Do institutional shareholders police management?

Managerial and Decision Economics

Volumn 18, Issue 1, 1997, Pages 1-10

  Clyde, Paul ^a  

^a NERA ECONOMIC CONSULTING   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0011314888     PISSN: 01436570     EISSN: 10991468     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1002/(SICI)1099-1468(199702)18:1<1::AID-MDE796>3.0.CO;2-0     Document Type: Article

References (17)

1. A. Agrawal and G. Mandelker (1990). Large shareholders and the monitoring of managers: the case of antitakeover charter amendments. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 25, 143–61.
2. B. Ambrose and W. Megginson (1992). The role of asset structure, ownership structure, and takeover defenses in determining acquisition likelihood. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 27, 575–89.
3. J. Brickley, R. Lease and C. Smith Jr (1988). Ownership structure and voting on antitakeover amendments. Journal of Financial Economics, 20, 267–91.
4. R. Bruner and E. R. Brownlee (1990). Leveraged ESOPs, wealth transfers, and 'shareholder neutrality': the case of Polaroid. Financial Management, 19, 59–74.
5. H. Demsetz (1983). The structure of ownership and the theory of the firm. Journal of Law and Economics, 26, 375–90.
6. H. Demsetz and K. Lehn (1985). The structure of corporate ownership: causes and consequences. Journal of Political Economy, 93, 1155–77.
7. D. A. Dreyfus (1989). Deregulation of the utilities: the natural gas experience. Business Economics, 24, 41–7.
8. I. Friend, M. Blume and J. Crockett (1970). Mutual Funds and Other Institutional Investors, New York: McGraw-Hill.
9. L. Gordon and J. Pound (1989). ESOPs and corporate control. Journal of Employee Ownership Law and Finance, 1, Fall, 63–74.
10. G. Jarrell and A. Poulsen (1987). Shark repellants and stock prices: the effects of antitakeover amendments since 1980. Journal of Financial Economics, 19, 127–68.
11. M. Jensen (1989). Eclipse of the public corporation. Harvard Business Review, September-October, 61–74.
12. M. Jensen (1993). The modern industrial revolution, exit, and the failure of internal control systems. Journal of Finance, 48, 831–80.
13. J. Pound (1988). Proxy contests and the efficiency of shareholder oversight. Journal of Financial Economics, 20, 237–66.
14. J. Pound (1991). Proxy voting and the SEC: investor protection versus market efficiency. Journal of Financial Economics, 29, 241–85.
15. M. J. Roe (1990). Political and legal restraints on ownership control of public companies. Journal of Financial Economics, 27, 7–43.
16. M. Schranz (1993). Takeovers improve firm performance: evidence from the banking industry. Journal of Political Economy, 101, 299–324.
17. A. Shleifer and R. Vishny (1986). Large shareholders and corporate control. Journal of Political Economy, 94, 461–88.