The first reorganisation of the CPSU Central Committee apparat under perestroika

Europe - Asia Studies

Volumn 49, Issue 2, 1997, Pages 281-302

  Hahn, Gordon M ^a  

^a STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0010939725     PISSN: 09668136     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/09668139708412440     Document Type: Article

References (101)

1. Yousseff Cohen, Radicals, Reformers, and Reactionaries: The Prisoner's Dilemma and the Collapse of Democracy in Latin America (Chicago, Chicago University Press, 1994).
2. Jeffrey Surovell, 'Gorbachev's Last Year: Leftist or Rightist?', Europe-Asia Studies, 46, 3, 1994, pp. 465-487 and Jeffrey Surovell, 'Ligachev and Soviet Polities', Soviet Studies, 43, 2, 1991, pp. 355-374.
3. Jeffrey Surovell, 'Gorbachev's Last Year: Leftist or Rightist?', Europe-Asia Studies, 46, 3, 1994, pp. 465-487 and Jeffrey Surovell, 'Ligachev and Soviet Polities', Soviet Studies, 43, 2, 1991, pp. 355-374.
4. Patrick Cockburn, 'Gorbachev and Soviet Conservatism', World Policy Journal, 6, 1, 1989, pp. 81-106; and Neil Robinson, 'Gorbachev and the Place of the Party in Soviet Reform', Soviet Studies, 44, 3, 1992, pp. 423-443; and Vera Tolz & Iain Elliot (ed), The Demise of the USSR (London, Macmillan, 1995). It is a disadvantage as well to do without reference to newly available archival documentation. Here, I draw extensively upon research in the former CPSU CC archive, now the Tsentr khraneniya sovremennoi dokumentatsii (TsKhSD). The internal structures of the remaining departments in the reorganised apparat, not including the Administration of Affairs, the General Department, and the Party Building and Cadre Work Department, discussed below are contained in TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 4, d. 9, pp. 1-24. I also use interviews conducted at the Gorbachev Foundation (from here on cited as the Gorbachev Fond Interviews) in Moscow in July-August 1995 with Vyacheslav Viktorovich Viktorov, who was transferred from the Propaganda Department to the General Department at the beginning of the first reorganisation and served as Grigorii Revenko's chief of staff when after the August 1991 putsch he became head of the USSR Presidential apparat after having served on the Presidential Council in 1990. I also interviewed Revenko, Gorbachev's top adviser Georgii Shakhnazarov, and former Politburo member and CC Secretary for ideology Vadim Medvedev, who also served on the Presidential Council in 1990.
5. Patrick Cockburn, 'Gorbachev and Soviet Conservatism', World Policy Journal, 6, 1, 1989, pp. 81-106; and Neil Robinson, 'Gorbachev and the Place of the Party in Soviet Reform', Soviet Studies, 44, 3, 1992, pp. 423-443; and Vera Tolz & Iain Elliot (ed), The Demise of the USSR (London, Macmillan, 1995). It is a disadvantage as well to do without reference to newly available archival documentation. Here, I draw extensively upon research in the former CPSU CC archive, now the Tsentr khraneniya sovremennoi dokumentatsii (TsKhSD). The internal structures of the remaining departments in the reorganised apparat, not including the Administration of Affairs, the General Department, and the Party Building and Cadre Work Department, discussed below are contained in TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 4, d. 9, pp. 1-24. I also use interviews conducted at the Gorbachev Foundation (from here on cited as the Gorbachev Fond Interviews) in Moscow in July-August 1995 with Vyacheslav Viktorovich Viktorov, who was transferred from the Propaganda Department to the General Department at the beginning of the first reorganisation and served as Grigorii Revenko's chief of staff when after the August 1991 putsch he became head of the USSR Presidential apparat after having served on the Presidential Council in 1990. I also interviewed Revenko, Gorbachev's top adviser Georgii Shakhnazarov, and former Politburo member and CC Secretary for ideology Vadim Medvedev, who also served on the Presidential Council in 1990.
