The limitations and costs of Lycan's 'simple' argument

Analysis

Volumn 61, Issue 272, 2001, Pages 319-323

  Campbell Manson, Neil ^a  

^a KING'S COLLEGE   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0010906223     PISSN: 00032638     EISSN: 14678284     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-8284.00313     Document Type: Review

References (9)

1. Armstrong, D. M. 1968. A Materialist Theory of the Mind. London Routledge & Kegan Paul
2. Block, N. 1995. On a confusion about a function of consciousness Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18: 227-87
3. Carruthers, P. 1996. Language, Thought and Consciousness. Cambridge Cambridge University Press
4. Carruthers, P. 2000. Phenomenal Consciousness. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
5. Dretske, F. 1993. Conscious experience. Mind 102: 263-83
6. Lycan, W. G. 1995. Consciousness and Experience. Cambridge MA: MIT Press
7. Lycan, W. G. 2001. A simple argument for a higher-order representation consciousness theory of consciousness. Analysis 61: 3-4
8. Rosenthal, D. 1997. A theory of consciousness. In The Nature of Consciousness, ed. N. Block, O. Flanagan and G. Güzeldere, 729-53. Cambridge MA: MIT Press
9. Zemach, E. 1986. Unconscious mind or conscious minds? Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10: 121-49