The possibility of metaphysics: Environmental ethics and the naturalistic fallacy

Environmental Ethics

Volumn 22, Issue 1, 2000, Pages 85-98

  Kerr, Andrew J ^a,b  

^a Oikos Organic Farm ^*  (United States)

^b Oikos Organic Farm   (United States)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 0012432313     PISSN: 01634275     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.5840/enviroethics200022151     Document Type: Article

References (32)

1. G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962), p. 40.
2. William Frankena, Ethics, 2d ed. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1973), p. 100.
3. Ibid. p. 101.
4. An article by Franklin I. Gamwell has aided my entire discussion of the naturalistic fallacy and Frankena's interpretation of it. See Franklin I. Gamwell, "Ethics, Metaphysics, and The Naturalistic Fallacy," Belief and Ethics: Essays in Honor of W. Alvin Pitcher, ed. W. Widick Schroeder and Gibson Winter (Chicago: Center for the Scientific Study of Religion, 1978), pp. 39-56.
5. A critic might argue, of course, that we choose our definitions of the good; experience reports individuals with differing choices of moral values, and the whole challenge of the moral life is to choose one's moral values well. In addition, an amoralist may choose to avoid living by moral values at all. But my point is not that we cannot choose among putative definitions of the good, but that we cannot choose the true definition of the good. In other words, a definition of the good is not true because we choose it; our choice does not validate the principle. Rather, we must make an appeal, or a justification, by giving reasons for our choice. Naturalism is the recommendation that the reason or reasons offered be some existential condition or conditions.
6. Peter Singer, Practical Ethics, 2d ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 21.
7. Ibid., pp. 11-17.
8. Ibid., pp. 21, 38-43, 334. Singer never uses the term strength to identify a standard for the comparison of interests, but his application of the principle of equal consideration of interests implies that his theory does not distinguish between genuine and putative interests, that is, that the type or content of the interest has no bearing on its intrinsic value. Singer's thought closely matches that of R. M. Hare, who does use the term strength of interest. See R. M. Hare, Moral Thinking: Its Levels, Method and Point (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), pp. 117-18.
9. Ibid., pp. 21, 38-43, 334. Singer never uses the term strength to identify a standard for the comparison of interests, but his application of the principle of equal consideration of interests implies that his theory does not distinguish between genuine and putative interests, that is, that the type or content of the interest has no bearing on its intrinsic value. Singer's thought closely matches that of R. M. Hare, who does use the term strength of interest. See R. M. Hare, Moral Thinking: Its Levels, Method and Point (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), pp. 117-18.
10. Peter Singer, Animal Liberation (New York: Avon Books, 1990), pp. 4-5.
11. Callicott borrows his account of moral sentiments, and his account of the naturalistic fallacy, from David Hume. Hume's "is/ought dichotomy" criticizes moral principles and notions of the good grounded upon "the relations among objects" because "relations among objects" expressed relations of a sort "entirely different" from the prescriptive relation implied by a moral principle. Although Hume did not specify in what sense prescriptive relations are "entirely different" from descriptive ones, his admonition that the move from is to ought requires additional argument suggests Hume would agree with Frankena that the naturalist assumes his definition of the good to be true by definition, an assumption that fails because in fact some alternative always exists. If relations among objects cannot define the good, nor the perception of such relations by reason, Hume concludes that sentiments must define the good; these sentiments do not describe relations among objects, nor express perceptions of such objects, but express instead tendencies which, as Callicott describes, "project" the quality of goodness upon circumstances. See J. Baird Callicott "Intrinsic Value, Quantum Theory, and Environmental Ethics," In Defense of the Land Ethic (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), pp. 160-65.
12. Ibid., p. 165.
13. Ibid., p. 166.
14. But why does this argument defend an ecocentric ethics, as opposed to an ethic more restricted in context? According to Darwin and other evolutionary thinkers, selection pressures can account only for sympathetic feelings among the humans with whom one lives in community, possibly only one's kin. How does Callicott justify the more extensive sympathy required by an ecocentric ethics? Because the sentiments are tendencies, Callicott explains, additional knowledge gained from ecology as to what constitutes true community will "reveal new relations among objects which, once revealed, stir our ancient centers of moral feeling" (Callicott, "Intrinsice Value," p. 174). In other words, current ecological science "thus informs[s] us of the existence of something which is a proper object of one of our most fundamental moral passions. The biotic community is a proper object of that passion..." (ibid., p. 173). The task of environmental ethics is to educate these passions; upon such education, our communal sympathies will project the quality of goodness upon the biotic community.