6. Patrick Cockburn, 'Gorbachev and Soviet Conservatism', World Policy Journal, 6, 1, 1989, pp. 81-106; and Neil Robinson, 'Gorbachev and the Place of the Party in Soviet Reform', Soviet Studies, 44, 3, 1992, pp. 423-443; and Vera Tolz & Iain Elliot (ed), The Demise of the USSR (London, Macmillan, 1995). It is a disadvantage as well to do without reference to newly available archival documentation. Here, I draw extensively upon research in the former CPSU CC archive, now the Tsentr khraneniya sovremennoi dokumentatsii (TsKhSD). The internal structures of the remaining departments in the reorganised apparat, not including the Administration of Affairs, the General Department, and the Party Building and Cadre Work Department, discussed below are contained in TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 4, d. 9, pp. 1-24. I also use interviews conducted at the Gorbachev Foundation (from here on cited as the Gorbachev Fond Interviews) in Moscow in July-August 1995 with Vyacheslav Viktorovich Viktorov, who was transferred from the Propaganda Department to the General Department at the beginning of the first reorganisation and served as Grigorii Revenko's chief of staff when after the August 1991 putsch he became head of the USSR Presidential apparat after having served on the Presidential Council in 1990. I also interviewed Revenko, Gorbachev's top adviser Georgii Shakhnazarov, and former Politburo member and CC Secretary for ideology Vadim Medvedev, who also served on the Presidential Council in 1990.
7. T. H. Rigby, 'Stalinism and the Mono-Organizational Society', in Robert Tucker (ed.), Stalinism: Essays in Historical Interpretation (New York, W. W. Norton, 1977), pp. 53-76, at pp. 58-59.
8. T. M. Smimov, 'Administrativno-komandnaya sistema upravleniya promyshlennost'yu: poiski alternativnykh variantov', in L. A. Moichanov & G. B. Denisov (eds), Gosudarstvennye uchrezhdeniya i obshchestvennye organizatsii SSSR: problems, fakty, issledovaniya (Moscow, MGIAI, 1991), pp. 112-119, at p. 115.
9. Sotsialisticheskaya industriya, 7 March 1989, cited in Smirnov, 'Administrativno-komandnaya sistema upravleniya promyshlennost'yu', pp. 117-118.
10. Sotsialisticheskaya industriya, 7 March 1989, cited in Smirnov, 'Administrativno-komandnaya sistema upravleniya promyshlennost'yu', pp. 117-118.
11. This arrangement was intended to integrate production lines previously spread over several enterprises that dealt not with each other but through the government ministries to which they were subordinated as well as Gosplan, Gossnab and the Council of Ministers departmental apparat.
12. Izvestiya, 29 August 1989, cited in Smirnov, 'Administrativno-komandnaya sistema upravleniya promyshlennost'yu', p. 115.
13. Izvestiya, 29 August 1989, cited in Smirnov, 'Administrativno-komandnaya sistema upravleniya promyshlennost'yu', p. 115.
14. Smirnov, 'Administrativno-komandnaya sistema upravleniya promyshlennost'yu', p. 118.
15. Ekonomicheskaya gazeta, 1989, 6, cited in Smirnov, p. 119.
16. Pravitel'stvennyi vestnik, 1989, 2.
17. Izvestiya, 22 April 1988, p. 3.
18. V. Shcherbakov & E. Yasin, 'Narodnokhozyaistvennyi kompieks strany: algoritm i struktury upravleniya', Ekonomicheskaya gazeta, 1989, 6, cited in Smirnov, 'Administrativno- komandnaya sistema upravleniya promyshlennost'yu', p. 116.
19. V. Shcherbakov & E. Yasin, 'Narodnokhozyaistvennyi kompieks strany: algoritm i struktury upravleniya', Ekonomicheskaya gazeta, 1989, 6, cited in Smirnov, 'Administrativno-komandnaya sistema upravleniya promyshlennost'yu', p. 116.
