Balancing, stability, and war: The mysterious case of the Napoleonic international system

International Studies Quarterly

Volumn 40, Issue 4, 1996, Pages 479-500

  Rosecrance, Richard ^a   Lo, Chih Cheng ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0010926703     PISSN: 00208833     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2600888     Document Type: Article

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