Delegation, commitment, and the regulatory mandate

Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization

Volumn 8, Issue 1, 1992, Pages 126-154

  Spulber, Daniel F ^a   Besanko, David ^a  

^a NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0011914244     PISSN: 87566222     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

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