20. Pravda, 9 April 1989, p. 3.
21. Having in mind the planned cut of approximately 700 of some 2000 officials, he suggested this did not count 225 officials of retirement age. This number therefore 'might grow during the carrying out in practice of the renewal of the apparat staff being implemented', and, given that these officials 'in their majority had high qualification and considerable work experience in party, state and management organs', new posts in government and elsewhere ought to be found for them. 'Nedobrozhelatel'nost' k partiinomu apparatu', Istochnik, 1995, 3, pp. 159-160.
22. Noting his desire to avoid 'half-measures', Gorbachev stipulated in the memo that for the 'transition stage' (presumably to the 'socialist market') he would accede to pressure from the apparat and permit retention of these two departments 'for the time being'. Izvestiva TsK KPSS, 1989, 1, pp. 84-85.
23. TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 12, d. 22, pp. 3-4.
24. Izvestiya TsK KPSS, 1989, 1, p. 85.
25. Albert Weeks, Nomenklatura, second edition (Washington, Washington Institute Press, 1989), pp. 47-51.
26. In January 1990 it was revealed that the party organisation of the CC apparat included 1303 responsible workers and 1062 technical workers. Izvestiya TsK KPSS, 1990, 1, pp. 116-117 . Less than a month before the XXVIII Congress, CC Ideology Department Deputy Head Aleksandr Degtyarev claimed that the CPSU CC apparat had been 'reduced by 40%, by more than 1000 employees', and regional apparaty had been 'reduced by the same extent'. Profil (in German), 21 May 1990, pp. 46-47 in FBIS-SOV-90-099, 22 May 1990, p. 46. This figure must have encompassed both otvetstvennye rabotniki and technical-clerical staff, for 1000 constitutes over 50% of the former.
27. In January 1990 it was revealed that the party organisation of the CC apparat included 1303 responsible workers and 1062 technical workers. Izvestiya TsK KPSS, 1990, 1, pp. 116-117 . Less than a month before the XXVIII Congress, CC Ideology Department Deputy Head Aleksandr Degtyarev claimed that the CPSU CC apparat had been 'reduced by 40%, by more than 1000 employees', and regional apparaty had been 'reduced by the same extent'. Profil (in German), 21 May 1990, pp. 46-47 in FBIS-SOV-90-099, 22 May 1990, p. 46. This figure must have encompassed both otvetstvennye rabotniki and technical-clerical staff, for 1000 constitutes over 50% of the former.
28. In January 1990 it was revealed that the party organisation of the CC apparat included 1303 responsible workers and 1062 technical workers. Izvestiya TsK KPSS, 1990, 1, pp. 116-117 . Less than a month before the XXVIII Congress, CC Ideology Department Deputy Head Aleksandr Degtyarev claimed that the CPSU CC apparat had been 'reduced by 40%, by more than 1000 employees', and regional apparaty had been 'reduced by the same extent'. Profil (in German), 21 May 1990, pp. 46-47 in FBIS-SOV-90-099, 22 May 1990, p. 46. This figure must have encompassed both otvetstvennye rabotniki and technical-clerical staff, for 1000 constitutes over 50% of the former.
29. Pravda, 5 July 1990, p. 5.
30. According to former CC General Department Head Valerii Boldin, the Party Construction and Cadre Work Department's staff was 'much reduced', with some sectors reduced to as few as four or five officials responsible for cadres in areas stretching tens of thousands of square miles. This is either a falsehood or reference to cuts made during the second reorganisation when the party renounced its nomenklatura powers over state posts. Valéry Boldin, Ten Years that Shook the World (New York, Basic Books, 1994), p. 239.
31. Shakhnazarov, Viktorov and Revenko-Gorbachev Foundation Interviews; Georgii Shakhnazarov, Tsena svobody (Moscow, Rossika, 1993), p. 351.
