Selective Acceptance and Inefficiency in a Two-Issue Complete Information Bargaining Game

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 31, Issue 2, 2000, Pages 262-293

  Weinberger, Catherine J ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0012285084     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/game.1999.0742     Document Type: Article

References (25)

1. Admati, A., and Perry, M. (1987). "Strategic Delay in Bargaining," Rev. Econ. Stud. 54, 345-364.
2. Bac, M., and Raff, H. (1996). "Issue-by-Issue Negotiations: The Role of Information and Time Preference," Games Econ. Behav. 13, 125-134.
3. Busch, L. A., and Horstman, I. (1997). "A Comment on Issue-by-issue Negotiations," Games Econ. Behav. 19, 144-148.
4. Dekel, E. (1990). "Simultaneous Offers and the Inefficiency of Bargaining: A Two Period Example," J. Econ. Theory 50, 300-308.
5. Farrell, J., and Maskin, E. (1989). "Renegotiation in Repeated Games," Games Econ. Behav. 1, 327-360.
6. Fernandez, R., and Glazer, J. (1991). "Striking for a Bargain between Two Completely Informed Agents," Am. Econ. Rev. 81, 240-252.
7. Fershtman, C. (1990). "The Importance of the Agenda in Bargaining," Games Econ. Behav. 2, 224-238.
8. Fershtman, C., and Seidmann, D. J. (1993). "Deadline Effects and Inefficient Delay in Bargaining with Endogenous Commitment," J. Econ. Theory 60, 306-321.
9. Fudenberg, D., and Tirole, J. (1983). "Sequential Bargaining Under Incomplete Information," Rev. Econ. Stud. 50 221-247.
10. Gul, F., and Sonnenschein, H. (1988). "On Delay in Bargaining with One-Sided Uncertainty," Econometrica 56, 601-611.
11. Haller, H., and Holden, S. (1990). "A Letter to the Editor on Wage Bargaining," J. Econ. Theory 52, 232-236.
12. Hart, O. (1989). "Bargaining and Strikes," Quart. J. Econom. 104, 25-43.
13. Herrero, M. J. (1993). "Two Issue Bargaining," unpublished manuscript, Carnegie Mellon University.
14. Lang, K., and Rosenthal, R. (1998). "Multi-Issue Bargaining with Perfect Information," unpublished paper, Boston University.
15. Merlo, A., and Wilson, C. (1995). "A Stochastic Model of Sequential Bargaining with Complete Information," Econometrica 63, 371-399.
16. Muthoo, A. (1991). "A Note on Bargaining over a Finite Number of Feasible Agreements," Econ. Theory 1, 290-292.
17. National Labor Relations Board (1993). Decisions and Orders of the National Labor Relations Board, Vol. 312, Case No. 247, Washington, DC: The Board, U.S.G.P.O.
18. National Labor Relations Board (1995). Decisions and Orders of the National Labor Relations Board, Vol. 318, Case No. 95, Washington, DC: The Board, U.S.G.P.O.
19. Osborne, M. J., and Rubinstein, A. (1990). Bargaining and Markets. San Diego: Academic Press.
20. Rubinstein, A. (1982). "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica 50, 97-109.
21. Rubinstein, A. (1985). "A Bargaining Model with Incomplete Information about Preferences," Econometrica 53, 1151-1171.
22. Rush, D. (1997). "Clinton Slashes at Defense Budget Bill," Pacifica Network News, October 14.
23. Sakovics, J. (1993). "Delay in Bargaining Games with Complete Information," J. Econ. Theory 59, 78-95.
24. Sobel, J., and Takahashi, I. (1983). "A Multistage Model of Bargaining," Rev. Econ. Stud. 50, 411-426.
25. van Damme, E., Selten, R., and Winter, E. (1990). "Alternating Bid Baragining with a Smallest Money Unit," Games Econ. Behav. 2, 188-201.