Incentive-compatible debt contracts: The one-period problem

Review of Economic Studies

Volumn 52, Issue 4, 1985, Pages 647-663

  Gale, Douglas ^a   Hellwig, Martin ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF BONN   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0012125938     PISSN: 00346527     EISSN: 1467937X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2297737     Document Type: Article

References (11)

1. Diamond, D. (1982), “Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring, (Working Paper No. 82, Center for Research in Security Prices, University of Chicago)
2. Gale, D. (1983a), “Competitive Models with Keynesian Features”, Economic Journal, 93, 17-33.
3. Gale, D. (1983b) Money: In Disequilibrium (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
4. Gale, D. and Hellwig, M. (1983), “Incentive Compatible Debt Contracts I: The One-Period Problem”, (Theoretical Economics Discussion Paper Series, 83/80, ICERD, London School of Economics).
5. Gale, D. and Hellwig, M. (1984a), "The Optimal Debt Contract: A Comparative Static Analysis”, (London School of Economics (mimco)).
6. Gale, D. and Hellwig, M. (1984b), “Incentive-Compatible Debt Contracts: The Two-Period Problem” (in preparation).
7. Hodgman, D. (1962), "Credit Risk and Credit Rationing: Reply', Quarterly Journal ofEconomics, 76, 488-493.
8. Jafee, D. M. and Russell, T. (1976), “Imperfect Information, Uncertainty and Credit Rationing”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 90, 651-666.
9. Stiglitz, J. E. and Weiss, A. (1981), "Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information", American Economic Review, 71, 393-410.
10. Stiglitz, J. E. and Weiss, A. (1980), “Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information II: Constraints as Incentive Devices”, (Bell Laboratories Discussion Paper No. 18).
11. Townsend, R. (1978), “Optimal Contracts and Competitive Markets with Costly State Verifications”, Journal of Economic Theory, 21, 417-425.