32. Shakhnazarov, Viktorov and Revenko-Gorbachev Foundation Interviews; Georgii Shakhnazarov, Tsena svobody (Moscow, Rossika, 1993), p. 351.
33. TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 12, d. 22, p. 2. Medvedev took final, de jure control over the Secretariat at the 9 April 1990 Politburo meeting. TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 42, d. 27, p. 16. He had been gradually assuming its chair unofficially through 1989. Medvedev, Gorbachev Fond Interviews.
34. Viktorov, Gorbachev Fond Interviews.
35. At the 8 September 1988 Politburo meeting Anatolii Dobrynin, soon to be removed from the party leadership, only noted that 'throughout the party apparat there (was) talk, rumours, and gossip'. TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 12, d. 22, pp. 22.
36. Compare the Politburo discussions of the proposals for the first and second reorganisations in TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 42, d. 29 and p. 12, d. 22.
37. In early January 1988 Gorbachev reduced the frequency of Secretariat meetings by half to fortnightly and stripped it of the agenda-setting power of reviewing the coming Politburo meeting's agenda points. See Den', 1991, 15 (August), p. 3. For El'tsin's attack on Ligachev and the party apparat at the October 1987 CC Plenum, see Izvestiya TsK KPSS. 1989, 2, pp. 209-287.
38. In early January 1988 Gorbachev reduced the frequency of Secretariat meetings by half to fortnightly and stripped it of the agenda-setting power of reviewing the coming Politburo meeting's agenda points. See Den', 1991, 15 (August), p. 3. For El'tsin's attack on Ligachev and the party apparat at the October 1987 CC Plenum, see Izvestiya TsK KPSS. 1989, 2, pp. 209-287.
39. Boldin, Ten Years that Shook the World, p. 174.
40. Izvestiya TsK KPSS, 1989, 1, pp. 83-84.
41. Boldin, Ten Years that Shook the World, p. 159. That Ligachev sought the enhancement of ideology's competence with the nationalities portfolio can only be speculation. However, he did not support its placement under party organisation's jurisdiction during the discussion of proposals for reorganising the local apparat, and Gorbachev, Shevardnadze and Razumovsky made a point of supporting the variant that would have been deleterious to Ligachev. TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 12, d. 22, pp. 7, 14, 23, 27.
42. 'Nedobrozhelatel'nost' k partiinomu apparatu', Istochnik, 1995, 3, pp. 159-160. It is worth noting that only the CC secretaries who chaired one of the six CC commissions created under the first reorganisation were familiarised with this document, indicating that the several month lapse in Secretariat meetings in autumn 1988, perhaps into early 1989, and Ligachev's demotion from secretary for ideology to deputy chairman of the CC Agrarian Policy Commission surely reduced his access to information; a crucial weapon in apparat politics.
43. TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 4, d. 9, p. 23.
44. TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 4, d. 9, p. 2. Leon Onikov, an Ideology Department consultant, highlighted the General and the Party Building and Cadre Work Departments' success in burying other reformist zapiski. Pravda, 7 and 8 October 1992.
45. As Ideology Department Head Kapto said, the function of his department's consultants group was 'to prepare analytical materials' and 'study the main problems in the ideological process and the theory and practice of perestroika'. Pravda, 20 February 1989, p. 2.
46. Pravda, 25 April 1990, p. 2.
47. TsKhSD, f. 89, 1. 4, d. 9, p. 23.
48. TsKhSD, f. 89, 1. 4, d. 9, p. 24.
49. TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 12, d. 22, pp. 3-4.
50. TsKhSD, f. 89, 1. 4, d. 9, p. 24.
51. This function had just been upgraded in May 1985, when the sector received a department deputy head to lead it. TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 4, d. 14.
52. TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 4, d. 9, p. 12.
53. TsKhSD, f. 89, 1. 4, d. 9, p. 24.
54. Pravda, 20 February 1989, p. 2.
55. Ibid.
56. They were: the Foreign Political Propaganda Department which was eliminated in 1986, probably subsumed with either the International or Propaganda Departments, and the Propaganda and Cultural Departments and the Scientific and Educational Institutes Department abolished in the first reorganisation. Only the Basic Scientific Research Sub-Department did not have a former department performing its function.
57. The three sub-departments were: the Sub-department for International Party, Public Organisations and Movements; the Sub-department for Socialist Countries of Europe and Ties with Their Communist and Workers' Parties; and the Sub-department for Socialist Countries of Asia and Cuba and Ties with Their Communist and Workers' Parties.
58. Pravda, 25 April 1990, p. 2.
59. Shakhnazarov, Gorbachev Fond Interviews.
60. Shakhnazarov, Tsena svobody, pp. 456, 486.
61. Viktorov, Gorbachev Fond Interviews.
62. Izvestiva TsK KPSS, 1990, 9, p. 23.
63. See the table that reports the submission of 108 decisions in 1986, 274 in 1987, 58 in 1988, 54 in 1989 and 36 in 1990 in Izvestiya TsK KPSS, 1990, 9, p. 23. Moreover, the erratic activity of the commissions, many of which failed to meet once every three months as stipulated in party normative documents, seems to have led to a failure to take advantage of the temporary deactivation of the Secretariat.
64. Viktorov and Revenko, Gorbachev Fond Interviews.
65. Shakhnazarov, Tsena svobody, pp. 387, 410.
66. Pravda, 25 April 1990, p. 2. See zapiski sent by Shakhnazarov to Gorbachev in Shakhnazarov, Tsena svobody, pp. 386-387, 401, 410, 415-416, 420, 422, 430, 435, 456, 463 and 478.
67. Pravda, 25 April 1990, p. 2. See zapiski sent by Shakhnazarov to Gorbachev in Shakhnazarov, Tsena svobody, pp. 386-387, 401, 410, 415-416, 420, 422, 430, 435, 456, 463 and 478.
68. Viktorov, Gorbachev Fond Interviews. It should be added that the Organisational Department's prerogatives were somewhat weakened by new electoral practices in the party and soviets, though the party did not fully renounce its state nomenklatura powers until the XXVIII Congress.
69. Pravda, 3 April 1990, p. 2.
70. Izvestiya TsK KPSS, 1990, 1, pp. 116-117.
71. Pravda, 25 April 1990, p. 2.
72. There were also 517 CC apparatchiki with a higher party education, 448 engineers, 141 economists, 194 teachers, 81 agronomists and only 29 jurists. The provincial apparalchiki included 64 former union republic, kraikom and obkom secretaries, 86 former gorkom and raikom secretaries, 169 former union republic, kraikom and obkom department heads and deputy heads. The average age was 46, with almost half in their forties and one-third in their twenties. Izvestiva TsK KPSS, 1990, 1, pp. 116-118; Pravda, 25 April 1990, p. 2.
73. There were also 517 CC apparatchiki with a higher party education, 448 engineers, 141 economists, 194 teachers, 81 agronomists and only 29 jurists. The provincial apparalchiki included 64 former union republic, kraikom and obkom secretaries, 86 former gorkom and raikom secretaries, 169 former union republic, kraikom and obkom department heads and deputy heads. The average age was 46, with almost half in their forties and one-third in their twenties. Izvestiva TsK KPSS, 1990, 1, pp. 116-118; Pravda, 25 April 1990, p. 2.
74. Pravda, 25 April 1990, p. 2.
75. See Pravda, 10 July 1989, p. 2; and 7 and 8 October 1991, p. 2.
76. See Pravda, 10 July 1989, p. 2; and 7 and 8 October 1991, p. 2.
77. Rossiya, 26 October-1 November 1994, p. 4. Even as a CC apparatchik Fedorov already showed his proclivity toward strict monetary policy, a normal credit system, and the State Bank's subordination to the government and legislature. For his views at the time see Ekonomika i zhizn', 1990, 8, p. 15; and Moscow News (English), 4-11 February 1990, p. 10.