15. But why does this argument defend an ecocentric ethics, as opposed to an ethic more restricted in context? According to Darwin and other evolutionary thinkers, selection pressures can account only for sympathetic feelings among the humans with whom one lives in community, possibly only one's kin. How does Callicott justify the more extensive sympathy required by an ecocentric ethics? Because the sentiments are tendencies, Callicott explains, additional knowledge gained from ecology as to what constitutes true community will "reveal new relations among objects which, once revealed, stir our ancient centers of moral feeling" (Callicott, "Intrinsice Value," p. 174). In other words, current ecological science "thus informs[s] us of the existence of something which is a proper object of one of our most fundamental moral passions. The biotic community is a proper object of that passion..." (ibid., p. 173). The task of environmental ethics is to educate these passions; upon such education, our communal sympathies will project the quality of goodness upon the biotic community.
16. J. Baird Callicott, "Intrinsic Value, Quantum Theory, and Environmental Ethics," In Defense of the Land Ethic, p. 162.
17. Admittedly, Kant often speaks of the categorical imperative as analytic, or necessary, but this claim follows from his explicit assumption that the human will is free. Because the experienced world (phenomenon) discloses no freedom, even as practical reason presumes it in order to understand human moral choice, no contradiction occurs for Kant if freedom is denied. See Immanuel Kant, Fundamental Principles of a Metaphysics of Morals; Robert M. Hutchins, Great Books of the Western World, vol. 42 (Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, 1952), p. 284.
18. Admittedly, Kant often speaks of the categorical imperative as analytic, or necessary, but this claim follows from his explicit assumption that the human will is free. Because the experienced world (phenomenon) discloses no freedom, even as practical reason presumes it in order to understand human moral choice, no contradiction occurs for Kant if freedom is denied. See Immanuel Kant, Fundamental Principles of a Metaphysics of Morals; Robert M. Hutchins, Great Books of the Western World, vol. 42 (Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, 1952), p. 284.
19. A critic might respond that solitary human experience would not make use of social instincts. But, nothing is solitary. See J. Baird Callicott, "Metaphysical Implications of Ecology," In Defense of the Land Ethic (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), pp. 110-11.
20. At times Rolston speaks not simply of creativity, but also of the divine creativity. Rolston sometimes speaks as if God were a creative creature supreme among creative creatures, and at other times Rolston speaks as if God was the creativity, or inventiveness, of life on Earth, or even of creativity as found throughout the universe, and thus a principle, akin to Henry N. Wieman's "creative event." In any case, Rolston is clear that the evolutionary and ecological processes on the Earth best express divine character; to speak of evolutionary and ecological processes seems to exhaust what can be spoken of God. If so, then identifying Rolston as a theocentric thinker should add nothing to my description of him as an ecocentric thinker. For further treatment on Rolston's theological ethic, see Frank Benzoni, "Rolston's Theological Ethic," Environmental Ethics 16 (1996): 339-52.
21. Holmes Rolston, III, "Is There an Ecological Ethic?" Ethics 47 (1975): 94.
22. Ibid., p. 100.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid., pp. 100-01.
25. Ibid., p. 198.
26. Holmes Rolston, III, Environmental Ethics: Duties To and Values In The Natural World (Philadephia: Temple University Press, 1988), p. 342.
27. Holmes Rolston, III, "The Human Standing in Nature: Storied Fitness in the Moral Observer," in Values and Moral Standing, ed. Wayne Sumner, Don Callen, and Thomas Attig (Bowling Green, Ohio: Bowling Green Studies in Applied Philosophy, 1986), p. 96.
28. A reader might disagree that Rolston would "understand such a lack of participation as bad" because humans, by means of culture, have transcended evolution to some extent. But Rolston I believe argues that culture itself should be one uniquely human way to participate in the ecosystem. He writes, "[n]o species has a 'right to life' apart from the continued existence of the ecosystem with which it cofits" (Rolston, Environmental Ethics, p. 155) and "[a] morally satisfactory fit must be a biologically satisfactory fit" (ibid. p. 58). Later, Rolston argues that the human niche in the ecosystem is that of "ideal observer" (ibid., pp. 338-39).
29. A reader might disagree that Rolston would "understand such a lack of participation as bad" because humans, by means of culture, have transcended evolution to some extent. But Rolston I believe argues that culture itself should be one uniquely human way to participate in the ecosystem. He writes, "[n]o species has a 'right to life' apart from the continued existence of the ecosystem with which it cofits" (Rolston, Environmental Ethics, p. 155) and "[a] morally satisfactory fit must be a biologically satisfactory fit" (ibid. p. 58). Later, Rolston argues that the human niche in the ecosystem is that of "ideal observer" (ibid., pp. 338-39).
30. A reader might disagree that Rolston would "understand such a lack of participation as bad" because humans, by means of culture, have transcended evolution to some extent. But Rolston I believe argues that culture itself should be one uniquely human way to participate in the ecosystem. He writes, "[n]o species has a 'right to life' apart from the continued existence of the ecosystem with which it cofits" (Rolston, Environmental Ethics, p. 155) and "[a] morally satisfactory fit must be a biologically satisfactory fit" (ibid. p. 58). Later, Rolston argues that the human niche in the ecosystem is that of "ideal observer" (ibid., pp. 338-39).
31. Charles Hartshorne, The Zero Fallacy, and Other Essays in Neoclassical Philosophy (Chicago: Open Court, 1997), p. 95.
32. Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality, Corrected Edition, ed. Donald W. Sherburne and David Ray Griffin (New York: Free Press, 1978), p. 21.