Political appointees vs. career civil servants: A multiple principals theory of political bureaucracies

European Journal of Political Economy

Volumn 10, Issue 3, 1994, Pages 465-497

  Spiller, Pablo T ^a   Urbiztondo, Santiago ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b UNIVERSIDAD NACIONAL DE LA PLATA   (Argentina)

Author keywords

Civil service; Multiple principals

Indexed keywords

EID: 0010909633     PISSN: 01762680     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/0176-2680(94)90005-1     Document Type: Article

References (39)

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8. A comment on the future of the U.S. civil service
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11. Presidential Influence on Congressional Appropriations Decisions
12. The politics of government decision-making: A theory of regulatory capture
13. The politics of bureaucratic structure
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15. Repeated Principal-Agent Games with Discounting
16. Repeated Moral Hazard
17. The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
18. Repeated insurance contracts and moral hazard
19. Politicians, Interest Groups, and Regulators: A Multiple-Principals Agency Theory of Regulation, or "Let Them Be Bribed"
20. Lessons for the United States