Turkish-Greek balance: A key to peace and cooperation in the Balkans

East European Quarterly

Volumn 32, Issue 4, 1998, Pages 469-488

  Turan, Ilter ^a   Barlas, Dilek ^a  

^a KOÇ UNIVERSITY   (Turkey)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 0010927023     PISSN: 00128449     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (32)

1. A concise description of developments which culminated in the founding of the Turkish Republic can be found in Roderic Davison, Turkey (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1968), 119-127
2. or Paul M. Pitman, III (ed.), Turkey: A Country Study (Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress Research Service, 1988), 43-48.
3. The withdrawal of the Empire from Balkan territories is recounted in Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel K. Shaw, The History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, Volume II (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 182-185; 190-192; 195-200; 207-211; 287-288 and 293-298.
4. We have borrowed the expression from Seyfi Taşhan, "Foreword" in Foreign Policy Institute (ed.), The Aegean Issues: Problems and Prospects (Ankara: Foreign Policy Institute, 1989), iv-v.
5. İhsan Gürkan, in his contribution to the same volume entitled "Certain Defence Issues in the Aegean Sea Basin: A Turkish View," (p. 105) refers to the same idea when talking about "the Aegean balance, created by relevant instruments of international law since 1913...,"
6. as does Duygu Bazoǧlu Sezer in Jonathan Alford (ed.), "Turkey's Security Policies," in Greece and Turkey: Diversity in Alliance (London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1984), 58, where she argues "This (Lausanne) established a balance between Greece and Turkey by defining the boundaries of territorial sovereignty in such a way that neither could obtain military preponderance in the Aegean." Andrew Wilson prefers to use the expression "geopolitical balance" to describe the same phenomena.
7. See also "The Aegean Dispute," in Alford, p. 92.
8. The details of the agreements reached at Lausanne as well as the texts may be found in Cemil Bilsel, Lozan, Volume II (Istanbul: Ahmet İhsan Matbaasi, 1933).
9. The Turkish efforts to build a regional balance during the interwar period is dealt with extensively in Dilek Barlas, Etatism and Diplomacy in Turkey, 1929-1939: Economic and Foreign Policy Strategies in an Uncertain World (Leiden: Brill, 1998).
10. The Turkish-Greek relations during the 1923-1932 period when major changes were affected is described in Olaylarla Türk Dyş Politikasi (Ankara: Alkim Kitabevi Yayynlari, 1989), 63-70.
11. For a more detailed account cf. George S. Harris, Troubled Alliance (Stanford: Hoover Institution, 1972), 9-48.
12. Kemal H. Karpat, "Bulgaria's Method of Nation Building and the Turkish Minority," in Kemal Karpat (ed.), The Turks of Bulgaria: The History, Culture and Political Fate of a Minority, ed. (Istanbul: ISIS, 1990), 18.
13. About a concise and analytical summary of the Cyprus dispute, see Robert McDonald, "The Problem of Cyprus" in Adelphi Papers No. 234 (London: Institute of Strategic Studies, Winter 1988/9).
14. A good account is also rendered in Olaylarla, 338-387.
15. Olaylarla, 588-592; Robert McDonald, "Alliance Problems in the Eastern Mediterranean-Greece, Turkey and Cyprus: Part II," in Prospects for Security in the Mediterranean, Part I, Adelphi Papers No. 229 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Spring 1988), 73-78.
16. Richard Haass, "Alliance Problems in the Eastern Mediterranean-Greece, Turkey and Cyprus: Part I," in Prospects, Adelphi Papers, op. cit., 68-70, discusses the complexity of relations and the failure of the Alliance to bring about solutions.
17. Andrew Wilson, "The Aegean Dispute," Jonathan Alford (ed.) in Greece and Turkey: Adversity in Alliance (London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, Adelphi Library, 1984), 105-106.
18. Riza Türmen, "Siyasi Gorüş," in Ege'de Deniz Sorunlari Semineri (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi, Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi, 1986), 95-97;
19. Cemil Bilsel, Ege'de Deniz Sorunlari Semineri ( 241-250 and 587-8.
20. Richard Haass, 58 argues that Lausanne intended that neither party gain military preponderance over the Aegean. See also Natalino Ronzitti, "The Aegean Demilitarization, Greek-Turkish Relations and Mediterranean Security," in Foreign Policy Institute, 295-308.
21. Natalino Ronzitti, " The Aegean Demilitarization, Greek-Turkish Relations and Mediterranean Security," in Ibid., 59. At the time of this writing, efforts were under way to get both parties to change their position. The Greeks would stop threatening to expand their territorial waters to 12 miles and the Turks would withdraw their declaration to use military force in response. Whether such agreements can be realized and sustained over a long period remains to be seen.
22. Namik Yolga, "Question de la Délimitation du Plateau Continental de la Mer Egée," in The Aegean Issues: Problems and Prospects, 133-146.
23. Andrew Wilson, 95.
24. Richard Haass, 69 and 70.
25. For the central aspects of the air issues, see Andrew Wilson, 95 and 100-101.
26. For a discussion of Greek relations with different countries of the Balkans and how these affect Turkish-Greek relations, see M. Cosmos Megalommatis, "The Political Evolutions in the Balkans, Greek-Balkan Relations and Turkey," in Erol Manisali (ed.), Balkanlar, Kafkasya ve Ortadoǧu'daki Gelişmeler ve Türkiye (İstanbul Kibris Araştyrmalari Vakfi, 1994), 32-52.
27. The Via Egnatia is discussed in Balkan News, March 27, 1994.
28. The Greek preference is also described in a paid advertisement by the government of Greece, entitled "Northern Greece: Springboard to the Balkans and Beyond," The Economist, 18-24 February 1995, 33-35. It is said that the road would go to Alexandroupolis which is very near the Turkish border.
29. Economist, 35.
30. Idem.
31. Idem.
32. Quite some time ago, Hans Morgenthau pointed to the inherent tendency for parties to a balance to achieve superior positions vis-à-vis others. "...Since no nation can be sure that its calculation of the distribution of power at any particular moment in history is correct, it must at least make sure that, whatever errors it may commit, they will not put the nation at a disadvantage in the contest for power. In other words, the nation must try to have at least a margin of safety which will allow it to make erroneous calculations and still maintain the balance of power...," Politics Among Nations, Second ed. (New York: Alfred E. Knopf, 1959), 189.