78. Rossiya, 26 October-1 November 1994, p. 4. Even as a CC apparatchik Fedorov already showed his proclivity toward strict monetary policy, a normal credit system, and the State Bank's subordination to the government and legislature. For his views at the time see Ekonomika i zhizn', 1990, 8, p. 15; and Moscow News (English), 4-11 February 1990, p. 10.
79. Rossiya, 26 October-1 November 1994, p. 4. Even as a CC apparatchik Fedorov already showed his proclivity toward strict monetary policy, a normal credit system, and the State Bank's subordination to the government and legislature. For his views at the time see Ekonomika i zhizn', 1990, 8, p. 15; and Moscow News (English), 4-11 February 1990, p. 10.
80. In the wake of the January 1991 Baltic coups Grachev refused a post in the new presidential apparat international affairs department. A. S. Chernyaev, Shest' let s Gorbachevym (Moscow, Progress, 1993), pp. 407-408. In March Grachev supported Gorbachev's turn away from the right, trying to restrain the democrats and rekindle the Gorbachevites' alliance with democrats formerly in the CPSU. See La Repubblica (in Italian), 23 March 1991, p. 13 in FBIS-SOV-91-059, 27 March, pp. 25-26.
81. In the wake of the January 1991 Baltic coups Grachev refused a post in the new presidential apparat international affairs department. A. S. Chernyaev, Shest' let s Gorbachevym (Moscow, Progress, 1993), pp. 407-408. In March Grachev supported Gorbachev's turn away from the right, trying to restrain the democrats and rekindle the Gorbachevites' alliance with democrats formerly in the CPSU. See La Repubblica (in Italian), 23 March 1991, p. 13 in FBIS-SOV-91-059, 27 March, pp. 25-26.
82. In the wake of the January 1991 Baltic coups Grachev refused a post in the new presidential apparat international affairs department. A. S. Chernyaev, Shest' let s Gorbachevym (Moscow, Progress, 1993), pp. 407-408. In March Grachev supported Gorbachev's turn away from the right, trying to restrain the democrats and rekindle the Gorbachevites' alliance with democrats formerly in the CPSU. See La Repubblica (in Italian), 23 March 1991, p. 13 in FBIS-SOV-91-059, 27 March, pp. 25-26.
83. The two CC departments which relied most heavily on consultants, the International Relations Department and the Department for Relations with Communist and Workers' Parties of Socialist Countries, developed reputations for being less rigid than the other departments. The latter was run and relied upon by Andropov when he was a CC Secretary. See A. S. Chernyaev, Shest' let's Gorbachevym, p. 37; Georgy Arbatov, The System: An Insider's Life in Soviet Politics (New York, Random House, 1992), pp. 83-87.
84. The two CC departments which relied most heavily on consultants, the International Relations Department and the Department for Relations with Communist and Workers' Parties of Socialist Countries, developed reputations for being less rigid than the other departments. The latter was run and relied upon by Andropov when he was a CC Secretary. See A. S. Chernyaev, Shest' let's Gorbachevym, p. 37; Georgy Arbatov, The System: An Insider's Life in Soviet Politics (New York, Random House, 1992), pp. 83-87.
85. However, the Socio-Economic Department and the CC International Department still maintained a healthy staff of consultants-40 and 24, respectively. TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 4, d. 9, pp. 23-24.
