273255
-
-
Peiree, Collected Papers, Vol. 5, paras. 286.
-
-
-
-
144
-
-
33845632973
-
-
Quoted in, Second Edition, William Morrow, New York, I am indebted to Howard DeLong for reminding me of this passage, although Countess Lovelace's ‘anticipation’ of Peirce in this respect is also noted in Gardner, 151 (without a direct quotation, however). I have found no references to Lovelace in Peirce's published works, although he was of course familiar with Babbage's work; see Note 70 above.
-
(1981)
The Analytical Engine
, pp. 57
-
-
Bernstein1
-
145
-
-
84911273254
-
-
Peirce, vol. 2, paras. 276–292.
-
-
-
-
146
-
-
84911273253
-
-
Gardener, 151
-
-
-
-
147
-
-
84911273252
-
-
Peirce, vol. 5, para. 289.
-
-
-
-
148
-
-
84911273251
-
-
Peirce, vol. 5, para. 289.
-
-
-
-
149
-
-
84911273250
-
-
Peirce, vol. 5, para. 289, n.1.
-
-
-
-
153
-
-
84911273249
-
-
An admirably clear statement of the case for mechanism based on the Church-Turing thesis has been made by Judson Webb, in his “Gödel and Church: A Prologue to Mechanism,” in Cohen and Wartofsky, 309–353, which also cites relevant passages from Peirce and Babbage.
-
-
-
-
154
-
-
84911273248
-
-
Peirce, I should add, opposed mechanism on the ground, among others, that the logic of relations (later proven undecidable) required creativity and inventiveness even for the derivation of logically necessary conclusions; see his Collected Papers, Vol. 3, paras. 618, 641, as well as the article by Hintikka referenced in Note 73 above.
-
-
-
-
155
-
-
0002988210
-
Computing Machinery and Intelligence
-
For an opposing view, see
-
(1950)
Mind
, vol.59
, pp. 433-460
-
-
Turing1
|