86. By January 1990 only 536 CC executive officials had lost their jobs. Izvestiya TsK KPSS, 1990, 1, p. 112. Therefore, a full year after the initiation of the reorganisation, 144 (22%) still needed to be cut to attain the figure announced at the XXVIII Congress. As 40% of the CC apparat executive workers at the end of 1989 had been appointed since late 1986, meaning 60% (840 of approximately 1400 remaining) had been appointed before then, more than 50% of the CC apparat after the first reorganisation's purge was completed were from among these pre-reorganisation appointees. Further estimating that those appointed between Gorbachev's assumption of power in March 1985 and late 1986 survived, the final cuts amounted to less than 20%, perhaps 15% of the CC apparat. On the further assumption that the renewal of CC apparatchiki before the XXVII Congress was meagre, then those pre-Gorbachev appointees remaining after the first reorganisation probably composed a third, even half of the apparat.
87. Izvestiya TsK KPSS, 1991, 7, p. 33.
88. For example, a 28 May 1991 CC Secretariat resolution included a 'request' that the USSR Cabinet of Ministers ensure 'the adoption of measures that will secure radical transformation in higher schools'. Izvestiya TsK KPSS, 1991, 8, p. 41.
89. Approved by the department's head, I. I. Skiba, this 10 August 1990 memorandum admonished a series of government departments for these problems and demanded 'the strengthening of control for fulfilment of its decisions'. The CC apparat memorandum provided Ryzhkov with data on the performance of these ministries, to which presumably he and his government should have had its own independent access. Here, the Secretariat and its departments were still performing the function of 'controlling over the fulfilment of decisions'. The CC apparat is likely still to have had direct access to the ministries' data sources, and party organisations in each government ministry may have helped gather information as well. Admonished in the memo were the State Planning Committee, the State Supply Committee, the Ministry of Foreign Economic Ties, the Timber Industry Ministry, and the Ministry of Trade. Izvestiya TsK KPSS, 1990, 12, pp. 140-141.
90. Izvestiya TsK KPSS, 1991, 7, p. 16.
91. TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 8, d. 6, pp. 1, 5. The purpose of the inventory was, according to Lushchikov's memorandum, 'to implement a universal and fundamental cleansing (raschistka) of acting legislation from antiquated norms'; it 'should be organised on new principles' owing to the new 'correlation of jurisdiction between the Union of SSRs and the union republics and their legislative and executive bodies'. TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 8, d. 6, pp. 1-2.
92. A CC Legislative and Legal Department memo of 3 July 1991-in the wake of the party-government's failed constitutional coup and the eve of the August putsch led by the same alliance that included the new Prime Minister, Pavlov-supported the Council of Ministers and its judicial department's rejection of the Justice Ministry's initiative. TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 8, d. 6, p. 2. There are examples of joint party-government activity. On the eve of the August putsch the CC apparat and the USSR State Committee for Education worked jointly on reforming Kharkov State University. The CC Humanitarian Department worked with the same government department on organising a student forum. Izvestiya TsK KPSS, 1991, 8, pp. 41 and 43.
93. TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 24, d. 29, p. 2; Pravda, 10 October 1990, p. 2.
94. Leon Onikov, 'Belmozhnye igry', Rodina, 3, 2, 1994, pp. 33-37.
95. Pravda, 5 July 1990, p. 5.
96. A. S. Kasymov, Perestroika v partii: Vybornye organy i apparat (Tashkent, 1991).
97. See the dispute over party reform between these two CC apparatchiki in the press in Moskovskie novosti, 13-20 May 1990, p. 7; Pravda, 6 April 1990, p. 2; and Ogonek, 1990, 13 (March), p. 10.
98. See the dispute over party reform between these two CC apparatchiki in the press in Moskovskie novosti, 13-20 May 1990, p. 7; Pravda, 6 April 1990, p. 2; and Ogonek, 1990, 13 (March), p. 10.
99. See the dispute over party reform between these two CC apparatchiki in the press in Moskovskie novosti, 13-20 May 1990, p. 7; Pravda, 6 April 1990, p. 2; and Ogonek, 1990, 13 (March), p. 10.
100. Chernyaev, Shest' let s Gorbachevym, p. 345.
101. See the 13 September and 16 November 1990 and 30 January 1991 Politburo discussions in TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 42, documents 29, 30 and 31.